Martell-Rodriguez v. Ramos-Lopez et al

Filing 5

OPINION AND ORDER dismissing the 3 Complaint sua sponte and without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 12/21/2016. (NNR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
HARRY MARTELL-RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 16-2925 (PG)
v.
EINAR RAMOS-LOPEZ, ET AL.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
On November 4, 2016, plaintiff Harry Martell-Rodríguez (“Martell” or
“plaintiff”)
several

filed

this action

officers

Rehabilitation

of

the

Puerto

Puerto

Rico

pro

se

under

Rico

42

U.S.C.

Department

(“PRDCR”),

and

the

of

§

1983 against

Correction

PRDCR’s

Committee

and
of

Classification and Treatment (“CCT”).1 Docket No. 3. On that same date,
Martell filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a). Docket No. 1. Martell, an inmate at Institution Adults Ponce 1000
in Ponce, Puerto Rico, alleges that defendants have maintained him in
medium

custody

reclassify

him

for
to

approximately
minimum

fourteen

custody

on

the

years
basis

and
of

have

refused

his conviction

to
and

sentence. Id. at page 5. Plaintiff seeks to compel reclassification of his
custodial status to minimum security. Id.
After a close examination of the complaint, the court sua sponte
dismisses plaintiff’s claims without prejudice for the reasons explained
below.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of
a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
“To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” GarciaCatalan

v.

U.S.,

734

F.3d

100,

102

(1st

Cir.2013)(quoting

FED.R.CIV.P.

8(a)(2)). When reviewing the complaint, the court must “ask whether the
complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, accepting

1

The defendants are: Einar Ramos-Lopez, Secretary of the DCRPR, Maria De LeonAponte, supervisor of custodial classifications, and Angel Droz-Rivera (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “defendants”). The complaint form does not state Droz-Rivera’s
position or functions within the DCRPR or the CCT. See Docket No. 3. Moreover, it is
unclear if they are sued in their individual or official capacities.

Civil No. 16-2925 (PG)

Page 2

the plaintiff’s factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor.” Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments
I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir.2014)(citing Maloy v. Ballori–Lage, 744
F.3d

250,

Additionally,

252

(1st

courts

Cir.2014))(internal

“may

augment

these

quotation

facts

and

marks

inferences

omitted).
with

data

points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the complaint,
matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice.” A.G. ex
rel. Maddox v. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.2013)(citing
Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011)).
“To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must ‘plead[ ]
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Cooper, 760 F.3d at
106 (citing Maloy, 744 F.3d at 252). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, … , on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) … .”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). When evaluating the plausibility of a legal
claim, courts should read the complaint “as a whole” and be cautious not to
apply the plausibility standard “too mechanically.” See Rodriguez-Vives v.
Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps, 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir.2014)(citing
Garcia–Catalan, 734 F.3d at 101, 103).
II.

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies
as

are

available

are

exhausted.”

42

U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a).

The

PRLA’s

exhaustion requirement applies to “all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances, or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); see also Johnson v. Thyng, 369 Fed.Appx. 144, 147
(1st Cir.2010)(prisoner required to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing § 1983 action, even if relief sought cannot be granted by the

Civil No. 16-2925 (PG)

administrative

Page 3

process)(quoting

Booth

v.

Churner,

532

U.S.

731,

734

(2001)).
In order to exhaust administrative remedies, the prisoner must comply
with the applicable regulation and procedural rules. See Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006). These rules, in turn, are defined not by the PLRA,
but by the prison grievance process itself. See Tomassini v. Correctional
Health Services Corp., No. 09-2059, 2012 WL 1601528, at *1 (D.P.R. May 07,
2012)(citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)). To that end, the
PRDCR has adopted administrative rules and regulations for the application
and review of requests for administrative remedies by incarcerated inmates.
See Torres Garcia v. Puerto Rico, 402 F.Supp.2d 373, 379 (D.P.R.2005). The
Regulation to Address the Applications for Administrative Remedies Filed by
Members

of

the

Correctional

Population,

for

example,

sets

forth

the

grievance procedures for inmates under the PRDCR’s custody. See Regulation
No. 8583 of May 4, 2015. In addition, the Manual for the Classification of
Inmates

provides

classification

of

for

the

initial

incarcerated

inmates

and

periodical

in

accordance

evaluation
with

the

and

PRDCR’s

institutional policy. See Regulation No. 8281 of November 20, 2012. The
Manual establishes the substantive and procedural rules for adjudicating an
inmate’s request for reclassification of custodial status, thus guaranteeing
due process during the internal prison procedure.
Furthermore,

pursuant

to

Puerto

Rico’s

Uniform

Administrative

Procedure Act (“UAPA”), “[a]ny party which is adversely affected by a final
order or resolution of an agency and who has exhausted all of the remedies
provided by the agency or by the corresponding administrative appellate body
may file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals,” P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 3, § 2172, within a specified term. The UAPA also provides that “[t]he
judicial review provided herein shall be the exclusive proceeding to review
the

merits

of

an

administrative

decision

submitted

under

this

chapter,

whether adjudicative or informal in nature.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 2172
(emphasis added).
In his complaint, Martell states that he exhausted administrative
remedies by first using the correctional facility’s internal grievance
procedure and later seeking judicial review of the CCT’s adverse resolution
from the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, San Juan Region. Id. at pp. 2-4. The
appellate

court’s

decision

in

the

case

of

Martell

Rodriguez

v.

Civil No. 16-2925 (PG)

Page 4

Administracion de Correccion y Rehabilitacion, No. 4-40956, KLRA201600474,
2016 WL 3391572 (T.C.A. May 31, 2016) describes how Martell availed himself
of

all

available

administrative

remedies,

thus

complying

with

the

applicable exhaustion requirements under federal and Puerto Rico law.2 See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 2172. Accordingly, the court
will move on to conduct a screening of the complaint.
B. Sua Sponte Dismissal
The PLRA “includes several provisions which grant this Court the
authority to screen and dismiss prisoner complaints.” Aldrich v. U.S., No.
13–12085–NMG, 2013 WL 6196002, at *4 (D.Mass. November 22, 2013)(citing 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (proceedings in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (screening
of suits against governmental officers and entities)). Section 1915(e)(2)
allows for sua sponte dismissal of an in forma pauperis action if the
complaint

is

frivolous,

malicious,

fails

to

state

a

claim,

or

seeks

monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2);
F.Supp.2d

28

190,

U.S.C.
206

§

1915A(b);

(D.Mass.2013)(“In

see

also

forma

Doherty

pauperis

v.

Donahoe,

complaints

may

985
be

dismissed sua sponte and without notice under § 1915 if the claim is based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual allegations that are
clearly baseless.”)(quoting Aldrich v. Considine, 2013 WL 4679722, at *4
(D.Mass. Aug. 29, 2013)). Because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se the
court construes his complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 52-21, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972)(per curiam); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36,
43 (1st Cir.2000)(“courts hold pro se pleadings to less demanding standards
than those drafted by lawyers”)(citations omitted).
In the instant case, the complaint states that plaintiff has been
serving his sentence at a state correctional facility in Ponce, Puerto Rico
for the last 23 years. It is also alleged that earlier this year, plaintiff
filed a request for reclassification from medium to minimum custody with
the CCT at his correctional facility. Plaintiff complains that the CCT

2

Although, ordinarily, courts may not consider matters outside the pleadings when
reviewing a complaint under the standard of Rule 12(b)(6), the petition form in this case
makes sufficient reference to the underlying administrative procedure followed by
plaintiff, as well as the P.R. Court of Appeals’ decision at the judicial review stage. See
Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir.2009). Alternatively,
these matters are susceptible to judicial notice. See Rodriguez-Ramos v. HernandezGregorat, 685 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir.2012); Berrios-Romero v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto
Rico, 641 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.2011)(noting that the court “may take judicial notice of law
at any time”). Accordingly, the court may still consider aforesaid materials under the Rule
12(b)(6) standard.

Civil No. 16-2925 (PG)

Page 5

denied the request based on his extensive term of imprisonment (175 years),
the violent nature of his offenses, and the fact that he has not been in
medium custody long enough. See Docket No. 3 at pp. 5-6. Finally, the
complaint states that the CCT failed to consider plaintiff’s compliance
with his institutional plan. However, for the reasons explained below, the
court finds that these allegations are insufficient to state a claim for
which relief can be granted.
At the outset, it is important to mention that plaintiff has not
included a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which this court’s
jurisdiction is granted. See Gargano v. Liberty Intern. Underwriters, Inc.,
572

F.3d

45,

indication

48 (1st

of

the

Cir.2009);

legal

basis

see

for

also

Fed.R.Civ.P.

bringing

suit

is

8(a).

the

The

title

of

only
the

complaint form, which states: “prisoner civil rights complaint, 42 U.S.C. §
1983”). Nonetheless, as the allegations recited above make clear, plaintiff
has not “allege[d] facts sufficient to support a determination (i) that the
conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii)
that

[the

alleged]

conduct

worked

a

denial

of

rights

secured

by

the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cepero–Rivera v. Fagundo, 414
F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Romero–Barcelo v. Hernandez–Agosto,
75 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.1996)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Indeed,

Martell

has

not

identified

the

existence

of

a

protected

interest with respect to his custodial status, or the deprivation thereof
as a result of the purported refusal to reclassify him. See Sanchez v.
Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir.2009); McGuinness v. Dubois, 75 F.3d
794, 797 (1st Cir.1996); Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.3d 440, 443
(1st

Cir.1992).

Accordingly,

the

court

cannot

begin

to

determine

the

foundation for this unspecified civil rights suit. Cf. Rivera Borrero v.
Rivera
whether

Correa,

93

prisoner

F.Supp.2d
enjoyed

a

122,

127

protected

(D.P.R.2000)(declining
liberty

interest

in

to

decide

custodial

classifications upon finding that the allegations in the complaint failed
to state a claim entitling the pleader to relief).
Section 1983 claims require that a plaintiff plausibly plead not only
the deprivation of a right, but also a causal connection between the actor
and the deprivation, and state action. See Sanchez, 590 F.3d at 41; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, the complaint provides no basis for the court
to infer that state action existed. It also fails to plausibly link each

Civil No. 16-2925 (PG)

particular

Page 6

defendant

with

an

encroachment

of

any

protected

right.

See

González–Piña v. Rodríguez, 407 F.3d 425, 432 (1st Cir.2005); Concepcion v.
Municipality of Gurabo, 558 F.Supp.2d 149, 162-163 (D.P.R.2007). Having
failed to plead the basic elements of a Section 1983 cause of action,
Martell’s complaint necessarily fails. See Green v. Concord Baptist Church,
313 Fed.Appx. 335 (1st
dismissal

of

action

Cir.2009)(affirming district court’s
where

the

allegations

in

the

sua

sponte

complaint

were

insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim and opportunity to amend would
be futile); Díaz v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. 16-1176 (PG),
2016 WL 6068119, at *1 (D.P.R. Oct. 14, 2016)(dismissing pro se plaintiff’s
claims for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)); Acevedo-Cruz v. Villegas, No. 09-1619 (JP), 2009 WL 2366419 (D.P.R.
July 29, 2009)(dismissing prisoner’s civil rights complaint for failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted, as permitted under

28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)).
The

court

is

well

aware

that

“sua

sponte

dismissals

are

strong

medicine, and should be dispensed sparingly.” Cardona Roman v. Univ. of
Puerto Rico, 799 F.Supp.2d 120, 133 (D.P.R.2011)(quoting Chute v. Walker,
281 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir.2002)). Here, however, the complaint is simply
too

vague

and

bare-boned,

and

does

not

set

forth

sufficient

factual

allegations in order to allow this court to “intuit the correct cause of
action, even if it was imperfectly pled.” Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d
886, 890 (1st Cir.1997). In sum, plaintiff has not alleged the minimal
facts

as

to

“who

did

what

to

whom,

when,

where

and

why.”

Educadores

Puertorriquenos en Accion, 367 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir.2004). Consequently,
the court hereby dismisses plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte and without
prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s unspecified claims against all
defendants

are

hereby

DISMISSED

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

Judgment

shall

entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, December 21, 2016.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

be