US Bank Trust National Association v. Garcia Padilla et al
Filing
75
OPINION AND ORDER re 2 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief and Motion for Preliminary Injunction; and re 72 Motion for Leave to File. Plaintiffs' respective requests to vacate the PROMESA automatic stay pursuant to section 405(e) (Docket No. 2) are DENIED. The Oversight Board's motion to intervene in these consolidated actions (Docket No. 72) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. U.S. Bank may proceed to disburse funds held in its reserve account to UPR bondholders pursuant to the terms of its trust agreement. (Docket No. 2.) Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 11/15/2016. (brc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BRIGADE LEVERAGED CAPITAL
STRUCTURES FUND LTD., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 16-1610 (FAB)
ALEJANDRO GARCIA-PADILLA,
et als.,
Defendants.
NATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCE
GUARANTEE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 16-2101 (FAB)
ALEJANDRO GARCIA-PADILLA,
et al.,
Defendants.
DIONISIO TRIGO-GONZALEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 16-2257 (FAB)
ALEJANDRO GARCIA-PADILLA,
et al.,
Defendants.
U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO,
et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 16-2510 (FAB)
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
2
OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court are the parties’ arguments as to whether
there is sufficient “cause” to grant plaintiffs relief from the
automatic
stay imposed
by
section
405(b)
of
the
Puerto
Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), Pub.
L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016).
For the reasons discussed
below, the Court holds that there is not and therefore MAINTAINS
the stay.
Also
before
the
Court
is
the
Financial
Oversight
and
Management Board for Puerto Rico (the “Oversight Board” or the
“Board”)’s motion to intervene in these consolidated cases. (Civil
No. 16-1610, Docket No. 137; Civil No. 16-2101, Docket No. 89;
Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 65; Civil No. 2510, Docket No. 72.)
Having considered the content of the Board’s motion, the Court
DENIES the motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I.
A.
BACKGROUND
The Moratorium Act and Ensuing Executive Orders
On April 6, 2016, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico enacted the
Puerto Rico Emergency Moratorium and Financial Rehabilitation Act
(“Moratorium Act”) to address its grave fiscal crisis, which has
been brought to a “perilous tipping point.”
Of Motives, § A.
Moratorium Act, Stmt.
The Moratorium Act aims to give the Puerto Rico
Government the “tools” it needs “to continue providing essential
services to the people” of Puerto Rico in light of the Government’s
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
lack
of
“sufficient
resources
to
comply
obligations as originally scheduled.”
with
Id.
3
debt
service
To that end, the
Moratorium Act empowers the Governor to issue executive orders
(1)
declaring
a
“state
of
emergency”
with
respect
to
the
Commonwealth or its instrumentalities, and (2) suspending payment
of principal and interest on “covered obligations,” during a
“covered period”
§§
103(m),
through
201(a).
January
It
also
31,
2017.1
authorizes
Moratorium
the
Governor
Act,
to
“expropriat[e] property or rights in property interests” and to
suspend or modify any statutory or other obligation to transfer
money for the payment of, or to secure, any covered obligation, so
that instrumentalities subject to the Moratorium Act are able to
pay for “essential services.”
Id. §§ 201(b), (d)(ii).
Pursuant to the authority vested in him by these provisions of
the Moratorium Act, the Governor has issued a series of executive
orders (collectively, the “Executive Orders”).
Of particular
relevance in these four consolidated actions are:
(1) Executive
Order 10, which declared a state of emergency with respect to the
Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico (“GDB”), imposed limits
on
transfers
to
GDB
creditors,
and
suspended
payment
of
any
obligations guaranteed by GDB; (2) Executive Order 14, which
declared a moratorium on the payment of GDB covered obligations;
(3) Executive Order 18, which declared a state of emergency with
1
The Moratorium Act expires by its own terms at the end of
the “covered period.”
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
4
respect to the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority
(“PRHTA”)
and
suspended
PRHTA’s
obligation
to
transfer
toll
revenues pledged to PRHTA bondholders; (4) Executive Order 30,
which
extended
the
emergency
period
with
respect
to
PRHTA,
suspended PRHTA’s obligation to make certain debt payments, and
suspended the Commonwealth’s obligation to make payments on bonds
or notes issued or guaranteed by the Commonwealth, other than
payments to GDB; and (5) Executive Order 31, which continued the
suspension of PRHTA’s obligation to transfer pledged toll revenues,
declared a state of emergency with respect to the University of
Puerto Rico (“UPR”) and the Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation
(“PRPFC”), and suspended UPR’s obligations to transfer pledged
revenues to UPR bondholders.
B.
Plaintiffs’ Claims in the Underlying Litigation
1.
Civil No. 16-1610
Plaintiffs
in
Civil
No.
16-1610
(the
“Brigade
plaintiffs”) allege that they are investors who collectively hold
more than $750 million worth of outstanding bonds issued by the
GDB.
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 52 at p. 4.)
They challenge
certain provisions of the Moratorium Act “that retroactively and
unconstitutionally strip them” of certain “contractual and property
rights
embodied
in
their
existing
GDB
bonds.”
They
seek
a
declaration that sections 105, 201(b), 201(c), 203(b)(i), 203(f),
301, 302, and 401 of the Moratorium Act should be declared null and
void because they: (1) violate the Contract and Takings Clauses of
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
5
the United States and Puerto Rico Constitutions, (2) violate the
Commerce
Clause
of
the
United
States
Constitution,
(3)
are
preempted by both the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States
Constitution and section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 903(1), and (4) violate the United States Constitution by staying
federal
court
proceedings.
Id.
at
p.
31-32.
The
Brigade
plaintiffs also seek an injunction prohibiting the Commonwealth
defendants from enforcing any of these challenged provisions.
2.
Civil No. 16-2101
In Civil No. 16-2101, plaintiff National Public Finance
Guarantee
Corporation
(“National”)
alleges
that
it
provides
insurance for approximately $3.84 billion of debt issued by both
PRHTA and the Puerto Rico Industrial, Tourist, Educational, Medical
and Environmental Control Facilities Financial Authority (“AFICA”).
(Civil No. 16-2101, Docket No. 1 at p. 1.)
its
insurance
“enabled
the
Commonwealth
National asserts that
and
many
of
its
instrumentalities to borrow funds on more favorable terms than they
otherwise could have.”
(Civil No. 16-2101, Docket No. 1 at p. 1.)
It further asserts that, in exchange for providing this insurance,
it obtained “various property and contractual rights relating to
the debt,” and that the Moratorium Act has effectively “taken these
property interests and substantially impaired these contractual
rights.”
Id. at p. 15-16.
National argues that the Moratorium Act is preempted by
federal law and that it violates the United States Constitution “in
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
a number of independent ways.”
declaration that:
Id. at p. 2.
6
It therefore seeks a
(1) Sections 201(a), (b), (d), and (e) of the
Moratorium Act are preempted by both the Bankruptcy Clause of the
United States Constitution and section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code,
11
U.S.C.
§
903(1),
(2)
sections
201
and
202
of
the
Moratorium Act violate both the Takings and Contracts Clauses of
the United States Constitution, and (3) section 201(b) of the
Moratorium Act violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution by purporting to bar access to the federal courts.
Id. at p. 31.
It also
seeks an injunction prohibiting the
Commonwealth defendants from taking any action pursuant to those
challenged provisions of the Moratorium Act.
3.
Id.
Civil No. 16-2257
Plaintiffs in Civil No. 16-2257 (the “Trigo plaintiffs”)
allege
that
they
are
a
group
of
predominantly
Puerto
Rican
individuals and corporations who together hold more than $100
million worth of GDB and PRPFC bonds.
No. 1 at p. 4.)
(Civil No. 16-2257, Docket
They assert that the Moratorium Act “creates a
framework and scaffolding for the systematic stripping of assets”
of the GDB and the PRPFC “that will render each unable to meet its
obligations to bondholders.”
Id. at p. 5-6.
The Trigo plaintiffs
therefore seek a declaration that sections 105, 201, 203, 301, 302
and 401 of the Moratorium Act are null and void because they:
(1) violate the Takings and Contracts Clauses of the United States
and Puerto Rico Constitutions, (2) are preempted by both the
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
7
Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution and section
903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 903(1), and (3) violate
the
United
proceedings.
States
Constitution
Id. at p. 14-15.
by
staying
federal
court
They also seek an injunction
prohibiting the Commonwealth defendants from enforcing any of these
challenged provisions.
4.
Civil No. 16-2510
In Civil No. 16-2510, plaintiff U.S. Bank Trust National
Association (“U.S. Bank”) alleges that it is a national banking
association
and
the
trustee
under
a
certain
trust
agreement
authorizing and securing UPR bonds with an outstanding principal
amount of $431,790,000.
(Civil 16-2510, Docket No. 1 at p. 1.)
It
argues that Executive Order 31 allows UPR and the Commonwealth to
“divert and expropriate pledged revenues,” including approximately
$89 million in tuition and fees, “to meet expenses other than debt
service.”
Id. at p. 1, 3.
According to U.S. Bank, this “threatens
irreparable harm” both to its interest as trustee and to the
bondholders by inviting the “permanent loss of collateral pledged
to secure” the UPR bonds.
alleges that
it
is
Id. at p. 3-4.
currently
in
Plaintiff U.S. Bank also
possession
of
certain funds
deposited in its UPR bond trust accounts, which it wishes to apply
to the payment of those bonds.
Id. at p. 4.
U.S. Bank seeks a declaration that (1) section 201 of the
Moratorium Act and Executive Order 31 violate the Takings Clauses
of the United States and Puerto Rico Constitutions, (2) section 201
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
8
of the Moratorium Act and Executive Order 31 violate the Contracts
Clauses
of
the
United
States
and
Puerto
Rico
Constitutions,
(3) Executive Order 31 is preempted by PROMESA section 303(3), and
(4) section 201 of the Moratorium Act and Executive Order 31 are
preempted by PROMESA section 303(1).
at p. 34.)
(Civil 16-2510, Docket No. 1
It also seeks a preliminary injunction compelling UPR
to transfer pledged revenues of tuition fees and student fees, as
well
as
a
defendants
permanent
from
injunction
enforcing
prohibiting
Executive
Order
the
31
of
the
On June 30, 2016, the President signed PROMESA into law.
The
challenged provisions of the Moratorium Act.
C.
or
Commonwealth
any
Id.
PROMESA and its Automatic Stay Provision
legislation seeks to address the dire fiscal emergency in Puerto
Rico.
It is designed to establish “[a] comprehensive approach to
[Puerto Rico’s] fiscal, management and structural problems and
adjustments . . . involving independent oversight and a Federal
statutory
authority
for
debts
a
restructure
§ 405(m)(4).
in
the
fair
Government
and orderly
of
Puerto
process.”
Rico
to
PROMESA,
PROMESA establishes the seven-member Oversight Board
for Puerto Rico. PROMESA §§ 101(b)(1), (e)(1)(A). “The purpose of
the Oversight Board is to provide a method for [Puerto Rico] to
achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.”
Id. § 101(a).
The Oversight Board operates as an entity within the
Puerto Rico Government, id. § 101(c), and is given broad authority
over the Commonwealth and any of its instrumentalities that the
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
Board designates as “covered” instrumentalities.
The
Board
is
endowed
with
a
variety
of
9
Id. § 101(d)(1).
significant
powers,
including the authority to develop, review, and approve territorial
and instrumentality fiscal plans and budgets, id. §§ 201-202; to
enforce budget and fiscal plan compliance, id. §§ 203-204; to seek
judicial
enforcement
of
its
authority
to
carry
out
its
responsibilities under PROMESA, id. § 104(k); and to intervene in
any
litigation
filed
against
instrumentalities, id. § 212.
the
Commonwealth
or
its
All members of the Oversight Board
were appointed on August 31, 2016.
Among
PROMESA’S
provisions
is
an
automatic
stay
of
all
liability-related litigation against the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, which was or could have been commenced before the law’s
enactment.
PROMESA § 405(b).
Congress deemed that component of
the legislation “essential to stabilize the region for the purposes
of resolving” Puerto Rico’s financial crisis.
Id. § 405(m)(5).
The stay is designed to “allow the Government of Puerto Rico a
limited period of time during which it can focus its resources on
negotiating a voluntary resolution with its creditors instead of
defending numerous, costly creditor lawsuits.”
Id. § 405(n)(2).
It also helps “to ensure all creditors have a fair opportunity to
consensually
renegotiate
terms
of
repayment”
and
allows
the
Oversight Board time “to determine whether to appear or intervene
on behalf of the Government of Puerto Rico in any litigation.”
§ 405(m)(5)(B), (A).
Id.
Congress indicated that, by serving these
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
important
purposes,
PROMESA’s
automatic
stay
was
10
ultimately
intended to “benefit the lives of 3.5 million American citizens
living in Puerto Rico.”
The
§
automatic
405(m)(5)(B),
and
Id. § 405(n)(5).
stay
is
remains
“limited
in
effect
in
nature,”
until
the
PROMESA
earlier
of
(1) February 15, 2017, with a possible extension of sixty or
seventy-five days, or (2) the date on which the Oversight Board
files a petition on behalf of the Government of Puerto Rico or any
of its instrumentalities to commence debt-adjustment proceedings
pursuant to title III of PROMESA.2
Id. § 405(d).
The court may,
however, grant relief from the stay to “a party in interest” either
“for cause shown,” or “to prevent irreparable damage” to the
party’s interest in property.
D.
Id. § 405(e)(2), (g).
Significant Procedural Developments
On August 22, 2016, the Court found that plaintiffs’ claims in
Civil No. 16-1610, Civil No. 16-2101, and Civil No. 16-2257 were
brought “with respect to a Liability,” and therefore fell “squarely
within the scope of cases automatically stayed pursuant to section
405(b)(1) of PROMESA.”
p. 11.)3
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 99 at
Accordingly, the Court stayed those actions and held an
evidentiary hearing on September 22 and 23, 2016 to determine
2
PROMESA’s automatic stay expires by its own terms on the
earlier of those dates.
3
For the sake of convenience, the Court will only cite to the
docket for Civil No. 16-1610 when referring to filings and orders
that appear in the dockets for all four of these consolidated
cases.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
11
whether, pursuant to section 405(e) of PROMESA, relief from stay
was warranted.4
Just prior to that hearing, on September 21, 2016, the United
States Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest on
Behalf of the United States urging the Court to “narrowly construe”
PROMESA’s “for cause” provision and to “postpone granting any
relief from the automatic stay until the Oversight Board . . . is
fully operational
and
in a
intervene” in this litigation.
position
to
determine
whether
to
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 116
at p. 2.)
On October 7, 2016, before the parties submitted their posthearing memoranda, the Oversight Board filed a motion seeking an
extension of time to allow it to “retain staff and counsel, to
review the record in these cases” and “to prepare its responses to
the lift stay motions.”
p. 3.)
filed
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 126 at
Citing its statutory right to intervene in any litigation
against
the
instrumentality,”
Commonwealth
PROMESA
§§
or
any
“covered
101(d)(1)(A),
212,
territorial
as
well
as
congressional intent that the automatic stay provide the Oversight
4
Plaintiff U.S. Bank in Civil No. 16-2510 did not challenge
the applicability of PROMESA’s automatic stay to its case. Rather,
its preliminary focus has been on seeking relief from the stay
pursuant to Section 405(e) of PROMESA.
See Civil No. 16-2510,
Docket No. 2. Thus, on August 25, 2016, it filed a motion seeking
to join the hearing scheduled for Civil No. 16-1610, Civil No. 162101, and Civil No. 16-2257. Id. Docket No. 19. The Commonwealth
defendants consented to that request, and on September 1, 2016, the
Court issued an order both granting U.S. Bank’s request to join the
hearing and staying its action pursuant to section 405(b)(1) of
PROMESA. Id., Docket Nos. 23-24.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
Board time
to
determine
whether
to
exercise
12
that
right,
id.
§ 405(m)(5)(A), the Oversight Board maintained that there was “good
cause” to grant its request.
p. 3.)
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 126 at
The parties were given an opportunity to respond to the
Oversight Board’s motion, Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 128, and no
objection was made.
Thus, on October 13, 2016, the Court granted
the Oversight Board’s request for additional time.
(Civil No. 16-
1610, Docket No. 133.)
On October 21, 2016, the Oversight Board moved the Court to
intervene in these four consolidated cases either as of right
pursuant to section 212 of PROMESA and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a), or permissively pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b). (Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 137.) The parties
were afforded an opportunity to respond to the Board’s request for
intervention.
Id., Docket No. 133.
With a full cast of characters now before it, the Court turns
to address the essential issues at hand: (1) whether the Oversight
Board is entitled to intervene in these consolidated actions, and
(2) whether plaintiffs in any of these four cases have shown
sufficient “cause” to vacate PROMESA’s automatic stay in order to
allow their individual claims to proceed to litigation on the
merits.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
II.
A.
13
DISCUSSION
The Oversight Board’s Motion to Intervene
The Oversight Board asserts that it is entitled to intervene
as of right in these consolidated actions pursuant to Federal Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
24(a)
and
section
212
of
PROMESA.
Alternatively, it argues that the Court should grant it permissive
leave to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(b).
1.
Procedural Deficiency pursuant to Rule 24(c)
Although
the
Oversight
Board’s
motion
to
intervene
indicates its opposition to vacating the stay in these cases, it is
not “accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense
for which intervention is sought,” as required by the federal rules
of procedure.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c).
Rather, the Board merely
states that it is “not at this time taking any position on the
merits
of
the
parties’
claims
and
defenses
in
the
pending
challenges to the Moratorium Act and related Executive Orders.”
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 137 at p. 10.)
The
First
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
has
indicated,
however, that Rule 24(c)’s requirements are mandatory and that a
party’s failure to meet them warrants dismissal of its motion. See
Public Service Company of New Hampshire v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 205
n. 6 (1st Cir. 1998).
Given the procedural deficiency in the
Oversight Board’s motion to intervene, the Court is obligated to
DENY that motion.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
B.
14
Plaintiffs’ Motions to Vacate PROMESA’S Automatic Stay
Plaintiffs in all four cases argue that the Court should
vacate the automatic stay “for cause shown,” pursuant to section
405(e) of PROMESA.
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 71; Civil
No. 16-2101, Docket No. 36; Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 11; Civil
No. 16-2510, Docket No. 2.)
cases
-
who
seek
relief
Unlike plaintiffs in the other three
from
stay
solely
to
litigate
their
constitutional claims - plaintiff U.S. Bank in Civil No. 16-2510
also
seeks
to
vacate
the
stay
in
order
to:
(1)
impose
a
preliminary injunction forcing its borrower, UPR, to transfer
pledged student tuition and fees to U.S. Bank’s trust accounts, and
(2) disburse funds currently held in a reserve account to UPR
bondholders.
(Civil No. 16-2510, Docket No. 2 at p. 2.)
The Commonwealth defendants oppose these requests for relief
and seek a continuation of PROMESA’s automatic stay.
(Civil
No. 16-1610, Docket No. 81; Civil No. 16-2101, Docket No. 74; Civil
No.
2257, Docket No. 53; Civil No. 16-2510, Docket No. 33.)
GDB,
PRPFC, and UPR filed additional post-hearing briefs in support of
maintaining the stay.
(Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 54; Civil
No. 16-2510, Docket No. 61.)
1.
Vacating the Automatic Stay “For Cause”:
the Governing Standard
Establishing
The automatic stay imposed by section 405(b) of PROMESA
is
not
absolute
expressed
its
in
view
nature.
that
the
Although
stay
is
Congress
needed
to
unambiguously
“provide
the
Government of Puerto Rico with the resources and the tools it needs
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
15
to address an immediate existing and imminent crisis,” PROMESA
§
405(n)(1),
it
also
seemed
to
anticipate
that
certain
circumstances might justify relief from the stay’s significant,
rigid effects.
It therefore included a form of safety valve in
section 405(e) of PROMESA to allow certain holders of “liability
claims” against the Government of Puerto Rico to proceed with their
actions, provided that they could effectively demonstrate “cause”
for doing so.
The text of PROMESA, however, does not indicate what,
exactly, a party in interest must do to establish “cause” for
relief from the automatic stay successfully. Rather, it leaves the
task of defining the boundaries of that specific term to the
discretion of the courts.
Thus, before it can proceed to review
the arguments and evidence presented by the various parties, the
Court must first attempt to hash out and clarify the meaning and
parameters of the governing principle of “for cause shown.”
i.
Defining “Cause” for Relief from Stay
Section
405
of
PROMESA
was
patterned
on
the
automatic stay provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 362, (“section 362”).
Indeed, the two provisions are, in
some respects, nearly identical.
In light of these appreciable
similarities, the Court will attempt to give meaning to the concept
of “cause” by looking first to judicial interpretations of that
term within the bankruptcy context.
certain
additional
considerations
It will then reflect upon
that
ought
to
inform
its
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
16
understanding of what constitutes proper “cause” to vacate the
PROMESA stay.
a.
Prevailing Interpretations of “Cause” within
Bankruptcy Case Law
Similar to section 405 of PROMESA, section 362
of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides that courts may grant
relief from the automatic stay to a party in interest “for cause.”
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
Also like PROMESA, however, section 362
does not provide concrete guidance on how that term ought to be
construed and applied in practice.
United
States
courts
of
appeals
reviewing
motions to vacate the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay pursuant to
section 362(d) have consistently found that the decision to grant
that relief is largely discretionary with the court. See, e.g., In
re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 130 (3d Cir. 2007) (commenting on the “wide
latitude accorded to the Bankruptcy Court to balance the equities
when granting relief from the automatic stay.”); Brown v. Chestnut
(In re Chestnut), 422 F.3d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that
11 U.S.C. § 362 gives the bankruptcy court broad discretion to
vacate the automatic stay and “flexibility to address specific
exigencies on a case-by-case basis”); Claughton v. Mixson, 33 F.3d
4, 5 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress “has granted broad
discretion to bankruptcy courts to lift the automatic stay” and
that “the courts must determine when discretionary relief is
appropriate on a case-by-case basis.”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 814 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1987)
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
17
(applying abuse of discretion standard to court’s decision granting
relief from the automatic stay); Matter of Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505,
507 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasizing that section 362(d) “commits the
decision of whether to lift the stay to the discretion of the
bankruptcy judge.”)
To help guide their analysis of whether to
enforce or vacate the stay, some courts, including those in this
district, have relied upon a laundry list of assorted factors.
See, e.g., Sonnax Industries, Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp.
(In re Sonnax Industries, Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280, 1286 (2d Cir. 1990)
(enumerating 12 different factors to be utilized in determining
whether there is “cause” to vacate a bankruptcy stay, including the
“impact of the stay on the parties and the balance of harms”); see
also C&A, S.E. v. P.R. Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 369 B.R. 87, 94-95
(D.P.R. 2007) (Casellas, J.) (considering factors similar to those
spelled out in Sonnax).
In the end, however, the process of evaluating
whether there is sufficient “cause” to vacate the automatic stay in
bankruptcy cases requires the court to engage in an equitable,
case-by-case balancing of the various harms at stake.
See, e.g.,
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Rivera, 208 B.R. 313, 315 (D.R.I. 1997)
(suggesting that cause generally exists “when the harm that would
result from a continuation of the stay would outweigh any harm that
might be suffered by the debtor . . . if the stay is lifted.”); In
re Robinson, 169 B.R. 356, 359 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting that, “in
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
18
deciding whether ‘cause’ has been shown, the bankruptcy court must
balance the potential hardship that will be incurred by the party
seeking relief if the automatic stay is not lifted, against the
potential prejudice to the debtor” if it is.); In re Turner, 161
B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Me. 1993) (“Cause may exist for lifting the
stay whenever the stay harms the creditor and lifting the stay will
not unduly harm the debtor.”); In re Harris, 85 B.R. 858, 860
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (holding that vacating the automatic stay is
appropriate where “no great prejudice will result to the debtor”
and “the hardship to the creditor resulting by continuing the stay
considerably outweighs the hardship to the debtor by modification
of the stay.”); In re Opelika Mfg. Corp., 66 B.R. 444, 448 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1986) (“Cause to lift the stay exists when the stay harms
the creditor and lifting the stay will not unjustly harm the debtor
or other creditors.”)
The Court finds that this general framework
employed in the bankruptcy context is also applicable to these
proceedings
pursuant to PROMESA.
Thus, in deciding whether the
plaintiffs in these cases have established “cause” for relief from
the PROMESA stay, the Court’s ultimate task is to perform a careful
balancing of the equities involved.
It must assess the hardships
realistically borne by plaintiffs if their requested relief is
denied and determine whether those outweigh the harm likely to be
visited upon the Commonwealth defendants if that relief is granted.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
b.
19
“Lack of Adequate Protection” as Sufficient
“Cause”
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code includes one
specific type of “cause” sufficient to grant a party in interest
relief from stay:
in property.”
“the lack of adequate protection of an interest
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
This provision has allowed
courts to vacate the stay in bankruptcy proceedings where a secured
party, faced with a decrease in the value of its collateral while
the stay is in effect, is not supplied by the debtor with an
alternative form of relief that will safeguard its interest in that
collateral.
See In re Monroe Park, 17 B.R. 934, 937 (D. Del. 1982)
(“[T]he concept of adequate protection requires a debtor to propose
some form of relief that will preserve the secured creditor’s
interest in the collateral, pending the outcome of bankruptcy
proceedings.”)
Section 405(e) of PROMESA, however, does not
explicitly identify “lack of adequate protection” as a ground for
obtaining relief from stay.
At first blush, that omission would
seem to suggest that Congress simply did not intend for inadequate
protection
to
justify
a
secured
creditor’s
circumvention
of
PROMESA’s automatic stay. Indeed, the Commonwealth defendants make
this exact argument and entreat the Court, in interpreting the
statute, to view the absence of “lack of adequate protection” as a
purposeful exclusion of significant consequence.
at 58:18-59:4.
See 9/22/16 Tr.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
20
The Court, however, declines to oblige the
Commonwealth on this request.
Rather, it finds that Congress was
not required to have included “lack of adequate protection” in the
statutory text in order for that particular, long-standing means of
showing “cause” to be available to creditors in PROMESA lift-stay
proceedings.
This is because the concept of “adequate protection”
has constitutional roots, not just statutory ones.
See H.R. Rep.
No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 339 (1977) (the concept of
adequate protection “is derived from the Fifth Amendment protection
of property interests.”); see also In re Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484
U.S. 365 (1988) (“Case law had made adequate protection of the
secured creditor a major consideration long before the draft
predecessor of the [1978 Bankruptcy Code] proposed to codify it as
a requirement.”)
constitutional
interest.”
Secured creditors are, in short, “entitled to
protection
for
[their]
bargained
for
property
In re Jug End in the Berkshires, Inc., 46 B.R. 892, 899
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
Thus, although Congress did not overtly
include “lack of adequate protection” as an example of proper cause
in
PROMESA’s
section
405(e),
the
United
States
Constitution
nevertheless affords secured creditors the right to invoke that
exception when seeking relief from the PROMESA automatic stay.
c.
Additional
“Cause”
Considerations
in
Interpreting
Before the Court transitions to its evaluation
of whether adequate “cause” to vacate the stay exists in these
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
21
cases, it acknowledges the lack of a “one-to-one” relationship
between section 405 of PROMESA and section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code.
In other words, it recognizes that the concept of “cause”
embraced by the Court for the purposes of the PROMESA stay need not
precisely mirror that adopted in the bankruptcy context.
Although
the Court endorses the general analytical approach to “cause”
followed in the bankruptcy arena, it is nevertheless mindful of the
specific Congressional findings and the enumerated purposes of
PROMESA’s automatic stay contained within section 405 of the
legislation.
These statutory provisions offer valuable insight
into Congress’ basic motive in including the stay provision and
have no counterpart in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.
As
such, the Court’s resolution of the motions currently before it
ought to be consistent with these provisions and should advance the
larger, overarching purposes for which PROMESA was enacted.
2.
Outlining the Alleged Harms
Having established the parameters of the “for cause”
standard that will apply to these lift-stay proceedings, the
Court’s next step is to drill down the precise “harms” that the
parties seek to place on their respective sides of the balancing
scale.
i.
Plaintiffs’ Arguments and Evidence on Harm
a.
The Brigade Plaintiffs
The Brigade plaintiffs in Civil No. 16-1610
assert that they “will suffer serious constitutional injury” if the
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
22
stay is not vacated to allow their claims to go forward.
(Civil
No. 16-1610, Docket No. 71 at p. 15.)
This injury would stem from
the
application
continued
existence
“unconstitutional”
provisions
and
of
the
of
Moratorium
certain
Act,
which
“retroactively alter GDB bondholder rights by, among other things,
adjusting bondholder priorities.”
No. 129 at p. 4.)
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket
They allege that those provisions strip them of
the benefit of their “bargained-for contractual rights,” including
“the right to recover on par with all other senior unsecured debt
of GDB and the ‘absolute and unconditional right’ that their
entitlement to principal and interest would not be changed without
their consent.”
Thus, unless
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 87 at p. 10-11.)
the
Court relieves
them
from
the
PROMESA stay,
plaintiffs “will continue to suffer injury from [those] patently
unconstitutional provisions of the Moratorium Act,” which “purport
to allow the restructuring of creditor claims against GDB without
creditor consent” and “to mandate unfair discrimination among
creditors of equal rank.”
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 71 at
p. 16-17.)
The Brigade plaintiffs also submit that the
challenged
“tremendous
provisions
amount
negotiation process.
of
of
the
legal
Moratorium
uncertainty”
Act
have
into
the
injected
a
voluntary
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 129 at p. 4).
This uncertainty, according to plaintiffs’ witness Mr. Bradley
Meyer, has stymied meaningful restructuring negotiations between
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
the
Commonwealth
and
its
creditors.
Mr.
23
Meyer’s
testimony
indicated, for example, that Law 40, which amended the Moratorium
Act,
essentially
derailed
negotiations
to
consummate
a
restructuring of the GDB, even after plaintiffs and the GDB had
successfully
developed
negotiations.
a
framework
agreement
See 9/22/16 Tr. at 176:18-179:7.
to
guide
those
In light of this
evidence, the Brigade plaintiffs suggest that another major “harm”
in refusing to allow their constitutional claims to go forward is
the perpetuation of a destabilizing level of uncertainty, which
ultimately keeps the parties from returning to their positions at
the bargaining table.
The Brigade plaintiffs contend, however, that
by vacating the stay and allowing their claims to proceed, the
Court
has
the
uncertainty.”
opportunity
They
to
argue
eliminate
that
by
this
“obstacle
adjudicating
of
the
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Moratorium
Act now the Court can clarify the “rules of the road,” which in
turn
will
help
foster
the
sort
of
voluntary
restructuring
negotiations that PROMESA was designed to facilitate. To emphasize
the importance of achieving that clarity, plaintiffs proffered the
testimony of Mr. Meyer, who explained that:
clarification around the rules of the road . . . is
exceptionally important in terms of stabilizing the
entire Commonwealth going forward. It’s important
because it provides certainty as to those relative
priorities vis-à-vis creditors . . . within the
Commonwealth so that we don’t have confusion around
how certain relative priority rights of creditors
will be treated.”
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
9/22/16 Tr. at 181: 12-24.
24
The Brigade plaintiffs further assert
that adjudicating its claims will facilitate the work of the
Oversight Board by definitively establishing “whether the framework
for
any
restructuring
can
be
based
on
the
structure specified by the Moratorium Act.”
Docket No. 129 at p. 17.)
current
priority
(Civil No. 16-1610,
The Brigade plaintiffs maintain that
resolving that issue now will provide the Board with both needed
guidance and the beginnings of a “firm foundation,” while also
preventing it from “wast[ing] effort, time, and scarce resources”
developing a restructuring that is premised on unconstitutional
law.
Id. at p. 10.
b.
Plaintiff National
Similar to the Brigade plaintiffs, plaintiff
National in Civil No. 16-2101 asserts that, if the Court fails to
exercise its discretion to vacate the stay, the Commonwealth
defendants
“will
continue
to
infringe
National’s
and
other
creditors’ constitutional and contractual rights with impunity.”
(Civil No. 16-2101, Docket No. 36 at p. 8.)
More specifically,
National contends that it will continue to be harmed by the
“flagrantly unlawful” actions of the Puerto Rican government, which
“wipe
out”
critical
investor
protections
and
permit
the
Commonwealth to assert control over secured revenues pledged to the
repayment of the bonds that it insures.
National’s evidence
establishes that the Commonwealth has, in an “unprecedented” move,
blocked roughly $11 million in combined secured monthly revenue
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
25
streams from reaching trust accounts maintained on behalf of PRHTA
and AFICA bondholders.5
p. 7-8.)
(Civil No. 16-2101, Docket No. 75 at
National argues that this misappropriation of bondholder
collateral by the Commonwealth amounts to sufficient “cause” to
vacate
significantly
and
unconstitutionally harms its business as a bond insurer.
Id.
Based
the
on
the
PROMESA
expert
stay
because
testimony
of
Mr.
it
Robert
Lamb,
National
maintains that the continued diversion of pledged bond revenues
will result in two distinct harms to its financial interests:
a
forced reexamination of its reserve levels and “a higher capital
charge by the rating agencies in order to maintain [its] rating” in
the insurance market.
9/22/16 Tr. at 139:17-24.
National also shares the Brigade plaintiffs’
concern that various provisions of the Moratorium Act, as well as
the
Executive
Orders
issued
pursuant
to
it,
have
created
a
debilitating level of legal uncertainty. National argues that this
uncertainty has “hamper[ed] negotiated resolutions” and made it
fundamentally “harder for the parties to reach agreement at the
bargaining table.”
(Civil No. 16-2101, Docket No. 75 at p. 15,
14.) It therefore echoes the need to have the Court “determine the
rules of the road now,” and suggests that the adjudication of its
5
During the evidentiary hearing, National’s expert witness on
municipal finance, Mr. Robert Lamb, testified that PRHTA’s secured
creditors are losing $10.6 million dollars each month in toll
revenue collateral, and that AFICA’s secured bondholders are losing
approximately “$500,000 a month” in UPR lease payment collateral.
9/22/16 Tr. at 102:16-20, 100:3-6.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
26
constitutional claims would “help provide the certainty necessary
to rebuild trust with creditors.”
Id. at p. 6, 15.
Allowing the
Commonwealth “to hide behind the stay to avoid a reckoning on the
constitutionality
of
its
unilateral
stripping
of
liens
and
diversion of assets,” on the other hand, would only “prolong
uncertainty and keep parties away from the bargaining table.”
Id.
at p. 15, 6.
c.
The Trigo Plaintiffs
The
Trigo
plaintiffs in Civil
No.
16-2257
reiterate the same basic harm emphasized by both the Brigade
plaintiffs and National.
They argue that the Moratorium Act and
the Executive Orders continue to cause them constitutional injury
by
“unilaterally
instrumentalities
divert[ing]
funds
from
agencies
and
[of the Commonwealth] . . . in patent violation
of creditor rights and without a vestige of accountability.”
(Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 52 at p. 6.)
Adjudication of their
constitutional claims is therefore needed to put an end to the
Commonwealth’s
“confiscatory
unconstitutional
actions,”
which
“deplete assets and resources” that otherwise “could be available
to pay all or part of [the] bondholders’ interest and principal.”
Id. at p. 5, 2.
The Trigo plaintiffs posit that vacating the
stay would also help to “eliminate destabilizing and unproductive
uncertainty,” provide guidance to the parties and the Oversight
Board, and ensure that all creditors have the chance to participate
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
27
in a restructuring process that is both “fair and orderly.”
pp. 5-7 (citing PROMESA § 405(m)(4)).
Id. at
They argue that the looming
harm if the stay is not vacated includes not only the “further
chaos and complication” that would ensue if parts of the Moratorium
Act are later declared unconstitutional, but also the continued
existence of a “slant[ed . . . playing field” on which certain
creditors are effectively reduced “to mere sideline spectators.”
Id. at p. 14, 5.
d.
Plaintiff U.S. Bank
Unlike the three sets of plaintiffs discussed
above, plaintiff U.S. Bank in Civil No. 16-2510 does not seek
relief from PROMESA’s automatic stay merely to obtain adjudication
of its underlying constitutional claims against the Commonwealth.
Rather, it requests that the stay be vacated so that it may also:
(1)
compel
UPR
-
through
a
preliminary
injunction
issued
concurrently by the Court - to transfer certain pledged revenues to
the trust accounts held for the benefit of UPR bondholders, and
(2)
apply
funds
currently
held
in
those
trust
accounts
accordance with the terms of the relevant trust agreement.
in
See
Civil No. 16-2510, Docket No. 3 at p. 28.
U.S. Bank argues that the requisite “cause” for
granting its first request for relief is established by its lack of
adequate protection in the pledged revenues, which serve as hard
collateral for the payment of the UPR bonds.
U.S. Bank contends
that these funds, which include student tuition and fees, will
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
28
continue to be diverted and expropriated by the Commonwealth and
UPR during the pendency of the stay in order “to meet expenses
other than debt service.”
Id. at p. 6.
It further alleges that,
once diverted, the pledged revenues are “gone forever” and that
“[n]one of the after-the-fact remedies provided by the Moratorium
Act or PROMESA” is sufficient to replace them. (Civil No. 16-2510,
Docket No. 65 at p. 7, 3.)
Rather, U.S. Bank claims that the
pledged revenues “are the only reliable source of repayment” for
the
UPR
bonds
and
that
“[a]ny
damages
remedy
would
merely
substitute, for hard collateral, an unsecured claim that the
Commonwealth or UPR cannot pay.”
at p. 16, 6.)
“plundering
of
(Civil No. 16-2510, Docket No. 3
Thus, if the stay is not vacated to halt the
its
collateral,”
U.S.
Bank
will
allegedly
be
converted “from a fully secured creditor entitled to be paid in
full to a second-priority unsecured creditor that may eventually be
paid pennies on the dollar.”
(Civil No. 16-2510, Docket No. 40 at
p. 3.)
As for the disbursement of funds currently held
in its trust accounts, U.S. Bank contends that relief from stay is
appropriate because the Commonwealth itself “does not appear to
have any objection” to the application of funds in U.S. Bank’s
possession.
ii.
(Civil No. 16-2510, Docket No. 3 at p. 27.)
The Commonwealth’s Arguments and Evidence on Harm
The Commonwealth defendants maintain that vacating
the stay would cause significant harm to the Government of Puerto
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
29
Rico and its people. They argue, for example, that granting relief
to the plaintiffs in these cases would further divert important
Commonwealth personnel and resources from addressing the financial
crisis and the Government’s obligations under PROMESA.
No. 16-1610, Docket No. 131 at p. 3-4.)
(Civil
At the hearing, the
defendants presented the testimony of Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury
Yaimé
Rullán-Cabrera
as
support
for
this
point.
Ms. Rullán’s testimony demonstrated how the burdens of litigation
at this preliminary stage of the proceedings are “already drawing
Commonwealth
officials
responsibilities.”
away
Id. at p. 3.
from
their
governmental
Ms. Rullán testified that she has
had to appear in court on several occasions and that Commonwealth
officials “have had to provide all the documentary information in
preparation for this and other litigation.”
25, 16–17.
9/23/16 Tr. at 75:22-
These burdens interfere not only with government
officials’ efforts to govern the Commonwealth on a day-to-day
basis, but also with their work in helping to “complete what would
be a sustainable fiscal recovery plan.”
Id. at 90:9–12.
Citing
these concrete burdens associated with litigation, defendants argue
that vacating the stay in these cases “would only result in more,
and potentially more damaging, diversion of the Commonwealth’s
personnel and resources.”
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 131 at
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
p. 5.)6
30
They conclude, therefore, that granting plaintiffs their
requested relief would directly contravene the PROMESA stay’s
purpose of “provid[ing] the Government of Puerto Rico with the
resources and the tools it needs to address an immediate existing
and imminent crisis.”
The
PROMESA § 405(n)(1).
defendants,
including
GDB, also
argue
that
granting relief in these cases could thwart the Commonwealth’s
ability
to
perform
basic
government
functions
by
“upending
everything that [it has] been relying on for the past several
months.”
9/22/16 Tr. at 48:25-49:1.
In other words, by producing
“the premature dismantling of statutory provisions created to
address the current fiscal emergency in Puerto Rico,” (Civil
No. 16-1610, Docket No. 81 at p. 13), vacating the stay here might
fundamentally “disrupt the Government’s processes for managing the
Commonwealth” and “interfere with the government’s ability to
provide essential services to residents of the Commonwealth.”
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 131 at p. 5.); see also Civil
No. 16-2257, Docket No. 54 at p. 14-15 (GDB emphasizing “the burden
[that] a judgment invalidating all or part of the Moratorium Act
6
In its own separate post-hearing memorandum, Civil No.
16-2257, Docket No. 54, GDB reinforces this point regarding the
burden and distraction that further lift-stay litigation would
cause to the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities. GDB argues
that a decision to vacate the stay in these cases would “engender
tremendous amounts of work for GDB, . . . involve distraction of
the Commonwealth and GDB officers” and divert “resources now
focused not only on the PROMESA process but on continuing to
operate and provide essential services to the public in the face of
the Commonwealth’s fiscal crisis.”
(Civil No. 16-2257, Docket
No. 54 at pp. 12-13.)
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
31
and executive orders will impose on the Commonwealth and its
instrumentalities.”)
The testimony of Ms. Rullán was proffered to
substantiate this danger of “calling into immediate question the
ground rules established by the Moratorium Act and executive
orders” upon which the Commonwealth’s day-to-day operations are
currently based.
(Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 54 at p. 8.)
Ms. Rullán testified that the invalidation of the Moratorium Act
and
related
Executive
Orders
would
severely
restrict
the
Commonwealth’s ability to manage daily demands with current assets.
See 9/23/16 Tr. at 88:3-18.
This difficulty, in turn, would
eventually require Commonwealth officials “to just paralyze the
government,” an act that would impede their ability to “tend to the
emergency situation” that continues to unfold on the island.
at 88:12-89:1.
Id.
Based on this testimony, defendants conclude that
vacating the stay here would result in a “death spiral” in which a
“paralyzed” government would ultimately be prevented from funding
“the essential services necessary to promote economic stability and
growth.”
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 131 at p. 5.)
The Commonwealth defendants additionally allege that
granting relief to plaintiffs in these cases is likely to “touch
off more lawsuits” and “invite more requests to lift the PROMESA
stay,”
something
that
will
further
divert
the
Commonwealth’s
limited resources and “deprive the Commonwealth of breathing room
from litigation that PROMESA is supposed to provide.”
To
support
this
claim,
defendants
offered
the
Id. at p. 7.
testimony
of
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
Dr. Jonathan Arnold.
32
Dr. Arnold opined that plaintiffs who “have
already filed a case will also seek to have stays lifted” and that
the result will be a “wave of litigation, first at the stage of
petitioning to lift the stay, and then to the extent that it’s
granted, then it will be the ongoing litigation after that.”
9/23/16 Tr. at 223:15–18.
conclude
that
floodgates
and
granting
Based on this testimony, the defendants
relief
encourage
“a
here
slew
of
will
.
open
.
.
the
litigation
other
creditors”
currently “on the sidelines” to pursue their claims against the
Commonwealth outside the PROMESA framework.7
Docket No. 131 at p. 6.)
(Civil No. 16-1610,
In this way, vacating the stay “would
force the Commonwealth to divert its attention from negotiating a
voluntary
resolution
with
its
creditors
to
defending
costly
lawsuits, the exact opposite of what Congress intended.”
(Civil
No. 16-2510, Docket No. 33 at p. 8.)
Finally, the Commonwealth defendants argue that
vacating the stay will fundamentally inhibit the Oversight Board’s
central role in the PROMESA process.
the requested relief here will:
7
They contend that granting
(1) interfere with the Board’s
The United States and GDB also raise this concern in their
respective filings with the Court. In its Statement of Interest,
the United States warns of “the potential cascading effect that
granting relief to one creditor may have on the overall scheme
designed by PROMESA, as there may be numerous other similarly
situated creditors.” (Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 116 at p. 6.)
GDB posits that “the effects of lifting the stay would reverberate
beyond these four cases” by “leading to a cascade of further
litigation and lift-stay proceedings” in which the Commonwealth and
GDB would be forced to participate. (Civil No. 16-2257, Docket
No. 54 at pp. 13-14.)
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
33
need to address the financial crisis on a “comprehensive basis,”
and (2) thwart its ability to organize a consolidated restructuring
approach effectively. (Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 131 at p. 7.)
With respect to the first point, defendants emphasize Congress’
explicit
finding
that
a
“comprehensive
approach
to
fiscal,
management, and structural problems and adjustments that exempts no
part of the Government of Puerto Rico is necessary . . . to
restructure
debts
in
a
fair
and
orderly
process.”
PROMESA
§ 405(m)(4). Defendants maintain that allowing these plaintiffs to
go forward with their claims would work against this “comprehensive
approach” and hinder the work of the Oversight Board by preventing
it from crafting a restructuring that is fair and equitable to all
stakeholders.
To support this position, defendants offered the
testimony of Ms. Elizabeth Abrams, a managing director at Millstein
&
Company
who
leads
the
restructuring
team
for
Puerto
Rico.
Ms. Abrams testified that “[t]he Oversight Board has fairly broad
authority to oversee, for lack of a better word, the negotiations
to set the rules and ultimately to approve the restructuring
agreements
that
are
reached.”
9/23/16
Tr.
at
139:15–18.
Consequently, if the stay were to be vacated here to allow these
plaintiffs to litigate a solution in court, the purpose of the
Oversight
Board
restructuring
139:19–22.
in
facilitating
process
“is
an
organized
effectively
and
preempted.”
coordinated
Id.
at
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
With
emphasize
“the
regard
to
the
advantage
of
a
second
34
point,
consolidated
defendants
approach
restructuring the debts of an entity like Puerto Rico.”
No.
16-1610,
restructuring
Docket
No.
approach,
131
Ms.
at
Abrams
p.
10.)
testified,
A
to
(Civil
consolidated
represents
“the
optimal outcome” and “the most fair and equitable way for the
Commonwealth . . . and for the creditors to determine what the
appropriate recoveries are, given that all of their debt is . . .
effectively
supported
101:25–102:6.
by
the
same
economy.”
9/23/16
Tr.
at
Defendants maintain that one of the benefits of
having an Oversight Board at the center of the PROMESA process is
that it is capable of orchestrating that particular line of attack.
Indulging plaintiffs’ requests for “piecemeal resolution” of their
claims, however, is “antithetical” to the concept of consolidated
restructuring and would therefore frustrate the Board’s ability to
coordinate any approach to resolving Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis
that is based on that principle.
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket
No. 131 at pp. 11-12.)
3.
Balancing the Equities
Having outlined the harms and interests at stake on both
sides of this contentious issue, the Court must now decide whether
any of the plaintiffs in these consolidated cases have carried
their burden of showing adequate “cause” for relief from the
automatic stay pursuant to section 405(e)(2) of PROMESA.
For the
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
35
reasons developed below, the Court concludes that none of them has
done so.
i.
With Respect to Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims,
the Balance of Equities Favors that the Stay be
Maintained
Because
plaintiffs
have
the
initial
burden
of
showing proper cause for relief from stay, see In re Bogdanovich,
292 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2002), the Court begins by critically
analyzing the nature and extent of the harm that they allegedly
face if their requested relief is denied.
As developed above, plaintiffs in each of these
cases assert that leaving the stay in place will subject them to
further constitutional injury.
continued
existence
and
This injury would arise from the
application
of
certain
“unlawful”
provisions of the Moratorium Act and related Executive Orders
issued by the Governor of Puerto Rico.
While the plaintiffs’
interests and arguments are not identical, they collectively assert
that
those
actions
by
the
Commonwealth
unconstitutionally
(i) deprive them of bargained-for contractual rights and security
interests;
(ii)
reorder
priorities
among
creditors;
(iii) discriminate among creditors with similar priorities; and
(iv) attempt to impose a debt restructuring on creditors without
their consent.
The mere fact that plaintiffs bring claims pursuant
to the Federal and Commonwealth Constitutions does not, however,
entitle them to automatic circumvention of the PROMESA stay.
See,
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
36
e.g., In re City of San Bernardino, 2016 WL 5019089, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. 2016) (finding that there is no exception to the Bankruptcy
Code’s automatic stay for constitutional claims, even if that
category of claims is “deserving” of an exemption.)
Rather,
plaintiffs must still satisfy the relevant balancing analysis
applicable to all proceedings seeking relief from stay “for cause
shown.” That is, they must still demonstrate that the harm flowing
from the continuation of those alleged constitutional violations
outweighs the detriment that the Commonwealth would suffer if the
stay were vacated to address them.
In each of these four cases, the evidence suggests
that the true harm resulting to plaintiffs from the continued
existence of the challenged
provisions of the Moratorium Act and
related Executive Orders is largely (if not purely) pecuniary in
nature. For the Brigade plaintiffs, the failure to vacate the stay
to
address
their
constitutional
claims
ultimately
raises
the
specter of preferential transfers of GDB monies to other creditors,
something which inherently decreases their overall share of a
finite pool of GDB assets.
by
the
continued
For National, the harm - brought about
misappropriation
of
$11
million
in
pledged
revenues intended to secure repayment of the bonds that it insures
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
- is predominantly financial.8
37
See 9/22/16 Tr. at 20:12–14 (“I
don’t know what more harm – what more concrete harm could possibly
be shown than people taking our money every single month.”)
the
Trigo
plaintiffs,
the
harm
is
found
in
the
For
continued
delinquency on interest and principal payments owed to them, as
well as a reduction in the market (as opposed to face) value of
their bonds.
See Id. at 29:19–23 (“The Plaintiffs . . . were thus
deprived of their absolute and unconditional . . . right to receive
payment of principal and interest of their bond without notice or
consent.”); id. at 231:21-25 (“Q. Other than . . . the lack of
payment of interest since May, is that the extent of your damages
to date?
A.
Yes.
And the fact that the value of those bonds have
reduced considerably.”)
And for U.S. Bank, the harm consists of
the prolonged diversion of pledged revenues that serve as hard
collateral for UPR bondholders.
No. 3 at p. 6.
See Civil No. 16-2510, Docket
Thus, between the four sets of plaintiffs in these
cases, the true harm in upholding the automatic stay appears to be,
as National suggested at the evidentiary hearing, allowing the
Commonwealth to continue “taking other people’s money away under
color of the Moratorium Act.”
8
See 9/22/16 Tr. at 19:17-19.
National argues that the continued monthly diversion of this
sum of money by the Commonwealth will jeopardize its liquidity and
produce a concomitant downgrade in its credit rating by the rating
agencies.
While those adverse consequences are theoretically
possible, National simply has not alleged sufficient facts to
convince the Court that this harm is anything more than speculative
in nature.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
38
The Court agrees with the Commonwealth defendants,
GDB, PRPFC and UPR that this monetary damage incurred by plaintiffs
during the stay could be quantified and therefore would not be
“permanent” or “irreparable.”
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 131
at p. 13; Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 54 at p. 11; Civil No. 162510, Docket No. 61 at pp. 3-4; see also K-Mart Corp. v. Oriental
Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 914 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[I]f money damages
will fully alleviate harm, then the harm cannot be said to be
irreparable.”)
Rather, this financial harm could effectively be
dealt with through the voluntary negotiations process fostered by
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
39
PROMESA and supervised by the Oversight Board,9 or through future
title III restructuring proceedings.
Any financial loss sustained
over the next few months could also be handled through certain
remedial provisions found within PROMESA, provisions that were
built into the statute precisely to offer greater “protection of
creditors” from the unlawful transfer of their interests.
PROMESA § 407.
See
Section 407(a), for example, provides that “if any
property of any territorial instrumentality . . . is transferred in
violation of applicable law under which any creditor has a valid
9
The Brigade plaintiffs, National and the Trigo plaintiffs
all assert that the Moratorium Act and the Executive Orders have
fundamentally stymied the voluntary negotiations process by
obfuscating the “rules of the road” governing creditor priorities
and the Commonwealth’s existing debt structure. See, e.g., 9/22
Tr. at 15:18-19. (Brigade plaintiffs claiming that the Moratorium
Act “was a hand grenade that was thrown into the restructuring.”).
They further suggest that meaningful, productive levels of
cooperation at the proverbial bargaining table will remain elusive
until
the
Court
resolves
the
constitutionality
of
the
Commonwealth’s challenged actions. See, e.g., Civil No. 16-2101,
Docket No. 75 at p. 12. (National arguing that, “[t]o negotiate
effectively, parties must know whether their interests are secure,
and
this
requires
a
ruling
on
the
Moratorium
Act’s
constitutionality.”)
At the same time, however, the Brigade
plaintiffs admit that they were able successfully to negotiate a
framework - complete with key terms - for a restructuring of GDB in
the aftermath of the Moratorium Act. See 9/22 Tr. at 190:6-10;
199:5-18. Other evidence also suggests - but does not definitively
establish - that negotiations between the parties continued even
after the Moratorium Act was amended in May of 2016. See 9/23 Tr.
at 127:14-17. In light of this evidence, the Court is skeptical
that adjudication of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims is needed to
restore voluntary negotiations between the Commonwealth and its
various creditors. Rather, the Court agrees with the Commonwealth
defendants that, even without resolution of the constitutional
issues, negotiations are possible.
Indeed, the additional,
supervisory involvement of the Oversight Board should make the
possibility of fruitful consensual negotiations all the more
likely.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
40
pledge of, security interest in, or lien on such property . . .
then
the
transferee
shall
be
liable
for
the
value
of
such
property.” Id. § 407(a). Creditors are empowered to enforce their
rights pursuant to section 407(a) “by bringing an action in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico after the
expiration or lifting of the stay of section 405.”
Id. § 407(b).
Taken together, these two provisions establish a mechanism for the
negation and
recovery
of any
improper
transfer
that
harms a
creditor’s interests while the Oversight Board is in existence.
Though
admittedly
imperfect,
that
remedial
vehicle
will
be
available to allow plaintiffs in these cases to undo any monetary
loss that they suffer during the pendency of the automatic stay.
Despite their
arguments
to
the
contrary,
there
is
simply
no
compelling reason why plaintiffs cannot be expected to utilize it.
In contrast to the monetary, fixable harm faced by
plaintiffs if their relief is denied, vacating the stay has the
potential to cause serious prejudice to the Commonwealth defendants
and the
PROMESA
process.
Although
the
Court
disagrees
that
vacating the stay would engender crushing levels of additional work
for the Commonwealth in defending these particular cases, it is
nevertheless mindful of the impact that granting relief here could
have in spawning additional proceedings to vacate the stay.
The
Court is, in other words, sensitive to the possibility of provoking
a massive “wave of litigation” by other creditors who are eager to
obtain relief outside the PROMESA process.
In addition to these
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
41
four consolidated actions, the Court counts ten other lawsuits that
have
been
commenced
against
the
Commonwealth,
its
covered
instrumentalities, and its public officials in this district.10
This fact - combined with the intuitive observation that vacating
the stay “will invite other participants in the litigation process
to seek to do the same,” 9/23/16 Tr. at 223:4–6 - is enough to
convince the Court that granting plaintiffs’ their desired relief
will only embolden more creditors and spark the type of race to the
courthouse that the PROMESA stay was designed to guard against.
See H.R. Rep. No. 114-602, at 52 (2016) (noting that the automatic
stay is “critical” in part because “it preempts a rush to the
courts by aggrieved creditors – an event that could increase the
impact of and accelerate Puerto Rico’s debt crisis.”)
While it is true that the Court would be able to
handle additional lift-stay motions on a case-by-case basis, the
Commonwealth would nevertheless be obligated to respond to each and
every proceeding initiated against it.
The Court agrees with the
Commonwealth defendants, GDB, and PRPFC that the distraction and
expense inherent in this “cascading” litigation would stretch the
10
See Assured Guar. Corp. v. García Padilla, Civil No.
16-1037; Fin. Guar. Ins. Co. v. García Padilla, Civil No. 16-1095;
Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highways and Transp. Auth.,
Civil No. 16-1893; Peaje Investments LLC v. García Padilla, Civil
No. 16-2365; Lex Claims, LLC v. García Padilla, Civil No. 16-2374;
Assured Guar. Corp. v. Puerto Rico, Civil No. 16-2384; Voya
Institutional Trust Co. v. University of Puerto Rico, Civil
No. 16-2519; Altair Global Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC v.
García Padilla, Civil No. 16-2696; Scotiabank de Puerto Rico v.
García Padilla, Civil No. 16-2736; Oriental Bank v. García Padilla,
Civil No. 16-2877.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
42
government’s resources and personnel, and quickly deprive the
Commonwealth of the breathing room that Congress believed it would
need both to fulfill its crucial obligations to the Oversight Board
and to reopen constructive dialogue with its creditors.
See Civil
No. 16-1610, Docket No. 131 at p. 6-7; Civil No. 16-2257, Docket
No. 54 at p. 13-14.)
A denial of stay relief in these cases would
therefore help to advance PROMESA’s explicit purpose of allowing
“the Government of Puerto Rico a limited period of time during
which it
can
focus
its
resources on
negotiating
a
voluntary
resolution with its creditors instead of defending numerous, costly
creditor lawsuits.”
PROMESA § 405(n)(2).
The Court also finds that vacating the stay here
would harm the PROMESA process by undermining the comprehensive,
consolidated restructuring approach that the statute was ultimately
designed to facilitate. In drafting PROMESA, Congress specifically
found that “[a] comprehensive approach to fiscal, management, and
structural problems and adjustments that exempts no part of the
Government of Puerto Rico is necessary . . . for the Government of
Puerto Rico to restructure debts in a fair and orderly process.”
PROMESA § 405(m)(4) (emphasis supplied).
By forcing “all claims
[to be] considered in parallel”, see 9/23/16 Tr. at 222:7–11 (J.
Arnold), this type of approach arguably helps “to ensure all
creditors have a fair opportunity to consensually renegotiate terms
of repayment.”
appear
to
PROMESA § 405(m)(5)(B).
agree
on
the
inherent
The parties themselves
advantage
in
adopting
a
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
43
comprehensive, consolidated approach to dealing with Puerto Rico’s
debt crisis.
See 9/22/16 Tr. at 192:4-6. (“Q. That is, if you want
to
problem
fix
the
and
you
consolidated approach; true?
9/23/16
Tr.
at
can
A.
101:25-102:2
do
it,
you
would
If you could, yes.”)
(“the
optimal
go
for
a
(B. Meyer);
outcome
for
the
Commonwealth is to reach a settlement with all of its . . . holders
of its tax supporte[d] debt at once.”) (E. Abrams); id. at 222:5–11
(J. Arnold).
Allowing the creditors in these actions to litigate
their individual solutions in court, however, would interfere with
the orchestration of this approach.
It would, in essence, permit
them to “jump to the front of the line” to protect their own
interests before other creditors have had the opportunity to defend
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
theirs.11
9/22/16 Tr. at 60:25-61:1.
44
All stakeholders, including
the Oversight Board, collectively deserve the chance to avoid this
piecemeal approach to resolving Puerto Rico’s fiscal emergency and
to allow the PROMESA process to function as designed.
In other
words, they deserve the opportunity to pursue the “ideal” solution
of “solv[ing] the entire puzzle” at once through a comprehensive,
11
Plaintiffs vehemently maintain that they are interested only
in challenging the constitutionality of the Moratorium Act, and
that the adjudication of their claims therefore will not, as
defendants allege, “cleave off value” to the detriment of other
stakeholders. See, e.g., 9/23 Tr. at 143:22-145:10.
In theory,
plaintiffs are correct about this: a decision invalidating the
Moratorium Act would not, on its own, decrease the total assets
available to all creditors in a consolidated, global restructuring.
The Court nevertheless rejects plaintiffs’ attempts to pull the
wool over its eyes. As Dr. Arnold noted:
“[I]t’s natural to think that businesses and their
lawyers are not incentivized just to challenge the
constitutionality of laws for the sake of the
public good to get an answer to that question.
That’s not the end of the line. The end point is
then to use the result of that in order to get
money later. So it’s obvious what the steps in
the chain will be leading down the road from
here.”
9/23 Tr. at 223:19-224:2; see also id. at 144:14-18 (“Presumably,
the creditors are looking . . . for relief from the stay and to
pursue their claims about the constitutionality of the Moratorium
Act so that they can pursue remedies against the issuer.”) (E.
Abrams). Like Dr. Arnold and Ms. Abrams, the Court is skeptical of
plaintiffs’ true motives and agrees with the Commonwealth
defendants, GDB and PRPFC that their ultimate aim is to obtain
money judgments against their borrowers or “to gain an advantage in
anticipated restructuring proceedings.” (Civil No. 16-1610, Docket
No. 131 at p. 15-16; Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 54 at p.11.)
Because the acquisition of that sort of advantage would work
against a comprehensive restructuring that is fair and equitable to
all stakeholders, it would also frustrate Congress’ intent in
designing PROMESA.
The Court is unwilling to risk these
undesirable consequences of a decision to vacate the stay here.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
45
consolidated restructuring approach. See 9/22 Tr. at 191:21-25 (B.
Meyer). Maintaining the stay in these cases would help to preserve
that model option for the benefit of all parties.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds
that the harm to plaintiffs in preventing their constitutional
claims from going forward does not outweigh the likely harm that
vacating the stay to address those claims would cause to both the
Commonwealth defendants and the PROMESA process.
Because the
equities tilt against them, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the
level of “cause” necessary to obtain their requested relief.
Accordingly, their respective requests to lift PROMESA’s automatic
stay are DENIED.12
4.
The Court Need Not Resolve Plaintiffs’ Constitutional
Claims at This Time
Pursuant to the “for cause” standard developed earlier,
the fact that plaintiffs’ threatened harm is of a “lesser” stripe
12
This is not, of course, to say that the Court gives credence
to each of the Commonwealth’s stated harms in its balancing
calculus. It is not, for example, persuaded by the defendants’
postulation of an apocalyptic “death spiral” following invalidation
of the Moratorium Act. Heeding the expert opinion of Dr. Carlos
Colon de Armas that “the Government of Puerto Rico has the revenues
to cover essential services and pay its debt commitments,” the
Court finds the Commonwealth’s hypothesized catastrophe to be a
melodramatic exaggeration divorced from reality. See 9/23 Tr. at
28:11-13. Nevertheless, the Court’s holding regarding the lack of
“cause” in these cases is driven by a simple, reasoned
determination: that the fixable financial harm confronted by the
plaintiffs if the stay remains in effect does not, on balance,
outstrip the harm to the Commonwealth and the PROMESA process that
a decision vacating the stay would engender. That the defendants
advance certain implausible arguments regarding the precise extent
of that harm does not change this basic, dispositive conclusion.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
46
than that faced by the Commonwealth is, on its own, sufficient to
deny plaintiffs their requested relief.
Nevertheless, the Court
identifies yet another reason militating in favor of a decision to
maintain the PROMESA stay in these consolidated actions:
the need
to comply with the principle of constitutional avoidance.13
It is the province of the Court, as an Article III Court,
to interpret the Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”)
This basic reality
has been acknowledged by the parties, who recognize that neither
PROMESA nor the Oversight Board usurps the Court’s authority to
address
constitutional
issues
that
are
brought
before
it.
Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that it is also bound by “[t]he
principle of constitutional avoidance, rooted in Article III as
well as in principles of judicial restraint.”
Sony BMG Music
Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 510 (1st Cir. 2011).
The Court
finds that this principle governs here.
13
The fact that the constitutionality of the Moratorium Act
and Executive Orders is not the issue before the Court in these
lift-stay
proceedings
does
not
render
the
doctrine
of
constitutional avoidance inapposite here. In essence, the Court
has two options before it.
It can:
(1) vacate the stay to
adjudicate plaintiffs’ challenges to the Moratorium Act now, or (2)
maintain the stay and leave room for the PROMESA process and action
by the Oversight Board to deal with those provisions. The former
option necessarily requires the Court to address constitutional
issues, while the latter allows time for those issues to disappear
or to be modified extrajudicially.
Because this second avenue
allows the Court to avoid reaching constitutional questions before
absolutely necessary, the principle of constitutional avoidance is
applicable and counsels in favor of pursuing that option here.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
47
“A fundamental and long-standing principle of judicial
restraint
requires
that
courts
avoid
reaching
constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”
Lyng v.
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988); see
also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011) (emphasizing the
rule that courts must avoid resolving constitutional questions
unnecessarily); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551
U.S. 587, 598 (2007) (“[F]ederal courts . . . must ‘refrai[n] from
passing upon the constitutionality of an act . . . unless obliged
to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function.’”
(quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982))); United
States v. Resendiz–Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 104 (2007) (“‘It is not the
habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.’” (quoting
Ashwander
v.
Tenn.
Valley
Auth.,
297
U.S.
288,
347
(1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring))); Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply
rooted
than
any
other
in
the
process
of
constitutional
adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”)
The courts
of
appeals,
including
the First
Circuit
Court of
Appeals, have consistently heeded this command from the Supreme
Court to avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings.
See, e.g.,
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
48
Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 172 (1st Cir. 2006); United States
v. Coker, 433 F.3d 39, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2005).
Here, the passage of PROMESA and the establishment of the
Oversight Board creates the distinct possibility that any ruling by
the Court regarding the constitutionality of the Moratorium Act and
its related Executive Orders will become moot.
congressional
mandate
responsibility
and
to
access
help
to
Puerto
the
In fulfilling its
Rico
capital
“achieve
markets,”
fiscal
PROMESA
§ 101(a), the Board has the ability, for example, to develop and
approve
a
enforcement
Fiscal
of
Plan
those
that
curtails
challenged
or
even
provisions.
prohibits
It
can
the
also
unilaterally dismantle them by exercising its “sole discretion” to
rescind any law that “alters pre-existing priorities of creditors
in a manner outside the ordinary course of business or inconsistent
with the territory’s constitution or the laws of the territory.”
PROMESA
§
204(c)(3)(B).
Moreover,
in
the
event
that
debt
adjustment proceedings become necessary, the provisions of title
III may effectively unwind the government’s controversial actions.
Section 303(1), for example, prohibits the application of any
territory law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness
or
moratorium
on
instrumentalities
the
to
a
indebtedness
creditor
who
of
the
does
territory
not
composition or moratorium. PROMESA, § 303(1).
consent
or
its
to
the
Section 303(3)
further preempts unlawful executive orders that alter, amend, or
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
49
modify the rights of holders of debt, or that divert funds from one
instrumentality to another or to the territory.
All
of
this
is to
show that,
in
Id. § 303(3).
drafting
PROMESA,
Congress intentionally provided many of the tools needed to deal
effectively with the “unconstitutional” conduct that plaintiffs
collectively challenge here.
Because PROMESA’s provisions and
action by the Oversight Board are capable of “eliminat[ing]” - “or
at the very least materially reshap[ing]” - the constitutional
issues presented in these consolidated actions, it is unnecessary
and premature for the Court to pass judgment on those issues at
this time.
2011).
See Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 660 F.3d at 511 (1st Cir.
Accordingly, declining to vacate the automatic stay here
puts the
Court
in
compliance with
the principle
of
judicial
restraint and its obligation to “avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng, 485
U.S. at 445.
5.
U.S. Bank Does Not Lack Adequate Protection
As discussed above, the Court finds that a secured
creditor’s lack of adequate protection in its collateral can
establish the requisite “cause” for vacating the PROMESA stay
pursuant to section 405(e).
The essential question in Civil
No. 2510 therefore becomes whether U.S. Bank’s interest in UPR’s
pledged revenues is in fact adequately protected against loss from
the Commonwealth’s acts of diversion.
The Court holds that it is.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
50
The term adequate protection is not explicitly defined in
the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts, however, have determined that “[t]he
focus of the [adequate protection] requirement is to protect a
secured creditor from diminution in the value of its interest in
[its] particular
debtor.”
collateral
during
the
period
of
use
by
the
In re Satcon Tech. Corp., 2012 WL 6091160, at *6 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2012); see also In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d
552, 564 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The whole purpose of adequate protection
for a creditor is to insure that the creditor receives the value
for which he bargained prebankruptcy.”); In re Born, 10 B.R. 43, 48
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981) (“The very heart of the concept of adequate
protection is to assure the secured creditor that as the bankruptcy
procedures unfold he will not be faced with a decrease in the value
of his collateral.”); In re Dynaco Corp., 162 B.R. 389, 393 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1993) (“The Court must ensure that, to the extent the debtor
is entitled to use cash collateral, there is adequate protection of
the creditor’s security interest so as to maintain the ‘benefit of
the bargain’ that the secured creditor originally made with the
debtors.”)
Thus, the concept of adequate protection generally
requires a debtor to propose some alternative form of relief that
will preserve the secured creditor’s interest in the collateral,
pending the outcome of bankruptcy proceedings.
Indeed, “[i]t is
well settled that the debtor bears the burden to demonstrate that
a creditor is adequately protected.”
B.R.
391,
408
(Bankr.
E.D.N.Y.
In re S. Side House, LLC, 474
2012).
The
exact
form
of
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
protection, however, is flexible.
51
See In re Monroe Park, 17 B.R.
934, 940 (D. Del. 1982) (noting that adequate protection in the
context of relief from the automatic stay “is a flexible concept
which requires a Court to make decisions on a case-by-case basis,
after full consideration of the peculiar characteristics common to
each proceeding.”)
Such protection may include an additional or
replacement lien, periodic payments, or any other method that
provides the creditor with the “indubitable equivalent” of its
interest in the property.
See 11 U.S.C. § 361.
Here, the evidence unequivocally establishes that the
Commonwealth and UPR have engaged in the diversion of pledged
revenues that serve as hard collateral for the repayment of UPR
bondholders.
See 9/22 Tr. at 147-48.
U.S. Bank maintains that no
acceptable substitute for those pledged revenues is available, only
an unsecured second-priority claim against the Commonwealth, which
is
“grossly
adjudged
inadequate
inability
obligation bonds.”
to
given
pay
the
even
Commonwealth’s
its
asserted
first-priority
and
general
(Civil No. 16-2510, Docket No. 65 at p. 7.)
In
arguing this lack of adequate protection, however, U.S. Bank
unjustifiably discounts provisions of both the Moratorium Act and
PROMESA that effectively preserve its contractual security interest
in UPR’s pledged revenues. See Moratorium Act § 204(a) (protecting
“the rights of a holder to any collateral, security interest or
lien that secures” an obligation that “was otherwise due or became
due before or during an emergency period” and “becomes payable at
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
52
the end of the covered period as a result of this Act.”); PROMESA
§ 405(k) (providing that the automatic stay “does not discharge an
obligation of the Government of Puerto Rico or release, invalidate,
or impair any security interest or lien securing such obligation.”)
Because of these provisions, and because UPR’S pledged revenues are
constantly replenished by an annual stream of student tuition and
fee payments, U.S. Bank continues to hold a security interest in a
stable, recurring source of income that will eventually furnish
funds for the repayment of the UPR bondholders.
Though U.S. Bank
will not receive the pledged revenues during the stay period,14 this
enduring security interest means that it faces only a “delay in
recouping such funds,” not a permanent loss of them.
The Court finds that the existence of this continuing
lien on a perpetual source of revenue satisfies the “flexible”
standard applicable to determinations of adequate protection.
It
therefore holds that the Commonwealth has carried its burden of
showing that the UPR bondholders will, in due time, receive the
“indubitable equivalent” of their current interest in UPR’s pledged
revenues.
14
Accordingly, plaintiff U.S. Bank’s motion to lift the
The fact that U.S. Bank will not have the benefit of
additional UPR pledged revenues during the stay period is of no
real consequence here. U.S. Bank admits that there are sufficient
funds in its reserve account to service the UPR bond debt until
December 2017. See 9/22 Tr. at 33: 17-18. Because UPR bondholders
would not miss a single principal or interest payment during the
pendency of the automatic stay, they will suffer no financial harm
if the stay is maintained.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
53
stay for the purpose of enforcing a preliminary injunction against
UPR is DENIED.
The Court, on the other hand, sees no reason to deny that
part of U.S. Bank’s motion seeking relief from stay in order to
disburse monies held in its reserve account.
The funds held in
that trust account are not subject to the Moratorium Act, see
Moratorium
specifically
Act
§
103(l)(ii),
opposed
this
and
request
the
at
Commonwealth
any
time
has
during
not
these
proceedings. The Court therefore GRANTS that portion of the motion
and VACATES the PROMESA stay for the limited purpose of allowing
U.S. Bank to transfer those funds in accordance with the terms of
the relevant trust agreement.
C.
A Brief Word to the Commonwealth Defendants
In a previous memorandum and order denying other plaintiffs
relief from the PROMESA stay,15 the Court urged the Commonwealth
defendants
not
to
waste
time
in
reinvigorating
consensual
negotiations with its various creditors. The Court reiterates that
same counsel here.
At bottom, the Commonwealth has three - theoretical - options
going forward.
In order to help extricate itself from its current
financial predicament, it can:
(1) make a serious commitment to
negotiate voluntarily with its creditors, (2) seek to be placed
into debt restructuring proceedings pursuant to title III of
15
See Civil No. 16-2365, Docket No. 74; Civil No. 16-2384,
Docket No. 59; Civil No. 16-2696, Docket No. 68.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
PROMESA,
or
bondholders.
(3)
recommence
making
payments
54
to
all
of
its
The third option is undoubtedly the most ideal, and
is expressly permissible during the PROMESA stay period.
See
PROMESA § 405(l) (providing that the automatic stay provision does
not “prohibit the Government of Puerto Rico from making any payment
on any Liability when such payment becomes due.”)
Taking the
Commonwealth at its word that its outstanding debt obligations are
truly not payable, however, that option is an infeasible avenue to
fiscal redemption. Although the second option may become necessary
in the future, debt adjustment proceedings pursuant to title III
must first be certified by the Oversight Board.
§ 302(2).
See PROMESA
This certification, in turn, requires a would-be debtor
to prove to the Board that it has, among other things, made
meaningful attempts to reach a consensual resolution with its
creditors.
See Id. § 206(a) (“The Oversight Board, prior to
issuing a restructuring certification regarding an entity . . .
shall determine, in its sole discretion, that . . . the entity has
made good-faith efforts to reach a consensual restructuring with
creditors.”)
Thus, the second option will not become available to
the Commonwealth and its covered instrumentalities unless and until
the first has been faithfully attempted.
In light of this fact,
the earnest revitalization of the voluntary negotiation process is
the Commonwealth’s only realistic pathway forward.
With the added
benefit and breathing room afforded by the Court’s decision today,
the defendants must not delay in pursuing it.
Civil Nos. 16-1610, 16-2101, 16-2257, 16-2510 (FAB)
III.
55
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Oversight Board’s motion
to intervene in these consolidated actions is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 137; Civil No. 16-2101,
Docket No. 89; Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 65; Civil No. 2510,
Docket No. 72.)
Plaintiffs’ respective requests to vacate the
PROMESA automatic stay pursuant to section 405(e) are also DENIED.
(Civil No. 16-1610, Docket No. 71; Civil No. 16-2101, Docket
No. 36; Civil No. 16-2257, Docket No. 11; Civil No. 16-2510, Docket
No. 2.)
U.S. Bank may, however, proceed to disburse funds held in
its reserve account to UPR bondholders pursuant to the terms of its
trust agreement.
(Civil No. 16-2510, Docket No. 2.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, November 15, 2016.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
United States District Judge
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