Alicea v. Veteran's Affairs Adm. et al

Filing 80

OPINION AND ORDER denying 79 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 5/7/2020. (mrr)

Case 3:17-cv-02298-RAM Document 80 Filed 05/07/20 Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BLANCA ALICEA,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL NO. 17-2298 (RAM)

ROBERT WILKIE, Secretary
Department of Veterans Affairs
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider.
(Docket No. 79). Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider its
Opinion and Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and the ensuing Judgment dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims.
(Docket Nos. 77 and 78, respectively). For the reasons stated
below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Blanca Alicea (“Alicea” or “Plaintiff”) sued David
J. Shulkin, M.D., the Secretary of the United States Department of
Veterans Affairs, and the United States Department of Justice for
unlawful employment practices that allegedly occurred during her
employment at the Veteran Affairs Caribbean Health Center (the
“VA”) (Docket Nos. 1, 13, 23). Plaintiff claimed that Defendants:

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Civil No. 17-2298 (RAM)

2

(1) violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621, et. seq; (2) engaged in unlawful workplace retaliation;
(3)

violated

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

(“EEO”)

waiver

requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 626(f); (4) interfered with her
federal statutory employment rights as prohibited by 29 U.S.C. §
626(f)(4) and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by attempting to “unlawfully
coerce plaintiff into withdrawing an EEO discrimination complaint
under threat of termination;” and (5) tampered and retaliated
against witnesses in connection with an administrative proceeding
(Docket Nos. 3 ¶¶ 14-22; 21 ¶¶ 27-34).
Defendant denied these allegations (Docket Nos. 13 and 23)
and in September 2019, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket
No. 50). On March 31, 2020, this Court granted Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 77). The Court also issued a
Judgment dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Docket No. 78).
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider on April 22, 2020.
(Docket No. 79). In said Motion, Plaintiff exclusively takes issue
with the dismissal of her retaliation claim. Id.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the
filing

of motions for reconsideration.

Consequently,

a

motion

which asks “the court to modify its earlier disposition of a case
because of an allegedly erroneous legal result is brought under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).” Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402

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Civil No. 17-2298 (RAM)

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F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Pérez-Greaux,
382 F.Supp.3d 177, 178 (D.P.R. 2019). According to the First
Circuit, reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy which should
be used sparingly.” U.S. ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 737 F.3d
116, 127 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis
added). Thus, a district court may grant reconsideration only if
there is a “manifest error of law, [...] newly discovered evidence,
or

in

certain

other

narrow

situations

[such

as

a

change

in

controlling law].” United States v. Peña-Fernández, 394 F.Supp.3d
205, 207 (D.P.R. 2019) (quoting Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc.,
772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014)).
Indeed, “[w]hen the motion simply regurgitates contentions
that were previously made and rejected, the movant has no legal
basis to insist upon reconsideration.” Liu v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d
37, 39 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Santa Cruz-Bacardi v. Metro Pavia
Hospital, Inc., 2019 WL 4453620, at * 2 (D.P.R. 2019) (quotation
omitted)

(emphasis

unavailable

if

said

added)

(“A motion for reconsideration “is

request

simply

brings

forth

a

point

of

disagreement between the court and the litigant.”) Further, it may
not be brought by a losing party to “raise legal theories that
should have been raised earlier.” Teamcare Infusion Orlando, Inc.
v. Humana Health Plans of Puerto Rico, 2018 WL 9412924, at *6
(D.P.R. 2018) (citation omitted). Hence, a reconsideration does
“not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural

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Civil No. 17-2298 (RAM)

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failures.” Peña-Fernández,

394

F.Supp.3d

at

207

(quotation

omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
In her Motion to Reconsider, Alicea argues that the Court
failed to adequately consider that the VA was aware of her ADEA
protected activity at the time of her termination.

(Docket No. 79

at 6-7). Plaintiff posits that the VA’s proffered Last Chance
Agreement (“LCA”), which included as a request that she withdraw
her EEOC Charge, is evidence that she: (1) would not have been
terminated if she had waived her claims; and (2) was therefore
unlawfully retaliated against. Id. at 2.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the Court did address the
fact that the VA was aware that Plaintiff had engaged in protected
activity at the time of her termination. (Docket No. 77 at 30-31).
However, in light of the evidence on record, the Court expressly
found

that

this

knowledge

was

insufficient

to

establish

the

causation necessary for a retaliation claim. Id. Specifically,
this Court held:
The First Circuit held that while contacting
the EEOC or filing a complaint “cannot be the
basis for adverse employment action but it
also cannot immunize an employee from action
already planned and not dependant [sic] on the
complaint.” [Sabinson v. Trustees of Dartmouth
Coll., 542 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008)]. It is
uncontroverted that the VA was aware of
Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim pending
before both the EEOC and this Court at the
time of her dismissal. However, said knowledge

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Civil No. 17-2298 (RAM)

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is insufficient to take a retaliation case to
the jury. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 828. “Were
the rule otherwise, then a disgruntled
employee,
no
matter
how
poor
[their]
performance […], could effectively inhibit a
well-deserved discharge by merely filing, or
threatening
to
file,
a
discrimination
complaint.” Id. See also Clark Cty. Sch. Dist.
v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001) (per
curiam)
(“Employers
need
not
suspend
previously planned [actions] upon discovering
that a [discrimination] suit has been filed,
and their proceeding along lines previously
contemplated, though not yet definitively
determined, is no evidence whatever of
causality”).
Id. at 31. Plaintiff has not cited any case law to the contrary in
her Motion to Reconsider. Furthermore, the Court noted that, in
other pleadings, Plaintiff herself provided additional reasons for
why she was terminated from her employment that were completely
unrelated to having engaged in protected activity. Id. at 31-32.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim that the LCA’s request that she waive
her EEOC Charge is inherently indicative of retaliation is equally
unsupported by evidence on record. See L. CV. R. 7(a).
Consequently, the Motion to Reconsider is unavailing because
Plaintiff fails to show a manifest error of law, newly discovered
evidence

or

any

reconsideration
Fernández,

of

394

other
the

circumstance

Court’s

F.Supp.3d

at

Opinion
207.

which
and

Having

would

Order.
already

warrant

See

Peña-

addressed

Plaintiff’s arguments in the Opinion and Order granting summary
judgment

(Docket

No.

77),

the

Court

finds

no

reason

for

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Civil No. 17-2298 (RAM)

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reconsideration.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s
Motion to Reconsider at Docket No. 79.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 7th day of May 2020.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge