Alberty-Marrero et al v. Mendez et al

Filing 108

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum and Order, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs Socorro Alberty-Marrero, Margarita Jimenez-Bracero, Adalberto Pantojas-Fonseca, and Martha Rivera-Lopez's First Amendment claim against Defendants. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 6/21/2023. (mrr)

Case 3:17-cv-02385-RAM Document 108 Filed 06/21/23 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
SOCORRO ALBERTY, et al.
Plaintiffs
CIVIL NO. 17-2385 (RAM)

v.
CARLOS “JOHNNY” MÉNDEZ, et al.
Defendants

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, U.S. District Judge
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion in Compliance
and Memorandum of Law (“Motion in Compliance” or “Motion”) in
response to the Court’s show cause order at Docket No. 100. (Docket
No. 104). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES
Plaintiffs
Adalberto

Socorro

Alberty-Marrero,

Pantojas-Fonseca,

and

Margarita

Martha

Jiménez-Bracero,

Rivera-López’s

First

Amendment claim against Defendants.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are 11 former termed employees of the Puerto Rico
House of Representatives. 1 (Docket No. 38 ¶ 3). According to their

1
Plaintiffs are Socorro Alberty-Marrero, Félix Arroyo-Molina, Margarita
Jiménez-Bracero, Wanda Llópiz-Burgos, Bárbara Ocasio-Matos, Anitza OrtizMedina, Adalberto Pantojas-Fonseca, Noelia Ramos-Vázquez, Martha Rivera-López,
María Sánchez-Soldevila, and Judith Soto-Calderón. (Docket No. 38 at 1).

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Amended Complaint, they identify as members of Puerto Rico’s
Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”). Id. ¶ 4. Defendants are former
Speaker of the House Carlos “Johnny” Méndez (“Méndez”); his wife
Lisandra

Maldonado

(“Maldonado”);

former

Administrator

of

the

House Moisés Cortés-Rosado (“Cortés-Rosado”); and former Human
Resources Director for the House Karen Torres de la Torre (“Torres
de la Torre”). Id. ¶¶ 20, 22, 23. Defendants Méndez, Cortés-Rosado,
and Torres de la Torre belong to Puerto Rico’s New Progressive
Party (“NPP”). Id. Plaintiffs allege that during the 2016-2017
transition from a PDP to an NPP administration in the House of
Representatives,
Fourteenth

Defendants

Amendment

rights

violated
by

not

Plaintiffs’

renewing

their

First

and

employment

contracts because of Plaintiffs’ allegiance to the PDP. (Docket
No. 38).
On November 15, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment on the First Amendment claim, and on December 18, 2019,
Plaintiffs filed the same. 2 (Docket Nos. 48 and 60, respectively).
On February 6, 2023, this Court denied each motion for summary
2 Neither party has filed a motion for summary judgment with regard to the due
process claim. The motions at Docket Nos. 48 and 60 only seek summary judgment
with respect to the First Amendment claim. See Docket Nos. 48 (only discussing
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim and making no mention of their due process
claim) and Docket No. 60 (seeking partial summary judgment just on Plaintiffs’
First Amendment claim). On February 6, 2023, this Court ordered Plaintiffs to
show cause as to why their due process claim should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, since they do not appear to
have a protected property interest in continued employment. (Docket No. 101).
Plaintiffs filed a motion in compliance with that order on February 27. (Docket
No. 103). After considering Plaintiffs’ arguments therein, the Court dismissed
their Fourteenth Amendment due process claim on May 19, 2023. (Docket No. 106).

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judgment. (Docket No. 100). The Court denied Defendants’ motion
because it was premised on the theory that they were not yet
officially in control of the House of Representatives, so they
could not have been responsible for any adverse employment actions
that Plaintiffs may have suffered during the transition of power
from

the

outgoing

PDP

administration

to

the

incoming

NPP

administration. Id. at 11-14. The Court found that Plaintiffs had
proffered evidence that contradicted this theory and suggested
that Defendants indeed played a role in the appointments process
during the transition period. Id. Thus, summary judgment in favor
of Defendants on the First Amendment claim based on that theory
alone was not warranted.
The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on
the First Amendment claim because there are still material issues
of fact barring summary judgment in their favor on that claim. Id.
at 14-15. In fact, in reviewing the record cited in the summary
judgment briefing, the Court questioned whether each Plaintiff had
even made “a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
[each] element essential to [his or her First Amendment] case, and
on which [he or she] will bear the burden of proof at trial[,]” as
required at the summary judgment stage. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides that courts may:
(1)

grant summary judgment for a nonmovant;

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4

(2)

grant the motion on grounds not raised by
a party; or

(3)

consider summary judgment on its own
after
identifying
for
the
parties
material facts that may not be genuinely
in dispute.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). The Court thus notified Plaintiffs that it
was considering granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants
on some or all Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim unless they each
made a showing sufficient to establish each element of his or her
prima facie political discrimination claim. (Docket No. 100 at 1516). In response to the Court’s show cause order, Plaintiffs filed
the present Motion in Compliance on February 28, 2023. (Docket No.
104). The Motion does not cite to any part of the record not
previously cited in the summary judgment briefing. Id. The Court
has reviewed these record citations in detail, both in adjudicating
the motions for summary judgment and again in evaluating the
present Motion in Compliance.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

After discovery, summary judgment is appropriate against a
party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to [his or her] case, and on
which [he or she] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322. A prima facie political discrimination claim under
the First Amendment requires proving four elements: “(1) that the

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plaintiff and defendant have opposing political affiliations, (2)
that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff’s affiliation, (3)
that an adverse employment action occurred, and (4) that political
affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse
employment action.” Reyes-Orta v. P.R. Highway & Transp. Auth.,
811 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011)). A prima facie
case for political discrimination may be built on circumstantial
evidence. See Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family Dep’t, 377 F.3d 81,
85-86

(1st

Cir.

2004)

(citations

omitted).

Two

cases

that

Plaintiffs cite in their Motion exemplify this well. These two
cases also indicate that the Celotex standard is a fairly low bar
to a political discrimination claim.
The first case Plaintiffs cite is Rodriguez-Rios v. Cordero,
138 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 1998). In that case, the First Circuit stated
that

“[a]lthough

a

highly

charged

political

atmosphere

alone

cannot support an inference of discriminatory animus, [a] highly
charged political atmosphere ..., coupled with the fact that
plaintiffs and defendants are of competing political persuasions,
may be probative of discriminatory animus.” Rodriguez-Rios, 138
F.3d at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Acevedo–
Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 1993)). The plaintiff had
provided evidence that the defendants were NPP activists and knew
that the plaintiff was a prominent PDP activist. See id. Coupled

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with the charged political atmosphere, the court was persuaded
that this was enough to at least survive summary judgment. See id.
The court noted that there was additional evidence to support
plaintiff’s

claim

–

i.e.,

that

her

responsibilities

were

reassigned to an NPP affiliate and that her office had recruited
at least three new NPP members but no PDP members. See id. The
panel also noted that the motivations behind the defendant’s
alleged “reorganization” were unclear. Id. at 25. The First Circuit
nevertheless stated that evidence of a highly charged political
environment and that the plaintiff was a conspicuous target for
political discrimination “would give [it] serious pause” “even
standing alone[.]” Id. at 24 (internal quotations omitted).
In the second First Circuit case cited by Plaintiffs, evidence
suggesting

that

the

defendant

knew

the

plaintiffs’

political

affiliations, fired them without explanation, and replaced them
with members of his own party was enough to survive summary
judgment. See Montfort-Rodriguez v. Rey-Hernandez, 504 F.3d 221
(1st Cir. 2007). The defendant had asked his Assistant Secretary
for Human Resources to compile a list of all trust employees. See
id. at 223. The Assistant Secretary testified to assuming that all
employees

on

this

list,

which

included

the

plaintiffs,

were

appointed during the prior administration (i.e., by the opposing
party). See id. at 225-26. Given that the defendant had asked the
Assistant Secretary to compile the list, the court thought it “fair

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to infer” that the defendant shared the Assistant Secretary’s
assumptions about the trust employees on the list. Id. The court
also noted that “quick terminations, with no attention to either
job functions or performances, are strongly suggestive of pure
political

motivation.”

Id.

at

227.

The

plaintiffs

had

even

identified their replacements from the opposing party. See id. The
court found that all of this evidence “render[ed] this case more
circumstantial than speculative.” Id. at 228 (citations omitted).
These

cases

show

that

making

a

circumstantial

case

for

political discrimination that meets the Celotex standard is not a
difficult task.
III. DISCUSSION
Given the charged political environment in this case, as long
as a Plaintiff has proffered some evidence to suggest that they
belonged to the opposing political party (i.e., the PDP), that
their political affiliation was known to Defendants, and that they
suffered

an

adverse

employment

action,

their

claim

survives

summary judgment. Some Plaintiffs, however, fail to clear this low
bar. The Court first explains why Plaintiffs Alberty-Marrero,
Jiménez-Bracero,

Pantojas-Fonseca,

and

Rivera-López’s

First

Amendment claims are dismissed. The Court then outlines why the
remaining
judgment.

Plaintiffs’

First

Amendment

claims

survive

summary

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A. Plaintiffs whose claims are dismissed
1. Socorro Alberty-Marrero
Plaintiff Alberty-Marrero testified to being a member of the
PDP. (Docket No. 60-4 at 1, 47). However, the record cited by
Plaintiffs

is

completely

devoid

of

any

evidence

(direct

or

circumstantial) that her affiliation was known or that she suffered
political discrimination at the hands of anyone in the House of
Representatives. More importantly, Ms. Alberty-Marrero resigned
from her job, yet she proffers no evidence that would support a
constructive discharge claim. (Docket No. 49-2 at 20-21).
2. Margarita Jiménez-Bracero
Ms. Jiménez-Bracero testified to being a member of the PDP.
(Docket No. 60-4 at 3). She provides some testimony that Defendant
Méndez and others in the incoming administration knew of her
political affiliation. Id. at 13, 17, 42-43, 45. However, Ms.
Jiménez-Bracero also resigned, yet cited to no evidence in the
record that would support a constructive discharge claim. (Docket
No. 49-2 at 38).
3. Adalberto Pantojas-Fonseca
Mr. Pantojas-Fonseca does not point to any evidence in the
record – not even his own testimony – establishing his political
affiliation. Therefore, he fails to proffer any evidence with
regard to the first element of a political discrimination claim.

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4. Martha Rivera-López
Ms. Rivera-López testified to being a member of the PDP.
(Docket No. 60-4 at 9). However, the record cited by Plaintiffs is
completely devoid of any evidence (direct or circumstantial) that
her

affiliation

discrimination

was
at

known

the

or

hands

that
of

she

anyone

suffered

political

in

House

the

of

Representatives.
Accordingly,
Pantojas-Fonseca,

Plaintiffs
and

Alberty-Marrero,

Rivera-López’s

First

Jiménez-Bracero,

Amendment

claim

is

dismissed for failure to make even a circumstantial case for
political discrimination sufficient to meet the Celotex standard.
B. Plaintiffs whose claims survive summary judgment
1. Félix Arroyo-Molina
Plaintiff Arroyo-Molina testified that he is a member of the
PDP and that an employee named Zaida Raquel Seguillot told him
that she mentioned his political affiliation to Defendant Méndez.
Id. at 2, 50-51. Mr. Arroyo-Molina also stated in his deposition
that the only two employees that his office dismissed were both
PDP affiliates. (Docket No. 60-5 at 21). He seems to contradict
himself by also stating that Ms. Seguillot from his office, a PDP
member herself, was not fired. (Docket No. 60-4 at 52). However,
weighing this contradicting evidence would require the Court to
make credibility determinations reserved for a jury. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Finally, Mr. Arroyo-

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Molina also testified that his office saw three new employees
during

this

time,

although

he

does

not

provide

any

evidence

suggesting that these new employees were NPP affiliates. (Docket
No. 60-5 at 22).
2. Bárbara Ocasio-Matos
Ms. Ocasio-Matos testified to being a “militant” of the PDP.
(Docket No. 60-4 at 5). She also testified that Antonio Silva, the
incoming Director for the House of Representatives, told her that
he did everything in his power to keep her on, but that “from the
Speaker’s office they said no.” (Docket No. 60-5 at 51).
3. Anitza Ortiz-Medina
Ms. Ortiz-Medina testified to being a member of the PDP.
(Docket No. 60-4 at 6). In response to an interrogatory, she claims
to have started working at the House of Representatives during a
PDP administration. Id. at 59. She also claims to have been deposed
in relation to another political discrimination case filed by NPP
employees who were fired after the PDP won the 2012 election and
to

having

disclosed

her

political

affiliation

during

that

deposition. Id.
In her interrogatory responses, she also states that everyone
in the Administrative Office where she worked was affiliated with
the PDP and that all but one were terminated. Id.; (Docket No. 605 at 24). She also reports having heard a rumor that some NPP

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employees who were fired after the 2012 election were re-hired
during the 2016-2017 transition. (Docket No. 60-4 at 59).
Though she resigned, Ms. Ortiz-Medina proffers some evidence
to support a constructive discharge claim. She testified that José
Fuentes,

the

outgoing

PDP

Administrator

for

the

House

of

Representatives, told her that if she resigned, she would receive
her severance payment faster instead of months in the future.
(Docket No. 49-2 at 65).
4. Noelia Ramos-Vázquez
Ms. Ramos-Vázquez testified to being a member of the PDP.
(Docket No. 60-4 at 7). She purportedly worked as a PDP observer
during the 2012 primaries and in “field operations and advance
party” in a 2016 political campaign. Id. at 8. She allegedly told
Defendant Méndez that she was hired during the Jaime Perelló PDP
administration. Id. at 7; (Docket No. 60-6 at 24-25).
In her deposition, Ms. Ramos-Vázquez testified that Antonio
Silva,

the

incoming

NPP

Administrator

for

the

House

of

Representatives, told her that he wanted to keep her on as his
secretary because he had heard that she did her job very well.
(Docket No. 60-5 at 54). She said that when her contract was not
renewed, Mr. Silva spoke with Defendant Moisés and that he appeared
angry following that meeting because Mr. Moisés had decided that
her contract would not be renewed. Id. at 54-55. She also testified
that Mr. Silva and Mr. Orlando Morales (the outgoing Director of

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12

Transportation) told her that the people who made this decision
were Defendants Cortés and Maldonado. (Docket No. 60-6 at 8). Ms.
Ramos-Vázquez also claims that after her contract expired, Mr.
Méndez told her that he would get her a job “through ADT” and
expedite her severance payment. (Docket Nos. 60-4 at 7; 60-6 at
21-24).
5. María Isabel Sánchez-Soldevila
Ms. Sánchez-Soldevila claims to be a member of the PDP in
response

to

an

interrogatory.

(Docket

No.

60-5

at

31).

She

purportedly served as a PDP officer of the Permanent Registration
Board for Loíza precinct 103 in 2019. 3 (Docket No. 60-4 at 10).
Though she started working at the House of Representatives during
an NPP administration, she claims that Defendant Méndez knew her
and her PDP affiliation because of her active involvement in PDP
politics. (Docket No. 60-5 at 31-32).
Ms.

Sánchez-Soldevila

also

testified

to

having

told

Mr.

Méndez about her contract’s expiration and that he told her to
continue following up. (Docket No. 60-6 at 16). She reports having
had

good

job

performance

during

her

time

in

the

House

of

Representatives. (Docket No. 60-5 at 31). She also stated in
response to an interrogatory that people from “Nuno” Maldonado’s
(NPP) office came to work in her office after Plaintiffs were

The Court notes that this would have been after the events giving rise to this
lawsuit.
3

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terminated and that other positions were filled by new employees,
though she did not specify their political affiliation. Id. at 32.
6. Judith Daniela Soto-Calderón
Ms. Soto-Calderón provides more extensive evidence that she
was an active and visible PDP activist. (Docket No. 60-4 at 11,
19, 25, 30).
Ms. Soto-Calderón also asserts there was a “list of [NPP
affiliate] directors who were being assigned to each office” and
that those who kept their jobs or were hired during the transition
period were NPP affiliates, though she provides no further details.
Id. at 19.
7. Wanda Llópiz-Burgos
Ms. Llópiz-Burgos provides substantial evidence to support
her claim of political discrimination. She testified that she and
other PDP employees in the Maintenance Office were told, “You have
little time here,” “You’re all going to be fired,” “Out is where
you’re going,” “Jane Doe will be here now,” “So-and-so are out,”
and “The lists are ready.” (Docket No. 60-5 at 3, 27). She claims
that Olga Mojica prepared a list of the office’s PDP employees and
that she was the first person on it. Id. at 3, 26-27, 29. She
testified to personally seeing that list, titled “Populetes” (a
derogatory term for PDP affiliates), because it was posted next to
the office’s microwave and switchboard “for everyone to see.” Id.

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14

at 28-29. She claims that everyone or almost everyone on that list
was fired. Id. at 3, 28.
Furthermore,
perfect

Ms.

evaluations

Representatives.

Llópiz-Burgos
during

(Docket

No.

reports

having

received

her

tenure

at

the

60-4

at

She

claims

4).

House
to

of
have

questioned Mr. Quiles at the Sergeant of Arms office about why her
contract was not renewed and that he told her, “Wanda, you know.”
Id.
Though the record is far from robust, Plaintiffs ArroyoMolina,

Ocasio-Matos,

Soldevila,
evidence

Ortiz-Medina,

Soto-Calderón,
to

speculative.”

make

their

and

Llópiz-Burgos

claims

Montfort-Rodriguez,

Ramos-Vázquez,

“more
504

Sánchez-

proffer

circumstantial

F.3d

at

228

enough
than

(citations

omitted). The remaining Plaintiffs, on the other hand, failed to
“make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to [their] case, and on which [they] will bear the burden
of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Plaintiffs AlbertyMarrero and Jiménez-Bracero did not provide any evidence that they
suffered an adverse employment action; Plaintiff Pantojas-Fonseca
did not point to any evidence that he belonged to the opposing
political party; and Plaintiff Rivera-López failed to proffer even
circumstantial
discrimination.

evidence

that

she

suffered

political

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15
IV.

For

the

foregoing

Jiménez-Bracero,

CONCLUSION

reasons,

Pantojas-Fonseca,

Plaintiffs
and

Alberty-Marrero,

Rivera-López’s

First

Amendment claims are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 21st day of June 2023.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH_____
United States District Judge