Cuevas-Serrano et al v. Puerto Rico Port Authority et al
Filing
67
OPINION AND ORDER granting 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Marcos E. Lopez on 12/12/2018. (YI)
Case 3:17-cv-01684-MEL Document 67 Filed 12/12/18 Page 1 of 10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ISABEL CUEVAS, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL NO.: 17-1684 (MEL)
PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, et al.
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Isabel Cuevas, Sonia Cuevas, and Nelson Cuevas (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against
the Puerto Rico Port Authority, Aeropuerto Internacional Rafael Hernández, the Department of
Transportation and Public Works, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and various unidentified
security companies on May 21, 2017. 1 ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs alleged that “Defendants breached
their duty of care and their negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.” Id. at 2.
Pending before the court is the Puerto Rico Port Authority’s (“Defendant”) motion for summary
judgment. ECF No. 33. Defendant argues in its motion for summary judgment that the damages
suffered by Plaintiffs are minor and do not exceed the $75,000 threshold necessary for the
existence of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Id. at 2. In their response in opposition, Plaintiffs
reject the arguments made within Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 39.
Defendant subsequently filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition. ECF No. 55.
1
The claims against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Department of Transportation and Public Works, and all
generically named defendants have been dismissed. ECF Nos. 31–32.
Case 3:17-cv-01684-MEL Document 67 Filed 12/12/18 Page 2 of 10
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of summary judgment “is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay
the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ.
Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is granted
when the record shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the
evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the
non-moving party. A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the
litigation.” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Rodríguez-Rivera v. Federico Trilla Reg’l Hosp., 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the
movant presents a properly focused motion “averring ‘an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case[,]’ [t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of
at least one fact issue which is both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’” Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d
112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990)). For
issues where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, the party cannot merely “rely
on an absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts [in the record]
that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute.” McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d
313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
The party need not, however, “rely only on
uncontradicted evidence . . . . So long as the [party]’s evidence is both cognizable and sufficiently
strong to support a verdict in her favor, the factfinder must be allowed to determine which version
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of the facts is most compelling.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.
2004) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court “must view the entire record in the
light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences
in that party’s favor.”
Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115.
There is “no room for credibility
determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial
process entails, [and] no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and
likelihood.” Greenburg v. P. R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). The
court may, however, safely ignore “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and
unsupported speculation.” Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.
1990) (citations omitted).
II.
UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS
Isabel Cuevas is 84 or 85 years old and suffers from the following illnesses: pancreatic
cancer, liver cirrhosis, hepatic encephalopathy, emphysema, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, diabetes, thrombocytopenia, and atherosclerotic heart disease. ECF Nos. 33-1, at 2, ¶ 5;
39-1, at 3, ¶ 5; 40-4, at 12, 14. The pancreatic cancer was detected a couple of weeks before June
1, 2018. ECF No. 39-3, at 73. It is unclear exactly when Isabel Cuevas’s other conditions
developed, but she had them at least since January 31, 2018. ECF No. 33-6. Further, the record
reflects that Isabel Cuevas was experiencing leg cramps and back problems before November 15,
2016. ECF No. 39-3, at 22; 41.
On November 15, 2016, Isabel Cuevas sustained a fall while walking on the sidewalk of
the Rafael Hernández Airport in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. ECF No. 33-1, at 1, ¶ 1. Whether she
tripped over due to a defect on the sidewalk is a matter in dispute. ECF No. 39-1, at 1–2, ¶ 1.
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Sonia Cuevas, Isabel Cuevas’s adult daughter, was beside her at the time of the accident. ECF
Nos. 39-1, at 4, ¶ 8; 55-1, at 3, ¶ 8. She feared that Isabel Cuevas had suffered trauma to her head
or a hemorrhage because her face was swollen. ECF Nos. 39-1, at 5, ¶ 11; 55-1, at 4, ¶ 11.
Isabel Cuevas received emergency room treatment for a laceration on her nose, which
required three stitches. ECF Nos. 33-1, at 1, ¶ 2; 39-1, at 2, ¶ 2. She also suffered trauma to her
head and hip. 2 Id. Isabel Cuevas could not travel for one week after the accident and, according
to Sonia Cuevas, was “traumatized” for three weeks. ECF Nos. 39-1, at 5, ¶ 12; 55-1, at 4–5, ¶
12.
Isabel Cuevas has been taken to the hospital five or six times since the accident due to back
pain, inability to walk, and numbness in her legs. ECF No. 39-3, at 73. Isabel Cuevas’s medical
records reflect 1) that Isabel Cuevas went to the hospital on February 23, 2017 for a “rib/trunk
injury” and was diagnosed with an “accidental fall; contusion of chest,” 2) that Isabel Cuevas went
to the hospital on March 9, 2017 for back pain and minor trauma and was diagnosed with an
“accidental fall; contusion of lower back,” and 3) that on May 23, 2018, a hospital employee
described Isabel Cuevas as suffering from chronic back pain for the past two years since a fall.
ECF Nos. 40-3, at 9, 17, 31; 40-4, at 12, 14. On May 23, 2018, Isabel Cuevas underwent a Lumbar
Spine CT due to pain radiating to her lower extremities. ECF Nos. 39-1, at 5, ¶ 15; 55-1, at 6, ¶
15.
III.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Because in its motion for summary judgment Defendant is not arguing that there is
insufficient evidence for Plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant
2
Plaintiffs clarified that Isabel Cuevas received emergency room treatment after she was taken to El Buen Samaritano
Hospital and treated by paramedics, who found that she had head trauma, trauma to her nose, trauma to her left knee,
and trauma to her right arm. ECF No. 39-1, at 2, ¶ 2. However, the exhibit Plaintiffs cite to does not support this
contention. See ECF No. 39-3, at 45.
4
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was negligent, the analysis will focus on whether Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence for
a reasonable factfinder to conclude that at least one of them suffered in excess of $75,000 in
damages, the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction. Generally, multiple
plaintiffs cannot aggregate their claims to meet the amount in controversy. CE Design Ltd. v. Am.
Econ. Ins. Co., 755 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2014). There is an exception to this rule in cases where
several plaintiffs seek to enforce a single title or right, in which they have a “common and
undivided interest.” Id. (quoting Troy Bank of Troy, Indiana v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S.
39, 40–41 (1911)). “[I]ndividually cognizable and calculable claims” do not meet this definition.
Id. at 44.
Turning to the case at bar, Plaintiffs’ claims are individually cognizable and calculable
because even though their alleged injuries resulted from the same event, they must be proven
separately. See Rodriguez v. P.L. Indus., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 538, 541 (D.P.R. 1999) (“Plaintiffs’
argument that their claims must be aggregated because their independent claims result from a
single act by Defendant is not compelling.”). Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims cannot be aggregated to
meet the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement. This leaves two possible scenarios in which
the court might exercise diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. First, all three claims might
exceed the amount in controversy individually. Second, if one or two of Plaintiffs’ claims cannot
exceed the amount in controversy, the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those
claims. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (holding that as long
as one party in a diversity jurisdiction action alleges a sufficient amount in controversy, the court
may exert jurisdiction over other parties in the case even when those parties’ own allegations are
insufficient to meet the amount in controversy).
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Here, neither Sonia Cuevas’s claim nor Nelson Cuevas’s claim for “severe mental distress,
anguish, humiliation, and shame” exceed the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement. ECF
No. 1, at 9. In Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2004) (reversed
on other grounds), the First Circuit held that the emotional distress claims of family members of
an injured girl could not meet the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement. Factors the First
Circuit examined included whether the family members believed the girl would die of her injury,
whether there was a “dramatic witnessing of the accident,” whether the accident strained the family
members’ relationship with the girl, whether the family members missed any work or school
obligations to take the girl to medical appointments, whether the family members received any
counseling services in connection with the girl’s injury, and whether the family members lived
with the girl. Id. Here, Sonia Cuevas witnessed the accident and may have taken Isabel Cuevas
to medical appointments but does not live with Isabel Cuevas. Nelson Cuevas lives with Isabel
Cuevas. However, the parties have cited to no evidence indicating that Sonia Cuevas and Nelson
Cuevas believed that Isabel Cuevas would die, that the accident strained their relationship with
Isabel Cuevas, and that they have any work or school obligations to take Isabel Cuevas to medical
appointments. Further, no evidence has been cited to by the parties to suggest that Sonia Cuevas
and Nelson Cuevas ever received psychological or psychiatric treatment for emotional damages in
connection with the accident. ECF Nos. 33-1, at 1–2, ¶¶ 4, 7; 39-1, at 3, ¶¶ 4, 7. Although Sonia
Cuevas saw a psychologist, the evidence cited to suggests that her mental health treatment was for
reasons unrelated to the accident. ECF No. 39-3, at 16–17. Thus, the only claim remaining that
might exceed the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement is that of Isabel Cuevas.
When assessing whether a personal injury claim exceeds the amount in controversy, the
District of Puerto Rico and the First Circuit have given weight to 1) the existence of broken or
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fractured bones, permanent impairment of bodily functions, scarring, continuing physical pain,
and emotional stress and embarrassment and 2) the need for surgery, physical therapy, and the
wearing of a cast. Tirado-Toro v. Builder’s Square, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 714 (D.P.R. 1997) (holding
that an injury the plaintiff suffered for which he received 14 stitches to the head was not worth
$75,000 because he suffered neither broken or fractured bones nor permanent damage); RayaRodríguez v. Sears Roebuck Co., 389 F. Supp. 2d 275, 278 (D.P.R. 2005) (holding that a plaintiff
could potentially recover more than $75,000 where she had a visible scar and suffered continuing
pain, emotional stress, and embarrassment and also required surgery and had to undergo physical
therapy); Stewart v. Tupperware Corp., 356 F.3d 335, 340 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs
who suffered injuries that resulted in permanent impairment to their total bodily functions and
mental anguish could potentially recover more than $75,000 each); Rosario Ortega, 370 F.3d at
129 (holding that a plaintiff who required surgery, had to attend physical therapy and wear a cast,
had a scar, and was diagnosed with a permanent physical impairment could potentially recover
more than $75,000).
Isabel Cuevas’s only evidence of damages includes emergency room treatment for a
laceration on her nose, which required three stitches, “trauma” to her head and hip, emotional
“trauma” lasting three weeks, five or six visits to the hospital, and continuing pain in her legs.
ECF Nos. 33-1, at 1, ¶ 2; 39-1, at 2, ¶ 2 and 5, ¶¶ 12–13; 39-3, at 73; 55-1, at 4–5, ¶¶ 12–13.
Plaintiffs, however, have cited to no evidence indicating that 1) Isabel Cuevas suffered broken or
fractured bones, permanent impairment of bodily functions (which is distinguishable from
continuing pain), 3 or brain damage, 2) Isabel Cuevas needed surgery, physical therapy, or to wear
a cast, and 3) Isabel Cuevas can no longer walk.
3
See Stewart, 356 F.3d at 337; Rosario Ortega, 370 F.3d at 129.
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Turning first to Isabel Cuevas’s visits to the hospital, the parties have cited to no evidence
indicating that Isabel Cuevas received medical treatment regarding or as a result of the injuries she
suffered on November 15, 2016 aside from her emergency room treatment on that same day. ECF
No. 33-1, at 1–2, ¶ 3. The first two visits to the hospital were due to injuries to areas of the body
not alleged in the complaint. Thus, the falls the medical records refer to may be events unrelated
to the fall at issue. Regarding the third visit to the hospital, a fall that occurred two years before
May 23, 2018 would have occurred approximately on May 23, 2016, and the accident at issue
occurred on November 15, 2016. Even lending the medical records a different interpretation, they
state that Isabel Cuevas’s back pain had been worsening for the past two weeks, which suggests
that it is not constant. ECF No. 40-4, at 12, 14.
Most importantly, in her deposition, Sonia Cuevas admitted that Isabel Cuevas’s visits to
the hospital were “not because she fell down.” ECF No. 39-3, at 75. She specified that “when
you are a diabetic you have all kinds of conditions.” Id. She further stated that Isabel Cuevas was
also being treated for her kidneys “because of the diabetes.” Id. at 77. Additionally, Nelson
Cuevas’s statement in his deposition that Isabel Cuevas has “gotten worse” since the accident does
not address the cause of her visits to the emergency room. ECF No. 39-4, at 27, 31. Isabel Cuevas
is 84 or 85 years old and unfortunately suffers from a rather lengthy list of illnesses, including
pancreatic cancer, liver cirrhosis, hepatic encephalopathy, emphysema, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, diabetes, thrombocytopenia, and atherosclerotic heart disease. Further, the
record reflects that Isabel Cuevas was experiencing leg cramps and back problems before the
accident. Under these circumstances, it is far from clear that without a medical expert, a reasonable
jury could find it more likely than not that Isabel Cuevas’s leg pain was a direct result of the
accident.
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Even assuming arguendo that without a medical expert, Plaintiffs can prove that Isabel
Cuevas’s continuing pain in her legs is the direct result of the injuries she suffered on November
15, 2016, no reasonable jury could find that Isabel Cuevas’s claim exceeds the $75,000 amount in
controversy requirement in light of the previously mentioned precedent. Scarring, continuing
physical pain, and emotional stress are certainly factors in determining whether a personal injury
claim exceeds the amount in controversy. However, those factors alone within the context of the
evidence of this case are not enough to tip this claim over the edge. See Raya-Rodríguez, 389 F.
Supp. 2d at 278 (holding that a plaintiff could potentially recover more than $75,000 where she
had a visible scar and suffered continuing pain, emotional stress, and embarrassment and also
required surgery and had to undergo physical therapy).
Reasonable minds could differ as to the extent of Isabel Cuevas’s damages. However, this
is a case where no surgeries or inability to walk ensued, where the injuries included only three
stitches, and no fractures or brain damage, where the individual has a lengthy list of unrelated
illnesses and was experiencing leg cramps and back problems before the accident, and where the
individual’s own daughter admitted that her mother’s visits to the hospital were “not because she
fell down.” With the evidence that Plaintiffs have cited to, a jury would be speculating as to
whether these visits resulted from the fall on November 15, 2016, from another fall, or from Isabel
Cuevas’s unrelated health conditions. Moreover, no evidence has been cited to by the parties to
suggest that Isabel Cuevas ever received psychological or psychiatric treatment for emotional
damages in connection with the accident on November 15, 2016. ECF Nos. 33-1, at 1–2, ¶ 4; 391, at 3, ¶ 4. Under these circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 33) is
GRANTED. 4 The complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 12th day of December, 2018.
s/Marcos E. López
U.S. Magistrate Judge
4
Even though the Puerto Rico Port Authority filed the motion for summary judgment, and not Aeropuerto
Internacional Rafael Hernández, the analysis is the same as to the latter Defendant. Thus, the case is dismissed in its
entirety without prejudice. Further, the docket does not reflect that summons were ever issued and served to
Aeropuerto Internacional Rafael Hernández. ECF No. 3. It is not evident how Plaintiffs could show that the complaint
should not be dismissed as to Aeropuerto Internacional Rafael Hernández for lack of diligent prosecution.
10
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