Parker Waichman LLP v. Salas LC et al

Filing 173

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 150 Motion for Reconsideration. Parker's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 10/12/2017. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
PARKER WAICHMAN LLP,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 16-1333 (FAB)

SALAS LC, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before

the

Court

is

plaintiff

Parker

Waichman

LLP

(“Parker”)’s motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e).

(Docket No. 150.)

Parker requests that

the Court reconsider its Opinion and Order granting the dismissal
of Parker’s claim for specific performance.

See Docket No. 142.

Parker also seeks reconsideration of this Court’s Order denying
Parker’s motion to compel.

See Docket No. 147.

Defendants John

F. Nevares and Associates, P.S.C. (“Nevares”), Salas LC (“Salas”),
and Eric J. Quetglas-Jordan d/b/a Quetglas Law Firm (“Quetglas”)
(collectively,

“defendants”)

No. 162, and Parker replied.

opposed

Parker’s

See Docket No. 167.

request,

Docket

For the reasons

set forth below, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
On July 13, 2017, the Court entered an Opinion and Order

denying defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil No. 16-1333 (FAB)

2

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granting the dismissal of Parker’s
claim for specific performance.

(Docket No. 142.)

The Court also

denied Parker’s motion to compel, see Docket No. 138, and limited
any future motions to compel to Parker’s quantum meruit claim.
(Docket No. 147.)
Now,

Parker

decisions.
Court’s

requests

that

(Docket No. 150.)

dismissal

of

Parker’s

the

Court

reconsider

these

Namely, Parker objects to the
specific

denial of Parker’s motion to compel.

performance

Id.

claim

and

With respect to the

dismissal of Parker’s specific performance claim, Docket No. 142,
Parker argues

that:

(1)

“Each

counsel

to

the

[Confidential

Operating Agreement for Plaintiff Attorney Group in Caribbean
Petroleum Oil and Fire Litigation] [hereinafter, “Agreement”] was
responsible for informing its own clients that fees were being
shared and [that] Plaintiff fulfilled its ethical obligations in
this regard.

Nevares did not.

Plaintiff should not be punished

for Nevares’ failure to do so;” (2) “Plaintiff was retained by 149
clients in the [Caribbean Petroleum Corporation] [hereinafter,
“CAPECO”] litigation and is now barred from receiving fees derived
from the claims of these clients;” (3) “Nevares shared the fees
derived from the CAPECO settlement with Defendants Salas, an
unadmitted attorney, and Quetglas without informing their clients—
an action that is, practically speaking, permitted by the Opinion

Civil No. 16-1333 (FAB)

3

and Order;” (4) “Nevares took Plaintiff’s financial resources to
pursue the CAPECO litigation, used those resources as if they were
his own, then intentionally and in derogation of the terms of that
Agreement, ‘boxed out’ Plaintiff from further participation in the
CAPECO litigation;” and (5) “Contrary to the Opinion and Order,
the [Agreement] was confidential solely as to third parties but
not as to the CAPECO clients themselves.”

(Docket No. 150 at

p. 5-6.)
Parker also asserts that the Court erred in its denial of
Parker’s motion to compel, Docket No. 147, because the Court
“barred Plaintiff, the law firm retained by 149 CAPECO claimants,
from conducting discovery in a number of relevant areas.”

(Docket

No. 150 at p. 17.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not specifically

provide for the filing of motions for reconsideration.”

Sanchez-

Perez v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, 717 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193-94 (D.P.R.
2010) (Besosa, J.) (quoting Sanchez-Medina v. UNICCO Serv. Co.,
265 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.P.R. 2010)).

“[I]t is settled in this

circuit[, however,] that a motion which ask[s] the court to modify
its

earlier

disposition

of

[a]

case

because

of

an

allegedly

erroneous legal result is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).”
Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005)

Civil No. 16-1333 (FAB)

4

(quoting In re Sun Pipe Line Co., 831 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1987));
see also Cent. Produce El Jibarito v. Luna Commercial Corp., 880
F. Supp. 2d 282, 284 (D.P.R. 2012) (Besosa, J.) (quoting same).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a district
court will alter its original order only if it “evidenced a
manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or
in certain other narrow situations.”

Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage,

Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Global Naps, Inc.
v. Verizon New England, Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2007)).
A motion for reconsideration does “not provide a vehicle for a
party to undo its own procedural failures [or] allow a party [to]
advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the
district court prior to judgment.”

Iverson v. City of Bos., 452

F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Aybar v. Crispin–Reyes, 118
F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)).

“Rule 59(e) does not exist to allow

parties a second chance to prevail on the merits . . . [and] is
not an avenue for litigants to reassert arguments and theories
that were previously rejected by the Court.”

In re Rosado, Bankr.

No. 09-01687, 2013 WL 1309412, at *1 (Bankr. D.P.R. Mar. 28, 2013)
(citing Harley–Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England–Old
Colony, N.A., 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 1990)).
In deciding a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing court
has

considerable

discretion.

Venegas-Hernandez

v.

Sonolux

Civil No. 16-1333 (FAB)

5

Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2004).

“As a general rule,

motions for reconsideration should only be exceptionally granted.”
Villanueva-Mendez v. Nieves Vazquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323
(D.P.R. 2005) (Dominguez, J.).
sparingly . . . .”

“Rule 59(e) relief is granted

Biltcliffe, 772 F.3d at 930.

III. DISCUSSION
The motion for reconsideration is unavailing because Parker
neither demonstrates a manifest error of law, nor presents newly
discovered evidence.

See Biltcliffe, 772 F.3d at 930.

Parker

submits that “critical passages from the depositions of Defendants
and Plaintiff,” Docket No. 150, Exs. 2-4, 7, and the “Parker
Declaration,” Docket No. 150, Ex. 1, “were unavailable as a matter
of law” and “should be considered ‘newly discovered’ for the
purposes of this application.”

(Docket No. 150 at p. 2.)

The

depositions, however, were all taken in May 2017, see Docket
No. 150, Exs. 2-4, 7, before Parker submitted his opposition to
defendants’ motion to dismiss on June 1, 2017.

See Docket No. 131.

Parker fails to explain why these depositions were allegedly
“unavailable” and why the Court should consider the depositions as
“newly discovered.”

See Docket No. 150 at p. 2.

Moreover, the

Parker Declaration is a six-page statement made by the plaintiff.
See Docket No. 150, Ex. 1.
August

4,

2017

as

an

Although the declaration was filed on
attachment

to

Parker’s

motion

for

Civil No. 16-1333 (FAB)

6

reconsideration, this evidence has been available since the case’s
inception

and

deposition.

could

have

been

raised

during

Parker’s

own

Parker provides no reason as to why this information

was “unavailable” earlier.
All

new

arguments

set

forth

in

Parker’s

motion

for

reconsideration are based on formerly available evidence and thus
could and should have been presented to the Court prior to its
opinion.

See Iverson, 452 F.3d at 104.

raise these arguments.

See id.

Parker can no longer

Additionally, all arguments that

were previously submitted to the Court in Parker’s earlier motions
cannot be reconsidered.
at

616.

Having

See Harley–Davidson Motor Co., 897 F.2d

already

addressed

Parker’s

arguments

in

its

decisions, see Docket Nos. 142 & 147, the Court AFFIRMS its
dismissal of Parker’s specific performance claim and denial of
Parker’s motion to compel.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Parker’s motion for reconsideration
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 12, 2017.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE