Leonhardt v. Aerostar Airport Holdings, et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: Granting 23 Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Prosecution Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Motion Reiterating Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi on February 7, 2018. (DVL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
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CELIA MARÍA LEONHARDT,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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AEROSTAR AIRPORT HOLDINGS
LLC, et al.,
CIVIL NO. 17-1387 (GAG)
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Defendants.
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OPINION AND ORDER
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Celia María Leonhardt (“Plaintiff”) sued Aerostar Airport Holdings LLC (“Aerostar”) and
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an unnamed insurance company. (Docket No. 1). For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES
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this case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) and 12(b)(6).
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I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
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On January 15, 2017, Plaintiff arrived at the Luis Muñoz Marin International Airport, to pick
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up a friend. (Docket No. 14 ¶ 2). Upon her friend’s arrival, Plaintiff exited the building, carrying her
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friend’s luggage. Id. Plaintiff then proceeded through an area outside the building that was not lit
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adequately. Id. Due to the insufficient lighting and Plaintiff’s inability to see, the wheels of the
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luggage became stuck, causing Plaintiff to fall. Id. In pain, Plaintiff was transported by ambulance
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to Carolina’s Medical Hospital where she was diagnosed with a fracture to the femur and underwent
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an emergency surgery. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
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Aided by a wheelchair, Plaintiff eventually traveled back to her home in Sacramento,
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California. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff’s orthopedic doctor, Dr. Fernando Torres Zayas, believed Plaintiff had
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a 60% chance of not being able to walk again. Id. In April 2017, Plaintiff underwent a second
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Civil No. 17-1387 (GAG)
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operation to ease her pain and enable her to make a full recovery. Id. ¶ 6. As of June 26, 2017,
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Plaintiff could stand, but was still unable to walk. Id. A full recovery is expected. Id. Plaintiff seeks
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$20,000 reimbursement for her medical expenses, as well as $300,000 in compensation for
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emotional damages. Id. ¶ 9.
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Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on March 21, 2017 (Docket No. 1). Aerostar filed a motion
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to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and a motion for a more definite statement. (Docket No. 11).
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Before the Court ruled on Aerostar’s motion, Plaintiff inexplicably responded with a motion for
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reconsideration of dismissal. (Docket No. 12). The Court denied both motions while noting that the
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“complaint is not properly presented and fatally deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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8(a).” (Docket No. 13). The Court instructed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint and on June 27,
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2017, Plaintiff did so. (Docket Nos. 13; 14). Aerostar thereafter filed a motion to dismiss for failure
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to state a claim. (Docket No. 16). Plaintiff did not respond, and Aerostar moved to deem its motion
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unopposed. (Docket No. 17). The Court denied Aerostar’s motion without prejudice and ordered
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Plaintiff to file a response by August 10, 2017. (Docket No. 18).
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Plaintiff again failed to respond and on August 16, 2017, Aerostar filed a second motion to
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deem its motion to dismiss unopposed. (Docket No. 20). The Court denied Aerostar’s motion
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without prejudice, and ordered Plaintiff to respond by August 22, 2017, noting that Plaintiff’s failure
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to do so would result in the case being submitted. (Docket No. 21). Plaintiff again failed to respond,
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and on August 22, 2017, Aerostar filed a third motion to deem its motion to dismiss unopposed.
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(Docket No. 22). Plaintiff did not respond. On January 9, 2018, Aerostar moved to dismiss for lack
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of prosecution pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 41(b). (Docket No. 23). The Court ordered
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Plaintiff to respond to the pending motions on or before the final deadline of January 16, 2018.
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(Docket No. 24). Yet again, Plaintiff ignored the Court’s order. On January 19, 2018, Aerostar filed
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a motion renewing its motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. (Docket No. 25). The Court denied
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Aerostar’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on January 25, 2018, noting that Plaintiff’s
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complaint was still fatally deficient and ordering her to file an amended complaint by February 5,
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2018. (Docket No. 26). In the Court’s order, Plaintiff was explicitly warned that failure to comply
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would result in sanctions, including dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). Id. Plaintiff
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did not respond.
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II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)1
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“If the plaintiff fails to prosecute . . . a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any
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claim against it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). District court judges inherently hold the authority to regulate
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their dockets and First Circuit precedent permits district court judges to rely upon Rule 41(b) when
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considering whether to involuntarily dismiss a case. See Garcia–Perez v. Hosp. Metropolitano, 597
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F.3d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 2010); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–33 (1962). A district court
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must balance its “venerable authority over case management with the larger concerns of justice,
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including the strong presumption in favor of deciding cases on the merits.” Malot v. Dorado Beach
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Cottages, 478 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2007). Dismissal with prejudice is the most severe penalty. See
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Benitez–Garcia v. Gonzalez–Vega, 468 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006). However, where the conduct is
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egregious, dismissal with prejudice may be warranted. Id. (dismissing a case with prejudice
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following repeated violation of court orders “is well within the arsenal of the trial judge”).
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Egregious conduct is measured by “the severity of the violation, the legitimacy of the party’s
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excuse, repetition of violations, the deliberateness vel non of the misconduct, mitigating excuses,
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prejudice to the other side and to the operation of the court, and the adequacy of lesser sanctions,”
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Rule 41(b) presumes dismissal on the merits unless a court states otherwise. The Court thus clarifies that
this dismissal is not an adjudication on the merits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
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Civil No. 17-1387 (GAG)
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as well as any other relevant factors. Robson v. Hallenbeck, 81 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 1996). When
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conducting its analysis, “it is proper [for the Court] in reviewing for ‘extreme’ misconduct to
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consider all of the aggravating circumstances together.” Enlace Mercantil Internacional, Inc. v.
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Senior Indus., Inc., 848 F.2d 315, 317 (1st Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
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A. Severity of the Violation
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Plaintiff’s violations were severe. The last time she filed anything was June 27, 2017.
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(Docket No. 14). As of today, 225 days have passed without any action from Plaintiff. While this is
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not multiple years, it is not the only factor the Court considers. Plaintiff has also ignored four Court
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orders concerning her response to various motions that Aerostar filed, including a motion to dismiss
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for lack of prosecution. (Docket Nos. 18; 21; 24; 26). The Court finds this “extremely protracted
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inaction” violates Rule 41(b) and a district court’s inherent power to regulate its docket. Cosme
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Nieves v. Deshler, 826 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1987). The Court warned Plaintiff on multiple occasions
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to respond to Defendant’s motions and Plaintiff has not complied. Plaintiff’s continuous disregard
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for this case and failure to comply with the Court’s orders constitute severe indifference to the
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Court’s authority. See Estate of Solis-Rivera v. United States, 993 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding
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egregious conduct after Plaintiff failed to respond just twice).
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B. Legitimacy of Excuses, Mitigation of Excuses, and Prejudice to the Other Side
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There is no indication that Plaintiff did not receive the Court’s orders, yet Plaintiff has offered
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no excuses for her utter inaction. While it is important that “the plaintiff is given an opportunity to
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explain [her noncompliance] or argue for a lesser penalty,” Benitez-Garcia v. Gonzalez-Vega, 468
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F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Robson, 81 F.3d at 3), Plaintiff here was given four opportunities
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to explain. She has simply elected not to do so. The mere fact that Plaintiff has consistently ignored
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the Court’s deadlines is sufficient to cause prejudice to the other side. See Robson, 81 F.3d at 4
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(“Repeated disobedience of a scheduling order is inherently prejudicial, because disruption of the
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court's schedule and the preparation of other parties nearly always results.”).
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C. Repetition of Violations and Deliberate Misconduct
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The Court has, on four separate occasions, ordered Plaintiff to comply with deadlines;
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Plaintiff has, on four separate occasions, failed to heed the Court’s orders. Without an explanation
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to the contrary, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s misconduct was deliberate or not.
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D. Adequacy of Lesser Sanctions
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Lesser sanctions would not be adequate. While true that the Court could sanction counsel in
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several ways, including a warning, formal reprimand, a fine, imposition of costs or fees, temporary
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suspension, and dismissal, Plaintiff has already been warned multiple times. Following the second
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motion to deem Aerostar’s motion to dismiss unopposed, Plaintiff was explicitly informed that
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failure to respond would result in the case being submitted. (Docket No. 21). In the Court’s fourth
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order to respond, Plaintiff was explicitly warned that failure to respond would result sanctions,
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including dismissal for failure to prosecute. (Docket No. 26). These warnings did not elicit a
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response from Plaintiff. There is nothing to indicate that fining counsel or imposing costs and fees
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would prove a more effective catalyst.
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III. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
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Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a
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claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
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a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
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face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This requires determining whether
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the complaint alleges enough facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555.
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The court accepts all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.
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Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as
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true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v.
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
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by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).2
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With respect to claims based upon premises liability, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has
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concluded that “the owner or operator of a commercial establishment has a duty to exercise
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reasonable care to maintain those areas that are accessible to the public, so as to avoid injury to its
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patrons.” Cline v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 620 F. Supp. 2d 233, 237 (D.P.R. 2008). To prove that a
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business owner breached that duty, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual or
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constructive knowledge of a hazardous or dangerous condition on his premises that more likely than
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not caused the damages to the plaintiff. Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 504
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F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2007); Cotto v. C.M. Ins. Co., 416 P.R. Offic. Trans. 786, 793-94, 116 D.P.R.
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64 (1985). “[T]o establish constructive knowledge, a plaintiff must prove either the existence of the
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dangerous condition for an unreasonable or excessive length of time or, in the absence of evidence
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regarding time, the owner's insufficient prevention policy or failure to implement the policy.” Carlo-
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Blanco v. Inmobiliaria Comercial, Inc., No. CIV. 12-1978 PAD, 2014 WL 4805101, at *3 (D.P.R.
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Sept. 26, 2014). Plaintiff here has failed entirely to allege facts that show “either the existence of the
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dangerous condition for an unreasonable or excessive length of time” or “the owner's insufficient
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prevention policy or failure to implement the policy.” Id. (emphasis added).
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Both of Plaintiff’s complaints inexplicably list the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”) in the initial
caption. (Docket Nos. 1; 14). The FTCA is only applicable where the defendant is the United States. Plaintiff has
explicitly averred that Aerostar is a private entity. (Docket Nos. 1 ¶ 2; 14 ¶ 2). Because Plaintiff filed her
complaint under diversity jurisdiction, the Court assumes, for the purposes of this discussion, that Plaintiff brings
her tort claim under local law.
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Even taking all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true, her complaint is fatally deficient. She
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has not, even with multiple chances to amend her complaint, managed to allege facts sufficient to
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state a plausible claim for relief.
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IV. Conclusion
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The Rule 41(b) aggravating factors, considered together, militate heavily in favor of
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dismissal. Practice before a federal court is dynamic. Often times, cases are complex and move
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quickly. The District of Puerto Rico has one of the most congested criminal and civil dockets in the
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nation. The Court simply cannot sit back and wait for counsel to proceed at their convenience.
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Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). For the aforementioned
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reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion at Docket No. 23 and DISMISSES this case with
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prejudice pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 41(b).
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SO ORDERED.
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In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 7th day of February, 2018.
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s/ Gustavo A. Gelpí
GUSTAVO A. GELPI
United States District Judge
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