Ruiz-Colon et al v. Rodriguez-Elias et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER "For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendants motion to reconsider and administratively closes this case. It may be reopened by any party should the judge presiding over the bankruptcy proceeding grant relief from the stay or upon the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, whichever first shall occur. SO ORDERED."Signed by Judge William G Young on 4/30/2018.(EES)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
___________________________________
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
ANDRÉS RODRÍGUEZ ELIAS,
)
individually and as member of the )
conjugal partnership existing
)
with Jane Doe; RAMÓN PÉREZ
)
CRESPO, individually and as
)
member of the conjugal partnership )
existing with Jane Roe; ANTONIO
)
MALDONADO TRINIDAD, individually
)
and as member of the conjugal
)
partnership existing with Carla
)
Coe; PEDRO GOYCO AMADOR,
)
individually and as member of the )
conjugal partnership existing
)
with Dona Doe; FRANCISCO CARBÓ
)
MARTÍ, individually and as member )
of the conjugal partnership
)
existing with Grace Goe; ERNESTO
)
FERNÁNDEZ, individually and as
)
member of the conjugal partnership )
existing with Jackie Joe; VICTOR
)
BURGOS BARROSO, individually and
)
as member of the conjugal
)
partnership existing with Jane
)
Poe; ELBA GONZÁLEZ, individually
)
and as member of the conjugal
)
partnership existing with John
)
Doe,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
NELSON RUÍZ-COLÓN, NELSON RUÍZCORREA, EVANGELISTA COLÓN,
LEINELMAR RUÍZ-CACERES,

YOUNG, D.J.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-02223-WGY

April 30, 2018

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Nelson Ruíz-Colón, Nelson Ruíz-Correa, Evangelista Colón,

and Leinelmar Ruíz-Caceres (collectively the “Plaintiffs”) bring
this civil rights complaint against Andrés Rodríguez Elias,
individually and as member of the conjugal partnership existing
with Jane Doe; Ramón Pérez Crespo, individually and as member of
the conjugal partnership existing with Jane Roe; Antonio
Maldonado Trinidad, individually and as member of the conjugal
partnership existing with Carla Coe; Pedro Goyco Amador,
individually and as member of the conjugal partnership existing
with Dona Doe; Francisco Carbó Martí, individually and as member
of the conjugal partnership existing with Grace Goe; Ernesto
Fernández, individually and as member of the conjugal
partnership existing with Jackie Joe; Victor Burgos Barroso,
individually and as member of the conjugal partnership existing
with Jane Poe; and Elba González, individually and as member of
the conjugal partnership existing with John Doe (collectively
the “Defendants”) alleging that the Defendants violated their
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution, as well as violated their rights under
Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, stemming from
wrongful incarceration.

The Defendants are a combination of

prosecutors and law enforcement officials of the Commonwealth of
[2]

Puerto Rico.

The Defendants move this Court to reconsider its

decision to deny the automatic stay imposed by the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”).
A.

Question Presented

This motion for reconsideration presents the Court with a
difficult, though now recurrent, problem, viz. administering the
stay occasioned by the quasi-bankruptcy status now being endured
by the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

The

Plaintiffs, claiming violations of their civil rights and
seeking money damages, bring this action against the Defendants,
who are government prosecutors and law enforcement officials.
Mindful of the bankruptcy-like stay of damages claims against
the Commonwealth itself, the Plaintiffs carefully frame their
complaint to seek redress from the Defendants solely in their
personal capacities even though the actions of which the
Plaintiffs complain are alleged to have taken place under color
of law.
After careful reflection –- while the issue is difficult
and either course is unfair –- this Court reconsiders its
earlier ruling and administratively closes this case pending
resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding.
B.

Procedural Posture

The Plaintiffs filed their complaint against the Defendants
on September 23, 2017, alleging wrongful incarceration (“count
[3]

I”), violation of due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“section 1983”) (“count II”), conspiracy to deprive
constitutional rights (“count III”), denial of access to courts
in violation of section 1983 (“count IV”), failure of the
Defendants to intervene in order to prevent misconduct (“count
V”), malicious prosecution in violation of state law (“count
VI”), damages under Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto
Rico (“count VII”), supervisory liability under section 1983
(“count VIII”), breach of the parent-child relationship under
section 1983 (“count IX”), and punitive damages (“count X”).
Compl. ¶¶ 117-79, ECF No. 1.

The Plaintiffs in their complaint

also request monetary damages totaling $25,000,000.00.

Id. ¶¶

180-89.
After two judges recused themselves from this case, the
case was randomly assigned to this session.
Clerk, ECF No. 8.

See Mem. of the

On February 22, 2018, the Defendants moved

this Court to take notice of the automatic stay and apply it to
this case.

See Notice of Automatic Stay, ECF No. 33.

The

Plaintiffs filed an opposition and requested that the Court lift
the automatic stay.

See Pls.’ Opp’n Mot., ECF No. 34.

The

Court denied the Defendants’ motion on March 6, 2018, lifted the
automatic stay, and requested that the parties submit a joint
proposed case management schedule within two weeks of the order.
See Order, ECF No. 35.

The Defendants filed a motion to
[4]

reconsider the Court’s order on March 15, 2018.

See Defs.’ Mot.

Recons., ECF No. 36.
II.

ANALYSIS
The Defendants argue that the stay should apply because the

Plaintiffs are requesting damages that the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico would routinely pay, regardless of the fact that the
Defendants are being sued solely in their individual capacities.
PROMESA “is a bankruptcy-like statute enacted by Congress
in June 2016 to help address the financial crisis in Puerto
Rico.”

Vázquez-Carmona v. Department of Educ. of Puerto Rico,

255 F. Supp. 3d 298, 298 (D.P.R. 2017) (Gelpi, J.).

See also

Peaje Invs. LLC v. García–Padilla, 845 F.3d 505, 509 (1st Cir.
2017).

Section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, made

applicable by Section 301(a) of PROMESA, “provides [that] an
automatic stay [is] applicable to ‘the commencement or
continuation’ of ‘a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before commencement of the case under [Title 11], or
to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under [Title 11].’”

Atiles-Gabriel v.

Puerto Rico, 256 F. Supp. 3d 122, 124 (D.P.R. 2017) (Gelpi, J.)
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)).

“Similarly, subsection

362(a)(6) automatically stays ‘any act to collect, assess, or

[5]

recover a claim against the debtor’ arising before the
petition.”

Id.

“Section 922(a), which applies to adjustment of the debts
of a municipality, provides an automatic stay applicable to ‘the
commencement or continuation’ of ‘a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against an officer or inhabitant of
the debtor that seeks to enforce a claim against the debtor.’”
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 922(a)).

The

Bankruptcy Code, as incorporated in PROMESA, defines “claim” as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
It is now pretty clear that where a litigant may be
entitled to equitable relief, the stay cannot frustrate the
grant of that relief even though an award of monetary damages
may be stayed and the Commonwealth has to expend funds
litigating the matter.

In Vázquez-Carmona, the plaintiff sought

a review of an administrative resolution of the Puerto Rico
Department of Education, under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act.

255 F. Supp. 3d at 298.

[6]

As part of

her amended complaint, the plaintiff requested injunctive and
declaratory relief.

Id.

Judge Gelpi did not apply the PROMESA

stay to the case because the plaintiff was not seeking monetary
damages, but rather “injunctive and declaratory relief to
enforce a federally protected right.”

Id.

“PROMESA expressly

contemplates that the temporary stay will not apply to suits to
enforce federal rights.”

Id.; accord Order on Mot. Recons.,

Cruz–Rodriguez v. Administración de Corrección de P.R., No.
3:17-cv–01464 (D.P.R. Mar. 30, 2018), ECF No. 23.
Likewise in Atiles-Gabriel, the plaintiff filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking
“collateral review of the constitutionality of his conviction
and sentence by the Commonwealth.”

256 F. Supp. 3d at 123.

The

defendants moved the court to stay the petition under PROMESA.
Id. at 124.

Judge Gelpi ruled that the automatic stay did not

apply to habeas corpus petitions because “[t]he relief sought
concern[ed] a person’s liberty; it [did] not seek a right to
payment, nor an equitable remedy for which monetary payment is
an alternative remedy” as explained in PROMESA.

Id. at 125.

Finally, in Cruz-Rodriguez, the plaintiff alleged that the
Department of Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Puerto Rico Department of Correction and Rehabilitation, and the
Commonwealth’s Parole Board failed to grant the plaintiff
parole, which he believed he was entitled to, and requested
[7]

$7,000,000.00 in restitution.

Notice Automatic Stay, No. 3:17-

cv-01464 (D.P.R. June 14, 2017), ECF No. 10.

This Court ruled

that the automatic stay did not apply because “[a]mong other
claims for relief, the plaintiff [sought] to have his liberty
restored.”

Id. at ECF No. 23.

On the precise point at issue here, however, Judge Gelpi,
in Guadalupe-Baez v. Pesquera, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.P.R. 2017),
declined to apply the automatic stay under PROMESA because under
section 3087, “the Attorney General retains discretion to decide
whether to defend and indemnify the Commonwealth actor in the
suit.” 1 Id. at 2.

The defendants appealed Judge Gelpi’s

1

32 L.P.R.A. § 3087 states:
The Secretary of Justice shall determine in which
cases the Commonwealth shall assume legal
representation and, subsequently, after considering
the findings of the court or which arise from the
evidence presented, he shall determine whether it is
in order to pay the full judgment imposed on the
public officials, ex-officials, employees or exemployees sued, pursuant to the provisions of §§ 30853092a of this title.
Nevertheless, if before acting or failing to do
so, the official, ex-official, employee or ex-employee
requested the Secretary of Justice to render an
Opinion to such effects and his action or omission was
performed according to the terms thereof, the
Commonwealth may not deny or withhold legal
representation from such persons or refuse the total
payment of the judgment imposed.
The Secretary of Justice shall notify the
decision to provide legal representation within thirty
(30) days after having received the corresponding
petition.
The petitioner may file a petition for review of
an adverse decision of the Secretary of Justice before
[8]

decision to lift the stay, but then voluntarily dismissed the
appeal.

Notice of Appeal, Guadalupe-Baez v. Pesquera, No. 3:13-

cv-01529 (D.P.R. Oct. 27, 2017), ECF No. 85; Mot. Dismiss,
Guadalupe-Baez v. Pesquera, No. 17-2117 (1st Cir. Jan. 25,
2018).
Moreover, unlike Vázquez-Carmona, Atiles-Gabriel, and Cruz,
the Plaintiffs’ only requests for relief for all of the ten
counts are purely monetary damages.

Compl. ¶¶ 180-89.

The

Plaintiffs’ case here is the type of case that is contemplated
by PROMESA for which the stay should apply.

See 11 U.S.C. §

922.
Perhaps most persuasive, in light of PROMESA, the First
Circuit has stayed appeals in civil rights cases where the
requested relief includes both monetary and non-monetary
damages.

In Cano-Rodriguez v. De Jesus-Cardona, the plaintiffs

brought an action against the Secretary of Justice of the

the Court of First Instance within fifteen (15) days
following receipt of the notice.
After the petition for review is filed, if the
writ is issued to that effect, it shall be the duty of
the Secretary of Justice to refer the record of the
case, within fifteen (15) days following the issuance
of the writ. The review before the Court of First
Instance shall be limited exclusively to questions of
law.
In order to protect the defendant's right to a
timely appearance in court, the Secretary of Justice
may request additional time to make a determination on
the petition presented to him.
[9]

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Secretary of the Puerto Rico
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and a political
activist in his individual capacity, alleging political
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment and violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as various state law claims.
3:14-cv-01284 (D.P.R. Apr. 3, 2014), ECF No. 1.

Compl., No.
The plaintiffs

requested monetary damages, as well as preliminary and permanent
injunctions against the defendants from violating the
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Id.

United States

Magistrate Judge Bruce J. McGiverin granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and dismissed the claims.
Nos. 65, 66.

Id. at ECF

The plaintiffs appealed and the First Circuit

stayed the proceedings in light of PROMESA.

Order, Cano-

Rodriguez v. De Jesus-Cardona, No. 16-1532 (1st Cir. Nov. 27,
2017) (“In view of the petition to restructure its debts filed
by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, this appeal is stayed.”).
In Besosa-Noceda v. Miranda-Rodriguez, the plaintiffs
brought a case against the Secretary of the Department of
Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, prosecutors, the
Puerto Rico Police Department, and police officers for claims
under section 1983 and for malicious prosecution in connection
with criminal charges brought against the plaintiffs.
No. 3:15-cv-01558 (D.P.R. May 10, 2015), ECF No. 1.
[10]

Compl.,
In their

request for relief, the plaintiffs only requested $5,200,000.00
in damages plus attorneys fees and court costs.

Id.

On August

15, 2016, Judge Carmen C. Cerezo granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Id. at ECF Nos. 75, 76.

The plaintiffs filed their appeal with

the First Circuit soon after.

Id. at ECF No. 77.

Circuit stayed the appeal in light of PROMESA.

The First

Order, Besosa-

Noceda v. Capo-Rivera, No. 16-2117 (1st Cir. Jan. 23, 2018) (“In
view of the petition to restructure its debts filed by the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, this appeal is stayed.”).
In Pabon-Ortega v. Llompart-Zeno, the plaintiff brought a
case against the Administrator of the Administration of
Tribunals of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in her individual
as well as official capacity, requesting injunctive relief and
monetary damages for discharging him from his job in violation
of the First Amendment.
3, 2016), ECF No. 1.

Compl., No. 3:16-cv-01185 (D.P.R. Feb.

Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez dismissed the

claims without prejudice because there were ongoing proceedings
pending before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, and the court
abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
ECF Nos. 40, 41.

Id. at

The plaintiff appealed this order and the

First Circuit stayed the appeal in light of PROMESA.

Order,

Pabon-Ortega v. Llompart-Zeno, No. 16-1599 (1st Cir. Jan. 24,

[11]

2018) (“In view of the petition to restructure its debts filed
by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, this appeal is stayed.”).
Here, should the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico choose to
defend this suit, the Commonwealth has to incur the costs of
litigating it.

These are the types of suits contemplated by

PROMESA that require an automatic stay because the defense is
funded by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its treasury.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

See

Whether or not the Plaintiffs are suing the

Defendants in their individual capacities, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico may still bear the costs of litigation according to
Puerto Rico law.

See 32 L.P.R.A. § 3085, stating that:

Every official, ex-official, employee or ex-employee
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico who is sued for
damages in his personal capacity, when the cause of
action is based on alleged violations of the
plaintiff's civil rights, due to acts or omissions
committed in good faith, in the course of his
employment and within the scope of his functions, may
request the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to provide him
with legal representation, and to subsequently assume
the payment of any judgment that may be entered
against his person. The Executive Directors, former
Executive Directors, members and former members of the
governing boards of public corporations and Government
instrumentalities, mayors and former mayors and
officials and former officials of the municipalities,
as well as the members and former members of the
Municipal Police Corps of the different ranks, shall
be covered by what is hereby provided, except for the
payment of judgments, which shall be governed by the
provisions of § 3092 of this title. Any action
brought under the provisions of §§ 3077-3092a of this
title shall not be covered by the provisions of this
section.
(emphasis added).
[12]

32 L.P.R.A § 3090 also states:
Every respondent covered by the provisions of §§ 30853092a of this title who applies to the Commonwealth
for legal representation may be represented in the
suit by attorneys from the Department of Justice or by
attorneys in private practice upon authorization of
the Secretary of Justice. In these cases, the
Commonwealth shall defray the reasonable cost of said
legal representation from a special fund created for
this purpose. The Commonwealth may recover expenses,
costs and attorney's fees and the amounts so recovered
shall be covered into the Treasury of Puerto Rico into
the same special fund.
Id.
As a practical matter, the Court is presented here with a
stark choice: either bar this suit from progressing while the
bankruptcy proceeding works its way to conclusion (thus
frustrating the Plaintiffs from vindicating their perhaps valid
claims while memories dim, witnesses disappear, and records
“gang aft agley” even though these Plaintiffs could not, in any
event, collect any money judgment the Court might render), or
allow this case to go forward, perhaps depriving these
Defendants of what they have every reason to expect -- the
services of counsel at public expense, with the natural
consequence that recruitment and retention will suffer at this
crucial time in Puerto Rico’s history and prosecutors and law
enforcement personnel may hesitate vigorously to enforce the
law.

Recognizing that, whatever my choice, certain citizens of

Puerto Rico are getting (and will get) less than the full
[13]

protection of the laws available to their fellow Americans in
the fifty states, I choose the better course.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’
motion to reconsider and administratively closes this case.

It

may be reopened by any party should the judge presiding over the
bankruptcy proceeding grant relief from the stay or upon the
conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, whichever first shall
occur.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

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