Morales-Ramos et al v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals LLC
Filing
47
OPINION AND ORDER re 23 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint and Request for Remand: GRANTED. This action is REMANDED to the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Guayama Superior Division for further proceedings. Judgment will be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 01/26/2017. (brc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
MERCEDES MORALES-RAMOS,
HUMBERTO MARTIN-MARTINEZ,
and the Conjugal Partnership
constituted by them,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
v.
PFIZER PHARMACEUTICALS LLC,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion to remand this
case to the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Guayama Superior
Division.
as
(Docket No. 23.)
defendant’s
opposition
Having considered the motion, as well
(Docket
No.
32),
the
Court
GRANTS
plaintiffs’ motion and REMANDS this case to the Commonwealth
court.1
I.
BACKGROUND
On December 23, 2015, Mercedes Morales-Ramos (“Morales”), her
husband Humberto Martin-Martinez (“Martin”), and their Conjugal
1
Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims
pursuant to Puerto Rico Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976 (“Law 80”), P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 29 §§ 185a et seq., and Article 1802 of the Puerto
Rico Civil Code, (“Article 1802”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141,
on the basis of preemption by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. (Docket
No. 31.) Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
this case, however, it need not address the merits of Pfizer’s
motion.
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
2
Partnership (collectively, the “plaintiffs”) filed suit against
Pfizer Pharmaceuticals LLC (“Pfizer”) in the Puerto Rico Court of
First Instance, Guayama Superior Division.
p. 4.)
(Docket No. 1-2 at
Their complaint alleged violations of both Federal and
Commonwealth
laws,2
which
purportedly
stemmed
from
Pfizer’s
termination of Morales’ employment as a result of a corporate
reorganization targeting the company’s Puerto Rico plants.
p. 9-10; see also Docket No. 28 at pp. 7-8.
Id. at
On February 16, 2016,
Pfizer removed the action to this district, asserting that original
subject matter jurisdiction was supported pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 by the existence of a federal question in plaintiffs’
complaint.
(Docket No. 1 at p. 2.)
Following removal, Pfizer
filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ COBRA, WARN, and OWBPA claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
No. 16.)
(Docket
Shortly thereafter, on April 28, 2016, plaintiffs filed
a motion seeking both authorization to amend their complaint as
well as remand of the case to the Commonwealth court.
23.)
(Docket No.
The Court granted the motion to amend, and allowed Pfizer
2
The initial complaint filed with the Commonwealth court
pursued claims against Pfizer pursuant to the following legal
provisions: Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, as amended (“Law 100”),
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146 et seq.; Law No. 115 of December 20,
1991, as amended (“Law 115”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194 et
seq.; Law 80; Article 1802; the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”), 29 U.S.C. 1162, et seq.; the Worker’s
Adjustment and Re-Training Notification Act (“WARN”), 29 U.S.C.
2101-2109; the Older Worker’s Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”), 29
U.S.C. 621, 623, 626 and 630; and ERISA. (Docket No. 1-2 at p. 4.)
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
3
time to respond to the request for remand. (Docket No. 27.)
On
April 29, 2016, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint - which
dropped the ERISA, WARN, COBRA, and OWBPA claims and focused
exclusively on alleged violations of Puerto Rico law, to wit:
Law
80, Law 115, and Article 1802 - thereby mooting Pfizer’s initial
motion to dismiss.
(Docket Nos. 28 & 25.)
On May 20, 2016, Pfizer
filed a motion to dismiss the Law 80 and Article 1802 claims
appearing in the amended complaint on the grounds that those claims
are preempted by ERISA.
(Docket No. 31 at p. 2.)
On that same
date, Pfizer also filed an opposition to plaintiffs’ request for
remand, arguing that the Court retains jurisdiction over this case
because
plaintiffs
ultimately
“still
relating to an ERISA-covered Plan.”
Plaintiffs
later
opposed
Pfizer’s
seek
benefits
under
and
(Docket No. 32 at p. 2.)
motion
to
dismiss,
(Docket
No. 38), and Pfizer replied, (Docket No. 41).
II.
A.
DISCUSSION
Federal Jurisdiction and Plaintiffs’ Request to Remand
A threshold issue in this case is federal subject matter
jurisdiction.
The Court must determine whether - in the wake of
the amended complaint’s elimination of plaintiffs’ federal causes
of action - it retains federal question jurisdiction in order to
justify continued removal of this action.
does not.
The Court finds that it
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
1.
4
Legal Standard
Removal of an action to federal court is governed by the
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides, in relevant
part,
that
defendants
may
remove
to
the
appropriate
federal
district court “any civil action brought in a State court of which
the
district
jurisdiction.”
courts
of
the
United
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
States
have
original
“The propriety of removal
thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed
in federal court.”
City of Chicago v. Int’l. Coll. of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997); see also Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc.,
201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2000) (“In order to invoke the district
court’s removal jurisdiction, a defendant must show that the
district court has original jurisdiction over the action.”)
The
defendant has the burden of making a “colorable showing” that a
basis for original jurisdiction exists, Danca v. Private Health
Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999), and removal
statutes are strictly construed against the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.
See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S.
28, 32 (2002).
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over
“federal question” cases — that is, cases “arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C.
§ 1331; see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 552 (2005).
In general, “[t]he presence or absence of
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
5
federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded
complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists
only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”
Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also BIW Deceived v. Local
S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., IAMAW
Dist. Lodge 4, 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The gates of
federal
question
jurisdiction
are
customarily
patrolled
by
a
steely-eyed sentry - the “well-pleaded complaint rule” - which, in
general, prohibits the exercise of federal question jurisdiction if
no
federal
complaint.”)
claim
appears
within
the
four
corners
of
the
The well-pleaded complaint rule therefore makes the
plaintiff the “master of the claim” and allows him to “avoid
federal
jurisdiction
by
exclusive
reliance
on
state
law.”
Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392.
There does exist, however, “an exception to this practice
of focusing on the face of the complaint.”
Danca, 185 F.3d at 4.
This “independent corollary” to the well-pleaded complaint rule is
known as “complete pre-emption.” See Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at
393. “Complete preemption is a short-hand for the doctrine that in
certain matters Congress so strongly intended an exclusive federal
cause of action that what a plaintiff calls a state law claim is to
be recharacterized as a federal claim.”
Fayard v. Ne. Vehicle
Servs., LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2008).
In other words,
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
6
complete preemption occurs where “the pre-emptive force of a
statute is so ‘extraordinary’•that it ‘converts an ordinary state
common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes
of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’”
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S.
at 393 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65
(1987)).
Thus, “[o]nce an area of state law has been completely
pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state
law is
considered,
from
its
inception, a federal
therefore arises under federal law.”
claim,
and
Id.; see also Franchise Tax
Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S.
California, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“[I]f a federal cause of action
completely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that
comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily
‘arises under’ federal law”); Danca, 185 F.3d at 4 (“Where a claim,
though couched in the language of state law, implicates an area of
federal law for which Congress intended a particularly powerful
preemptive
sweep,
the
cause is
deemed
federal
no
matter
how
pleaded.”) Consequently, where the doctrine of complete preemption
applies, federal question jurisdiction exists and removal of a
plaintiff’s complaint - even one that does not directly assert a
federal cause of action - is proper.
See Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004) (“[W]hen a federal statute wholly
displaces
the
state-law
cause
of
action
through
complete
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
7
pre-emption, the state claim can be removed.”) (internal quotations
omitted); BIW Deceived, 132 F.3d at 831.
One context in which the Supreme Court has applied the
doctrine of complete preemption involves claims for benefits from
plans regulated by ERISA.
See Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 66-67
(preemptive force of ERISA operates to convert ordinary state law
claims
into
federal
ones,
thereby
giving
rise
to
removal
jurisdiction); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 57 (1987) (finding a “clear expression of congressional intent
that ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme [found in § 502(a) of the
statute] be exclusive.”); Hotz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Mass., Inc., 292 F.3d 57, 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (“ERISA’s civil
enforcement provisions . . . have been interpreted to establish
federal removal jurisdiction over any state law claims that in
substance seek relief that is otherwise within the scope of those
ERISA remedy provisions.”); Negron-Fuentes v. UPS Supply Chain
Sols., 532 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Any claim replicating
section 502(a) is a federal claim for jurisdictional purposes,
whether substantial or not.”)
To establish complete preemption by
ERISA, as would support removal of a state law claim, a defendant
“must show that the state cause of action falls within the scope of
ERISA § 502(a).”
U.S. at 66).
Danca, 185 F.3d at 5 (citing Metro. Life, 481
“For this to occur, the state law must be properly
characterized as an ‘alternative enforcement mechanism’ of ERISA §
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
8
502(a) or of the terms of an ERISA plan.”
Id.
(citing New York
State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co.,
514
U.S.
645,
658
(1995)).
This
means
that,
“if
an
individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent
legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the
individual’s cause of action is completely pre-empted by ERISA.”
Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 210.
Because § 502(a) “does not
purport to reach every question relating to plans covered by
ERISA,” however, courts must “look beyond the face of the complaint
to determine whether the real nature of the claim is federal,
regardless of plaintiff’s [state law] characterization.”
Danca,
185 F.3d at 5 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
2.
Analysis
In its notice of removal, defendant Pfizer - responding
to a complaint that advanced federal WARN, COBRA, ERISA, and OWBPA
claims - invoked federal question jurisdiction as the basis for the
Court’s removal jurisdiction.
See Docket No. 1 at p. 2.
As
support for this jurisdictional claim, Pfizer cited both the
existence of federal claims on the face of plaintiffs’ complaint,
as well as complete preemption by ERISA.
See Id. at pp. 2-3.
When
plaintiffs amended their complaint, however, they withdrew all
federal causes of action and exclusively pursued claims based on
alleged violations of Puerto Rico Commonwealth law.
Plaintiffs
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
9
aver that this act of withdrawal has stripped the Court of subject
matter jurisdiction, as the existence of federal claims on the face
of the complaint had been “the only basis for this federal court’s
jurisdiction under the federal question statute.”
at pp. 2-3.)
(Docket No. 23
The essential question therefore becomes whether the
doctrine of complete preemption serves to convert plaintiff’s state
law claims into federal ones, thereby supporting continued federal
question jurisdiction and, consequently, sustained removal of this
case.
As highlighted above, for complete preemption by ERISA to
occur, the state cause of action must fall within the scope of
ERISA § 502(a).
See Danca, 185 F.3d at 5.
ERISA § 502(a) provides
for, inter alia, a cause of action by a participant or beneficiary
“to recover benefits due . . . under the terms of the plan, to
enforce . . . rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify .
. . rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
29
Thus, it follows that plaintiffs’ amended
complaint will be deemed to present a federal claim warranting
removal pursuant to complete preemption by ERISA only if its claims
can be properly characterized as seeking:
(1) to recover benefits
due to Morales pursuant to an employer-sponsored severance plan,
(2) to enforce her rights under the terms of that plan, or (3) to
clarify her rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
10
Here, defendant Pfizer argues that plaintiffs allegations
amount to “a claim for benefits that falls under the provisions of
ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B).”3
(Docket No. 32 at p. 4.)
The Court,
however, disagrees with this conclusion and adopts a different
interpretation
of
the
amended
complaint’s
factual
and
legal
content. At bottom, plaintiffs seek to hold Pfizer accountable for
the “wrongful” involuntary termination of Morales’ employment.
Although plaintiffs continually make reference to Pfizer’s Puerto
Rico Separation Plan of April 1, 2014 (the “Plan”) - and canvass
Morales’ troubles
3
with
the
internal
administrative
procedures
Pfizer fills most of the pages of its opposition with
arguments concerning (1) why its Puerto Rico Separation Plan is
covered by ERISA, and (2) how plaintiffs’ causes of action in the
amended complaint “relate to” that ERISA Plan. Rather than helping
to inform the Court’s “complete” preemption analysis pursuant to
ERISA § 502(a), these arguments relate to the separate and distinct
concept of “conflict” preemption pursuant to ERISA § 514.
See
McMahon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 162 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1998)
(laying out the “two central questions” involved in ERISA § 514
preemption
analysis.);
see
also,
Danca,
185
F.3d at
4
(“[E]mphasiz[ing] the difference between complete preemption, a
concept associated with jurisdiction, and the affirmative federal
defense of ERISA § 514 preemption.”); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637,
639-40 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Under ERISA, § 502(a) provides the basis
for complete preemption whereas § 514(a) provides the basis for
conflict preemption.”); Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531 (6th
Cir. 1995) (explaining the difference between “complete preemption”
and “conflict preemption” under ERISA); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). The First Circuit
Court of Appeals has unambiguously stated, however, that § 514
analysis cannot provide a basis for federal jurisdiction.
See
Danca, 185 F.3d at 5 (“ERISA § 514 is not relevant to the complete
preemption analysis; courts look instead only to ERISA § 502(a) .
.
.
which
contains
ERISA’s
exclusive
civil
enforcement
provisions.”) (internal citations omitted).
Thus, the Court
disregards Pfizer’s § 514 arguments when performing its
jurisdictional analysis.
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
established
by
the
Plan
11
-
a
careful
reading
of
the
amended
complaint reveals that they are not actually asserting a claim for
any type of benefit pursuant to that Plan.
In short, plaintiffs
ask the Court to order the reinstatement of Morales to a position
within Pfizer, and to award her any “benefits”4 that she would have
received had her dismissal never occurred.
These claims are
brought pursuant to Commonwealth labor laws and would involve
remedies unrelated to the benefits offered pursuant to Pfizer’s
severance Plan.
Thus, the Court ultimately agrees with plaintiffs
that “[n]othing in [the amended] complaint relates to the Plan nor
seeks redress under it,” and that the “claims relate solely to a
reorganization process, and an unlawful termination . . . .”
(Docket No. 38 at p. 2-3.)
Because plaintiffs are not seeking to recover benefits of
an ERISA plan, to enforce Morales’ rights under an ERISA plan, or
to clarify her rights to future benefits, the claims in the amended
complaint do not constitute an alterative enforcement mechanism for
ERISA’s § 502(a) civil enforcement scheme and are not, therefore,
completely preempted by that federal statute. The Court thus lacks
4
Plaintiffs ambiguously assert that they seek Morales’
reinstatement along with “all the benefits she is entitled to.”
(Docket No. 28 at p. 24.) (emphasis added).
The Court gives
plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt and infers that, by “benefits,”
they are merely referring to financial and professional benefits
that traditionally accompany reinstatement following wrongful
termination (such as backpay, accrued vacation days, seniority
status, etc.) rather than to any severance benefits offered by
Pfizer’s 2014 separation Plan.
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
12
continuing federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
Accordingly,
plaintiffs’
request
to
remand
this
case
to
the
Commonwealth court is properly GRANTED.
The
Court
Pfizer’s manifest
hastens
confusion
to
register
over
the
its
understanding
apparent
of
inconsistencies
between plaintiffs’ allegations and their request for remand.
See
Docket No. 32 at p. 1 (declaring that the allegations in the
amended complaint “tell a different story” from the contentions
advanced in plaintiffs’ motion to remand.)
Pfizer,
the
amended
complaint
was
In all fairness to
constructed
in
a
fairly
thoughtless and slipshod manner, placing too much emphasis on the
provisions of the separation Plan and the difficulties that Morales
experienced when pursuing the internal administrative procedures
created by that Plan.
Counsel for plaintiffs would have done well
to pare down references to those matters and focus their attention
- in a clear and concise manner - on the sole cause of action that
they
actually
wish
to
litigate:
Morales’
involuntary,
allegedly unjustified, dismissal from her position at Pfizer.
and
As
mentioned above, however, courts must often “look beyond the face
of the complaint to determine whether the real nature of the claim
is federal . . . .”
Danca, 185 F.3d at 5.
Here, after wading
through the morass of plaintiffs’ meandering allegations, the Court
finds
no
“federal
claims
in
state
law
clothing”
to
support
continued removal jurisdiction over this case. Negron-Fuentes, 532
Civil No. 16-1266 (FAB)
F.3d at 6.
of
Rather, the Court identifies only Commonwealth claims
wrongful
separate
13
and
termination
apart
from
and
any
retaliation,
allegations
claims
which
concerning
stand
Pfizer’s
severance Plan and the headaches Morales endured when invoking its
claims and appeals processes.
In the end, plaintiffs are right to
seek remand of their action to the Commonwealth court, even if
their fumbling overemphasis on the provisions of the separation
Plan obfuscated the true claims at issue and made it more difficult
for the Court to arrive at its ultimate conclusion.
III.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Docket No. 23) is GRANTED and
this action is REMANDED to the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance,
Guayama Superior Division for further proceedings.
The Clerk of
the Court shall, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c), mail a certified
copy of this Order to the Clerk of the aforementioned Commonwealth
court.
Judgment will be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 26, 2017.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
United States District Judge
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