Cruz-Berrios v. Puerto Rico Department of Correction and Rehabilitation et al
Filing
116
OPINION AND ORDER granting 98 Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing with prejudice all of Plaintiff's claims as to all Defendants. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 3/25/2020. (mrr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JOSE JULIAN CRUZ-BERRIOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL NO. 16-3155 (RAM)
PUERTO RICO DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION AND REHABILITATION,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment
(Docket
No.
98).
Plaintiff
José
Julián
Cruz-Berrios
subsequently filed an Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
and Defendants replied. (Docket Nos. 112 & 115). Co-defendants
Manuel Quilichini and Dr. Gladys Quiles’ Motion for Joinder at
Docket
No.
submissions,
100
the
is
GRANTED.
Court
GRANTS
After
considering
Defendants’
Motion
the
for
parties’
Summary
Judgment for the reasons set below.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff José Julián Cruz-Berrios (“Plaintiff” or “CruzBerrios”) is an inmate with Type-2 Diabetes Mellitus who resides
at Puerto Rico Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s
(“PRDC”) Institutional Complex #501 in Bayamón, Puerto Rico.
On
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
2
December 16, 2016, he filed suit against several Defendants.
(Docket No. 2 at ¶¶ 3.1, 4.1). Defendants include the Secretary of
Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and other PRDC
officials (collectively, “the Governmental Defendants”) as well as
Manuel Quilichini (“Quilichini”) as Chief Executive Officer of
Correctional Health Services Corp. (“CHSC”), the former contract
provider of health services to PRDC’s inmates, and Dr. Gladys
Quiles (“Dr. Quiles”), a medical doctor working at Correctional
facility #292 in Bayamón and acting on behalf of CHSC. Id. at ¶¶
3.1-3.27. Neither the current contract provider, Physicians HMO,
Inc. (“Physicians HMO”), nor Eric Rolón (“Rolón”), the current
PRDC administrator, were joined in the Complaint. 1
In
his
Complaint,
Mr.
Cruz-Berrios
seeks
declaratory
injunctive relief and money damages. Id. ¶ 1.2. 2 He includes claims
allegedly arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the United States Constitution and the Court’s
federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331
and
1343.
Id.
¶
2.1.
The
Complaint
also
invokes
the
Constitution and Laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the
1
Mr. Rolón and Physicians HMO d/b/a Grupo de Salud Correcional, first appeared
as Defendants in the Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. (Docket No. 75). Summons for both Defendants were issued
on May 20, 2019. (Docket No. 81). However, the record reflects that the summons
have yet to be returned, either executed or unexecuted.
2
The money damages claims are stayed pursuant to the Puerto Rico Oversight
Management and Economic Stability Act, PL 114-87. (Docket No. 19).
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
3
Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over
state law claims. Id. ¶ 2.6. Plaintiff posits that the situations
in the Complaint are known to PRDC officials ranging from the
Wardens and co-defendants working at Correctional Complexes #292,
448 and 501 up to PRDC’s Secretary. (Id. ¶¶ 4.1, 4.57).
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Injunctive Relief for
Lack of an Indispensable Party (“Motion to Dismiss”) on November
29, 2018. (Docket No. 56). On January 10, 2019, Magistrate Judge
Hon.
Marcos
E.
López
issued
a
Report
and
Recommendation
recommending denial of the same. (Docket No. 58). On May 13, 2019,
Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction (“Amended Preliminary Injunction”) to
prevent all Defendants from denying him medical care to treat his
Type-2 diabetes, among other medical conditions, and to stop them
from allegedly discriminating against him because of his diabetes.
(Docket No. 75). The Governmental Defendants filed a “Response in
Opposition to ‘Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
For Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 75)’” (“Response in Opposition”)
requesting the Court to deny injunctive relief and dismiss the
Complaint due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. (Docket No. 82). On October 1, 2019, Plaintiff stated in
a Motion in Compliance with Order and Notifying Absence From
Jurisdiction (“Motion in Compliance”) that he joined Physicians
HMO to the Amended Preliminary Injunction thus his Complaint was
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
4
no longer a missing indispensable party and requested more time to
summon Physicians HMO and Mr. Rolón. (Docket No. 95).
On November 8, 2019, this Court at Docket No. 97 denied
without prejudice the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 56), the
Amended Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 75) and the Motion in
Compliance (Docket No. 95). The Court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation and sua sponte converted the
Governmental Defendants’ Response in Opposition into a summary
judgment motion. (Docket No. 97 at 18-19). The Court also granted
the
parties
additional
time
to
file
the
statement
of
facts,
memorandum of law and any oppositions thereto. Id. On November 27,
2019, the Governmental Defendants filed the Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Motion for Summary Judgment” or “MSJ”) (Docket No. 98)
accompanied by a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (“SUMF”).
(Docket No. 98-7). On December 2, 2019, co-defendants Quilichini
and Dr. Quiles filed a Motion for Joinder to the MSJ. (Docket No.
100). Lastly, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment
(“Opposition”)
(Docket
No.
112)
which
Governmental
Defendants’ countered with a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Reply”). (Docket No. 115).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) if a
movant shows “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that
they are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
5
P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could resolve the point in the [non-movant’s]
favor.” Mercado-Reyes v. City of Angels, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d
344, 347 (D.P.R. 2018) (quotation omitted). A fact is material if
“it is relevant to the resolution of a controlling legal issue
raised by the motion for summary judgment.” Bautista Cayman Asset
Co. v. Terra II MC & P, Inc., 2020 WL 118592, at *6 (D.P.R. 2020)
(quotation omitted).
The movant “bears the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Morales-Quinones, 2020 WL 1126165, at *1 (D.P.R. 2020) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Next, the
burden shifts to the non-movant to present at least one issue of
fact which is genuine and material. Id. (quotation omitted). A
non-movant
must
do
this
“through
submissions
of
evidentiary
quality,” which show “that a trialworthy issue persists.” Robinson
v. Town of Marshfield, 950 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). Thus, while a court will draw all inferences in favor of
the non-movant, summary judgment may be proper if their case solely
relies
on
improbable
inferences,
conclusory
allegations
and
unsupported speculation. See Burke Rozzetti v. Ford Motor Co.,
2020 WL 704860, at *3 (D.P.R. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Local Rule 56 also governs summary judgment. See L. Civ. R.
56. Per this Rule, a non-movant must “admit, deny or qualify the
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
6
facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to
each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material
facts.” Id. Moreover, “unless a fact is admitted, the reply shall
support each denial or qualification by a record citation.” Id.
Local rules such as Rule 56, are “designed to function as a means
of ‘focusing a district court's attention on what is and what is
not-genuinely controverted.’” Marcano-Martinez v. Cooperativa de
Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico, 2020 WL 603926, at *2 (D.P.R.
2020) (quotation omitted). Hence, “litigants ignore Local Rule 56
at their peril.” Calderón Amézquita v. Vicens, 2019 WL 3928703, at
*1 (D.P.R. 2019) (citation omitted).
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
In
general,
Plaintiffs
admitted
or
qualified
the
SUMF’s
facts. (Docket No. 112-1). However, Plaintiff’s responses to Fact
Nos. 6-15 were general denials stating, “Defendant’s statement
number __ is neither denied, nor admitted for lack of information,
however it is irrelevant to the Summary Judgment” or “Defendant’s
statement number __ is neither denied, nor admitted for it is a
legal conclusion.” (Docket No. 112-1 ¶¶ 6-15). Responses which “do
not oppose the truth of the statement offered and are either
irrelevant to the matter at hand, provide additional evidence not
related to the fact in question and/or failed to contradict it”
are insufficient to properly controvert a material fact. See Aztar
Corp. v. N.Y. Entertainment, LLC, 15 F.Supp.2d 252, 254 n. 1
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
7
(E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd. 210 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that
responses
only
averring
a
“lack
of
knowledge
or
information
sufficient to either admit or deny [a fact]” did not create an
issue of fact.) Thus, Facts Nos. 6-15 are deemed admitted.
Therefore, crediting only material facts in the SUMF that
are properly supported by a record citation and uncontroverted,
the Court makes the following findings of facts:
1. Mr. Cruz Berrios is an inmate under the custody of
the
PRDC,
incarcerated
at
the
“Bayamon”
501
Correctional Institute. (Docket No. 98-7 ¶ 1).
2. Mr. Cruz has diabetes Mellitus, Type 2. (Id. ¶ 2).
3. Mr. Cruz has a special diet low in sodium and of 2,200
calories a day which includes snacks. (Id. ¶ 3).
4. In addition, Mr. Cruz has diabetic neuropathy. (Id. ¶
4).
5. On August 29, 2017, Dr. Ilia Torres Mojica, the
Medical Services Corporate Director for Correctional
Health Services Corp. provided a certification that
detailed the medical treatments followed for Mr. Cruz.
(Id. ¶ 5).
6. Mr. Cruz has received monthly monitoring and treatment
for his medical conditions in the Bayamón Correctional
Complex Chronic Conditions Clinics. (Id. ¶ 6).
7. Mr. Cruz receives periodical follow-ups in external
clinics for medical services in endocrinology,
gastroenterology,
urology,
podiatrist
and
psychiatrist. (Id. ¶ 7).
8. Mr. Cruz also receives medical treatment for his
mental health conditions. (Id. ¶ 8).
9. Mr. Cruz has continuous access to medical services.
(Id. ¶ 9).
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
10. The insulin was administrated to Mr. Cruz per his
doctor’s ordered [sic]. (Id. ¶ 10).
11. On May 17, 2019, Dra. Gladys Quiles Santiago, the
Medical Services Director of Bayamón Correctional
Complex, certified that in compliance with doctor
orders, Mr. Cruz has been receiving medical
treatment for his physical and mental conditions.
(Id. ¶ 12).
12. Mr. Cruz in many occasions has refused medical
treatment and to follow the medical diet per his
doctors’ orders. (Id. ¶ 13).
13. The patient has a cane that assist [sic] him in
walking and no other equipment was established as
needed. (Id. ¶ 14).
14. In Puerto Rico, any member of the correctional
population seeking administrative remedies must
comply with the grievance procedure established by
Regulation 8583 (Rules VII to XV). (Id. ¶ 15).
15. Mr. Cruz-Berrios began the administrative grievance
process in five (5) occasions with a Request for
Administrative Remedy, nevertheless, in none of
those
requests
he
filed
a
Request
for
Reconsideration. (Id. ¶ 16).
16. Plaintiff did not seek judicial review before the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, prior to the filling
of this action. (Id. ¶ 17).
17. On January 9th, 2015, Mr. Cruz filed Request for
Administrative Remedy number Q-032- 15. (Id. ¶ 18).
18. On December 1st, 2015, Mr. Cruz filed Request for
Administrative Remedy number B2599-15. (Id. ¶ 19).
19. On June 8, 2017, Mr. Cruz filed Request for
Administrative Remedy number B-860-17. (Id. ¶ 20).
20. On May 3, 2017, Mr. Cruz filed Request for
Administrative Remedy number B-687-17. (Id. ¶ 21).
21. On May 3, 2017, Mr. Cruz filed Request for
Administrative Remedy number B-686-17. (Id. ¶22).
8
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
9
22. The Medical certification signed by Dr. Gladys
Quiles Santiago, the Medical Director at Physician
Correctional, dated November 21, 2019, shows that
Plaintiff currently continues to receive medical
treatment and monitoring for his health conditions.
(Id. ¶ 23).
IV.
The
Prison
1997e(a),
Litigation
mandates
that
DISCUSSION
Reform
Act
(“PLRA”),
42
U.S.C.
§
administrative
remedies
be
exhausted
before an inmate can file suit in federal court. This seeks to
“eliminate unwarranted interference by federal courts with the
administration of prisons and affords corrections officials time
and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing
the initiation of a federal case.” Negrón-Cruz v. Almodovar, 2020
WL 762217, at *1 (D.P.R. 2020) (quotation omitted). Specifically,
the statute provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies
as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis
added).
Exhaustion must occur even if the available remedies fail
to meet federal standards or if they are not “plain, speedy, and
effective.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Indeed,
the First Circuit has stated that “[a] prisoner must exhaust
administrative remedies before a complaint under § 1983 will be
entertained even where the relief sought cannot be granted by the
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
10
administrative process.” Johnson v. Thyng, 369 F. App'x 144, 147
(1st Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). For example, even if the
prison administrative process does not cover monetary relief, the
inmate still must complete the administrative process. See Booth
v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001).
The Supreme Court has ruled that “failure to exhaust is an
affirmative defense under the PLRA, and inmates are not required
to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). However, this does not
mean that prisoners are excused from complying with aspects of the
administrative
grievance
process,
such
as
deadlines.
Rather,
compliance with grievance procedures “is all that is required by
the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Vazquez-Marin v. Diaz-Colon, 2013
WL 6417488, at *3 (D.P.R. 2013) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218).
Moreover, proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
defined by the PLRA, “but by the prison grievance procedures.”
Jones, 549 U.S. at 217. Therefore, the scope of Mr. Cruz-Berrios’
duty to exhaust administrative remedies is determined by the PRDC’s
regulations to which this Court “must look.” Arroyo-Morales v.
Administracion de Correccion, 207 F.Supp.3d 148, 151 (2016). The
PRDC’s Regulation No. 8583 titled “Regulation to Address the
Application for Administrative Remedies Filed by Members of the
Correctional
Population”
(“Regulation
No.
8583”)
details
the
grievance procedure for PRDC inmates under custody. (Docket No.
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
11
98-3, Rules XII-XV). These steps generally include: 1) filing a
request
for
administrative
remedies;
2)
if
displeased
with
response, filing a reconsideration within twenty (20) days after
receipt of response with the regional coordinator; and 3) if still
displeased with coordinator’s response, requesting judicial review
before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. Id. After seeking judicial
review at the Court of Appeals, an inmate must then file a
Certiorari with the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, to finally
exhaust all administrative remedies, before filing in federal
court. (Docket No. 98 at 10). 3 If an inmate fails to pursue even
one of these steps, he has failed “to exhaust his administrative
steps
fully,
as
required
by
the
PLRA.”
Arroyo-Morales,
207
F.Supp.3d at 152 (citation omitted)(emphasis added); see also,
Figueroa-Vazquez v. Departamento de Correccion Y Rehabilitacion de
Puerto Rico, 2020 WL 710608, at *3–4 (D.P.R. 2020) (dismissing an
inmate’s claims since he did not file a reconsideration of his
request nor did he comply with the final step of the exhaustion
requirement, which was seeking judicial review of the Department’s
determinations).
3
A certification issued by the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico shows that Plaintiff did not file in the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico any action after 2014 relating to the administrative complaints at issue
in this case. (Docket No. 98-5). This Certification is self-authenticating under
Fed. R. Evid. 902(1). See Pagán-Porratta v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 2019 WL
4055133, at *6 n.7 (D.P.R. 2019) (holding as self-authenticating under Fed. R.
Evid. 902(1) a certification on “Autonomous Municipality of Guaynabo Human
Resources Office” letterhead, bearing the Municipality’s seal and containing
the Office Director’s signature).
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
12
In the case at bar, Plaintiff admitted in his Opposition that
it is “completely clear” that he began the grievance process on
five (5) occasions by filing a Request for Administrative Remedy
(“Request”). (Docket No. 112 at 4; Docket No. 112-1 ¶¶ 18-22).
These five requests were: (1) Request No. Q-032-15 dated January
9th, 2015; (2) Request No. B-2599-15 dated December 1st, 2015; (3)
Request No. B-860-17 dated June 8, 2017; (4) Request No. B-687-17
filed on May 3, 2017; and, (5) Request No. B-686-17 filed on May
3, 2017. (Docket No. 98-7 ¶¶ 18-22). Defendants noted that per
Regulation No. 8583, Plaintiff had twenty (20) days from receipt
of
notification
of
a
response
to
his
request
to
file
a
reconsideration of the same with a coordinator. (Docket No. 98 at
10; Docket No. 98-4 at 14, Rule XIV-1). Only after filing a
reconsideration, could an inmate request judicial review.
The evidence in the record on summary judgment shows that
Plaintiff failed to file a reconsideration for any of the abovementioned requests. (Docket No. 98-4 at 1-2, certified English
translation at Docket No. 106-1 at 1-2). Moreover, Plaintiff did
not provide any evidence to contradict this in his Opposition.
Rather, he solely stated that he was not “currently adding new
documents [to the record], since Plaintiff lacks plenty of the
related evidence that proof [sic] the tenths of times he has
exhausted administrative remedies, and the only evidence Cruz has
at hand are the ones already provided and admitted by Defendant at
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
13
Docket No. 98-4.” (Docket No. 112 at 4). He also insists that he
“exhausted administrative remedies, however the institution failed
to
comply
with
its
own
Regulations,”
as
they
only
allegedly
notified Plaintiff of the outcome of his requests on November 13,
2019, two (2) years after Plaintiff initiated the administrative
remedies process. Id. at 5-6. This, in contravention of Rule XIII4 which states that an evaluator should provide a response in
writing to the correctional population with twenty (20) days after
he submits his response of administrative action. Id. at 5.
A review of the record shows that only three of the Requests
were notified in an untimely manner on November 13, 2019: Request
No. B-860-17, 4 Request No. B-687-17, 5 and Request No. B-686-17. 6
(Docket No. 115 at 2) (citing Docket No. 98-4 at 3-4, English
translation at 106-1 at 3-4). In his Opposition, Plaintiff averred
that
at
the
date
of
the
Certification
stating
that
no
reconsideration had been filed, the time for Plaintiff to file a
reconsideration “had not even started.” (Docket No. 112 at 6).
4
The Certification of Administrative Remedies (“Certification”) shows that the
answer to the request by the corresponding area was received, presumably by the
evaluator, on June 28, 2017. (Docket No. 106 at 4). Evaluator attempted to
deliver answer to Plaintiff twice, but Plaintiff did not respond to evaluator’s
call. Id.
5
The Certification shows that the answer to the request by the corresponding
area was received, presumably by the evaluator, on May 22, 2017; on May 26,
2017, the evaluator “attempted to deliver the answer [to Plaintiff], but he
[Plaintiff] did not answer the call at the section.” Id.
6 The Certification shows that an answer by the evaluator to the request was
issued to Plaintiff on June 6, 2017. The evaluator attempted twice to deliver
the response receipt to Plaintiff on May 10 and on May 26, 2017, but Plaintiff
did not answer the call at the section. Id.
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
14
While Plaintiff is correct that the twenty-day reconsideration
clock did not begin to run until the day when he was notified of
the response to those three requests, as Defendants explained in
their Reply, Plaintiff nonetheless had until December 3, 2019 to
file his reconsiderations. (Docket No. 115 at 2). The record shows
that even if Defendants notified the response outside of the
timeframe required by Regulation No. 8583, Plaintiff did not file
a reconsideration within the twenty days after he was notified of
the responses.
The other two requests were answered and notified to Plaintiff
on a timely basis. (Docket No. 115 at 2). For example, Request No.
Q-032-15 was answered by the corresponding area on January 15,
2015, while a response receipt was delivered to Plaintiff on
January 27, 2015. (Docket No. 106 at 3). Whereas Request No. B2599-15, was answered on December 17, 2015, with a response receipt
delivered to Plaintiff on December 21, 2015. Id. at 4. Plaintiff
likewise failed to file a Reconsideration for either of those
requests. Id. at 3-4; Docket No. 115 at 2.
As Plaintiff failed to file a reconsideration for any of his
requests, he failed to exhaust administrative remedies readily
available to him. “In other words, by pursuing only some of the
steps available and not appealing any of the decisions issued as
part of the grievance procedure, Plaintiff failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him.” Figueroa-Vazquez, 2020
Civil No. 16-3155 (RAM)
WL
7710608,
at
*3
15
(quoting
Torres-Vega
v.
Administración
De
Corrección, 2015 WL 3720250, at *4 (D.P.R. 2015)). The U.S. Supreme
Court has cautioned that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliances
with an agency’s deadlines […] because no adjudicative system can
function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on
the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. NGO, 548 U.S. 81, 9091 (2006) (emphasis ours).
Berrios’
claims
have
This case is not the first time Cruz-
been
dismissed
for
failure
to
exhaust
administrative remedies. See Cruz Berrios v. Oliver-Baez, 792 F.
Supp.2d 224 (D.P.R. 2011).
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
(Docket
No.
98)
dismissing
with
prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims as to all Defendants. Judgment
shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 25th day of March 2020.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge
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