Meephead, LLC v. Teux Arts, Inc. et al

Filing 51

ORDER denying #47 Motion requesting Order. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 8/1/2017. (VCC)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

MEEPHEAD, LLC
Plaintiffs,
v.
TEUX ARTS, INC., ET AL.
CIV. NO.: 16-3018 (SCC)

Defendants,

CHRISTIAN AGUILA,
Third Party Defendant.

ORDER
On May 31, 2017, MEEPHEAD, LLC served a request for admissions
on defendant Teux Arts, Inc. See Docket No. 47-1. Teux Arts failed to timely
respond to the discovery request. Meephead now moves the court to admit
the matters contained in the request for admissions. See Docket No. 47.
Three days after Meephead’s motion, Teux Arts produced the
responses to the Request for Admissions. Shortly thereafter, Teux Arts
opposed the request to have the matters admitted. Teux Arts argues that
Meephead did not make a “reasonable and good-faith effort” to resolve the
controversy amicably before filing the motion, as Local Rule 26(b) requires.
See Docket No. 48. In addition, Teux Arts avers that during a settlement
conference held on July 6, 2017, it made a point to explain the technical

Civil No. 16-3018 (SCC)

Page 2

difficulties encountered in accessing discovery-related documents. Lastly,
Teux Arts recalls the Magistrate Judge’s command to the parties to “attempt
to resolve their discovery disputes amicably.” Id.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3), if a party served with a written request
for admissions fails to respond within 30 days, the matters contained
therein are admitted. The 30 days may be shortened, or lengthened, if the
parties so stipulate, or upon order of the court. Any matter thus admitted
is “conclusively established” unless the Court, “on motion”, allows the
withdrawal or amendment of the admission. See Fed. R. Civ. P 36(b).
In order to relieve a party of the consequences of its failure to
respond in a timely fashion, the Court must consider: (1) whether “the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby,” and (2)
whether “the party who obtained the admission fail[ed] to satisfy the court
that withdrawal will prejudice [that party] in maintaining [the] action or
defense on the merits.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); see also, Human Resource
Development Press, Inc. v. IKON Office Solutions Inc., 246 F.R.D. 82, 85
(D.Mass. 2007).
The first prong is met “when the party seeking withdrawal
establishes that such withdrawal ‘would facilitate the development of the
case in reaching the truth,’” or, in the other hand when “upholding the
admissions would practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of
the case.” Id. Such is the case here. Allowing the admissions to stand would
conclusively establish Meephead’s claims without facilitating the
presentation of the merits of the case.
As to the second prong, the prejudice that the Rule talks about “is
not simply that the party who initially obtained the admission will now
have to convince the fact finder of its truth,” but rather, it is a measure of

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Page 3

the difficulties that the party may encounter in proving its case. See Brook
Village North Associates v. General Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66, 70-1 (1st Cir. 1982).
For example, key witnesses might have become unavailable, or evidence
needed to establish matters already addressed by the admissions might be
difficult to obtain. Id. (citing Westmoreland v. Triumph Motorcycle Corp., 71
F.R.D. 192 (D.Conn.1976)). Meephead has not convinced the Court that the
presentation of its case would be prejudiced by allowing withdrawal of the
admissions. Timing is also not on Meephead’s side. Though this case cannot
be said to be in its early stages, there is still ample time for Meephead to
gather evidence on the merits of its claims. Had trial been around the
corner, a different conclusion might be warranted. See Brook Village, 686 F.2d
at 72 (“Rule 36 plainly contemplates a more restrictive standard for
foregoing the conclusive effect of admissions once trial has begun.”).
Considering all factors, the Court finds that applying the sanction of
Rule 36 is not proper in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 1st day of August, 2017.
S/SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE