J. Walter Thomson

Filing 83

OPINION AND ORDER re 78 Report and Recommendation, re 66 Motion for Attorney's Fees. The Report & Recommendation is ADOPTED IN PART. Peer International's motion for attorney's fees, costs and sanctions is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 01/14/2019. (brc)

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

J. WALTER THOMPSON PUERTO RICO,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

LATIN AMERICAN MUSIC COMPANY,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is Peer International Corporation of Puerto
Rico (“Peer International”)’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs
and

sanctions.

(Docket

No.

66.)

The

Court

referred

Peer

International’s motion to a magistrate judge for a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”).

(Docket No. 68.)

For the reasons set

forth below, the R&R is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Peer

International’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs and sanctions is
GRANTED.
I.

Background
Walgreens

Company

(“Walgreens”)

commissioned

J.

Walter

Thompson Puerto Rico (“Walter Thompson”) to produce a marketing
campaign for the 2016 Christmas season.

(Docket No. 1 at p. 3.)

Walter Thompson procured a license from music publisher Peer

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 2 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

2

International to use “Llegó la Navidad” by Raúl Balseiro (“the
composition”). Id. at p. 2. Peer International issued the license
to Walter Thompson for a $5,500.00 fee.

Id.

After the marketing

campaign aired throughout Puerto Rico, defendants Latin American
Music Company, Inc. (“LAMCO”) and ACEMLA de Puerto Rico, Inc.
(“ACEMLA”) informed Walgreens that they possessed exclusive rights
to the composition.

Id. at pp. 2—3. 1

To resolve competing claims of ownership regarding “Llegó la
Navidad,” Walter Thompson filed an interpleader complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22. (Docket No. 1.) In addition
to answering the interpleader complaint, LAMCO and ACEMLA set forth
copyright

infringement

claims

against

Walter

Thompson,

Peer

International, and Walgreens. (Docket No. 14.) Peer International
moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil

Procedure

collateral

12(c).

estoppel

(Docket

compelled

No.
this

52.)

The

doctrine

Court

to

grant

International’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

of

Peer

J. Walter

Thompson P.R., Inc. v. Latin Am. Music. Co., 308 F. Supp. 3d 611
(D.P.R. 2018) (Besosa, J.).

1

LAMCO is a music publisher. (Docket No. 1. at p. 3.) ACEMLA is a performing
arts society. Id. Luis Raúl Bernard (“Bernard”) serves as president of both
entities. See Affirmation of Luis Raúl Bernard, Latin Am. Music Co. v. Media
Power Group, Inc., Civil No. 07-2254 (ADC) (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2009) (Docket
No. 57, Ex. 51 at p. 2).

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 3 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

3

Because LAMCO and ACEMLA’s copyright infringement claims are
frivolous, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”). J. Walter Thompson
P.R., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 3d at 618.

Rule 11 provides that:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion,
or other paper [. . .] an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances . . . the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

Jelka L. Duchesne (“Duchesne”), Ibraham

Latiff-Carrasquillo (Latiff”), Robert Penchina (“Penchina”), and
Kelly D. Talcott (“Talcott”) appeared on behalf of LAMCO and
ACEMLA.

(Docket Nos. 10, 13, 30 and 32.)

The Court ordered each

attorney:
to submit individual filings addressing (1) whether
LAMCO and ACEMLA claimed to own “Llegó la Navidad,” (2)
on what basis counsel filed documents to the Court
representing that LAMCO and ACEMLA own “Llegó la
Navidad,” and (3) why the Court should not impose
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.
J. Walter Thompson P.R., 308 F. Supp. 3d at 618.

Only Talcott

failed to comply with the Court’s Order to Show Cause.

(Docket

Nos. 58—60.)
Peer International moved for sanctions against LAMCO and
ACEMLA

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

section

1927

(“section

1927”).

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 4 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

4

(Docket No. 66 at p. 24.)

The Court referred Peer International’s

motion “for a report and recommendation on attorney’s fees and
sanctions.”

(Docket No. 68.)

The Order to Show Cause, however,

remained before the Court.
The magistrate judge recommended that (1) LAMCO and ACEMLA
pay $107,181.00 in attorney’s fees, and (2) that the Court forgo
the imposition of sanctions.

(Docket No. 78.)

does

magistrate

not

object

to

the

concerning the award of attorney’s fees.
Consequently,

the

Court

ADOPTS

Peer International

judge’s

recommendation

(Docket No. 80 at p. 5.) 2

the

magistrate

judge’s

recommendation that LAMCO and ACEMLA pay $107,181.00 in attorney’s
fees.

(Docket No. 78 at p. 13.)

however,

to

sanctions.

the

magistrate

(Docket

International,

the

No.

Peer International does object,

judge’s

80

magistrate

at

p.
judge

recommendations
6.)

According

“issued

regarding
to

Peer

recommendations

regarding the Court’s Order to Show Cause . . . under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11, . . . not regarding Peer’s motion for
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.”
I.

Id.

The Court agrees.

Standard of Review
A district court may refer a pending motion to a magistrate

judge for a R&R.

2

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P.

The Court referred Peer International’s Bill of Costs to the Clerk of the
Court. (Docket No. 63.)

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 5 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

5

72(a); Loc. Rule 72(b).

Any party adversely affected by the R&R

may file written objections within fourteen days of being served
with the magistrate judge’s report. Loc. Rule 72(d). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).

A party that files a timely objection is entitled to

a de novo determination of “those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which specific
objection is made.”

Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F. Supp. 2d

189, 191-92 (D.P.R. 2005) (García-Gregory, J.) (citing United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980)).
with this rule precludes further review.

Failure to comply

See Davet v. Maccorone,

973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1992).
In conducting its review, the Court is free to “accept,
reject,

or

modify,

in

whole

or

in

part,

the

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”

findings

or

28 U.S.C. § 636

(a)(b)(1); Álamo Rodríguez v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 286 F.
Supp. 2d 144, 146 (D.P.R. 2003).
of

the

R&R

to

which

the

The Court may accept those parts
parties

do

not

object.

See

Hernández-Mejías v. Gen. Elec., 428 F. Supp. 2d 4, 6 (D.P.R. 2005)
(Fusté, J.) (citation omitted).
II.

Peer International Moved for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1927, Not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
The Order to Show Cause and the motion for sanctions are

distinct.

The Court invoked Rule 11.

J. Walter Thompson P.R.,

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 6 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

6

Inc., 308 F. Supp. at 618.
(Docket No. 66.)

Peer International cited section 1927.

The Court’s referral for an R&R concerned Peer

International’s motion for sanctions, requiring the magistrate
judge

to

analyze

section 1927.

LAMCO

and

ACEMLA’s

(Docket No. 68.)

any reference to section 1927.

actions

pursuant

to

The R&R, however, is devoid of

(Docket No. 78.)

Accordingly, the

R&R is clearly erroneous because the magistrate judge misapplied
the law.

See Le Blanc v. B.G.T. Corp., 922 F.2d 394, 400 (1st

Cir. 1993) (remanding action in part because “the magistrate judge
applied a different, incorrect legal standard”); Winthrop House
Ass’n v. Brookside Elm Ltd. Partners, 451 F. Supp. 2d 336, 348 (D.
Conn. 2005) (“Because these issues were beyond the scope of the
referral [to the magistrate judge], this court finds that the
better approach is to decline to adopt the recommendations as to
these

issues

REJECTS

the

magistrate judge’s R&R regarding the imposition of sanctions.

The

Court

finds

in

that

their

entirety.”).

sanctions

against

The

Court

counsel

are

appropriate

pursuant to Rule 11 and section 1927, in addition to the granting
of attorneys’ fees to Peer International by LAMCO and ACEMLA.
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
A frivolous lawsuit may result in sanctions, such as an

award of attorney’s fees.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).

Courts employ

an objective standard in determining whether a litigant and his or

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 7 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

7

her attorney reasonably commenced and litigated a cause of action.
See Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 630 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming
the

imposition

of

sanctions

pursuant

to

Rule

11

because

“plaintiffs’ attorney’s litigation of this claim was ‘a vexatious
time consuming exercise which bore no fruit.’”); Nyer v. Winterthur
Int’l, 290 F.3d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming the imposition
of

sanctions

particularly

pursuant
relying

on

to

Rule

this

11,

because

apportionment

“no

attorney,

argument,

could

reasonably have believed that the facts of this case could sustain
a claim against [the defendant]”). While the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions does not require a finding of bad faith, a showing of at
least culpable carelessness is required.

Citibank Global Mkts.,

Inc., v. Santana, 573 F.3d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 2009).

Sanctions

pursuant to Rule 11 “must be limited to what suffices to deter
repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).

of sanctions is a judgment call.”

Ultimately, the “imposition

Kale v. Combined Ins. Co., 861

F.2d 746, 758 (1st Cir. 1988).
B.

28 U.S.C. section 1927
Section

multiplies

the

1927

provides

proceedings

in

that
any

an
case

attorney

“who

unreasonably

so
and

vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 8 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

8

because of such conduct.”

28 U.S.C. § 1927.

The imposition of

sanctions pursuant to section 1927 does “not require a finding of
subjective bad faith.”

Cruz, 896 F.2d at 631.

Vexatious conduct

encompasses behavior that is “harassing or annoying, regardless of
whether it is intended to be so.” Id. Counsel subject to sanctions
“evince a studied disregard of the need for an orderly judicial
process, or add up to a reckless breach of the lawyer’s obligations
as an officer of the court.”

Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Vélez, 639

F.3d 228, 245 (1st Cir. 2010).

Section 1927 serves to “deter

frivolous litigation and abusive practices by attorney’s and to
ensure that those who create unnecessary costs also bear them.”
Id. at 247.
C.

Sanctions are Warranted
The Court recognizes that mere ineptitude is beyond the

purview of Rule 11 and section 1927.

See Jensen v. Philips Screw

Co., 546 F.3d 59, 67 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming the imposition of
sanctions,

noting

that

“[d]distinguishing

between

what

is

a

vigorous but reasonable attempt to salvage a case that is going
badly and a stubbornly capricious attempt to gain advantage by
prolonging matters is not easy”); Young v. City of Providence, 494
F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2005) (“It is true that courts ought not invoke
Rule 11 for slight cause; the wheels of justice would grind to a
halt if lawyers everywhere were sanctioned every time they made

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 9 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)
unfounded

objections,

9
weak

arguments,

claims.”) (citation omitted).
ACEMLA,

however,

section 1927.

are

flagrant

and

dubious

factual

The claims raised by LAMCO and
violations

of

Rule

11

and

The proposition that LAMCO and ACEMLA own “Llegó la

Navidad” is legally untenable.

A cursory review of dispositive

precedent reveals that LAMCO and ACEMLA are collaterally estopped
from asserting ownership over the composition.

See Civil No. 07-

2254. 3
1.

Before this Litigation Commenced, a Jury had
Determined that LAMCO and ACEMLA Do Not Own “Llegó
la Navidad”
In 2007, LAMCO and ACEMLA sued Media Power Group,

Inc. (“Media Power”) for copyright infringement.

(Case No. 07-

2254, Docket No. 1.) 4 A seven-day jury trial commenced on August 8,
2011.

(Docket No. 193.)

Bernard, the president of LAMCO and

ACEMLA, testified for two days.

(Docket Nos. 193 and 194.)

Joey

3

To invoke collateral estoppel, federal common law required Peer International
to establish that:
(1) the issue sought to be precluded in the later action is
same as that involved in the earlier action; (2) the issue
actually litigated; (3) the issue was determined by a valid
binding final judgment, and (4) the determination of that issue
essential to the judgment.

the
was
and
was

Latin Am. Music. Co. v. Media Power Grp., Inc., 705 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2014);
Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. United States, 850 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2017).
4

The Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings and judicial orders docketed
in Media Power Group. See Rodríguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 750 F.
Supp. 2d 407, 411 (D.P.R. 2010) (Besosa, J.) (“It is well-accepted that federal
courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if those
proceedings have relevance to the matters at hand”) (internal citation omitted).

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 10 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)
Mercado

(“Mercado”),

10
director

for

the

Rights

of

Published

Relations for Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”), also testified at
trial.

Mercado

“administered
since 1992.

by

stated
Peer

that

Music,

“Llegó
as

(Docket 232 at p. 105.)

la

part

Navidad”

of

the

BMI

had

been

catalog”

Mercado testified that “Peer

is the owner of the right to ‘Llegó la Navidad’ by Raúl Balseiro.”
Id. at p. 113.
The

trial

court

provided

the

jury

with

the

following instruction:
An owner of copyright owns the right to exclude any other
person from reproducing, performing, displaying, or
using the work covered by copyright for a specified
period of time [. . . ] In this case, plaintiffs contend,
and the defendants dispute, that plaintiffs are, and at
all relevant times, have been the copyright owner or
license of exclusive and/or non-exclusive rights, under
the United States Copyright with respect to [“Llegó la
Navidad.]”
(Docket No. 231 at pp. 147—49.)

The jury verdict form asked

whether “by a preponderance of the evidence . . . [LAMCO and
ACEMLA] have established ownership as to any of these songs?”
(Docket No. 211 at p. 1.)
the

jury

found

that

The jury answered “No.”

LAMCO

and

ACEMLA

possessed

Id.
no

Because
ownership

interest in the composition, their deliberations concluded.

Id.

LAMCO and ACEMLA appealed the Media Power decision.
Media Pwr. Grp., Inc., 705 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2013).

The issue

of ownership, LAMCO and ACEMLA argued, was improperly submitted to

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 11 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)
the jury.

Id.

11

The First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed,

holding that:
At trial, the parties treated ownership as a live issue.
In the jointly proposed pretrial order and in its opening
statement to the jury, LAMCO acknowledged its burden to
establish ownership.
LAMCO then produced evidence of
ownership, and the defendants challenged the sufficiency
of LAMCO’s evidence.
Id. at 39—40.
estopped
Navidad.”

from

Accordingly, LAMCO and ACEMLA are collaterally
asserting

copyright

for

“Llegó

la

See Media Power Grp., Inc., Civil No. 07-2254.
Counsel

careless”

protection

for

for

failing

to

preclusive precedent.
Inc., 573 F.3d at 32.

LAMCO
grasp

and
that

ACEMLA
Media

were

Power

“culpably
constitutes

Civil No. 07-2254; Citibank Global Mkts.,
Indeed, LAMCO and ACEMLA cited the same

certificate of copyright for “Llegó la Navidad” that the jury
rejected as proof of ownership in Media Power.

(Civil No. 07-

2254, Docket No. 209 at p. 1; Civil No. 17-1094, Docket No. 14 at
p. 6.)
Representations

made

by

LAMCO

and

ACEMLA

bankruptcy proceedings compound the need for sanctions.

in

LAMCO and

ACEMLA filed for bankruptcy protection pursuant to Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. sections 301, et seq.

(Docket

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 12 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)
No. 38.) 5

12

In asset schedules submitted to the bankruptcy court,

the only property listed that LAMCO and ACEMLA claimed to own are
their respective logos, each valued at $1.00.
Ex. 2 at p. 7.)

(Docket No. 52,

Absent from LAMCO and ACEMLA’s asset schedule is

“Llegó la Navidad.”

Id.

In sum, LAMCO and ACEMLA own “Llegó la

Navidad” for purposes of seeking relief pursuant to the Copyright
Act, but not for purposes of the bankruptcy proceeding.

5

This

Penchina asserts that LAMCO possessed an exclusive license, granting LAMCO
standing to assert copyright infringement claims regarding “Llegó la Navidad.”
(Docket No. 58 at p. 5.) This argument is unavailing. In 2002, LAMCO assigned
and transferred, set over and conveyed to [Dolores Vera (“Vera”)] all rights,
title, sets over and convey[ed] to [Dolores Vera (“Vera”)] the bulk and totality
of that portion of all rights, title and interest set forth in all the musical
compositions . . . it presently own[ed].”
(Docket No. 58 at p. 21.)
Subsequently, LAMCO and Vera entered into a sub-publishing agreement. (Docket
No. 58 at p. 22.) Vera granted LACMO the “exclusive right of public performance
of the Compositions, for profit or otherwise (including broadcasting and
television).” Id. The sub-publishing agreement is “automatically . . . deemed
terminated” in the event LACMO “becomes insolvent, or any solvency, bankruptcy
or composition proceeding is commenced by or against [LAMCO] and is not
dismissed within thirty (30) days. Id. at p. 29. LAMCO and ACEMLA declared
bankruptcy on March 24, 2014. (Docket No. 38 at p. 2.) The bankruptcy court
granted Peer International’s motion to lift the automatic stay on November 7,
2017, more than thirty days after LAMCO and ACEMLA declared bankruptcy. Docket
No. 40; see No. 17-2023-ESLAA (LAMCO), Docket No. 151 (Lamoutte, J.).
Accordingly, any exclusive license belonging to LAMCO expired automatically
pursuant to the sub-publishing agreement.

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 13 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

13

inconsistency bolsters the Court’s conclusion that this action is
meritless. 6
2.

LAMCO and ACEMLA’s Copyright Infringement Claims
Unreasonably Multiplied this Proceeding
The

against

Walter

assertion

Thompson,

of

Peer

copyright

infringement

International,

and

claims

Walgreens

unreasonably multiplied this proceeding. (Docket No. 14.) Indeed,
Walgreens was not a party to this action until LAMCO and ACEMLA
alleged that “Walgreens is liable to LAMCO/ACEMLA for copyright
infringement.”

Id. at p. 9.

LAMCO and ACEMLA’s baseless claims

required Walter Thompson, Peer International, and Walgreens to
file answers in defense of the copyright infringement allegations.
(Docket Nos. 16, 22 and 25.) This litigation consumed considerable
judicial

resources.

The

Court

held

an

initial

scheduling

conference, issued a Case Management Order, and adjudicated Peer
International’s judgement on the pleadings.

6

(Docket Nos. 27, 51

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
expressed identical misgivings regarding a similar LAMCO and ACEMLA litigation,
and for the same reasons.
In Latin American Music Company v. Spanish
Broadcasting System, Inc., Civil No. 13-1526 (RJS), LAMCO and ACEMLA sued a
radio station for copyright infringement. LAMCO and ACEMLA “represented that
they were the copyright owners or licensees of exclusive rights with respect to
the songs at issue in this case.” No. 13-1526, Docket No. 150. The court in
Spanish
Broadcasting
System
took
exception
to
LAMCO’s
conflicting
representations to the bankruptcy court. Id. at p. 5. Despite assertions that
LAMCO owned the disputed composition, “LAMCO’s bankruptcy filings in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which Mr. Bernard also
signed and authenticated during cross-examination, indicates that LAMCO owns no
intellectual property beyond its logo.” Id. at p. 4. The Court ordered counsel
for LAMCO and ACEMLA to identify the basis for their assertions that LAMCO and
ACEMLA owned the relevant compositions. Id.

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 14 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)
and

56.)

14

Consequently,

infringement

claims

the

Court

constituted

inadvertence, or incompetence.”
Disregarding

finds

“more

that

than

the

mere

copyright

negligence,

Cruz, 896 F.2d at 631.

preclusive

precedent

and

asserting

ownership over “Llegó la Navidad” warrants sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11 and section 1927.

Latiff and Talcott signed the pleading

that this Court deemed frivolous.

(Docket No. 14 at p. 11.)

Penchina and Duchesne did not appear in this litigation until after
LACMO

and

ACEMLA

filed

the

copyright

infringement

claims.

Accordingly, the Court declines to sanction Penchina and Duchesne.
Latiff complied with the Court’s Order to Show Cause, stating that
he relied on Talcott in hopes of learning from an attorney with
experience in copyright law.
to

Latiff,

he

did

infringement claims.

not

(Docket No. 60 at p. 2.)

participate

Id. at p. 4.

in

drafting

the

According
copyright

By signing LACMO and AMCELA’s

pleadings, however, Latiff affirmed that “the claims, defenses,
and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument.”
declines

to

impose

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

sanctions

on

Latiff.

Instead,

The Court
the

Court

cautions Latiff that failure to read and verify the accuracy of
the pleadings he signs may result in sanctions in the future.
Talcott flouted the Court’s Order to Show Cause.

The Court has no

reason to doubt Latiff’s contention that Talcott drafted the

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 15 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)

15

meritless copyright infringement allegations.

(Docket No. 60.)

Accordingly, the Court SANCTIONS Kelly D. Talcott in the amount of
$2,500.
Relitigating issues already disposed of in prior
actions needlessly consumes judicial resources.

LAMCO and ACEMLA

were keenly aware that they do not own “Llegó la Navidad.”

The

Court cannot impose sanctions on LAMCO and ACEMLA pursuant to
section 1927, because this provision applies only to counsel and
pro se litigants.

See Bolivar v. Pocklington, 975 F.2d 28, 33

n.13 (1st Cir. 1992) (“Section 1927 would not empower the district
court

to

impose

sanctions

on

[the

plaintiff]

in

these

circumstances, as it provides for sanctions only against ‘any
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases.’”).

Pursuant

to Rule 11, the Court “may not impose a monetary sanction . . .
against a represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2).”
Civ. P. 11(c)(5)(A).
award

attorney’s

fees

Fed. R.

The Court possesses the inherent power to
if

a

party

has

acted

“in

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991).

bad

faith,

Chambers v.

The magistrate judge already

recommended, and the Court concurs, that LAMCO and ACEMLA must pay
$107,181.00 in attorney’s fees.
Courts

have

repeatedly

dismissed

copyright

infringement actions commenced by LAMCO and ACEMLA on collateral

Case 3:17-cv-01094-FAB Document 83 Filed 01/14/19 Page 16 of 16

Civil No. 17-1094 (FAB)
estoppel grounds.

16

See Banco Popular de P.R., Inc., v. Latin Am.

Music Co., No. 01-1142, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125302 (Oct 14, 2008)
(Gelpí,

J.)

(holding

that

collateral

estoppel

demanded

the

dismissal of copyright infringement claims asserted by LAMCO and
ACEMLA); see Media Power Grp., Inc., 705 F.3d at 42 (1st Cir. 2014)
(holding that “[t]he district court correctly concluded that LAMCO
was collaterally estopped from litigating the claims as to the
four Corretjer songs”).

LAMCO and ACEMLA’s pattern of asserting

ownership over compositions they plainly do not own is troubling,
vexatious, and an abuse of the judicial process.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the R&R is ADOPTED IN PART

and REJECTED IN PART.

(Docket No. 78.)

Peer International’s

motion for attorney’s fees and sanctions is GRANTED.
No. 66.)

(Docket

LAMCO and ACEMLA are ORDERED pay Peer International

$107,181.00 in attorney’s fees.

The Court SANCTIONS Kelly D.

Talcott in the amount of $2,500.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 14, 2019.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE