Gonzalez-Guzman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Filing 28

TRANSFER ORDER granted 11 Motion to Transfer Venue to Southern District of Florida; granted 24 Motion for Leave to Reply to 20 Opposition. Clerk of Court shall enter order in conformity with this Transfer Order. Signed by Judge Carmen C. Cerezo on 10/31/2016. (mld)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
VICTOR M. GONZALEZ-GUZMAN
Plaintiff
vs
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
CO., d/b/a MET LIFE;
CORPORATIONS “A,” “B,” “C;” JANE
DOE; JOHN ROE
Defendants

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TRANSFER ORDER
Before the Court is defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s
Motion to Transfer (d.e. 11), plaintiff Víctor M. González-Guzmán’s Opposition
(d.e. 20), and plaintiff’s Reply (d.e. 24-1).1
BACKGROUND
On May 23, 2016, plaintiff filed his Complaint (d.e. 1) against defendant
for Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Denial of Benefits in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Florida State Law. On July 26, 2016
defendant filed its Motion to Transfer (d.e. 11), arguing that the Court should
transfer the case to the Southern District of Florida. Defendant’s argument
rests on its assertion that litigating the case in said district would be more
convenient for all parties, given that Florida law will apply, all non-party
witnesses are in the Southern District of Florida, and all events relevant to
plaintiff’s Complaint took place in the Southern District of Florida.
On August 22, 2016, plaintiff filed his Opposition (d.e. 20), arguing that
the District of Puerto Rico is the proper venue for this action. Specifically,

1

The Motion for Leave to File Reply (d.e. 24) is GRANTED.

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plaintiff argues that defendant’s motion should be denied because it lacks
evidentiary support, and because plaintiff’s physical condition would make
litigating in Florida unduly burdensome.
On September 9, 2016, defendant filed its Reply (d.e. 24-1) in which it
reiterates the argument in its Motion to Transfer (d.e. 11) and argues that
plaintiff’s health does not outweigh the other factors that militate in favor of
transfer.
ANALYSIS
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought[].” It is within
the court's discretion to grant a motion to transfer venue. Arroyo-Perez v.
Demir Grp. Int'l, 733 F. Supp. 2d 314, 319 (D.P.R. 2010). “Section 1404(a) is
intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for
transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of
convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29,
108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed. 2d 22 (1988); see also Cianbro Corp. v.
Curran-Lavoie, Inc., 814 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1987); Rivera-Carmona v.
Am. Airlines, 639 F.Supp. 2d 194, 197 (D.P.R. 2009). The burden of proof
rests with the party seeking transfer because of the strong presumption in favor
of plaintiff's choice of venue. See Albizu Rodriguez v. Carlos Albizu Univ.,
585 F.Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D.P.R. 2008); see also Rivera–Carmona v.
Am. Airlines, 639 F.Supp. 2d at 197. However, “where the transactions or facts
giving rise to the action have no material relation or significant connection to
the plaintiff’s chosen forum, then the plaintiff’s choice is not accorded the same

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‘great weight’ and in fact is given reduced significance.”

Arroyo-Perez,

733 F.Supp. 2d at 318, (citing Wine Mkts. Int’l, Inc. v. Bass, 939 F.Supp. 178,
183 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)).
Based on the record before the Court, jurisdiction and venue are proper
in the Southern District of Florida. Nevertheless, in evaluating whether a case
should be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), we consider four
factors: “(1) the convenience of the parties and witnesses, (2) the availability
of documents, (3) the possibility of consolidation, and (4) the order in which the
district court obtained jurisdiction.”

Arroyo-Perez, 733 F.Supp. 2d 314,

319 (D.P.R., 2010) (citing Albizu Rodríguez v. Carlos Albizu Univ.,
585 F.Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D.P.R. 2008)); Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel,
223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). Courts must also consider public systemic
interests, such as familiarity with the governing law and the local interest in
deciding local controversies at home, in deciding whether a case should be
transferred. Goya Foods, Inc., et al. v. Golla Oy, et al., 959 F.Supp. 2d 201,
205 (D.P.R. 2013); see also Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988).
(1)

The convenience of the parties and witnesses.

Defendant contends that because “every event pertinent to this case took
place in South Florida” (d.e. 11, p. 8; d.e. 24-1, p. 3), and because “all of the
non-party witnesses are located there” (d.e. 11, p. 8), the information before
the Court militates in favor of transfer. Plaintiff argues that defendant’s failure
to detail why plaintiff’s treating physicians in Florida will be called as
witnesses,” (d.e. 20, p. 14), and plaintiff’s medical condition (d.e. 20, p. 15)
require that this court deny defendant’s Motion.

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The convenience analysis includes two parts: (1) the convenience of the
parties, and (2) the convenience of the witnesses.

Of these two

considerations, the latter is “probably the most important factor.” Arroyo,
733 F.Supp. 2d at 320 (quoting Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1978).
Based on the record before the Court, including the two doctor’s notes
provided by plaintiff (d.e. 20-1, d.e. 20-2), he would be more inconvenienced
by litigating this case in the Southern District of Florida than defendant,
particularly in light of defendant’s superior financial abilities. Accordingly, we
find that the convenience of the parties factor weighs against transfer. But that
is not the end of our convenience analysis. As this district has noted, e.g., in
Arroyo, supra, the convenience of the witnesses is “probably the most
important factor,” and “where the transactions or facts giving rise to the action
have no material relation or significant connection to the plaintiff’s chosen
forum, then the plaintiff’s choice is not accorded the same ‘great weight’ and
in fact is given reduced significance.” Id. at 318.
The conference in which plaintiff alleges he was coerced to sign a
document (d.e. 1, ¶ 18) occurred in the Southern District of Florida, and the
witnesses to said conference are located there. Plaintiff filed his administrative
complaint there (d.e. 1, ¶ 38). Plaintiff addressed his Notice of Claim and
Request for Investigation to MetLife’s office in Florida. (d.e. 1 ¶ 39). The law
firm Dell & Schaefer, which plaintiff alleges represented him unfairly in his
pre-suit mediation, is located in Florida. (d.e. 1, ¶ 44). Plaintiff was diagnosed
with Fibromyalgia in 2009, while residing in Florida (d.e. 1, ¶ 10). The most
recent evidence of Social Security benefits provided to plaintiff (d.e. 1, ex. 1)
was addressed to him in the Southern District of Florida on January 13, 2015.

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(d.e. 1, ¶ 4). Defendant argues that all of the treating doctors at the time of
plaintiff’s claim are located in Florida, and it submits that “all of these nonparty
witnesses would be expected to testify about Gonzalez’s medical condition and
treatment.” (d.e. 11, p. 6).
In his Complaint, plaintiff implies that he moved to Puerto Rico some time
after he moved to the Dominican Republic and before the filing of this suit.
(d.e. 1, ¶ 4). In his Opposition, plaintiff argues that all of his treating physicians
are in Puerto Rico (d.e. 20, ¶ 9), but the allegations in his Complaint (d.e. 1)
only reference as relevant to his claim the treatment that he received in Florida
while he was covered by defendant. As to plaintiff’s argument that because
“defendant failed to include any affidavits from alleged witnesses stating that
they are unwilling or unable to travel . . . they lack evidentiary support,” such
affidavits are not required by the Court, and it would be substantially more
convenient for the doctors listed in defendant’s Motion (d.e. 11, p. 6) to testify
in South Florida where they live and work than it would be for them to travel to
Puerto Rico. The same is true of the other non-party witnesses listed in
defendant’s Motion (d.e. 11, pp. 2, 6).

Accordingly, we find that the

convenience of the witnesses factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer.
(2)

The availability of documents.

Defendant states that “all medical records, employment records, and
records pertaining to th mediation are located in Florida in the possession of
[the] nonparty witnesses.” (d.e. 11, p. 7). Plaintiff does not dispute this, rather,
he argues that “the documents can be digitized and transferred to this venue.”
(d.e. 20, p. 12). We find that the availability of documents factor weighs heavily
in favor of transfer.

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(3)

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The possibility of consolidation and the order in which the
district court obtained jurisdiction.

These two factors are based on the interest of justice. The purpose of
these factors is to prevent duplication and inconsistent rulings. “Where identical
actions are proceeding concurrently in two federal courts . . . the first filed
action is generally preferred in a choice-of-venue decision.” Cianbro Corp. V.
Curran-Lavoie, Inc., 814 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Codex v. Milgo Elec.
Corp. 553 F.2d 735, 737 (1st Cir. 1977); see also Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel,
223 F.3d at 11. These factors are not relevant to the instant case, as there are
no other relevant actions.
(4)

Public Interest.

Aside from the private interests outlined above, Courts must also
consider systemic interests in deciding whether a case should be transferred.
Goya Foods, Inc., et al. v. Golla Oy, et al., 959 F.Supp. 2d 201,
205 (D.P.R. 2013); see also Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988). “Familiarity with the governing law” and “the local
interest in deciding local controversies at home” are examples. Id. (citing
Johnson v. VCG Holding Corp., 767 F.Supp. 2d 208 (D.Me. 2011) (quoting
Charles Alan Wright et al., 15 Federal Practice & Procedure § 3847
(Westlaw 2013)).
Aside from plaintiff’s claim under the American Disabilities Act, all of the
laws under which he alleges entitlement to relief find their provenance in the
state of Florida. The District of Puerto Rico is undoubtedly capable of applying
Florida law; yet, the Southern District of Florida is more familiar with Florida law
and in a better position to apply it. See e.g. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Economou, 557 F.Supp. 2d 216 (D.N.H. 2008).

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CONCLUSION
Having considered the convenience of the witnesses and parties and the
availability of documents, defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the
Southern District of Florida (d.e. 11) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall
enter an order in conformity with this Order.
SO ORDERED.
At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on October 31, 2016.

S/CARMEN CONSUELO CEREZO
United States District Judge