Betancourt-Rivera v. Vazquez-Garced
Filing
27
OPINION AND ORDER re 16 Motion for Reconsideration: GRANTED. This case is stayed pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 2161(a) and 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) and 922. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 05/16/2018. (brc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DAVID BETANCOURT-RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
WANDA VÁZQUEZ-GARCED, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before
(“Vázquez”)’s
the
Court
and
Erick
is
defendants’
Rolón-Suárez’
Wanda
Vázquez-Garced
(“Rolón”)’s
motion
for
reconsideration regarding denial of the automatic stay pursuant to
the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act
(“PROMESA”), 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq.
(Docket No. 16.)
reasons
and
set
forth
below,
Vázquez’s
Rolón’s
For the
motion
for
reconsideration is GRANTED.
I.
Background
Plaintiff David Betancourt-Rivera (“Betancourt”) commenced
this action on August 2, 2017 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“section 1983”), asserting that Vázquez, the Puerto Rico Attorney
General, and Rolón, Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, violated the Eighth Amendment of
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
the
United
States
2
Constitution. 1
(Docket
Nos.
1
and
26.)
Betancourt is an inmate in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s prison
system.
(Docket No. 26.)
According to Betancourt:
[He] is a witness, they put [witnesses] in a building
for witnesses, and although there was an agreement that
they were not going to mix [inmates] together, they are
doing it, even though in the past witnesses were killed.
[Inmates] are living neither safely nor at peace. 2
Id. at p. 5.
He requests that the Court order Vázquez and Rolón
to remove non-witnesses from his facility, to corroborate that
inmates housed in the same facility as Betancourt are indeed
witnesses, and to transfer Betancourt to “Stop 8 3 like before.”
Id. at p 6.
Moreover, Betancourt requests $3,000,000 in monetary
damages.
Vázquez filed two notices of automatic stay pursuant to
Title III of the PROMESA.
(Docket Nos. 12 and 14.)
denied both requests to stay this litigation.
The Court
(Docket Nos. 13 and
15.) Vázquez and Rolón now move for reconsideration of the Court’s
1 Section 1983 is a federal statute by which the deprivation of constitutional
rights may be redressed. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment governs section 1983 claims regarding
allegations that prison officials failed to place inmates in protective custody.
See Giroux v. Somerset Cnty., 178 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying the Eighth
Amendment to section 1983 claims that prison officials placed a government
cooperator in a prison cell with an inmate posing a known danger).
3
“Stop 8” refers to a prison facility located at what used to be Stop 8 of the
now-defunct street car line on Fernández-Juncos Avenue.
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
3
denial of the automatic stay.
(Docket No. 16.)
Having further
considered the issue, the Court concurs that the automatic stay is
applicable to Betancourt’s section 1983 cause of action pursuant
to
Title
III
of
PROMESA.
Accordingly,
the
motion
for
reconsideration is GRANTED.
II.
Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not specifically
provide for the filing of motions for reconsideration.”
Sánchez-
Pérez v. Sánchez-González, 717 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193-94 (D.P.R.
2010) (Besosa, J.) (quoting Sánchez-Medina v. UNICCO Serv. Co.,
265 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.P.R. 2010)).
“[I]t is settled in this
circuit[, however,] that a motion which ask[s] the court to modify
its
earlier
disposition
of
[a]
case
because
of
an
allegedly
erroneous legal result is brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).” Marie
v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting
In re Sun Pipe Line Co., 831 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1987)); see
also Cent. Produce El Jibarito v. Luna Commercial Corp., 880 F.
Supp. 2d 282, 284 (D.P.R. 2012) (Besosa, J.) (quoting the same).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a district
court will alter its original order only if it “evidenced a
manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or
in certain other narrow situations.”
Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage,
Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Global Naps, Inc.
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
4
v. Verizon New England, Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2007)).
A
motion for reconsideration does “not provide a vehicle for a party
to undo its own procedural failures [or] allow a party [to] advance
arguments that could and should have been presented to the district
court prior to judgment.”
Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94,
104 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Aybar v. Crispin–Reyes, 118 F.3d 10,
16 (1st Cir. 1997)).
“Rule 59(e) does not exist to allow parties
a second chance to prevail on the merits [. . . and] is not an
avenue for litigants to reassert arguments and theories that were
previously rejected by the Court.”
Harley–Davidson Motor Co. v.
Bank of New England–Old Colony, N.A., 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir.
1990).
In deciding a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing court
has
considerable
discretion.
Venegas-Hernández
Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2004).
v.
Sonolux
“As a general rule,
motions for reconsideration should only be exceptionally granted.”
Villanueva-Méndez v. Nieves-Vázquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323
(D.P.R. 2005) (Domínguez, J.).
III. Discussion
The Court’s disposition regarding the automatic stay must
ensure that Betancourt is afforded judicial redress for purported
violations of his civil rights without frustrating the debtrestructuring scheme set forth in PROMESA.
Regrettably, the
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
economic
crisis
5
afflicting
the
Commonwealth
of
Puerto
Rico
requires the Court to reconcile these interests.
A.
PROMESA, Title III and the Automatic Stay
On June 30, 2016, President Barack Obama signed PROMESA
into law.
PROMESA seeks to address the dire fiscal emergency in
Puerto Rico, and sets forth “[a] comprehensive approach to [Puerto
Rico’s] fiscal, management and structural problems and [. . .] a
Federal statutory authority for the Government of Puerto Rico to
restructure debts in a fair and orderly process.”
§ 2194(m)(4).
48 U.S.C.
PROMESA establishes a seven-member Oversight Board
for Puerto Rico.
Id. at § 2121(e)(1)(A).
“The purpose of the
Oversight Board is to provide a method for [Puerto Rico] to achieve
fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.”
Id. at
§ 2121(a). 4
Congress
patterned
the
automatic
stay
contained
in
section 2194 of PROMESA on the United States Bankruptcy Code.
48 U.S.C. §§ 2102-2241.
Section 2194(b)(1) of PROMESA stays
“actions or proceedings against the Government of Puerto Rico that
4
The Oversight Board operates as an entity within the Government of Puerto
Rico, id. at § 2121(c), and wields broad authority over the Commonwealth and
any of its instrumentalities designated as “covered” instrumentalities. Id.
§ 2121(d)(1). For instance, the Oversight Board has the authority to develop,
review, and approve territorial and instrumentality fiscal plans and budgets,
id. §§ at 2141—2142; to enforce budget and fiscal plan compliance, id. §§ at
2143—2144; to seek judicial enforcement of its authority to carry out its
responsibilities under PROMESA, id. § at 2124(k); and to intervene in any
litigation filed against the Commonwealth or its instrumentalities. Id. § 2152.
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
w[ere]
or
could
[PROMESA].”
6
have
been
commenced
Id. at § 2194(b)(1).
before
the
enactment
of
The statute also stays judicial
actions “to recover a Liability Claim against the Government of
Puerto Rico that arose before the enactment of [PROMESA].”
Id.
In the bankruptcy context, the automatic stay becomes operative
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and “is extremely broad
in scope,” applying “to almost any type of formal or informal
action
taken
against
the
Montalvo
debtor.”
v.
Autoridad
de
Acueductos y Alcantarillados, 537 B.R. 128, 140 (Bankr. D.P.R.
2015) (citing Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, 3 Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 362.03 (16th ed. 2015)). 5
Suspending
stabilize
the
debt-related
region
Commonwealth’s
for
financial
the
crisis.
litigation
purposes
Id.
at
is
of
§
“essential
resolving”
2194(m)(5).
to
the
The
automatic stay “allow[s] the Government of Puerto Rico a limited
period
of
time
during
which
it
can
focus
its
resources
on
negotiating a voluntary resolution with its creditors instead of
defending
numerous,
§ 2194(n)(2).
5
costly
creditor
lawsuits.”
Id.
at
Congress indicated that by serving these important
The automatic stay in PROMESA, however, is “limited in nature,” 48
U.S.C. § 2194(m)(5)(B), and remained in effect upon enactment of PROMESA until
the earlier of (1) February 15, 2017, with a possible extension of sixty or
seventy-five days, or (2) the date on which the Oversight Board filed a petition
on behalf of the Government of Puerto Rico or any of its instrumentalities to
commence debt-adjustment proceedings pursuant to Title III of PROMESA. Id. at
§ 2194(d). The initial automatic stay expired on May 1, 2017.
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
7
purposes, PROMESA’s automatic stay was ultimately intended to
“benefit the lives of 3.5 million American citizens living in
Puerto Rico.”
Id. at § 2194(n)(5).
The Oversight Board filed a Title III petition on behalf
of
the
Commonwealth
of
Puerto
Rico
on
May
3,
2017.
In
re
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 17-3283 (LTS) (D.P.R. May 3,
2017). 6
structure
Title III of PROMESA parallels the debt reorganization
for
municipalities
Bankruptcy Code.
set
forth
in
Chapter
9
of
the
See 48 U.S.C. §§ 2161, 2164 (incorporating by
reference 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922).
Because the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico seeks relief pursuant to Title III, the automatic stay
remains in effect. 7
Id. at § 2194(d)(1)(C).
This Court possesses the authority to determine whether
the automatic stay is applicable.
See Chao v. Hospital Staffing
Services Inc., 270 F.3d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Chao held that:
6
The Oversight Board also filed Title III petitions on behalf of the Puerto
Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (“COFINA”), the Puerto Rico Highways and
Transportation Authority (“HTA”), the Employees’ Retirement System (“ERS”), and
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”).
The Oversight Board
commissioned Prime Clerk LLC to maintain filings and other records pertaining
to PROMESA litigation. Dockets relating to litigation commenced pursuant to
Title III are available at https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico.
7
The court presiding over the Title III petition confirmed that Bankruptcy Code
sections 362(a) and 922(a) are applicable, enjoining all persons and entities
“from commencing or continuing any judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the Debtors, including the issuance or employment of process,
that was or could have been commented before the Title III Cases were commenced.”
In re Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 17-3282, Docket No. 543 (D.P.R. Jun. 29,
2017) (Swain, J.).
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
8
Not surprisingly, courts have uniformly held that when
a party seeks to commence or continue proceedings in one
court against a debtor or property that is protected by
the stay automatically imposed upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition, the non-bankruptcy court properly
responds to the filing by determining whether the
automatic stay applies to (i.e. stays) the proceedings.
Id.
(citing cases from the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals).
Although the First Circuit Court of Appeals has not
addressed this issue, bankruptcy courts within this circuit concur
that “[t]he court in which the litigation claim to be stayed is
pending has jurisdiction to determine not only its own jurisdiction
but also the more precise question whether the proceeding pending
before it is subject to the automatic stay.”
In re Martínez, 227
B.R. 442, 444 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1998) (citation omitted).
B.
The Court’s Initial Denial of the Automatic Stay
Originally, the Court denied Vázquez’s request to stay
this action because PROMESA must comport with federal law.
Docket
No. 13; See, e.g., Peaje Investments LLC v. García-Padilla, 845
F.3d 505, 511 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution entitles creditors to protect their
property
interests
during
bankruptcy
proceedings).
PROMESA
provides that “nothing in this Act shall be construed as impairing
or
in
any
manner
relieving
a
territorial
government,
or
any
territorial instrumentality thereof, from compliance with Federal
laws.”
48 U.S.C. § 2106.
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
Irrespective
9
of
the
pending
economic
crisis,
the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico continues to function as a governmental
unit subject to the United States Constitution and federal law.
Congress enacted section 1983 “to deter state actors from using
the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their
federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if
such deterrence fails.”
Because
Betancourt’s
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
section
1983
action
pertains
to
alleged
violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Court permitted this
litigation to proceed.
C.
The Automatic Stay
Section 1983 Claim
is
Applicable
to
Betancourt’s
In the year following the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s
Title III petition, several courts have applied the automatic stay.
Consequently,
precise. 8
the
parameters
Actions
subject
of
the
automatic
stay
to
the
automatic
stay
are
more
“involve
significant problems which are not encountered in the private
sector,” because “important constitutional issues arise when a
8
The automatic stay in inapplicable to habeas corpus actions.
See AtilesGabriel v. Commonwealth, 256 F. Supp. 3d 122. 127 (D.P.R. 2017) (Gelpí, J.)
(“Even if Congress had intended Title III to trigger a stay so broad as to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, Congress would not have manifested that
intent by legislative silence”). Moreover, actions that seek injunctive relief
rather than monetary damages may fall beyond the scope of the automatic stay.
See Vázquez-Camora v. Dep’t of Educ., 255 F. Supp. 3d 298 (D.P.R. 2017) (Gelpí,
J.) (“Plaintiff seeks de novo judicial review of an agency action to under [the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act]. The relief requested
is not monetary damages, rather, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory
relief to enforce a federally protected right.”).
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
10
[government entity] enters the bankruptcy arena.”
Bennett v.
Jefferson County, 518 B.R. 613, 637 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (contrasting
the policies underlying Chapter 11 bankruptcy with Chapter 9
bankruptcy, noting that the purpose of Chapter 9 “is not future
profit,
but
rather
(citation omitted).
continued
provision
of
public
services”)
PROMESA and precedent from this district
establish that the automatic stay encompasses Betancourt’s section
1983 action.
1.
Section 1983 and the Automatic Stay
The district courts presiding over section 1983
actions apply the automatic stay, directing litigants to seek
relief from the Title III petition court. See Ruiz-Colón v. Elías,
No. 17-2223, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74455 (D.P.R. Apr. 30, 2018)
(Young, J.) (applying the automatic stay to section 1983 action
against Puerto Rico prosecutors and police officers for alleged
violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments);
Nieves-López v. Bhatia-Gautier, No. 14-1220, Docket No. 69 (D.P.R.
Oct. 20, 2017) (García, J.) (applying the automatic stay to a
section
1983
action
premised
on
political
discrimination);
Marrero-Méndez v. Pesquera, No. 13-1203, Docket No. 131 (D.P.R.
July 20, 2017) (García, J.) (applying the automatic stay to a
section 1983 action against the superintendent of the Puerto Rico
Police Department (“PRPD”) for religious discrimination); María
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
11
Judith Díaz-Castro v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 16-2873,
Docket No. 31 (D.P.R. Jun. 20, 2017) (Cerezo, J.) (applying the
automatic stay to a section 1983 action against PRPD officers for
purported violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Caraballo-Rivera v. García-Padilla, No. 14-1435, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165529 (Oct. 3, 2017) (Domínguez, J.) (applying
the automatic stay to a section 1983 action where plaintiff sued
Puerto Rico governor for political discrimination).
The
First
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
stayed
appeals in cases involving section 1983 causes of action.
the
See
Cano-Rodríguez v. De Jesús-Cardona, No. 16-1532 (1st Cir. Nov. 27,
2017); Besosa-Noceda v. Miranda-Rodríguez, No. 16-2117 (1st Cir.
Jan 23, 2018).
In Cano-Rodríguez and Besosa-Noceda, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals declined to adjudicate the appeal, holding
that “[i]n view of the petition to restructure its debts filed by
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, this appeal is stayed.”
The
predominant
rationale
for
Id.
extending
the
automatic stay to section 1983 actions centers on the relief
requested by plaintiffs. A liability claim is a “right to payment”
or “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment.” 9
9
48 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1).
Similarly, section 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code automatically stays “any
act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debt” arising before the
petition.
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
12
Civil actions containing a demand for money damages constitute a
“liability.”
48 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1); see Marrero-Méndez, No. 13-
1203, Docket No. 131 at p. 1 (holding that the section 1983 claim
falls within the automatic stay because “the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico has assumed the costs of [defendants’] representation and
possibly the payment of any adverse judgment”).
PROMESA halts
litigation “to recover a Liability Claim against the Government of
Puerto Rico.”
Id.
Accordingly, the automatic stay encompasses
section 1983 actions that seek money damages from the Title III
debtor.
A
decision
by
this
Court
with
analogous
circumstances and procedural posture is illustrative.
In Ruiz-
Colón v. Elías, plaintiffs sued a prosecutor within the Puerto
Rico Department of Justice pursuant to section 1983 for purported
violations
of
the
Fourth,
Eighth,
and
Fourteenth
Amendments.
No. 17-2223, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74455, at *3 (April 30, 2018)
(Young,
J.).
Plaintiffs
requested
$25,000,000 in monetary damages.
injunctive
Id. at *2.
relief
and
Just as the Court
did in this litigation, the Ruiz-Colón court initially denied
defendants’ request to stay the section 1983 action pursuant to
PROMESA.
Id.
at
*3.
Defendants
moved
for
reconsideration,
presenting “the Court with a difficult, though now recurrent,
problem viz. administrating the stay occasioned by the quasi-
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
bankruptcy
status
now
13
being
endured
by
the
people
of
the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” Id. The Court in Ruiz-Colón granted
defendants’ motion for reconsideration because the section 1983
action imposed litigation costs on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
and possible liability for monetary damages. 10
Id. at *12 (“These
are the type of suits contemplated by PROMESA that require an
automatic stay because the defense is funded by the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico and its treasury.”).
Betancourt’s
section
1983
action
exposes
the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to monetary damages in the same manner
as the litigation in Ruiz-Colón.
entitle
him
to
money
damages
A victory for Betancourt would
payable
from
public
coffers.
Moreover, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is litigating this matter
on behalf of Vázquez and Rolón, incurring costs associated with
this
action
petitions.
while
simultaneously
addressing
the
Title
III
A judgment in favor of Betancourt would constitute a
“Liability Claim,” instilling in Betancourt a “right to payment”
10
Plaintiffs in Ruiz-Colón v. Elías and Cruz-Rodríguez v. Administración de
Corrección de Puerto Rico, et al. both sued Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
instrumentalities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and requested monetary damages.
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74455; No. 17-1464 (Young, J.).
The automatic stay
applied in Ruiz-Colón, but not in Cruz-Rodríguez. Id. Unlike the plaintiff in
Ruiz-Colón, however, the plaintiff in Cruz-Rodríguez requested that his “liberty
be restored,” implicating the writ of habeas corpus. Habeas actions are not
subject to the automatic stay. See Atiles-Gabriel v. Commonwealth, 256 F. Supp.
3d 122, 127 (D.P.R. 2017) (Gelpí, J.) (“[R]eading PROMESA as a whole, it is
unlikely Congress intended the filing of a Title III petition to trigger a stay
so broad that the availability of habeas procedures would even be called into
question.”).
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
against
the
14
Commonwealth
§ 2194(a)(2)(A).
By
of
adopting
Puerto
the
Rico.
automatic
48
stay,
U.S.C.
Congress
contemplated “an orderly adjustment of all of the Government of
Puerto Rico’s liabilities.”
Id. at § 2914(n)(4).
Consequently,
the automatic stay halts this action unless the bankruptcy court
grants relief from the stay.
The
Court
is
mindful
that
Betancourt
seeks
compliance with the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment enshrined in the Eighth Amendment.
No. 26.)
(Docket
Compliance with this essential protection is consistent
with the automatic stay.
The court presiding over the Title III
petition affirmed that the automatic stay “shall [not] affect the
substantive rights of any party.”
In re Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, No. 17-bk-3282, Docket No. 543 at p. 5 (D.P.R. Jun. 29, 2017)
(Swain, J.). 11
The Title III court will determine whether relief
from the automatic stay is warranted.
See In Re Fin. Oversight &
Mgmt. Bd., No. 17-bk-4780 2017 Bank. LEXIS 4168 *9—10 (D.P.R.
Sept. 14, 2017) (Swain, J.) (“To determine whether there is cause
to lift the bankruptcy stay, the Court examines the factors first
11
Should Betancourt move for relief from the stay, he must comport with the
Third Amended Notice, Case Management and Administrative Procedures, setting
forth the requirements for requesting relief from the automatic stay. (In re
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Case No. 17-3283, Docket No. 1513 at pp. 11-12.)
For instance, at least fifteen business days before filing for relief from the
automatic stay, litigants must contact counsel for the Oversight Board. Id. at
p. 11-12.
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
15
enumerated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in In re Sonnax Indus.”).
Indeed, the Title III Court
previously addressed whether the automatic stay is applicable to
section 1983 actions.
See In re Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
No. 17-bk-3283, Docket No. 2205 (D.P.R. Jan. 1, 2018) (denying
relief from the automatic stay in a section 1983 action, holding
that “[a]lthough the Court is deeply mindful of the serious nature
of the factual allegations underlying the Lawsuit, the Movants
have not made the requisite showing of cause for relief from the
automatic stay”). 12
Accordingly, the Court grants Vázquez’s and
Rolón’s motion to stay this action.
12
(Docket No. 12.)
See also, id. at Docket No. 1234 (D.P.R. Sept. 5, 2017) (Swain, J.) (denying
relief from the automatic stay in a section 1983 action against three PRPD
officers); id. at Docket No. 1205 (D.P.R. Aug. 29, 2017) (Swain, J.) (denying
relief from the automatic stay in a section 1983 action against Puerto Rico
Department of Justice attorneys and PRPD officers).
Civil No. 17-2040 (FAB)
IV.
16
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Vázquez’s and Rolón’s motion
for reconsideration is GRANTED.
(Docket No. 16.)
This case is
stayed pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 2161(a) and 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)
and 922.
Any request to lift or vacate the stay must be filed in
the bankruptcy court in Bankruptcy Case No. 17-bk-3283 (LTS).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 16, 2018.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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