Johnson v. Departamento de Correccion y Rehabilitacion et al
Filing
54
OPINION AND ORDER granting 46 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Judgment is to be issued accordingly. Signed by Judge Daniel R. Dominguez on 6/14/2017. (EA)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
OBE E. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 16-1400 (DRD)
v.
DEPARTAMENTO DE CORRECCIÓN
Y REHABILITACIÓN, et. al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants, Puerto Rico Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, Mariluz Acevedo-Pérez, Edward García-Soto, and Michael SebastianPérez’ (hereinafter, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at Docket 36
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) which is unopposed by Petitioner, Obe
E. Johnson (hereinafter, “Petitioner”). See Docket No. 46.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2005, Petitioner was arrested and charged with armed robbery and
violation of Puerto Rico weapon laws for events that occurred on February 5, 2005. On
June 13, 2005, he was found guilty on all counts in state court. Consequently, on
September 15, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment. See Docket
No. 1 p. 1 ¶ 4; see Johnson v. Muñíz, Civil No. 14-1867-FAB-BJM at Docket No. 46. Petitioner
is currently imprisoned under a correctional institution that belongs to the Puerto Rico
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Id. at ¶ 4. On November 20, 2008, the
Puerto Rico Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and judgment. Id. On June
1, 2009, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico denied Petitioner’s petition for certiorari.1 Id.
Petitioner then filed several pro se petitions before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court to set
aside his conviction on constitutional grounds, all of which have been denied by the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico since December 9, 2011. 2 Id.
The Court notes that Petitioner has filed several habeas corpus petitions in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 which were denied for lack of prosecution, failure to exhaust
state remedies, and as successive petitions. Docket No. See Civil No. 09-1172 (CCC)
(dismissing for failure to state a claim); Civil No. 09-1639 (JAF) (dismissing for lack of
prosecution); Civil No. 10-1177 (JAF) (dismissing for failure to exhaust state remedies;
Civil No. 12-1027 (SEC) (dismissing for lack of prosecution and unauthorized successive
petition); Civil No. 13-1272 (JAF) (denying petition as time-barred). See Docket No. 10 p.
2 ¶ 5. Petitioner has also filed pro se actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious
prosecution against a state judge, police officer and the United States of America. See Civil
No. 09-1173 (JP); Civil No. 09-1638 (GAG); and Civil No. 13-1271 (CCC). Id.
Petitioner alleges that on January 25, 2008, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico revoked the sentence
imposed to him by the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance and subsequently, the Puerto Rico Court of
Appeals, and a new trial was ordered. Therefore, he is illegally under custody at the Guayama 500 Prison.
However, this information is incorrect. Docket No. 36 p. 3 ¶ 5.
1
2 “Ordinarily, a
court may not consider any documents outside the complaint, or not expressly incorporated
therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment.” Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 267 F 3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). However, a narrow exception exists for documents
whose authenticity is not disputed, official public records, documents central to plaintiff’s claim, or
documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).
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In the instant case, Petitioner alleges he is illegally under custody in the Guayama
500 Prison because on January 25, 2008, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico revoked the
sentence imposed on him by the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals and ordered
a new trial. He also claims that the only reason he remains detained is because of race
discrimination by Defendants. Concordantly, Petitioner is seeking money damages for
thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) and release from prison pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
See Docket No. 36 pp. 2-3 ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8.
Defendants allege that Petitioner does not explain specific facts that constitute a
deprivation of his rights, and that he has failed to plead content that make his claim
plausible. See Docket No. 46 p. 2 ¶ 9. Further, Defendants aver that from the text of the
Amended Complaint there is no link to Defendants with actionable conduct. Id. He also
fails to establish a personal involvement by Defendants, and fails to allege facts that are
sufficient to create a causal connection between Defendants and the alleged violations to
his constitutional rights. Id. at ¶ 10. Moreover, Defendants allege that the complaint must
be dismissed since Defendants are immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at p. 3 ¶
11.
On January 31, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment
of Complaint. See Docket No. 1. Defendants proceeded to file a motion to dismiss
complaint (Docket No. 10), in which they argued for a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
based on Petitioner’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Petitioner
filed an opposition to such motion (Docket No. 15).
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Then, on June 26, 2016 Petitioner filed a Motion of Error to a Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the Defendant or the Court Should Please Correct
Error. See Docket No. 13. Because Petitioner was acting pro se, the Court granted
Petitioner leave to amend the complaint. See Docket No. 14. Although Defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Docket No. 16), the Court denied motions on
Dockets 10 and 16 without prejudice. See Docket No. 19.3
Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint (Docket No. 18) and Defendants moved to
dismiss the amended complaint under the same argument of failure to state a claim
(Docket No. 20). The Court temporarily denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss since such
motion was not aimed at the operative complaint, which was yet to be filed. See Docket
No. 28. Petitioner then filed a second Amended Complaint on December 8, 2016. See Docket
No. 29. Consequently, Defendants moved for a renewed dismissal for failure to state a
claim. See Docket No. 30. Then, on December 27, 2016, Petitioner filed yet a third Motion
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Docket No. 31).
Considering the fact that Petitioner was acting pro se, the Court temporarily
denied Defendants motion to dismiss at Docket No. 30, and granted Petitioner’s request
for leave to file amended complaint. However, the Court warned Petitioner that no
ORDER temporarily denying 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, temporarily denying 16
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, noting 17 Informative Motion, and noting 18 Informative
Motion. Upon careful review of the record, it appears that Docket No. 15 is the response to the motion to
dismiss at Docket No. 10, not an amended complaint. It is Docket No. 18 that constitutes the amended
complaint. Therefore, Defendants are to answer the complaint at Docket No. 18 or otherwise plead on or
before 8/26/2016. As the motions to dismiss are not aimed at the actual amended complaint, they must be
denied without prejudice.
3
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further amendments would be allowed unless a manifest injustice would occur. See
Docket No. 32.4
Concordantly, on January 31, 2017, Petitioner filed his fourth and final Amended
Complaint (Docket No. 36), and Defendants moved for dismissal on March 20, 2017
(Docket No. 46), which is unopposed. However, Petitioner also submitted a Memorandum
of Law Brief. See Docket No. 47. Notwithstanding, this amended complaint was also
prepared under pro se and unfortunately, remains under the same defects as the original
complaint. Accordingly, Defendants restated their prior motions to dismiss arguments
(Docket No. 46).
II.
APPLICABLE LAW
A. Issue Preclusion
“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that
action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). However, one should not be deceived
by the apparent simplicity of this general res judicata principal. The terminology and
reach of res judicata have been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. See, e.g., 18
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4416 (2d ed.).
In fact, the parties themselves seem to disagree on some of these very issues.
At the outset, the Court notes that “[r]es judicata is an umbrella term
encompassing both issue preclusion (traditionally known as collateral estoppel) and
Petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 33), which was denied by the Court for
being premature. See Docket No. 35.
4
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claim preclusion (the traditional phrase is merger and bar).” (Emphasis added). NegronFuentes v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 532 F.3d 1, 5 n. 2 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing AVX Corp.
v. Cabot Corp., 424 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2005)). Over a century ago, the Supreme Court
had the following to say regarding what has come to be known as issue preclusion:
The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right,
question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a
subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and, even if the
second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or fact once
so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken
as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains
unmodified. This general rule is demanded by the very object for which
civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose
of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its
enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for the aid of
judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of
person and property if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness
did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters
properly put in issue, and actually determined by them.
Southern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897). It should also be recognized
that “[f]ederal common law governs the application of issue preclusion here, because it
is an earlier federal judgment's preclusive effect at stake.” Negron-Fuentes, 532 F.3d at 7
(citing Hoult v. Hoult, 157 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1022 (1999)).
Accordingly, the First Circuit has provided the following requirements in order to
determine whether issue preclusion attaches to the prior judgment: “(1) both proceedings
involved the same issue of law or fact, (2) the parties actually litigated that issue, (3) the
prior court decided that issue in a final judgment, and (4) resolution of that issue was
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essential to judgment on the merits.” United States v. Szpyt, 785 F.3d 31, 40 n. 7 (1st Cir.
2015) (citing Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., 603 F.3d 71, 95 (1st Cir. 2010)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to provide “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). When addressing a motion to dismiss filed by a defendant under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “we accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[].” Gargano v.
Liberty Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2009). However, under Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff must “provide the grounds of
his entitlement [with] more than labels and conclusions.” See Ocasio-Hernandez v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (“in order to ‘show’ an entitlement to relief
a complaint must contain enough factual material ‘to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).’) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (Citation omitted). Thus, a
plaintiff must, and is now required to, present allegations that “nudge [his] claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible” in order to comply with the requirements of Rule
8(a). Id. at 570; see e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court’s inquiry occurs in a two-step
process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. “Context based” means that a Plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts that comply with the basic elements of the cause of action. See Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 671-672 (concluding that plaintiff’s complaint was factually insufficient to
substantiate the required elements of a Bivens claim, leaving the complaint with only
conclusory statements). First, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint[,]” discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and
factually threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Mead v. Independence Ass’n, 684 F.3d 226, 231 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Any statements in the
complaint that are either legal conclusions couched as facts or bare bones recitals of the
elements of a cause of action are disregarded.”). “Yet we need not accept as true legal
conclusions from the complaint or ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based
upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the
complaint “states a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This second step is
“context-specific” and requires that the Court draw from its own “judicial experience and
common sense” to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or, conversely, whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id.
Thus, “[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss, [a] plaintiff must allege sufficient
facts to show that he has a plausible entitlement to relief.” Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo,
590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has
not ‘show[n]’ ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, such inferences must be at least as plausible as any
“obvious alternative explanation.” Id. at 682 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). “A
plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot
the elements of the cause of action.” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12, (citing Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 680).
The First Circuit has cautioned against equating plausibility with an analysis of
the likely success on the merits, affirming that the plausibility standard assumes “pleaded
facts to be true and read in a plaintiff’s favor” “even if seemingly incredible.” SepúlvedaVillarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556); Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680); see Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556 (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears that a recovery
is very remote and unlikely.”)(internal quotation marks omitted); see Ocasio-Hernandez,
640 F.3d at 12 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (“[T]he court may not disregard properly
pled factual allegations, ‘even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable.’”). Instead, the First Circuit has emphasized that “[t]he make-or-break
standard . . . is that the combined allegations, taken as true, must state a plausible, [but]
not a merely conceivable, case for relief.” Sepúlveda-Villarini, 628 F.3d at 29.
However, a complaint that rests on “bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions,
periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like” will likely not survive a motion to dismiss.
Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996); Sánchez v. United States, 671 F.3d 86, 92
(1st Cir. 2012) (“we must credit the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly,
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unadorned factual assertions as to the elements of the cause of action are inadequate as
well.
Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset, 631 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2011).
“Specific
information, even if not in the form of admissible evidence, would likely be enough at
[the motion to dismiss] stage; pure speculation is not.” Id. at 596; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
681 (“To be clear, we do not reject [] bald allegations on the ground that they are
unrealistic or nonsensical ... It is the conclusory nature of [the] allegations, rather than
their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”);
see Mendez Internet Mgmt. Servs. v. Banco Santander de P.R., 621 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.
2010) (The Twombly and Iqbal standards require District Courts to “screen[] out rhetoric
masquerading as litigation.”).
Finally, the Court notes that “[i]t is not necessary to plead facts sufficient to
establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage.”
Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-
Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). Notwithstanding, the elements of the prima
facie case are relevant to a plausibility determination and “[t]hose elements are part of
the background against which a plausibility determination should be made.” Id.
C. State Immunity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 does not create any independent substantive rights; Section 1983 is
only a procedural vehicle to vindicate constitutional and other federal statutory
violations brought about by state actors. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, n.3
(1979)(“Section 1983 . . . is not itself a source of substantive rights, but [merely provides]
a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred . . . .”); Albright v. Oliver, 210
U.S. 266 (1994); Lockhart-Bembery v. Sauro, 498 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2007); Cruz-Erazo v.
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Rivera-Montañez, 212 F.3d 617 (1st Cir. 2000). Section 1983 merely provides a mechanism
to remedy for deprivations of rights that are federally enshrined elsewhere. Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
Section 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.”
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
When assessing the imposition of liability under Section 1983, we must first ask
“(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the
color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Gutierrez-Rodriguez
v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 558 (1st Cir. 1989)(citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535
(1981)). Acting under color of state law requires that a “defendant in a § 1983 action have
exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49
(1988)(internal citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, “[i]t is firmly established
that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position
given to him by the State.” Id. at 49-50. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S.Ct. 473,
476 476, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961).
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Although Section 1983 provides an avenue to remedy many deprivations of civil
liberties in federal court, it “does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a
remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.” Will v. Michigan Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits for
monetary damages against a State in federal court, unless said State has waived its
immunity or unless Congress has expressly overridden that immunity. See CONST.
Amend. XI; Will, 491 U.S. at 66 (citing Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public
Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472-473 (1987) (plurality opinion)); O’Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d
41 (1st Cir. 2000). Furthermore, “neither a state agency nor a state official acting in his
official capacity may be sued for damages in a section 1983 action.” Johnson v. Rodriguez,
943 F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1991)(emphasis ours). The reasoning follows that a suit against
an official actor is a suit against his office, and by default a suit against the state. See Will,
491 U.S. at 71; Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165-166 (1985).
Puerto Rico has long been considered a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
See Irizarry–Mora v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 647 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2011); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v.
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1993). “The Eleventh Amendment bars
the recovery of damages in a federal court against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and, by the same token, it bars the recovery of damages in official capacity suits brought
against Puerto Rico officials where recovery will come from the public fisc.” Culebras
Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506, 516 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Ramirez v. P.R. Fire
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Service, 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983) and Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985))
(emphasis in the original); Maysonet–Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2003).
III.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Court must begin by noting that Petitioner has filed several habeas corpus
petitions in the federal court, which were denied for lack of prosecution, failure to
exhaust state remedies, and as successive petitions. Upon evaluation of the issue
preclusion requirements, the Court is forced to conclude that Petitioner has filed yet
another complaint containing the same issue of fact, that is, a petition of habeas corpus
under 18 U.S.C. § 2254; which was litigated between Petitioner and the government; and
resulted in several final judgments denying Petitioner’s claims of illegal custody.
Moreover, the issue of habeas corpus was essential to the judgment on the merits in
previous proceedings. Consequently, Petitioner is barred from restating habeas corpus
issues of fact having been ruled upon by the Federal Court in previous proceedings,
finding them meritless and successive.5
With the issue preclusion hurdle out of the way, all that is left for the Court is to
rule upon Petitioner’s allegations of violation of his constitutional and civil rights due to
his race. Defendants argue that Petitioner has failed to state a claim under which a relief
can be granted and a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) must be granted by the Court. The
Court agrees with Defendants’ reasoning. Even if the Court were to entertain Petitioner’s
allegations in the instant case, the Amended Complaint remains under the same defects
5
See Civil No. 09-1172 (CCC); 10-1177 (JAF); 12-1027 (SEC) and; 13-1272 (JAF).
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as the original complaint. Petitioner makes conclusory allegations that he is being held
illegally under custody and in violation of his civil rights due to his race. Petitioner fails
to mention facts that could constitute a violation of his civil or constitutional rights.
Petitioner simply mentions Defendants without specifying instances in which they were
personally involved in violations of his rights. Furthermore, Petitioner fails to establish a
causal connection between the alleged violations to his civil or constitutional rights and
Defendants. Even considering the liberality of pro se pleading standards, there are simply
insufficient facts to configure a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Furthermore, Petitioner is seeking compensation in damages from the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation of Puerto Rico as well as co-defendants Mariluz
Acevedo-Pérez, Edward García-Soto, and Michael Sebastian-Pérez; all of which are being
sued in their official capacity. However, since Puerto Rico has long being considered an
arm of state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation is an arm of the state, it cannot be sued in federal court, and hence, it is
immune from suits under the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, since co-defendants,
Mariluz Acevedo-Pérez, Edward García Soto, and Michael Sebastian-Pérez were state
officials acting in their official capacity they are also immune from damages suits under
the Eleventh Amendment.
Consequently, Petitioner is barred by the Eleventh Amendment from seeking
damages from Defendants.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, this Court GRANTS Defendants Motion to
Dismiss (Docket No. 46). Consequently, the Court hereby DISMISSES WITH
PREJUDICE the instant case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 14th day of June, 2017.
/S/ DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ
Daniel R. Domínguez
United States District Judge
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