DeMario et al v. Lamadrid-Maldonado et al

Filing 310

OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth in this Opinion and Order, the Municipality of Hormigueros and its insurer Triple-S's Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket No. 250 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims against the Municipality of Hormigueros and Triple S Propiedad, Inc. are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 1/18/2023.(mrr)

Case 3:16-cv-02897-RAM Document 310 Filed 01/18/23 Page 1 of 19

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

DINO DEMARIO, et al.
Plaintiffs
v.

CIVIL NO. 16-2897(RAM)

ANTHONY LAMADRID-MALDONADO, et al.
Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on co-defendants the
Municipality of Hormigueros (the “Municipality” or “Hormigueros”)
and

Triple

“Defendants”)
Having

S

Propiedad,
motion

reviewed

the

for

Inc.’s
summary

parties’

(“Triple-S”),
judgment.

submissions,

(collectively

(Docket
the

No.

Court

250).
GRANTS

Defendants’ request for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 250, 263,
and 278).
I.

BACKGROUND

Dino DeMario and Cheryl Steele (collectively "Plaintiffs")
are the parents of the late Nicholas DeMario. (Docket No. 99 ¶¶ 34). On November 1, 2015, Nicholas DeMario was assisting his friends
with pushing their vehicle, a Mazda Protege with license plate
number 1KG-492, which had suffered a mechanical breakdown on a
road in the Municipality. Id. ¶ 16. Anthony Lamadrid-Maldonado

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2

(“Lamadrid”) was driving a Mitsubishi Eclipse with license plate
number

GLG-871

in

the

same

direction.

Id.

¶

17.

Lamadrid’s

Mitsubishi hit the rear end of the Mazda and Nicholas DeMario was
pronounced dead at the scene. Id.
On October 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against
Lamadrid,

the

Municipality,

the

Puerto

Rico

Electric

Power

Authority (“PREPA”), the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation
Authority (“PRHTA”), and unnamed insurance companies, seeking
emotional damages as well as medical and funeral expenses caused
by the loss of their son. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs subsequently
filed three (3) amended complaints incorporating as co-defendants
various insurance companies, including Triple-S. (Docket Nos. 2 ¶
10; 61 ¶¶ 11-12; 99 ¶ 13).1
Essentially, Plaintiffs assert the street light poles in the
area where the accident occurred were not energized. (Docket No.
99 ¶ 26). Plaintiffs further allege these street light poles were
under the jurisdiction, ownership, care, custody and control of
the Municipality, PREPA, and the PRHTA. Id. Thus, they maintain
said co-defendants negligently failed to maintain the street light
poles functional and are thereby liable for their son’s death. Id.
¶¶ 29-30.

1

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at Docket No. 99 is the
operative complaint.

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3

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docket No.
250). Defendants assert the area where the accident occurred
corresponded to the PRHTA’s construction project titled Project
AC-200213

(“Project

AC-200213”

or

“Project”).

Id.

at

15-16.

Defendants posit that the Municipality did not have control or
ownership of the Project, and thus had no obligation to provide
illumination to the area of the accident. Id.
Plaintiffs
Judgment.

filed

(Docket

No.

an

Opposition

263).

They

to

aver

Motion

that

the

for

Summary

Municipality

requested, and ultimately received, authorization from the PRHTA
to energize the public lighting in a portion of the Project. Id.
¶¶ 3-4. Moreover, the Municipality reached an agreement with PREPA
for the wiring of 12 light poles. Id. ¶ 5. In light of this,
Plaintiffs

maintain

that

the

Municipality

made

a

unilateral

declaration of intention and had a subsequent obligation regarding
the energization of the Project or compensate for damages caused
by failing to do so. Id. ¶¶ 10-14.
Lastly, Defendants replied to Plaintiffs' opposition. (Docket
No. 278). Therein, Defendants maintain that although it was not
the Municipality’s obligation, it illuminated the intersection of
Roads 319 and 344, which did not cover the area of the accident.
Id.

at

2-3.

Furthermore,

Defendants

argue

that

the

elements

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4

required for a unilateral declaration of intention are not present.
Id. at 3-7.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that (1)
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact; and (2) they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence about the fact is
such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of
the non-moving party.” Thompson v. Coca–Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168,
175 (1st Cir. 2008). A fact is considered material if it “may
potentially ‘affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’”
Albite v. Polytechnic Univ. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d
191, 195 (D.P.R. 2014) (quoting Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d
657, 660–661 (1st Cir. 2000)).
The moving party has “the initial burden of demonstrat[ing]
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with definite and
competent evidence.” Mercado-Reyes v. City of Angels, Inc., 320 F.
Supp. 344, at 347 (D.P.R. 2018) (quotation omitted). The burden
then shifts to the nonmovant, to present “competent evidence to
rebut the motion.” Bautista Cayman Asset Co. v. Terra II MC & P,
Inc., 2020 WL 118592, at 6* (quoting Méndez-Laboy v. Abbott Lab.,
424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2005)). A nonmoving party must show “that

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5

a trialworthy issue persists.” Paul v. Murphy, 2020 WL 401129, at
*3 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
While a court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the

non-movant,

it

will

disregard

conclusory

allegations,

unsupported speculation and improbable inferences. See Johnson v.
Duxbury,

Massachusetts,

931

F.3d

102,

105

(1st

Cir.

2019).

Moreover, the existence of “some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 (2007)
(quotation omitted). Hence, a court should review the record in
its entirety and refrain from making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000).
In this District, summary judgment is also governed by Local
Rule 56. See L. CV. R. 56(c). Per this Rule, an opposing party
must “admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for
summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the
moving party’s statement of material facts.” Id. Furthermore,
unless the fact is admitted, the opposing party must support each
denial or qualification with a record citation. Id.
Additionally, Local Rule 56(c) allows an opposing party to
submit additional facts “in a separate section.”

L. CV. R. 56(c).

Given that the plain language of Local Rule 56(c) specifically

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Civil No. 16-2897 (RAM)

6

requires that any additional facts be stated in a separate section,
parties are prohibited from incorporating numerous additional
facts within their opposition. See Natal Pérez v. Oriental Bank &
Trust, 291 F. Supp. 3d 215, 218-219 (D.P.R. 2018) (quoting Carreras
v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) and
Malave–Torres v. Cusido, 919 F.Supp. 2d 198, 207 (D.P.R. 2013)).
If a party opposing summary judgment fails to comply with the
rigors that Local Rule 56(c) imposes, “a district court is free,
in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving
party's facts as stated.” Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, litigants ignore this
rule at their peril. See Natal Pérez, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 219
(citations omitted).
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
To make findings of fact, the Court analyzed Defendants’
Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (Docket No. 250-1) and
Plaintiffs’ Opposing Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 2631). After only crediting material facts that are properly supported
by a record citation2 and uncontroverted, the Court makes the
following findings of fact:3

2

Any supporting documents not in the English language and lacking a certified
English translation were not considered. See L. CV. R. 5(c).

3

References to a specific Finding of Fact shall be cited in the following
manner: (Fact ¶ _).

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A. The accident
1. On November 1, 2015 at approximately 4:17 a.m., there was an
accident at the Exit of Road #2 at Km. 162.7 in Hormigueros.
(Docket No. 250-1 ¶ 1).
2. The accident involved two vehicles: (1) a 2000 Mitsubishi
Eclipse, license plate number GLG-871, driven by co-defendant
Anthony Lamadrid-Maldonado; and (2) a 1991 Mazda Protege,
license

plate

number

IKG-492

driven

by

Milaiza

Martiz-

Cardona. (Docket Nos. 250-1 ¶ 1; 266-1).
3. As a result of the accident, Nicholas DeMario, who was
assisting to push Milaiza Martiz-Cardona’s Mazda after it
suffered a mechanical breakdown, died at the scene. (Docket
No. 250-1 ¶ 3).
B. Eng. Ivelisse Pérez’s Deposition Testimony
4. On April 16, 2018, Eng. Ivelisse Pérez (“Eng. Pérez”), an
engineer

for

the

PRHTA

for

approximately

27

years,

was

deposed. (Docket No. 250-1 ¶ 5).
5. Eng. Pérez served as a regional director for the PRHTA from
February 2009 through June 2012. Id. ¶ 7.
6. As a regional director, she had knowledge of what was going
on in different PRHTA projects. Id. ¶ 8.
7. Eng. Pérez testified that during her tenure as a regional
director,

the

PRHTA’s

construction

project

AC-200213

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Civil No. 16-2897 (RAM)

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(“Project AC-200213” or the “Project”) was in transition from
construction to liquidation or closeout. Id. ¶ 7.
8. Project AC-200213 encompassed the area where the accident
occurred. Id. ¶ 6.
9. The plans for the Project included installing and wiring light
posts. Id. ¶ 9.
10. Eng. Pérez testified that the Project was never energized by
PREPA. (Docket No. 250-3 at 8, 10-11).
11. Project AC-200213 was not energized in part because the wiring
system

installed

was

stolen

during

the

Project’s

construction, and because work regarding some substations was
not performed. (Docket Nos. 250-1 ¶¶ 11-13; 250-3 at 10).
12. The PRHTA did not restore the stolen cables because it did
not reach an agreement with the contractor. (Docket No. 2501 ¶ 15).
13. Eng. Pérez did not know why the PRHTA did not solve the issue
to energize the Project but noted it was a determination for
upper management. Id. ¶ 14.
14. She further explained that during the construction phase, the
PRHTA is the custodian of the project and once construction
is over and the final inspection is conducted, the Department
of Transportation and Public Works (“DTOP” for its Spanish

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acronym) becomes the custodian for the road and is responsible
for its maintenance. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
C. Yaritza Cordero’s Deposition Testimony
15. On July 17, 2018, PRHTA employee Yaritza Cordero (“Cordero”)
was deposed. Cordero began working as a project administrator
at the Mayagüez regional offices in 2002 and handles the
construction

of

roads,

bridges,

signing

and

emergency

projects. (Docket Nos. 250-1 ¶ 19; 250-4 at 4).
16. She worked on the process of liquidation for Project AC200213. (Docket Nos. 250-1 ¶ 20; 250-4 at 6).
17. Cordero testified that if vandalism occurs in a project, the
contractor, who is required to have the proper insurance
policy, is supposed to file an insurance claim and remains
responsible for any vandalism that occurs to the material
used while the project is underway. (Docket No. 250-1 ¶¶ 2123).
18. With regards to the Project, Cordero testified that the
contractor installed the cable work to power the illumination
system but it was stolen. The contractor had insurance and
was asked to cover the reinstallation, but the cables were
stolen more than once. The contractor ultimately submitted a
new proposal with new numbers because the cost of cable had
increased. (Docket Nos. 250-1 ¶¶ 24-25; 250-4 at 14-15).

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10

19. The PRHTA did not accept the new price because it was bloated
and thus did not reach an agreement with the contractor.
(Docket No. 250-1 ¶¶ 26, 28).
20. She testified that when she entered the Project, she was
informed that the lighting was not going to be installed
because

the

agency

was

not

going

to

repay

for

the

installation. Id. ¶ 27.
D. Miguel Santiago-Del Valle’s Deposition Testimony
21. On August 7, 2018, Miguel Santiago-Del Valle (“Santiago”),
who had served as PREPA’s Inspector General from 2001 until
December 30, 2017, was deposed. (Docket Nos. 250-1 ¶ 29; 2505 at 4)
22. As Inspector General, Santiago was assigned to the Mayagüez
region and inspected all the systems that were built to be
connected to PREPA. Id.
23. He testified that in his experience, the contractor and the
owner are responsible for ensuring that materials are not
stolen from the project. (Docket No. 250-1 ¶ 31).
24. The reason provided to Santiago for why the system was not
being wired is that the installed cables were stolen and that
the contractor submitted a price increase the PRHTA could not
accept. Id. ¶ 32.

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11

E. The Municipality’s Request to Energize an Intersection
25. In September 2011, the Mayor of Hormigueros, Mayor Pedro J.
García Figueroa (“Mayor García”) requested authorization from
the PRHTA and Eng. Pérez to energize the luminaries located
in the intersection of Roads 319 and 344, which could be a
single

circuit

out

of

the

entire

project,

with

the

Municipality covering the cost. (Docket No. 184-3 at 60).
26. Eng. Pérez testified that Mayor García’s request did not
include the area where the accident occurred. Rather, if
traveling from Ponce to Mayagüez, the intersection is before
the area where the accident occurred. Id. at 65-66.
27. The intersection of Roads 319 and 344 was ultimately energized
after the Municipality paid for it. (Docket No. 278-2 at 3).
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. The Municipality’s Liability
The substantive law of Puerto Rico controls in this diversity
case. See Rivera-Marrero v. Presbyterian Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 2016
WL 7670044, at *1 (D.P.R. 2016) (quoting Summers v. Fin. Freedom
Acquisition LLC, 807 F.3d 351, 354 (1st Cir. 2015)) (“Since this
is a diversity case, we look to federal law for guidance on
procedural matters (such as the summary judgment framework) and to
state law (here, [Puerto Rico] law) for the substantive rules of
decision.”).

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Civil No. 16-2897 (RAM)
Plaintiffs

are

12

seeking

emotional

damages

as

well

as

compensation for medical and funeral expenses following the death
of

their

son,

allegedly

caused

in

part

by

co-defendants’

negligence. (Docket No. 99 ¶¶ 41, 43). Article 1802 of the Civil
Code is Puerto Rico’s general tort statute. It states that a person
who “causes damages to another through fault or negligence” shall
be liable in damages. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. “The three
essential elements for general tort claims are: (1) evidence of
physical or emotional injury, (2) a negligent or intentional act
or omission (the breach of duty element), and (3) a sufficient
causal nexus between the injury and defendant's act or omission
(in other words, proximate cause).” Vazquez-Filippetti v. Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico, 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added) (citing Torres v. KMart Corp., 233 F.Supp.2d 273, 277–78
(D.P.R. 2002)).
The first element is met, as it is uncontested that Plaintiffs
have suffered emotional injury following the death of their son.
As

to

the

second

element,

given

that

Plaintiffs

allege

the

Municipality failed to install, maintain, and energize the light
poles related to Project AC-200213, the question is whether an
omission or breach of duty occurred. Omissions generate liability
under Article 1802 “when the law imposes a duty of care requiring
the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the

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Civil No. 16-2897 (RAM)

13

protection of others against unreasonable risk.” Zabala-Calderon
v. United States, 616 F. Supp. 2d 195, 199 (D.P.R. 2008) (quotation
omitted). This duty “may arise in one of three ways: ‘(1) by a
statute, regulation, ordinance, bylaw, or contract; (2) as the
result of a special relationship between the parties that has
arisen through custom; or (3) as the result of a traditionally
recognized duty of care particular to the situation.’” Carr v.
Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 2011 WL 1484158, at *3 (D.P.R. 2011)
(citing De–Jesus–Adorno v. Browning Ferris Industries of Puerto
Rico, Inc., 160 F.3d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1998)). See also VazquezQuintana v. Falk, 2018 WL 8838860, at *4 (D.P.R. 2018).
Foreseeability is a central “component of the ‘breach’ subelement because a defendant only breaches his duty if he acted (or
failed to act) in a way that a reasonably prudent person would
foresee as creating undue risk.” Vazquez-Filippetti, 504 F.3d at
49 (citing Pacheco Pietri v. ELA, 1993 P.R.-Eng. 839, 817 (1993))
(emphasis added). “However, the foreseeability required under art.
1802 does not extend to all imaginable effects resulting from
defendant's conduct. This would be tantamount to turning the
defendant into an absolute insurer of its acts and omissions.”
Wojciechowicz v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 2d 241, 272 (D.P.R.
2008), aff'd, 582 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

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The uncontested facts reflect that the PRTHA was the owner
and custodian of Project AC-200213, which encompassed the area
where the accident occurred. (Facts ¶¶ 7, 14). The record shows
that the Project was not energized because the wiring system which
had been installed by the contractor was stolen on more than one
occasion and the PRHTA could not reach an agreement with the
contractor

the

restore

them.

(Facts

¶¶

11-12,

18-20,

24).

Moreover, for the Municipality to energize certain light poles at
the intersection of Roads 319 and 344, it needed authorization
from the PRHTA. (Fact ¶ 25). From these facts, it is evident that
the agency with ownership and control of the Project while it was
under

construction

was

the

PRHTA,

and

not

the

Municipality.

Furthermore, following the construction phase of the Project Eng.
Pérez testified that DTOP would then become the custodian for the
road and be responsible for its maintenance. (Fact ¶ 14).
In

their

Opposition

to

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

Plaintiffs argue that the Municipality’s request to energize a
portion

of

the

Project

constituted

a

binding

unilateral

declaration of intention, which in turn created their duty to
illuminate and maintain the area where the accident occurred.
(Docket No. 263 ¶¶ 11-12, 14). The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has
recognized a unliteral declaration of intention “as a source of
obligation by which a person binds himself or herself on his or

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Civil No. 16-2897 (RAM)

15

her own will (only relying on his or her interests and desires) to
give, to do, or not to do something in favor of another[.]” Ortiz
v. P. R. Tel., 162 P.R. Dec. 715, 2004 TSPR 133 (2004), P.R. Offic.
Trans. Such a declaration must meet the following requirements to
be binding:
(1) the sole will of the person who intends to
be bound; (2) sufficient standing; (3) a clear
intention to be bound; (4) an object of the
obligation; (5) certainty as to the form and
content of the declaration; (6) a suitable
juridical act; and (7) the content of the
obligation may not be contrary to law, to
morals or to public policy.
Id. If the declaration is binding, the person must fulfill it on
their own terms and will be required to compensate for any damages
caused

by

violating

their

obligation

to

do

so

or

otherwise

incurring in fraud, negligence or delay. Id. (quoting Ramírez v.
Gautier, 87 P.R.R. 470, 493-494 (1963)); see also P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 31, § 3018 (“Those who in fulfilling their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
whatsoever act in contravention of the stipulations of the same,
shall be subject to indemnify for the losses and damages caused
thereby.”).

Even

assuming

the

Municipality’s

request

for

authorization of a certain portion of the Project, and subsequent
acts post authorization, constituted a unilateral declaration of
intent, the limited scope of the request does not impose liability
on Hormigueros in the case at bar.

Although it could be concluded

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Civil No. 16-2897 (RAM)

16

that the Municipality had an obligation to maintain the light poles
it received authorization to install, the same were not located at
the site of the accident. (Facts ¶¶ 25-27). Plaintiffs do not
dispute this. Hence, the Municipality’s request to install light
poles at its own expense to ensure the safety of a specific
intersection cannot be construed as a declaration of intent to
energize and maintain the entirety of Project AC-200213.
In the operative Complaint, Plaintiffs mention that various
co-defendants failed to comply with the “Illumination Handbook of
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, the Federal Highway
Administration Rules, the National Highway System Designation Act
of 1995, the AASHTO Highway Subcommittee on Design, Federal Highway
Act

of

1956

and

the

Federal

Highway

Administration

Lighting

Handbook, among others.” (Docket No. 99 ¶ 30). However, they
subsequently failed to identify any specific statute or regulation
imposing upon the Municipality the duty to energize an uncompleted
highway project it does not have ownership or control over.
Instead, they have invoked in passing doctrines such as estoppel
and “one’s own acts,” requesting that the Court “inject equity
principles

in

the

absence

of

a

specific

applicable

legal

provision.” (Docket No. 263 ¶¶ 9, 13). Defendants contend this is
a

tacit

admission

that

there

is

“an

absence

of

a

specific

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17

applicable legal provision” against the Municipality. (Docket No.
278 at 8). The Court agrees.
Lastly, the Court notes that all sources of claims raised by
Plaintiff in their Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, i.e.
unilateral declaration of intent, estoppel, and “one’s own acts,”
are not raised in the operative Complaint. “It is one matter that
the Court must analyze the factual scenario in this case construing
the facts, the record, and all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Another is
to

allow

the

plaintiff

to

bring

forth

new

never

raised

allegations.” Davila Rivera v. Caribbean Refrescos, Inc., 2004 WL
1925477, at *8 (D.P.R. 2004), report and recommendation adopted
sub nom. Rivera v. Caribbean Refrescos Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 435
(D.P.R.

2004),

aff'd

sub

nom.

Davila-Rivera

v.

Caribbean

Refrescos, Inc., 150 F. App'x 3 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal citation
omitted)

(emphasis

added).

Plaintiffs

have

not

been

able

to

establish their Article 1802 claim against the Municipality for
failing to maintain and energize the area of the accident in the
absence of a duty to do so. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims against
the Municipality of Hormigueros are DISMISSED.
B. Triple-S’ Liability
The Insurance Code of Puerto Rico (the “Insurance Code”)
governs insurance contracts, known as policies, in Puerto Rico.

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Civil No. 16-2897 (RAM)

18

See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, §§ 1101-1137. Section 2003 of the
Insurance Code, known as Puerto Rico’s “direct action statute”
regulates lawsuits against an insurer, providing in part:
Any individual sustaining damages and losses
shall have, at his option, a direct action
against the insurer under the terms and
limitations of the policy, which action he may
exercise against the insurer only or against
the insurer and the insured jointly. The
direct action against the insurer may only be
exercised in Puerto Rico. The liability of the
insurer shall not exceed that provided for in
the policy, and the court shall determine not
only the liability of the insurer, but also
the amount of the loss. Any action brought
under this section shall be subject to the
conditions of the policy or contract and to
the defenses that may be pleaded by the
insurer to the direct action instituted by the
insured.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 2003(1). This statute “merely
permits an injured party to maintain against the insurer the same
claim it could pursue against the insured.” Torres-Troche v.
Municipality of Yauco, 873 F.2d 499, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing
Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 186 (1st
Cir. 1967)). An “insurer's liability arises from and is dependent
on its contractual obligations to the insured.” Id. Given that the
claims

against

the

insured

Municipality

have

been

dismissed,

claims against its insurer Triple-S are also DISMISSED.

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19
V.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs failed to establish that the Municipality had a
duty to install, energize, or otherwise maintain light poles for
the

area

of

Project

AC-200213

where

the

accident

occurred.

Therefore, the Municipality and its insurer Triple-S’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at Docket No. 250 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims
against the Municipality of Hormigueros and Triple S Propiedad,
Inc. are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 18th day of January 2023.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge