Horowitz v. The Ritz Carlton Hotel Company of Puerto Rico, Inc. et al
Filing
103
OPINION AND ORDER re 60 Motion for Summary Judgment; re 70 Motion in Limine; re 80 Motion for Leave to File; and re 92 Motion in Limine. Luxury Hotels' motion for summary judgment is DENIED, Luxury Hotel's motions in limine are DEN IED WIHTOUT PREJUDCE, and Horowitz's motion to amend his statement of uncontested material facts is DENIED. The pretrial conference is set for August 31, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. and trial is set for September 17, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. The parties will file their respective proposed voir dire questions and proposed jury instructions no later than August 24, 2018. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 08/02/2018. (brc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DAMOND B. HOROWITZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
LUXURY HOTELS INTERNATIONAL OF
PURETO RICO, INC.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Luxury Hotels International of
Puerto
Rico
(“Luxury
Hotels”)’s
motion
for
summary
judgment
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 (“Rule 56”), Luxury
Hotel’s motion in limine to exclude expert witnesses Paul Ullucci
(“Ullucci”) and Edward Eichner (“Eichner”), and Luxury Hotel’s
motion in limine to exclude documents relating to the indoor
cycling (“spinning”) industry.
(Docket Nos. 60, 70 and 92.)
Plaintiff Damond B. Horowitz (“Horowitz”)’s moves to amend his
statement of uncontested material facts.
(Docket No. 80.)
For
the reasons set forth below, Luxury Hotel’s motion for summary
judgment is DENIED, Luxury Hotel’s motions in limine are DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Horowitz’s motion to amend his statement of
uncontested material facts is DENIED.
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
I.
2
Luxury Hotel’s Motion for Summary Judgment
This
litigation
concerns
a
single
cause
of
action
for
negligence arising from an injury sustained during an indoor
cycling class.
The following facts are deemed admitted by both
parties pursuant to Local Rule 56.
Loc. R. 56(e); P.R. Am. Ins.
Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 130-31 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing
Loc. R. 56(e)). 1
A.
Background
Luxury Hotels operates and manages the fitness center at
the Ritz-Carlton Hotel (“Ritz Carlton”) in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
(Docket No. 19 at p. 2.) 2
the Ritz Carlton.
On August 4, 2011, Horowitz checked into
(Docket No. 60, Ex. 2 at p. 2.)
The following
1
Local Rule 56 governs the factual assertions made by the parties in the context
of summary judgment. Loc. R. 56; Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007).
The Rule “relieve[s] the district court of any
responsibility to ferret through the record to discern whether any material
fact is genuinely in dispute.” CMI Capital Market Inv. v. González-Toro, 520
F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008). The movant must submit factual assertions in “a
separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered
paragraphs.” Loc. Rule 56(b). The nonmovant must “admit, deny, or qualify the
facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered
paragraph of the moving party’s statement of facts.” Loc. R. 56(c). The movant
may reply and admit, deny, or qualify the opponent’s newly-stated facts in a
separate statement and by reference to each numbered paragraph.
Loc. Rule
56(d).
Facts that are properly supported “shall be deemed admitted unless
properly controverted.” Loc. R. 56(e); P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 603 F.3d 125, 130
(1st Cir. 2010).
2
Horowitz’s amended complaint named both the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company of
Puerto Rico, Inc. (“Ritz Carlton Company”) and Luxury Hotels as defendants.
(Docket No. 19.)
Subsequently, Horowitz moved to dismiss the Ritz Carlton
Company from this litigation because Luxury Hotels operates and manages the
fitness center where Horowitz attended the spinning class, not the Ritz-Carlton
Company. (Docket No. 26.) Id. Accordingly, this Court dismissed Horowitz’s
claims against the Ritz Carlton Company without prejudice on April 10, 2017.
(Docket No. 28.)
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
3
day, Horowitz attended a forty-five minute spinning class at the
Ritz Carlton’s fitness center.
(Docket No. 19 at p. 3.) 3
On
August 7, 2011, Horowitz notified Ritz Carlton personnel that he
suffered from soreness and experienced difficulty walking.
p. 4.
Id.
Id. at
An on-call physician treated Horowitz at his hotel room.
That same night, Horowitz visited the emergency room at
Ashford Presbyterian Community Hospital (“Ashford Presbyterian”).
Id.
at
pp.
4—5.
Horowitz
received
medical
treatment
until
August 8, 2011, “discharging [himself] against the advice of [his]
attending physician.”
Horowitz
condition
allegedly
(Docket No. 60, Ex. 3.)
suffers
from
resulting
August 7, 2011 spinning class.
from
rhabdomyolysis,
his
a
participation
(Docket No. 19 at p. 5.)
medical
in
the
During
Horowitz’s vacation in Puerto Rico, he experienced “excruciating
pain and a great deal of discomfort.”
Id. at p. 8.
He purportedly
continues to endure bilateral weakness, bilateral intermittent
pain, and bilateral discomfort.
Id.
Horowitz seeks $1,250,000.00
in economic damages from Luxury Hotels, litigation costs, and
attorney’s fees pursuant to Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil
3
Horowitz alleges that the spinning class instructor, Josué González
(“González”), failed to warn Horowitz “to not overexert himself.”
(Docket
No. 68, Ex. 2. at p. 4.)
Luxury Hotels, however, maintains that González
“cautioned participants to exercise at their own paces and levels.” (Docket
No. 69, Ex. 4 at p. 6.) This discrepancy is a question of fact for the jury to
resolve.
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
4
Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, sections 5141 et seq. (“Article
1802”).
Id. at p. 7.
Luxury Hotels moves for summary judgment because, it
argues, Horowitz “lacks adequate, credible, expert evidence to
establish the alleged industry standards and deviations.”
No. 60, Ex. 5 at p-. 1—2.)
(Docket
Horowitz opposed summary judgement,
and Luxury Hotels replied.
(Docket Nos. 69 and 74.)
After
retaining new counsel, Horowitz moved to amend his statement of
uncontested material facts “in the interest of factual accuracy.”
(Docket Nos. 80 and 81.)
The proposed amendments to his statement
of uncontested material facts are inconsequential.
Horowitz
initially
admitted
that
Presbyterian “at around 11:00 p.m.”
Docket
No.
69,
Ex.
1
at
p.
2.)
he
For instance,
arrived
at
Ashford
(Docket No. 60, Ex. 1 at p. 3;
The
proposed
statement
of
uncontested material facts states that the “[a]rrival time was
actually
earlier
than
11
p.m.”
(Docket
No.
81
at
p.
2.)
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Horowitz’s motion to amend his
statement
of
uncontested
material
facts
because
the
proposed
amendments are insignificant, and the amendment would be futile.
B.
Jurisdiction
The
Court
has
jurisdiction
over
this
civil
action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), because the dispute is between
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
5
citizens of different states and the matter in controversy exceeds
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
C.
Standard
A court will grant summary judgment if “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“A
dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a
reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving
party.
A fact is material if it has the potential of determining
the outcome of the litigation.”
Dunn v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 761
F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).
The
role
of
summary
judgment
is
to
“pierce
the
boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties’ proof in order
to determine whether trial is actually required.”
Tobin v. Fed.
Exp. Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 450 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citation
omitted).
The party moving for summary judgment shoulders the
initial burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact” with definite and competent evidence.
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Celotex
Once a properly
supported motion has been presented, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant “to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could
find in [its] favor.”
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless
Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Summary
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
6
judgment is appropriate if the nonmovant’s case rests merely upon
“conclusory allegations, improbable references, and unsupported
speculation.”
Forestier-Fradera v. Municipality of Mayagüez, 440
F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006).
D.
Discussion
Horowitz
negligence.
sets
forth
a
single
(Docket Nos. 19 and 24.)
cause
of
action
for
A federal court sitting in
a diversity action must apply the substantive law of the forum
where the action is filed.
See Rodríguez v. Señor Frog=s de la
Isla, Inc., 642 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citations
omitted).
Consequently, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil
Code governs this Court’s analysis.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
§§ 5141 et seq.
1.
Article 1802
Article
1802
provides
for
a
cause
of
action
resulting from an individual’s negligent act. Isla Nena Air Servs.
V. Cessna Aircraft Co., 449 F.3d 85, 88 (1st. Cir. 2006) (citing
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141). 4
To prevail on a negligence
claim, plaintiffs must establish three elements:
(1) an injury,
(2) a breach of duty, and (3) proximate causation of the injury.
Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st
4 Article 1802 states that “[a] person who by an act or omission causes damage
to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.” P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 5141.
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
7
Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Generally, “duty is
defined by the general rule that one must act as would a prudent
person under the circumstances.”
Id.
(citation omitted); see
e.g., Wojciechowicz v. United States, 582 F.3d 57, 67 (1st Cir.
2009) (holding that the “actions of the [air traffic] controller
must be judged against what a reasonable person, under the same or
similar circumstances, would have done”).
law, a duty of care may arise:
Pursuant to Puerto Rico
(1) by statute or regulation,
(2) “as the result of a special relationship between the parties,”
or (3) “as the result of a traditionally recognized duty of care
particular to the situation.”
De Jesús-Adorno v. Browning Ferris
Indus., 160 F.3d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1998). 5
a
duty
of
care
Article 1802.
is
fatal
to
a
cause
of
Failure to establish
action
pursuant
to
See De Jesús-Adorno v. Browning Ferris Indus., 992
F. Supp. 121, 123 (D.P.R. 1998) (Pieras, J.) (“As a simple matter
5
This Opinion and Order concerns only the existence and scope of the applicable
duty of care. Wojciechowicz, 582 F.3d at 66 (holding that “[t]he existence and
the extent of a duty are questions of law”) (citation omitted); Woods-Leber v.
Hyatt Hotels of P.R., 951 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (D.P.R. 1996) (Domínguez, J.)
(holding that “even where there is a duty of care, the Court must still determine
what degree of care is required by considering the foreseeability of an
injury”). Whether a defendant breached his or her duty of care is question of
fact falling within the province of the jury. See Situ v. O’Neill, 124 F. Supp.
3d 34, 46 (D.P.R. 2015) (Gelpí, J.) (denying summary judgment in a negligence
action because “genuine material factual disputes exist as the breach of duty
element of the present tort claim, the resolution of which must be left to the
trier of fact”) (citing Marshall v. Pérez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 849 (1st Cir.
1987)).
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
8
of tort law, if BFI had no duty to repair the hole, it cannot be
held liable for its failure to do so.”).
2.
Luxury Hotels Owed Horowitz a Duty of Care
As the manager and operator of the Ritz Carlton
fitness
center,
Luxury
Hotels
owed
Horowitz
a
duty
of
care.
Article 1802 generally “does not require a plaintiff to state a
specific duty on the part of the defendant.”
Ramírez-Pomales v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F. Supp. 913, 924 n.2 (D.P.R. 1986)
(Lafitte, J.), aff’d, 839 F.2d 1 (1988); see Mateo v. Empire Gas
Co.,
No.
13-1762,
2016
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
126803
*12
(D.P.R.
Sept. 16, 2016) (García, J.) (“As a wholesaler and supplier of
propane gas, Empire Gas, and its filing plant, City Gas, owed a
duty of care to those who may have encountered their propane gas
to act as a reasonably prudent company under the circumstances,
and
to
exercise
due
diligence
to
avoid
foreseeable
risks.”)
Indeed, Puerto Rico law presumes that “every man owes to his fellow
creatures that degree of care and vigilance as will enable him to
enjoy his life with safety.”
Vázquez-Filippetti, 504 F.3d at 50,
n.2 (quoting Pérez-Escolar v. Collado, 90 D.P.R. 806 (1964)).
No party denies the existence of a duty of care.
Rather, Luxury Hotels contends that “the duty of care or standard
applicable to innkeepers, hotels, fitness centers, gyms, spinning
instructors
or
spinning
professionals
[is]
so
technical
or
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
9
specialized in nature that [it has] to be established through
credible, sound, expert testimony.”
p. 10.
(Docket No. 60, Ex. 5 at
The Court disagrees.
Luxury Hotel’s motion for summary judgment hinges
on
whether
the
evidence
submitted
by
Horowitz
pursuant to an unduly narrow duty of care.
is
sufficient
In its motion for
summary judgment, Luxury Hotels cites medical malpractice cases
for the proposition that “courts recognize matters as being so
technical or specialized in nature that expert evidence is required
of the party bearing the burden of proof to be able to sustain a
decision by the trier of fact.”
Id. at p. 5 (citing Bradley v.
Sugarbaker, 809 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that the
district court erred by excluding expert testimony “relevant to
what the standard of care requires when a physician engages in a
discussion of alternatives with his patient”)).
Luxury Hotels’ misapprehension of the applicable
duty of care stems from Horowitz’s amended complaint.
sets forth two divergent duties of care.
Horowitz
(Docket No. 19.)
First,
Horowitz alleges that Luxury Hotels deviated from a litany of
standards pertaining to indoor cycling.
7.)
(Docket No. 19 at pp. 5-
According to Horowitz, Luxury Hotels is negligent because:
(a)
they
never
screened
[Horowitz]
to
assess
[Horowitz’s] suitability or level of expertise in
spinning; (b) never informed [Horowitz] of any of the
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
10
risks to which he was about to be exposed, including the
very serious risk (as a first-time spinner) of
rhabdomyolysis; (c) even though [Horowitz] had never
previously engaged in any spinning at all, [Luxury
Hotels] placed [Horowitz] in a non-beginner class along
with much more advanced spinners; and (d) . . . placed
[Horowitz] in a 45-minute class, which was 50 percent
longer in duration than the 30-minute limit which
spinning provides/professionals had been cautioned and
urged to adhere to for first-time spinners.
Id. at p. 7.
professional
The standards articulated by Horowitz derive from
indoor
cycling
literature
Instructor News” and “wwww.spinning.com.”
including
“Spinning
Id. at p. 6.
Second,
Horowitz, adopts a more generalized duty of care, claiming that
Luxury Hotels “owed [Horowitz] the basic duty of care that an
innkeeper owes it guests.”
(Docket No. 19 at p. 7.)
This Court
concurs with the latter.
Luxury Hotels and Horowitz’s contention that the
applicable duty of care is specific to the spinning industry is
misguided.
In actions involving complex subject matters, such as
negligent design defect and medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs
must set forth expert testimony establishing the applicable duty
of care.
See Prado-Álvarez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 313 F.
Supp.
61,
2d
73
(D.P.R.
2004)
(Pieras,
J.)
(dismissing
with
prejudice negligent design defect claim because “[p]laintiffs have
not named an expert on cigarette design who could testify that
Defendant was negligent in the design of its cigarettes”) aff’d,
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
405 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2005);
11
Rodríguez-Díaz v. Seguros Triple-S,
636 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of medical a
malpractice action pursuant to Article 1802 because plaintiff
failed to “establish, through expert evidence, the degree of care
and scientific knowledge required by the profession in the specific
type of patient”) (citation omitted).
Nothing in the record suggests that a negligence
action stemming from a spinning class implicates a duty of care
requiring expert testimony, rather than the general “obligation to
anticipate and take measures against a danger that is reasonably
foreseeable.”
Woods-Leber, 951 F. Supp. at 1035.
Horowitz cites
no statute or regulation suggesting that the duty of care for
fitness
centers
testimony.
offering
spinning
classes
requires
expert
Luxury Hotels named Douglas Baumgarten (“Baumgarten”)
as an expert in exercise science because he is “quite familiar
with Spinning and other forms of indoor cycling exercise.” (Docket
No. 69, Ex. 4 at p. 2.)
Baumgarten asserts that “there are
virtually no statutes regarding exercise instruction, as there are
myriad types of exercise programs and many different ways of
instruction or coaching participants.”
Id. at p. 3.
The parties
present no reason to hold Luxury Hotels liable for negligence
because it allegedly deviated from the standards set forth in
indoor cycling publications including “Spinning Instructor News”
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
and “wwww.spinning.com.”
12
(Docket No. 19 at p. 6.)
Citation to
trade magazines and websites for spinning enthusiasts does not
establish the obligatory duty of care for indoor cycling classes
within the meaning of Article 1802.
The duty of care in the context of a spinning class
need not correspond to technical, industry-specific standards.
See e.g., Gass v. Marriot Hotel Servs., 558 F.3d 419, 430 (6th
Cir.
2009)
(“Expert
testimony
is
not
necessary
to
allow
a
reasonable jury to conclude that such actions are negligent,
inasmuch as an ordinary person understands that it is unacceptable
to enter a place where another is residing and fill that place
with airborne poison, without providing for evacuation of the
inhabitants,
appropriate
ventilation,
or
taking
other
precautions.”); Bonilla v. New Jersey, No. 15-6795, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112958 *28 (D.N.J. July 19, 2017) (“Here, the Court finds
that the level of care to which Defendants must be held in training
their employees on how to operate the Machine is not so esoteric
as to require expert testimony—it concerns the fairly mundane
question of the care necessary in dealing with a large, mechanical
device.”).
The relationship between the parties demonstrates
that Luxury Hotels owed Horowitz the duty of care that an innkeeper
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
owes its guests.
13
Article 1057 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code
provides that:
The fault or negligence of the debtor consists of the
commission of steps which may be required by the
character of the obligation and which may pertain to the
circumstances of the persons, time and place. Should the
obligation not state what conduct is to be observed in
its fulfilment, that observed by the good father or a
family shall be required.
Laws P.R. Ann. tit. 31, § 3021.
Courts impose a heightened duty
of care on innkeepers pursuant to Article 1057.
Chapman v. E.S.J.
Towers, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 571, 573 (D.P.R. 1992) (Pérez-Giménez,
J.); Grasis v. Win Access, Inc., No. 13-1226, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67654 * (D.P.R. Mar. 28, 2017) (Carreño-Coll, Mag. J.) (“Under
Puerto Rico law, a hotel-keeper owes its guests a heightened duty
of care and protection.”) (citation omitted).
“any
person,
firm,
corporation,
or
other
An innkeeper is
type
of
business
organization, engaged for profit, in the operation of a hotel.”
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 711(b).
By offering spinning classes to
hotel guests, Luxury Hotels engaged “in the operation of a hotel.”
Id.; see Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 545, 458 (1st Cir.
1995) (holding that a hotel-operated taxi “must be viewed as an
innkeeper” because the taxi driver was “an employee of the hotel,
performing a private service for a private purpose”).
Indeed,
both parties acknowledge that the duty of care belonging to an
innkeeper is applicable in this action.
(Docket No. 19 at p. 7;
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
14
Docket No. 60, Ex. 5 at p. 10.)
As an innkeeper for purposes of
Article 1802, Luxury Hotels owed Horowitz a duty to “maintain [the
spinning class] in such a safe condition that one who is induced
to enter the premises will not suffer any damage.”
Maldonado v.
K-Mart Corp., No. 97-1268, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23555 *8 (D.P.R.
Oct. 18 2000) (citing Soc. Ganaciales v. González Padín Co., 117
D.P.R. 94 (1986)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Luxury Hotels
owed Horowitz the same duty of care that an innkeeper owes its
guests.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3021.
This Court DENIES Luxury
Hotels’ motion for summary judgment.
II.
Luxury Hotel’s Motions in Limine
Luxury Hotels requests that the Court preclude any reference
to Ullucci and Eichner at trial.
(Docket No. 70.)
Horowitz
designated Ullucci as an expert witness on March 24, 2018, more
than a week after the deadline to do so. (Docket No. 49 at p. 6;
Docket No. 55 at p. 2.)
Hotels’
motion
to
Accordingly, the Court granted Luxury
strike
Ullucci,
holding
that
Horowitz
“is
precluded from utilizing Dr. Paul Ullucci, Jr. as an expert witness
or otherwise at trial.”
(Docket No. 56.)
Horowitz named Eichner
as an expert before the conclusion of discovery, but subsequently
withdrew Eichner’s expert witness designation.
p. 2.)
(Docket No. 62 at
Luxury Hotels requests that the Court broaden its previous
order by “precluding Dr. Cardona-Cancio, [Horowtiz], or any of the
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
15
witnesses . . . from making any direct or indirect reference to
the opinion of Ullcci and Eichner.”
The comprehensive preclusion of any reference to Ullucci and
Eichner is unwarranted.
Luxury Hotels provides no basis for the
Court to expand its previous ruling regarding the exclusion of
Ullucci, or to preclude any reference to Eichner.
The Court’s
order prohibiting Horowitz from utilizing Ullucci as an expert at
trial is sufficient.
(Docket No. 56.)
preclude
designated
Horowitz’s
Luxury Hotels’ request to
expert,
Néstor
Cardona-Cancio
(“Cardona”), from “making any direct or indirect reference to the
opinions of Drs. Ullucci, Jr. and Eichner” is unnecessary. (Docket
No. 70 at p. 4.)
This Court need not bar Cardona from referring
to Ullucci and Eichner.
Cardona’s
testimony
must
comply
with
Federal
Rules
of
Evidence 702 and 703 (“Rule 702” and “Rule 703,” respectively).
Pursuant
to
Rule
702,
a
witness
may
testify
to
scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge if it “will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.”
Fed. R. Evid. 702; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (holding that Daubert applies to
technical and other specialized expert testimony as well as to
scientific testimony.)
Rule 703 sets forth an exception to the
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
hearsay
exclusion,
16
providing
that
“[f]acts
or
data
that
are
otherwise inadmissible shall not he disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the Court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the
expert’s
opinion
substantially
effect.”
outweighs
their
prejudicial
Fed. R. Evid. 703.
In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, a trial
court “must perform a gatekeeping function and decide whether the
proposed testimony, including the methodology employed by the
witness in arriving at the proffered opinion, rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the facts of the case.”
Cummings v.
Standard Register Co., 265 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal
citations omitted).
Whether an expert satisfies these criteria is
a “case-specific inquiry and . . . a question that the law grants
the trial judge broad latitude to determine.”
citation omitted).
Id. (internal
Luxury Hotels may set forth any objection it
may have regarding Ullucci and Eichner in the context of trial.
In its second motion in limine, Luxury Hotels moved to exclude
the following:
(1) e-mails between Horowitz and insurance firm
AIG, (2) an expert report by Eichner, (3) Eichner’s professional
qualifications,
(Docket No. 92.)
and
(3)
spinning
articles
and
publications.
The Court will address the admissibility of this
Civil No. 16-2871 (FAB)
evidence
at
trial.
17
Accordingly,
this
Court
DENIES
WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Luxury Hotels’ motions in limine.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Luxury Hotels’ motion for
summary judgment is DENIED, Luxury Hotel’s motions in limine are
DENIED
WIHTOUT
PREJUDCE,
and
Horowitz’s
motion
statement of uncontested material facts is DENIED.
to
amend
his
The pretrial
conference and trial are set for August 31, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. and
September 17, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. respectively.
The parties will
file their respective proposed voir dire questions and proposed
jury instructions no later than August 24, 2018.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, August 2, 2018.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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