Cofino-Hernandez et al v. Department of Education of Puerto Rico et al
Filing
39
OPINION AND ORDER granting 27 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 2/2/2017. (PMA)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
RINA COFINO-HERNANDEZ, on her own
behalf and on behalf of her minor
son FLC,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL NO. 16-1366 (PG)
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
After securing a favorable ruling from the Department of Education
of Puerto Rico (“DOE”) in administrative case number 2013-114-034, Rina
Cofino Hernandez (hereinafter, the “Plaintiff” or “Cofino”) filed this
action against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on her behalf and that of
her
son,
minor
FLC,
pursuant
to
the
Individuals
with
Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq. See Docket No. 1. Cofino
requested in her complaint that the court enforce the ruling of the
administrative forum by means of a preliminary and permanent injunction
ordering the DOE to reimburse the plaintiffs for the costs associated with
providing FLC with the academic and related services he is entitled to. On
June 2, 2016, the parties filed a Stipulation pursuant to which the
parties
agreed
that
the
DOE
would
pay
the
plaintiffs
the
requested
amounts. See Docket No. 20. As a result, the court entered judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims.
As
prevailing
parties
pursuant
to
the
IDEA’s
attorney’s
fees
provision, the plaintiffs also request that the DOE be ordered to pay the
attorneys’ fees incurred both as a result of litigating the instant case
and of prosecuting their case at the administrative level. See Dockets No.
1, 27. The plaintiffs seek an award of $5,240 in attorney’s fees. See
Docket No. 27. The defendant’s untimely opposition was stricken from the
record, see Docket No. 35, and thus, the attorneys’ fees petition stands
unopposed.
After
review,
the
court
GRANTS
attorneys’ fees for the reasons explained below.
plaintiffs’
motion
for
Civil No. 16-1366 (PG)
Page 2
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Cofino is the mother and legal guardian of FLC, a minor
student with disabilities under IDEA. The complaint states that as a child
with educational disabilities, FLC is qualified under federal and state
law
to
receive
academic
and
related
services
provided
by
the
public
education system, which the DOE administers.1 See Docket No. 1. On August
29,
2013,
Cofino
filed
an
administrative
complaint
before
the
DOE
requesting reimbursement of the private school tuition fees they had paid.
After a hearing, the DOE’s administrative law judge (ALJ) ordered the DOE
to reimburse FLC’s parents the amounts paid for the educational services
the minor had received so far during the 2013-2014 academic year, as well
as for the purchase of services for the remainder of the academic year.
See id. at ¶¶ 25-27.
The DOE did not comply with the ALJ’s order. As a result, the
plaintiffs filed the above-captioned complaint seeking its enforcement,
reimbursement of the educational expenses incurred, as well as attorneys’
fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA. In their motion, the plaintiffs
submitted invoices setting forth the hours expended by attorneys Jose
Torres Valentin2 (“attorney Torres”) and Juan Nieves Gonzalez (“attorney
Nieves”), calculated at an hourly rate of $100 for each attorney, for a
total of $5,240 in attorneys’ fees. See Docket No. 27.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Attorney’s Fees under IDEA
Per the so-called “American Rule,” litigants must generally bear
their own fees and costs absent explicit statutory authority. See Baker
Botts v L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015); Buckhannon Bd.
& Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
602, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001). However, Congress has created an exception for
prevailing parties in IDEA cases, authorizing an award of attorney’s fees
as part of the costs. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); see also Maine Sch. Adm.
Dist. No. 35 v. Mr.R., 321 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.2003)(noting that “Congress
sometimes chooses to allow for fee-shifting in particular situations, and
1
2
FLC is duly registered with the DOE as a child with disabilities.
Attorney Torres successfully represented the minor’s parents in the administrative
proceedings.
Civil No. 16-1366 (PG)
Page 3
it chose to do so in connection with the IDEA.”). In pertinent part, IDEA
provides that the court “in its discretion may award reasonable attorney’s
fees as part of the costs--to a prevailing party who is the parent of a
child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
A party achieves “prevailing party” status under IDEA where there is
(1) a material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties;
(2) actual relief on the merits for the party seeking attorney’s fees; (3)
a judicial imprimatur on the change. See Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Sch., 401
F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir.2005); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 29-30
(1st Cir.2004)(holding that the Buckhannon fee-shifting provision applies
to
IDEA);
Rodriguez
v.
Puerto
Rico,
764
F.Supp.2d
338,
342
(D.P.R.2011)(citation omitted); see also Davis v. District of Columbia, 71
F.Supp.3d
applies
to
141,
147
(D.D.C.2014)(stating
administrative
hearings
that
under
the
IDEA
Buckhannon
even though
standard
the
relief
granted is administrative and not judicial).
Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs obtained a favorable
ruling
and
relief
on
the
merits
via
the
final
resolution
issued
in
administrative case number 2013-114-034. See Docket No. 1-7. The defendant
does not challenge this allegation. See Answer to Complaint, Docket No.
11. The plaintiffs were also able to expeditiously reach an agreement in
the above-captioned judicial proceedings, whereby the DOE agreed to make
the requested payments to the plaintiffs. See Docket No. 20. Accordingly,
the
plaintiffs
possess
prevailing
party
status
within
the
meaning
of
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) and an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees in their
favor is appropriate. The court notes, however, that “although Plaintiff’s
motion for attorney fees is unopposed, the Court is not relieved of its
duty of making sure that the amount requested by Plaintiff is reasonable.”
Michel-Ramos v. Arroyo-Santiago, 493 F. Supp. 2d 249, 253 (D.P.R. 2007).
B. Lodestar Calculation
Once the party seeking attorney’s fees comes across the prevailing
party threshold, the court must determine the reasonable fee. See Comm’r,
INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161, 110 S.Ct. 2316 (1990). In a fee-shifting
case such as the instant one, the court follows the lodestar method for
determining the reasonable amount of a fee award. See Diaz v. Jiten Hotel
Management, Inc., 741 F.3d 170, 173 n. 1 (1st. Cir.2013)(citations and
Civil No. 16-1366 (PG)
Page 4
internal quotation marks omitted). “The lodestar is the product of the
hours reasonably worked times the reasonably hourly rate(s).” Gross v. Sun
Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 763 F.3d 73, 86 (1st Cir.2014)(citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “In crafting its lodestar, the trial
court may adjust the hours claimed to remove time that was unreasonably,
unnecessarily or inefficiently devoted to the case … .” De Jesus Nazario v.
Morris Rodriguez, 554 F.3d 196, 207 (1st Cir.2009).
The inquiry does not end there, as there are remaining considerations
that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward. See
Torres-Rivera
v.
O’Neill-Cancel,
524
F.3d
331,
336
(1st
Cir.2008)(indicating that the adjustment of the lodestar itself may be
based on several different factors, among which are the time and labor
actually
required
in
order
to
effectively
handle
the
matter).
After
calculating the hours reasonably expanded on the case, the court multiplies
the same by the attorney’s hourly rate. See Santiago v. Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, No. 08-1832 (ADC), 2010 WL 3419985, at *2 (D.P.R. Aug. 26,
2010)(so noting). The burden falls on the party seeking relief to submit
evidence justifying the fee request. Id.; see Spooner v. EEN, Inc., 644
F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir.2011)(explaining that to meet this burden, a party is
required
to
“include[]
submit
counsel’s
appropriate
supporting
contemporaneous
time
documentation,
and
billing
which
may
records
and
information establishing the usual and customary rates in the marketplace
for comparably credentialed counsel”)(citation omitted).
1. Hourly Rate
The lodestar method requires that the hourly rate applied by the
court be “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar
services
by
lawyers
of
reasonably
comparable
skill,
experience
and
reputation.” Tejada-Batista v. Fuentes-Agostini, 263 F.Supp.2d 321, 327
(D.P.R.2003)(quoting
Blum
v.
Stenson,
465
U.S.
886,
895
(1984)).
In
identifying the reasonable hourly rate, “the court may rely upon its own
knowledge of attorneys’ fees in the community.” Rodriguez v. International
College of Business and Technology, Inc., 356 F.Supp.2d 92, 96 (D.P.R.
2005)). Similarly, the IDEA specifies that the fees awarded should be
based on the prevailing community rates in which the action arose for the
kind and quality of services furnished. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C).
Civil No. 16-1366 (PG)
Page 5
“Because this action arose in Puerto Rico, the Court shall consider Puerto
Rico to be the relevant community for purposes of determining fees.”
Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico, 1 F.Supp.2d 111, 115 (D.P.R.1998).
Plaintiffs propose a rate of $100 per hour for both attorney Torres
and attorney Nieves. See Docket No. 27. Plaintiffs assert that said rate
is reasonable and reflects the market value for the services rendered. Id.
In
support,
attorney
Nieves’
statement
lists
several
cases
from
this
district court approving such a rate. See Docket No. 27-4.
Upon review, the court finds that the requested rate is reasonable
despite the fact that attorney Nieves was not a seasoned attorney, having
less than four years of experience in the practice of law at the time he
filed the complaint in this case. See Hernandez-Melendez v. Puerto Rico,
Civil No. 3:14-cv-01493 (JAF), 2014 WL 4260811, at *2 (D.P.R. Aug. 29,
2014)(finding hourly rate of $150 requested by attorney in IDEA case is
appropriate, if not at the lower end for attorneys in the Puerto Rico
community with comparable expertise and experience); Guillemard-Ginorio v.
Contreras, 603 F. Supp. 2d 301 (D.P.R. 2009) (hourly rate of $215 for outof-court work and $225 for in-court work by associate with three years of
experience
was
appropriate
prevailing
plaintiffs
in
in
§
calculating
1983
action);
attorney
fee
Bobe-Muniz
v.
award
for
Caribbean
Restaurants, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.P.R. 1999) (allowing hourly rate
of $105 for work by associate with less than three years of experience in
calculating fee award for prevailing defendants in Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and wrongful discharge action).
2.
Number of Hours
As previously noted, the court may exclude unnecessary or redundant
hours in crafting the lodestar. See De Jesus Nazario, 554 F.3d at 207. The
court may also consider the time and labor required; the novelty and
difficulty of the legal issues; the skill and experience of the attorney;
the customary fee; the amount involved and the results obtained; and
awards in comparable cases. See Gonzalez, 1 F.Supp.2d at 114 (citation
omitted). On the other hand, the party seeking the award of attorney’s
fees
must
“justify
[his]
claim
by submitting
detailed
time
records.”
Rodriguez, 764 F.Supp.2d at 345 (quoting Miller v. San Mateo–Foster City
Unified School Dist., 318 F.Supp.2d 851, 865 (N.D.Cal.2004)). The First
Civil No. 16-1366 (PG)
Page 6
Circuit has explained that fee awards require supporting documents that
set forth a “full and specific accounting of the tasks performed, the
dates
of
Weinberger
performance,
v.
Great
Cir.1991)(internal
and
the
Northern
citations
number
Nekoosa
omitted).
of
hours
Corp.,
The
925
First
spent
on
F.2d
each
518,
Circuit
task.”
526
has
(1st
further
stated that “if time records are too generic then the lack of specificity
can as a practical matter make it too difficult to permit a court to
answer questions about excessiveness, redundancy, and the like. In that
event, the court may either discount or disallow those hours.” Torres–
Rivera v. O’Neill–Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir.2008).
In the instant case, attorney Torres billed a total of 35 hours for
representing the plaintiffs at the administrative forum. On the other
hand, attorney Nieves billed a total of 17.4 hours for representing the
plaintiffs
in
this
district
court.
The
sum
of
the
total
hours
the
attorneys billed amounts to 52.4 hours for representing the plaintiffs in
both her administrative claim and her federal complaint.
After an exhaustive review of the attorneys’ invoices, the court
finds they are neither excessive or duplicative. On the contrary, the
attorneys made adequate and efficient use of their time, as it stems from
the invoices. Considering the procedural background of the case and the
results obtained, the court finds that the entries in question are more
than reasonable. Moreover, after reviewing the invoices on record, the
court
concludes
that
they
are
sufficiently
detailed
as
to
meet
the
plaintiffs’ burden. As such, no downward adjustments are unnecessary.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’
petition for attorneys’ fees and expenses (Docket No. 27). Plaintiffs are
awarded $5,240 in attorneys’ fees - $3,500 for attorney Torres’ work, and
$1,740 for attorney Nieves’ work.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 2, 2017.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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