Medina-Perez v. USA

Filing 15

ORDER denying 1 Motion to Vacate. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 9/21/2018. (PMA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
Francisco Javier Medina-Perez,
Petitioner

CIVIL NO. 17-1270 (PG)
Related Crim. No. 12-714 (PG)

v.
United States of America,
Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is petitioner Francisco Javier Medina-Perez’s (“Petitioner” or “MedinaPerez”) motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 1),
and the United States’ (or the “government”) opposition thereto (Docket No. 13). For the reasons
explained below, the court DENIES Petitioner’s motion to vacate.
I. Background
On October 4, 2012, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging Medina-Perez
with violations concerning a carjacking incident. See Crim. No. 12-714 (PG) (hereinafter “Crim.”),
Crim. Docket No. 10. After pleading guilty to both counts, Medina-Perez was convicted of aiding
and abetting a carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) (“Count One”), and possession of a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (“Count
Two”). See Crim. Docket No. 51. On June 7, 2013, the court sentenced Medina-Perez to be
imprisoned for a total term of 162 months - 78 months on Count One, plus a consecutive 84-month
sentence on Count Two. Id.
II.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence “upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the

Civil No. 17-1270 (PG)

Page 2

sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack.” 28 U.S.C § 2255(a); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-427 (1962); Ellis v. United
States, 313 F.3d 636, 641 (1st Cir. 2002).
III.

Discussion

On February 23, 2017, Medina-Perez filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Docket No. 1. In his petition, Medina-Perez claims that the court
must vacate his Section 924(c) convictions because: (1) Section 924(c)’s residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague after Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015); and (2) his
carjacking convictions fail to categorically qualify as crimes of violence under the statute’s force
clause. See Docket No. 1 at pp. 2-14. In support of his arguments, Petitioner contends that
intimidation does not amount to the use, attempted use, or threatened use of “violent force,” and
that aiding and abetting does not require “violent force.” Id. at pp. 12-13.
The government submits these claims fail because: (1) the First Circuit has determined that
carjacking is a crime of violence under Section 924(c)’s force clause; and (2) the court has already
rejected the argument that aiding and abetting does not require “violent force.” See Docket No. 13
at p. 2. The court agrees.
In United States v. Cruz-Rivera, No. 16-1321, 2018 WL 4378173, at *2 (1st Cir. Sept. 14,
2018), the First Circuit recently held that carjacking is a crime of violence under Section 924(c)’s
force clause. Furthermore, this district court has rejected the argument that aiding and abetting
does not require “violent force.” See Cruz-Arboleda v. United States, Civil No. 16-2216 (PG), 2018
WL 3031480 at *3 (D.P.R. June 14, 2018) (holding that aiding and abetting the commission of a
crime of violence is a crime of violence itself) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 23 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1994). Consistent with the above-cited decisions, the court finds Petitioner’s claims are meritless.

Civil No. 17-1270 (PG)

Page 3

IV.

Conclusion

Based on the above, the court finds that petitioner’s request for habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 1) is DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
V.

Certificate of Appealability

It is further ordered that no certificate of appealability should be issued in the event that the
petitioner files a notice of appeal because there is no substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 21, 2018.

S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE