Luis Alvarez-Cabrera et al v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. et al
Filing
139
OPINION AND ORDER granting 129 Motion for Summary Judgment. Judgment of dismissal with prejudice shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 7/2/2020. (mrr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
Luis Álvarez-Cabrera, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL NO. 17-2305 (RAM)
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
and Toyota Motor Corporation
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Raúl M. Arias-Marxuach, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Toyota Motor Corporation’s (collectively,
“Toyota” or “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No.
129). Having considered the parties’ submissions in support and in
opposition to the motion (Dockets Nos. 133-138), the Court GRANTS
Defendants’
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment.
(Docket
No.
129).
Judgment of dismissal with prejudice shall be entered accordingly.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an automobile accident which took place
on May 27, 2010 at around 12:55 am. (Docket No. 1 at 10). According
to
the
Complaint,
Plaintiff
Tatiana
Álvarez-Pérez
(“Álvarez-
Pérez”) was driving a 2004 Toyota Sequoia going north on PR Road
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
#
176,
when
the
2
vehicle
“suddenly
and
unexpectedly
and
unintentionally accelerated” reaching high speeds at which she
lost
control,
crashed
against
several
objects
and
crashed against a cement electric power post. Id.
eventually
¶ 32. Ms.
Álvarez-Pérez “received a heavy blow and multiple traumas to the
head, causing her to lose consciousness, and her body to remain
crushed and jammed within the car.” Id. ¶¶ 33. She was comatose
for a prolonged period due to brain trauma, underwent multiple
surgeries, is partially physically impaired, and has suffered
mental, psychological, moral and emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 162163,
170-171.
accident.
Ms.
(Docket
Álvarez-Pérez
No.
129-3
at
has
3,
no
19).
recollection
The
only
of
the
person
who
witnessed it was Marco Antonio Vega-González (“Vega-González”) a
third-party. (Docket Nos. 133 at 4; 137 at 1). Mr. Vega-González
was driving home from work as a supervisor in a data processing
firm near the locus in quo. (Docket No. 136-1 at 13, 48-50).
Plaintiffs Luis Álvarez-Cabrera (“Álvarez-Cabrera”) and Sandra
Pérez-Méndez
(“Pérez-Méndez”)
are
Ms.
Álvarez-Pérez’s
parents
(collectively with Álvarez-Pérez, “Plaintiffs”). (Docket No. 1 ¶
180).
The Complaint against Toyota was filed on May 23, 2011 and
sought to assert claims for negligence, strict products liability
due to design defect, strict products liability for failure to
warn, breach of implied warranties of merchantability, fraudulent
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
3
concealment and temerity. (Docket No. 1 at 48-51). On July 26,
2011, the case was transferred to multi-district litigation before
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
(“the MDL Court”). (Docket No. 4). The MDL Court reduced the issues
in this case by limiting the scope of Plaintiffs’ expert testimony
and granting summary judgment dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims
save for the design defect claim. (Dockets Nos. 89 and 96). For
his lack of qualifications in the field of automotive engineering,
among other reasons, the MDL Court struck Plaintiffs’ expert’s
opinions on design defect while allowing his testimony on accident
reconstruction to stand. (Docket No. 89). The MDL Court also
granted Defendants’ summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for
manufacturing defect and for negligent design. (Docket No. 96).
The MDL Court allowed Defendants to withdraw their request for
summary judgment on the claim for strict products liability for
design defect because the claim “turns completely on issues of
Puerto Rico law” and “it would be more efficient for a court
overseeing the trial in Puerto Rico to determine whether there is
a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Plaintiffs design
defect claim sufficient to present the claim to a jury.” Id. at 4.
The case was remanded to the District of Puerto Rico on
January 1, 2018. (Docket No. 104). It was transferred to the
undersigned on June 12, 2019. (Docket No. 127). On that same date,
the Court granted Defendants’ motion to file a renewed motion for
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
4
summary judgment. (Docket No. 128). Defendants filed the Motion
for Summary Judgment (“Motion for Summary Judgment” or “MSJ”) on
July 10, 2019. (Docket No. 129). Plaintiffs opposed the MSJ on
August 19, 2019. (Docket Nos. 133-136). Defendants filed a reply
to the opposition on August 26, 2019. (Docket Nos. 138-139).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because Plaintiffs’ sole remaining claim is for
design defects, the consumer expectations test is inapplicable
because
this
case
involves
complex
technical
matters,
and
Plaintiffs’ expert’s opinions on design defects were stricken by
the MDL Court. (Docket No. 129 at 2-3). In response, Plaintiffs
posit that the consumer expectations test is applicable and that
they can prove their design defects case by circumstantial evidence
of a malfunction. (Docket No. 133 at 14-15). The circumstantial
evidence
consists
of
Plaintiff’s
expert
witness’
accident
reconstruction and Mr. Vega-González’s fact witness testimony. Id.
at 4. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ MSJ for the following reasons.
First, Plaintiffs lack expert evidence that the 2004 Toyota
Sequoia had a design defect and that it caused the accident.
Second, the consumer expectations test is inapplicable to
this
automobile
products
liability
because
the
2004
Toyota
Sequioa’s electronic brakes and throttle are complex products.
Third,
the
malfunction
theory
of
liability
is
also
inapplicable. Ms. Álvarez-Pérez cannot recollect the accident and
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
5
thus cannot testify that she used the vehicle in a reasonably
foreseeable manner.
Further,
reconstruction
the
eyewitness
are
insufficient
testimony
and
circumstantial
the
accident
evidence
of
a
defect because they cannot fill the gap in Plaintiffs’ evidence
posed by Ms. Álvarez-Pérez’s lack of recollection of her operation
of the car. Lastly, the malfunction theory requires eliminating
all probable causes of the accident other than a defect and
Plaintiffs cannot do so in this case.
II.
APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Summary judgment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) if a
movant shows “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that
they are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could resolve the point in the [non-movant’s]
favor.” Mercado-Reyes v. City of Angels, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d
344, 347 (D.P.R. 2018) (quotation omitted). A fact is material if
“it is relevant to the resolution of a controlling legal issue
raised by the motion for summary judgment.” Bautista Cayman Asset
Co. v. Terra II MC & P, Inc., 2020 WL 118592, at *6 (D.P.R. 2020)
(quotation omitted).
The movant “bears the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
6
Morales-Quinones, 2020 WL 1126165, at *1 (D.P.R. 2020) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Next, the
burden shifts to the non-movant to present at least one issue of
fact which is genuine and material. Id. (quotation omitted). A
non-movant
must
do
this
“through
submissions
of
evidentiary
quality,” showing “that a trialworthy issue persists.” Robinson v.
Town of Marshfield, 950 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). Thus, while a court will draw all inferences in favor of
the non-movant, summary judgment may be proper if their case solely
relies
on
improbable
inferences,
conclusory
allegations
and
unsupported speculation. See Burke Rozzetti v. Ford Motor Co.,
2020 WL 704860, at *3 (D.P.R. 2020) (quotation omitted).
It is well settled that “‘[t]he mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position’ is not enough
to ward off summary judgment.” Irobe v. United States Department
of Agriculture, 890 F.3d 371, 380 (2018) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). The non-movant “‘must,
with respect to each issue on which [it] would bear the burden of
proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably
resolve that issue in [its] favor.’” Id. at 377 (quoting Borges ex
rel. S.B.M.W. v. Serrano-Insern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010)).
“Put another way, summary judgment is warranted if a non-movant
who bears the burden of proof on a dispositive issue fails to
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
identify
‘significantly
7
probative’
evidence
favoring
his
position.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250).
Local Rule 56 also governs summary judgment. See L. Civ. R.
56. Per this Rule, a non-movant must “admit, deny or qualify the
facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to
each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material
facts.” Id. Moreover, “unless a fact is admitted, the reply shall
support each denial or qualification by a record citation.” Id.
Local rules such as Rule 56, are “designed to function as a means
of ‘focusing a district court's attention on what is and what is
not-genuinely controverted.’” Marcano-Martinez v. Cooperativa de
Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico, 2020 WL 603926, at *2 (D.P.R.
2020) (quotation omitted). Hence, “litigants ignore Local Rule 56
at their peril.” Calderón Amézquita v. Vicens, 2019 WL 3928703, at
*1 (D.P.R. 2019) (citation omitted).
B. Strict products liability claims under Puerto Rico law.
The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has adopted the following strict
products liability doctrine articulated by the California Supreme
Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.:
‘A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being’
and that ‘liability is not one governed by the
law of contract warranties but by the law of
strict liability in tort.’
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
8
González-Cabán v. JR Seafood, 132 F. Supp. 3d 274, 279 (D.P.R.
2016) (quoting Rivera-Santana et al. v. Superior Pkg., Inc., 132
P.R. Dec. 115, 126, Offic. Trans. Slip. Op. at 2 (1992)). See also
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-901 (Cal.
1962). Nevertheless, “the manufacturer […] is not the insurer of
every damage his products may cause.” Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai
Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 71 (1st Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
To establish a products liability, claim under Puerto Rico
law, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) [Defendant’s] equipment has a defect, in
any of its modalities; (2) the defect existed
when the product left [Defendant’s] control;
(3) [Defendant] is in the business of selling
this type of product; (4) the defect was the
adequate cause of [Plaintiff’s injuries]; and
(5) [Plaintiff] use[d] the product in a manner
that was reasonable and foreseeable by
[Defendant].
Santos-Rodríguez v. Seastar Solutions, 858 F.3d 695, 698 (2017)
(quoting Rodríguez-Méndez v. Laser Eye Surgery Mgmt. of P.R., Inc.,
195 P.R. Dec. 769 (2016)).
The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has “recognized three types of
defects that trigger the application of the strict liability
doctrine: (1) manufacturing defects; (2) design defects, and (3)
defects for insufficiency of warnings or instructions [“failure to
warn”].” González-Cabán v. JR Seafood, 199 P.R. Dec. 234, 241,
P.R. Offic. Trans. Op. Slip. at 3 (2017); Pérez–Trujillo v. Volvo
Car Corp. (Sweden), 137 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1998).
The Court
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
9
will not expound on the requirements of claims for manufacturing
defects and for failure to warn because Plaintiffs’ sole remaining
claim is for design defect.
To prove design defects, two tests are potentially available
“depending on the nature of the product.” Carballo-Rodriguez v.
Clark Equipment Co., Inc., 147 F.Supp.2d 66, 71 (2001). The first
test is the consumer expectations test. It requires a plaintiff to
show that “the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner.” Betancourt Ruiz v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2007
WL 9760418, at *1 (D.P.R. 2007) (citing Rivera Santana et al. v.
Superior Pkg., Inc., 132 P.R. Dec. 115, 129, Offic. Trans. Slip.
Op. at 3 (1992)). The consumer expectations test “cannot be the
basis of liability in cases involving complex technical matters.”
Quintana-Ruiz, 303 F.3d at 77 (consumer expectations test not
applicable to case involving an airbag); see also Fremaint v. Ford
Motor Co., 258 F.Supp. 2d 24, 30 (D.P.R. 2003). The District of
Puerto Rico has even applied this rule in a case involving such a
seemingly simple product as an aircraft overhead bin. See Silva v.
American Airlines, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 528, 533 (D.P.R. 1997).
The second test to prove a design defect is the risk/utility
test which requires plaintiff to prove that the product’s design
proximately caused his injuries. See Collazo Santiago v. Toyota,
149 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). If the
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
10
plaintiff proves that “the product's design is the proximate cause
of the damage,” the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
“the benefits of the design at issue outweigh the risk of danger
inherent
in
such
a
design.”
Quintana
Ruiz,
303
F.3d
at
69
(quotation omitted). “The risk-utility balancing test is designed
to avoid converting the manufacturer into the insurer of every
harm that arises out of a product from which the consumer derives
utility.” Id. at 71.
Lastly, a lack of expert evidence need not be fatal at the
summary judgment stage in a products liability case. Per First
Circuit
jurisprudence,
“a
strict
liability
claimant
may
demonstrate an unsafe defect through direct eyewitness observation
of a product malfunction, and need not adduce expert testimony to
overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Pérez-Trujillo, 137 F.3d
at 55. This means that “‘[s]trict liability claimants may resort
to
an
array
of
circumstantial
evidence,’ including
direct
observations regarding the malfunction of a product.” Velazquez v.
Abbott Labs., 901 F. Supp. 2d 279, 293 (D.P.R. 2012) (quoting
Pérez-Trujillo, 137 F.3d at 55) (emphasis ours). Or they may choose
to rely on other evidence, “such as similar accidents involving
the same product, elimination of other possible causes of the
accident, and proof tending to establish that the accident does
not occur absent a manufacturing defect.” Id. The need for expert
evidence thus depends on whether “the question is one of common
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
11
knowledge such that lay people could ‘reach the conclusion as
intelligently as the witness.’” Id. (quoting Collazo–Santiago v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 937 F.Supp. 134, 140 (D.P.R. 1996), aff'd, 149
F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1998)).
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the parties’ submissions and evidentiary materials
at Docket Nos. 129, 135-136 and 138, and viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court enters the following
findings of uncontroverted material facts: 1
1. On May 27, 2010, the day of the accident, plaintiff ÁlvarezPérez was driving her 2004 Toyota Sequoia northbound on Road
176 in San Juan, Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 129-2 at ¶¶ 1-2).
2. Ms. Álvarez-Pérez has no memory of the accident. Id. ¶ 4.
3. Plaintiff Álvarez-Cabrera purchased a new Toyota Sequoia in
2004. Id. ¶ 9.
4. Mr.
Álvarez-Cabrera
electronics,
brakes,
never
experienced
steering,
any
issues
with
the
accelerator
pedal,
ignition,
cruise control, or floor mats of the Toyota Sequoia. Id. ¶ 10.
5. Mr. Álvarez-Cabrera never experienced unintended acceleration
while operating the Toyota Sequoia nor did anyone ever report
experiencing such an event in the vehicle to him. Id. ¶ 12.
1
References to a specific Finding of Fact shall be cited in the following
manner: (Fact ¶ _).
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
12
6. Ms. Álvarez-Pérez never experienced any unintended acceleration
in the 2004 Toyota Sequoia prior to the May 27, 2010 accident.
Id. ¶ 13.
7. In Ms. Álvarez-Pérez’s experience with the Toyota Sequoia prior
to the May 27, 2010 crash, the brakes and accelerator pedal in
the car always functioned properly. Id. ¶ 14.
8. Ms.
Álvarez-Pérez
electrical
system,
never
experienced
ignition,
steering,
any
issues
brakes,
with
the
acceleration
system, or floor mats of the 2004 Toyota Sequoia. Id. ¶ 15.
9. Plaintiff Pérez-Méndez never experienced any issues on the
occasions she drove the Toyota Sequoia. Id. ¶ 17.
10. At around 12:55 a.m., Ms. Álvarez-Pérez had stopped at the
intersection of Rhin Street with the main state road, at a red
light. She was on the left lane of the four lane PR-176 state
road, with a roadway section of two lanes per traffic direction.
(Docket No. 134 at ¶ 1).
11. Mr.
Vega-González,
the
sole
eyewitness
to
the
collision,
arrived at the stop light and stopped, side by side, to the
right of the Toyota Sequoia already at the light. Id. at ¶ 2.
12. The road was dry and there was no rain. Id. ¶ 3.
13. Mr. Vega-Gonzalez’s car windows were down. Id. ¶ 4.
14. He looked to the left and saw Ms. Álvarez-Pérez talking on her
cell-phone. Id. ¶ 5.
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
15. Mr.
Vega-González
13
departed
first
from
the
stop
light.
Ms.
Álvarez-Pérez remained stopped at the light. Id. ¶ 27.
16. About two lights down, Mr. Vega-González was going to make a
left turn to go to his house and he switched to the left lane
to take PR State Road 1. (Docket No. 136-1 at 48-49).
17. He was traveling at about 35-40 miles an hour. Id. at 50-51.
18. After about 20 seconds, he heard the noise of a car accelerating
and coming in his direction.
Id. at 53.
19. Mr. Vega-González moved to the right lane to get out of the way
of the oncoming car. Id. at 54.
20. The Toyota Sequoia passed him, invaded the oncoming lane so as
not to hit him and it kept going, with the same noise, as if it
were accelerated. Id. at 55.
21. Mr.
Vega-González
could
see
Ms.
Álvarez-Pérez
was
braking
because he could see the brake lights flashing. Id. at 57-58.
22. Per his testimony, the lights went on and off about three times.
Id. at 59-60.
23. Per
Mr.
Vega-González’s
testimony,
the
Toyota
Sequoia
was
reducing speed but it would not stop accelerating. Id. at 60.
24. Mr. Vega-González accelerated his car to follow Plaintiff’s car.
(Docket No. 136-1 at 60; Docket No. 134 ¶ 31).
25. Ms. Álvarez-Pérez lost control of the Toyota Sequoia after she
avoided hitting Mr. Vega-González. Id. at 60-61.
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
14
26. The Toyota Sequoia then climbed on a sidewalk, hit a sign and
some planters and left the side walk. It climbed the sidewalk
again and hit a wooden pole. It came to a stop when it hit a
concrete pole next to the wooden pole. Id. at 61.
27. Plaintiffs'
only
expert
designated
to
offer
design
defect
opinions is Mr. Otto R. González-Blanco (“González-Blanco”).
(Docket No. 129-2 ¶ 18).
28. The MDL Court excluded Mr. González-Blanco’s opinion that the
accident was caused by unintended acceleration resulting from
electric failures (“the causation opinion”). (Docket 89 at 5;
Docket No. 129 ¶ 19).
29. The MDL Court excluded the causation opinion because it found
that Mr. González-Blanco was unqualified to render it because
“he lacks the basic credentials to express any opinion with
regard to the malfunctioning of the vehicle. He is not qualified
to express an opinions [sic.] about the electronics of the car
or the functioning of the brake pedal.” (Docket No. 89 at 5).
30. The MDL Court also excluded Mr. Gonzalez-Blanco’s causation
opinion because of his lack of an independent opinion, that “the
trajectory showed continuous acceleration does not support the
separate question of causation,” and because of his reliance on
a report of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(“NASA”)
unintended
which
was
inconclusive
acceleration
related
and
to
could
the
not
replicate
Toyota
vehicles’
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
15
electronic systems. Thus, “his reliance on the NASA report does
not save his causation opinion.” Id.
31. The
MDL
Court
also
excluded
Mr.
González-Blanco’s
causation
opinion because it was not reliable since he “could not testify
to a ‘reasonable degree of certain or probability’ that a specific
vehicle malfunction caused to the crash. […] He could not attach
a ‘degree’ of certainty to his malfunction opinion.” (Emphasis
added). Id. 2
32. The MDL Court did not exclude Mr. González-Blanco’s reconstruction
of the accident. Id. at 4.
33. Mr. González-Blanco’s reconstruction of the accident states:
The accident occurred at approximately 12:55 a.m. The
unintended acceleration (UA) originated after departing
the stop light at Rhin Street, intersection with state
road PR-176, within the next 800 ft. towards UMET
University. Mr. Marco A. Vega Gonzalez, only witness,
driving ahead in his Toyota FJ Cruiser, driving at ± 40
mph, before changing lanes due to “fast” approach of the
Plaintiff’s vehicle to his rear. The Toyota Sequoia2004, driven by Miss Alvarez Perez became accelerated
thru an initial path of ± 800.00 ft., approximately
within ±460 ft. to an estimated speed of ±61 mph. The
accident
originates
with
the
above
acceleration
condition, diverting in several impact events in the
following sequence and maintained speeds (Toyota Sequoia
brakes did not override the acceleration condition) :
Impact -1 with curb-into-sidewalk on interior right lane
in front of UMET University grounds, at a speed of ±58
mph; impact-2 with several (2) ornamental concrete pots
along the above mentioned sidewalk, at a sustained speed
2
The MDL Court also excluded González-Blanco’s opinion regarding “the effects
of alcohol or cannabis on Tatiana’s [Ms. Álvarez-Pérez] ability to drive and
control the vehicle of the evening of the accident.” (Docket No. 89 at 5-6).
Given the insufficiency of Plaintiffs’ evidence to create a trial-worthy issue
that the car had a design defect, neither Toyota’s evidence suggesting Ms.
Álvarez-Pérez was intoxicated nor Plaintiffs’ opposing evidence are material.
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
16
of ±58 mph; impact-3 with the last pot at a sustained
speed of ±58 mph; impact-4 with a high 12 ¼” curb,
redirecting the steering of the vehicle to the left into
the road interior lane at a sustained speed of 58 mph;
impact-5 redirected vehicle by Plaintiff to the right
into the curb of the continuous sidewalk at a sustained
speed of ±57.5 mph; impact-6 the front of the Toyota
Sequoia into a three steel posts of road signs at a
sustained speed of ±58 mph; impact-7 vehicle slides
sideways to the left (drivers side) into a creosote wood
utility pole, shearing the pole at the base at sustained
speed of ±52 mph and stopping on the same side (drivers
door), carrying the prior wood pole on the vehicle roof,
final impact-7 stopping with a second self support
concrete pole. During impacts 4 thru 6, the front and
rear tires & rims were severely damage. (Docket 135-1 at
6).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs lack expert evidence that a design-defect existed
and that it caused the accident. (Facts ¶¶ 27-28). The MDL Court
found that Mr. González-Blanco was not qualified to render an
opinion “about the electronics of the car or the functioning of
the brake pedal.” (Fact ¶ 29). Further, as noted by another Judge
in this District, Mr. González-Blanco does not have expertise or
formal education in “automotive design, engineering or electronics
and has not been recognized by any court as expert in these areas.”
See Hernandez-Denizac v. Kia Motors Corporation, 323 F. Supp. 3d
277, 285 (D.P.R. 2018). To wit, the Hernandez-Denizac Court also
stated that González-Blanco is “not an expert with respect to
anything related to automotive manufacturing or design.” Id. Thus,
Plaintiffs herein sought to establish a prima facie case of design
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
17
defect products liability claim through the consumer expectations
test and the malfunction theory of liability.
The consumer expectations test, however, is inapplicable to
this automobile products liability case. As noted earlier, the
test “cannot be the basis of liability in cases involving complex
technical matters.” Quintana-Ruiz, 303 F.3d at 77. It is “reserved
for cases in which the everyday experience of the product's users
permits a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum
safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert
opinion about the merits of the design.” Collazo–Santiago v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 937 F.Supp. 134, 139 (D.P.R. 1996), aff'd, 149 F.3d
23 (1st Cir. 1998). Further, while some products liability cases
which rely on the consumer expectations test do not need expert
testimony to prove causation, in cases such as the one at bar which
involve complex technical matters, the First Circuit has held that
“[a] jury in such a case must rely on expert testimony and cannot
substitute its own experience.” Quintana-Ruiz, 303 F.3d at 77.
This because “the ordinary consumer of an automobile simply has
‘no idea’ how it should perform in all foreseeable situations, or
how safe it should be made against all foreseeable hazards.” Id.
(quotation omitted). 3 See also, Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. WHAC LLC,
3 In contrast, the California Supreme Court stated that what may be reasonably
expected from motor vehicles, and therefore where the consumer expectations
test is applicable, include “that such vehicles will be designed so as not to
explode while idling at stoplights, experience sudden steering or brake failure
as they leave the dealership, or roll over and catch fire in two-mile-per-hour
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
18
2020 WL 1316493, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[I]t is undisputed that
motor vehicle design is a complex field, and the myriad factors
affecting placement of various automobile components – including
electrical conductors and connection points – are not readily
understood by laypeople.”)
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the First Circuit and other
judges sitting in this district have declined to apply the consumer
expectations test in cases involving the design of automobile
airbags, automobiles and seat belts. See Quintana-Ruiz, 303 F.3d
at 79; Fremaint, 258 F.Supp. 2d at 30 (finding that the consumer
expectations test was not applicable to case involving tire failure
and questioning the safety of the design of a Sport Utility Vehicle
and its seatbelt). In the case at bar, there is no proof, expert
or otherwise, as to what the minimum ordinary consumer expectations
for the throttle and braking systems of a sport utility vehicle
comparable to the 2004 Toyota Sequoia. Hence, there is no reason
on the record why the 2004 Toyota Sequoia’s throttle and braking
systems should be an exception which warrants application of the
consumer expectations test.
The malfunction theory of liability is also inapplicable to
the present case. The 2004 Toyota Sequoia was approximately six
collisions.” Fremaint, 258 F. Supp. at 30 (quoting Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 8
Cal.4th 548, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298, 308 n. 3 (1994)). These examples
are extreme events which bear no resemblance to the accident at issue here.
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
19
(6) years old before the accident in May 27, 2010. (Facts ¶¶ 3,
6). Further, no issues with the electronics, brakes, steering,
accelerator pedal, ignition, cruise control, or floor mats of the
2004 Toyota Sequoia were reported by any of its drivers, that is
the Plaintiffs. (Facts ¶¶ 4-9). More importantly, Ms. AlvarezPérez cannot recollect the accident and thus cannot testify that
she used the vehicle in a reasonably foreseeable manner, which is
part of her burden of proof. (Fact ¶ 2).
The Hernandez-Denizac case is instructive. See HernandezDenizac, 323 F. Supp. at 285 n. 4 (quotation omitted). Said case
held that the case was not “a situation where ‘direct eyewitness
observation of a product malfunction’ renders expert testimony
unnecessary” when the only person who could provide eyewitness
testimony of what occurred during the accident was the plaintiff
who had no recollection of anything that happened just before or
during the crash. Id. The District of Puerto Rico also stated
therein that plaintiffs’ manufacturing defect claim could not
survive summary judgment given that plaintiffs “failed to ‘present
evidence that [Defendant's] design of the [airbag] was defective,’
and rel[ied] instead on the fact that the airbag did not deploy to
serve
as
indication
that
a
defect
existed
in
the
design
or
manufacture.” Id. at 285. A similar situation occurred in the
instant case because Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that a
manufacturing defect led to the failure of the break. Instead they
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
20
relied on the fact that the brakes supposedly failed to claim that
said failure was due to a design defect. Cf. Tweedy v. Wright Ford
Sales, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 570, 574–75, 357 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1976)
(holding that design defect on the automobile’s brake which caused
it to fail was evident and did not necessitate expert testimony
because plaintiff showed that he used the brake in a reasonable
manner and there was no evidence of any reasonable secondary
cause).
Here,
unlike
Tweedy,
Plaintiff
Álvarez-Pérez
cannot
demonstrate that she was driving in a reasonable manner nor can
she prove that there are no secondary causes other than the design
defect for the accident. This leaves Plaintiffs with Mr. VegaGonzález’s eyewitness testimony and Mr. González-Blanco’s accident
reconstruction to attempt to make a prima facie case of a defect.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Mr. VegaGonzález’s testimony is that he saw the 2004 Toyota Sequoia’s brake
lights
go
on
and
off
several
times,
but
the
Toyota
Sequoia
continued to accelerate forward, albeit reducing in speed. (Facts
¶¶ 20-23). Mr. Vega-González’s testimony supports an inference
that Ms. Alvarez-Pérez pressed the brake pedal and the Toyota
Sequoia did not stop. (Fact ¶ 20). But as Toyota correctly notes,
Mr. Vega-González was in his car and not in the 2004 Toyota Sequoia
driven by Ms. Alvarez-Pérez. (Docket No. 137 at 7). Thus, the Court
agrees with Defendants that “even setting aside the limitations of
an eyewitness who was operating a vehicle” while he was “observing
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
21
another vehicle [...] this ‘circumstantial evidence’ does not and
cannot establish that there was a defect in the vehicle which
caused the accident to occur.” Id. Mr. Vega-González cannot “say
what was going on inside the Sequoia at the time of the crash.”
Id. Therefore, his testimony does not rule out, for example, that
Ms. Álvarez-Pérez may have mistakenly pressed the accelerator
pedal as she pressed on the brake pedal.
Further,
the
malfunction
theory
of
liability
requires
eliminating “all probable causes other than a defect, of the
malfunction.” Makuc v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 835 F.2d
389 (1st Cir. 1987). 4 Plaintiffs’ repeated assertions that Ms.
Álvarez-Pérez removed her foot from the accelerator pedal, which
they made despite the lack of evidence, fail to eliminate other
probable causes of the accident as required by the malfunction
theory of liability. (Docket No. 133 at 15 and 16).
The instant case differs from other products liability cases
where eyewitness observation was deemed sufficiently probative of
a defect to survive summary judgment. For example, in PérezTrujillo v. Volvo Car Corp. (Sweden), the eyewitness testified
4
In Makuc, the First Circuit explained that Massachusetts has adopted the
principles set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A when it comes to
breach of warranty actions. See Makuc, 385 F.2d at 392 (citation omitted). Under
these, a plaintiff must show “that the product was in a defective condition
when it left the defendant's possession.” Id. at 393. Puerto Rico has also
adopted these principles. See Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967,
971 (1st Cir. 1991) (“A manufacturer is liable in tort on a theory of strict
liability when it places a product on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, and it has a defect that causes injuries.”)
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
22
that he saw the airbag was deployed and there was smoke in the car
before a collision. See Pérez-Trujillo, 137 F.3d at 53. There, an
eyewitness directly observed the product malfunction—an airbag
deploying under normal driving conditions—and the First Circuit
held
that
“direct
observation
of the
malfunction
itself
is
circumstantial evidence of a defective condition.” Id. at 53-55.
In Ortiz-Martinez v. Hyundai Motor Co., plaintiff also had evidence
that the airbag deployed while the car was being parked at low
speed. See Ortiz-Martinez v. Hyundai Motor Co., 602 F.Supp.2d 311,
314 (D.P.R. 2009).
Here, Vega-González’s testimony is solely based on the fact
that he saw the brake light turn on three times and the vehicle
appeared to reduce its speed. (Facts ¶ 21-23). Yet, simply because
Vega-González
thought
he
saw
Plaintiff
Álvarez-Pérez’s
car
braking, via the flashing lights, does not mean that Plaintiff was
braking the vehicle and that a defect in the brakes prevented her
from stopping the same or reducing her speed further. Again, Mr.
Vega-González can proffer no testimony about what was going on
inside the 2004 Toyota Sequoia driven by Ms. Álvarez-Pérez. In
Santos-Rodríguez v. Seastar Solutions, the First Circuit found
that although the plaintiffs showed that something was wrong,
specifically that the rod end of the boat’s steering mechanism
failed, ”the Plaintiffs did not present evidence that Seastar's
design of the rod end was defective.” Santos-Rodríguez, 858 F.3d
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
23
at 699. Furthermore, the Santos-Rodríguez Court held that “[t]his
is precisely the type of showing rejected” by the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court in Rodríguez-Méndez v. Laser eye Surgery Mgmt. of
P.R., Inc. Id. In Rodríguez-Méndez, the plaintiff developed an eye
issue
after
receiving
laser
eye
surgery
and
then
sued
the
manufacturer of the surgical equipment for allegedly selling a
defective product. See Rodríguez-Méndez v. Laser Eye Surgery Mgmt.
of P.R., Inc., 195 P.R. Dec. 769, 774 (2016). However, the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff's reliance on the
presence
of
insufficient
suffer[ed]
metal
“to
from
particles
establish
a
in
his
that
manufacturing
eye,
[the
defect
without
surgical]
[or]
was
more,
was
equipment
defectively
designed.” Id. at 790 (translation ours).
Likewise, Mr. González-Blanco’s accident reconstruction is
insufficient to create a trial worthy issue on malfunction. The
MDL Court already ruled “that the [fact that the] trajectory showed
continuous acceleration does not support the separate question of
causation.” (Docket 89 at 5). (emphasis added). Put in another
way, the presence of continuous acceleration by itself does not
prove that a defect existed and that it caused the accident.
V.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs had the burden of making a prima facie showing
that a design defect was the adequate cause of Ms. Álvarez-Pérez’s
accident. The evidence they proffered is insufficient. Plaintiffs
Civil No. 17-2305 (RAM)
24
do not have an expert qualified to proffer testimony that the 2004
Toyota Sequoia had a design defect. Moreover, Ms. Álvarez-Pérez
cannot testify that she was operating the 2004 Sequoia in a
reasonably foreseeable manner because she has no recollection of
the accident. The best Plaintiffs could do was try and establish
such a defect with circumstantial evidence. Neither Mr. VegaGonzález’s testimony that the brake lights went on and off as if
the brakes were being applied, nor González-Blanco’s accident
reconstruction’s showing of continuous acceleration suffice to
establish that a design defect, rather than driver error, caused
the accident. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Docket No. 129). Judgment of dismissal with prejudice
shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 2nd day of July 2020.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge
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