Valdez-Aponte v. Figueroa

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at Docket No. 3 because it is untimely. Judgment of dismissal with prejudice shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 4/21/2021. (mrr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

JAVIER VALDEZ-APONTE
Plaintiff
v.

CIVIL NO. 16-2922(RAM)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant

OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, District Judge
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Javier Valdez-Aponte’s
(“Valdez-Aponte” or “Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. (Docket No. 3). The Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus for being untimely.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 25, 2007, Valdez-Aponte was indicted on six counts
of a seven-count indictment. (Docket No. 9 at 2). He ultimately
accepted a plea agreement for Count 1 of the indictment. Id. On
September 25, 2008, Valdez-Aponte pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess

with

intent

to

distribute

thirty-five

(35)

grams

of

cocaine and six hundred (600) grams of heroin within one thousand
(1,000) feet of protected locations, namely a public housing
project and schools, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B), and 860. (Docket No. 9 at 2-3; Criminal Case No. 07-

Civil No. 16-2922 (RAM)
cr-00453-PAD-45,

Docket

2
No.

1356).1

He

was

sentenced

to

one

hundred and eight (108) months of imprisonment. Id. Judgment was
entered accordingly on October 2, 2008. (Docket No. 9 at 4;
Criminal Case No. 07-cr-00453-PAD-45, Docket No. 1356).
On July 7, 2016, Valdez-Aponte filed a pro se Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). (Docket No. 3).2 Therein,
Petitioner alleges that: (1) his conviction constitutes double
jeopardy; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (3)
he was denied the right to appeal; and (4) the sentence exceeds
the maximum authorized by law . Id. at 11-13. Although the Petition
was originally filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Court
subsequently ordered that because Valdez-Aponte “remains within
the custody of BOP and considering also he is pro-se, it is now
determined that thus [sic] petition is to be considered as one
filed under [28 U.S.C.] § 2255.” (Docket No. 4).
On June 5, 2017, the United States filed their Response in
Opposition to the Petition. (Docket No. 9). The United States
argued that Valdez-Aponte’s motion is untimely and addressed each
allegation on the merits. Id.

1

The Court takes judicial notice of the filings in USA v. Cruz-Mojica et al,
Criminal Case No. 07-cr-00453-PAD-45, the federal criminal case against ValdezAponte which led to the sentence object of the present habeas petition. See
AES Puerto Rico, L.P. v. Trujillo-Panisse, 133 F. Supp. 3d 409, 415 (D.P.R.
2015) (holding that “documents on file in federal or state courts are proper
subjects of judicial notice.”).
2

Valdez-Aponte’s Petition was received by the Clerk’s Office of the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico on July 19, 2016 and was
filed on November 4, 2016. (Docket No. 3).

Civil No. 16-2922 (RAM)

3

The case was reassigned to the undersigned on September 9,
2019. (Docket No. 15).
III. APPLICABLE LAW
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provides that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or
that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
Furthermore, § 2255 establishes that prisoners have a oneyear period to file a motion requesting relief pursuant to this
statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). This one-year filing period
begins to run from the latest of:
(1) the date on which
conviction becomes final;

the

judgment

of

(2) the date on which the impediment to making
a motion created by governmental action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the movant was
prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if
that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme
Court
and
made
retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the
claim or claims presented could have been

Civil No. 16-2922 (RAM)
discovered
diligence.

4

through

the

exercise

of

due

Id. (emphasis added).
IV.

DISCUSSION

Valdez-Aponte was sentenced on September 25, 2008 and the
judgment was entered on October 2, 2008. (Docket No. 9 at 4;
Criminal Case No. 07-cr-00453-PAD-45, Docket No. 1356). The record
reflects

that

Petitioner

did

not

appeal

this

judgment. When

“appellate review is not sought, the judgment becomes ‘a final
judgment for habeas purposes once the deadline for filing a notice
of appeal expire[s] 14 days later.’” Reyes-Santana v. United
States,2017 WL 1321983, at *1 (D.P.R. 2017) (quoting United States
v. Gilbert, 807 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2015)) (emphasis added).
See also Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (establishing that in criminal
cases,

a

defendant

must

file

their

notice

of

appeal

within

fourteen (14) days of entry of the judgment). Thus, ValdezAponte’s judgment of conviction became “final” for purposes of §
2255(f)(1) on October 16, 2008.
Pursuant

to

the

prisoner

mailbox

rule,

“a

pro

se prisoner's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2254 is filed on
the date that it is deposited in the prison's internal mail-system
for forwarding to the district court, provided that the prisoner
utilizes, if available, the prison's system for recording legal
mail.” Morales-Rivera v. United States, 184 F.3d 109, 109 (1st

Civil No. 16-2922 (RAM)

5

Cir. 1999). Applying this rule, Valdez-Aponte filed the present
Petition on July 7, 2016, more than seven years following finality
of judgment. (Docket No. 3 at 16).
Petitioner’s § 2255 motion clearly does not comply with the
one-year

period

established

by

the

statute

and

is

therefore

untimely. See e.g., Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F. 3d 46, 53-54 (1st
Cir. 2002) (finding that a habeas petition which had been filed
one day late was time barred). Although the one-year period can
be equitably tolled under certain circumstances, Petitioner has
not proffered any grounds for such equitable tolling and the Court
finds none. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. United States, 2012 WL
6016751, at *2 (D.P.R. 2012) (citing Ramos–Martinez v. United
States, 638 F.3d 315, 319 (1st Cir. 2011)).
In its Response in Opposition, the United States posits that
Petitioner presumably seeks a new one-year period to file his §
2255 motion for double jeopardy claims pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Puerto-Rico v. Sanchez-Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863
(2016). (Docket No. 9 at 4). However, the ruling in Sanchez-Valle
does not apply retroactively. See Santana-Rios v. United States,
235 F. Supp. 3d 386, 387 (D.P.R. 2017) (holding that Sanchez-Valle
does not apply retroactively and denying a § 2255 petition for
being time-barred).
Thus, there is no justification for Valdez-Aponte’s failure
to comply with the one-year period established in § 2255(f).

Civil No. 16-2922 (RAM)

6

Notably, in Collado v. United States, a case where the petitioner
filed his § 2255 motion four years after the finality of judgment,
another judge sitting in this District explained that:
[The petitioner’s] failure to acknowledge or
explain this egregious delay suggests that he
was (and remains) simply unaware of or
unconcerned with the statutory requirement.
Collado's ignorance of the law, however, is
insufficient to justify the extraordinary
action of departing from the will of Congress
as
clearly
expressed
in section 2255.
Therefore, having failed to file his motion
within one year of the date that his
conviction became final, Collado's motion is
untimely.
Collado v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 2d 282, 285 (D.P.R. 2008)
(emphasis added).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Valdez-Aponte’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at Docket No. 3 because it is
untimely.

Accordingly,

Petitioner’s

arguments

the
on

Court
the

does

not

merits.

No

need

to

address

certificate

of

appealability shall be issued as Petitioner has failed to make a
substantial

showing

of

the

denial

of

a

constitutional

right

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner may still seek a
certificate directly from the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit in accordance with Rule 22(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Judgment of dismissal with prejudice
shall be entered accordingly.

Civil No. 16-2922 (RAM)

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 21st day of April 2021.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge