Rosario Ramos et al
Filing
31
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Amended Pleadings due by 3/8/2019. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 2/22/2019. (PMA)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
Carlos L. Rosario Ramos, et al.,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL NO. 18-1050 (PG)
v.
The Municipality of Río Grande, et
al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants Municipality of Río Grande
(henceforth “Municipality”), Hon. Angel B. González Damudt (henceforth “GonzálezDamudt”), Rey O. Caraballo Rodríguez (henceforth “Caraballo-Rodríguez”); Leysla Ortiz
Sánchez (henceforth “Ortiz-Sánchez”), Jose A. Adorno Aponte (henceforth “Adorno-Aponte”),
and Evelyn González Robles (henceforth “González-Robles”) (collectively as “Defendants”). See
Docket No. 18. In their motion, Defendants request the dismissal of this case arguing that
plaintiffs Carlos L. Rosario Ramos (henceforth “Rosario-Ramos”), Ivelisse Rosario Méndez
(henceforth “Rosario-Méndez”), and Ricardo Torrens Osorio (henceforth “Torrens-Osorio”)
(collectively as “Plaintiffs”) failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs
filed a timely response to said motion (Docket No. 27), to which Defendants have not replied.
After considering the parties’ pleadings and the applicable law, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
On January 31, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the present complaint against the Municipality and the
other individual Defendants in their official and personal capacities pursuant to the Civil Rights
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 2 of 15
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations to their rights under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The complaint also includes claims for damages under Article 1802
of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141. In sum, plaintiffs Rosario-Ramos and
Rosario-Méndez allege that Defendants violated their First Amendment rights by retaliating
against them after having made constitutionally-protected public expressions.
Specifically, on August 3, 2009, Rosario-Ramos started work as a heavy equipment driver
under a temporary contract with the Public Works Department of the Municipality of Río
Grande. See Docket No. 1 at page 2. On September 25, 2016, Rosario-Ramos wrote a Facebook
message stating: “Populares de Río Grande with Davis [sic] Acosta, (Popular Party Members
with David Acosta).” Id. Through this message, Rosario-Ramos changed his political affiliation
from the Popular Democratic Party (henceforth “PDP”) to the New Progressive Party
(henceforth “NPP”). See id. The next day, Mayor González-Damudt purportedly ordered the
PDP administration of Río Grande to commence a program of persecution and discrimination
against Rosario-Ramos. Said pattern of discrimination by co-defendants Mayor GonzálezDamudt,
Caraballo-Rodríguez,
and
Ortiz-Sánchez
culminated
with
Rosario-Ramos’
termination on January 31, 2017, even though he allegedly had a perfect performance and track
record, and Mayor González-Damudt had promised him on July 2016 that he would be
reclassified as a regular permanent employee. See id.
On the other hand, on July 19, 2013, Rosario-Méndez began to work as a temporary
employee in the Purchasing Office of the Municipality of Río Grande. During her tenure as a
purchasing officer, Rosario-Méndez dealt with several irregularities perpetrated by Mayor
González-Damudt and the special assistant to the mayor, co-defendant Adorno-Aponte.
Specifically, they purportedly ordered Rosario-Méndez to purchase materials using public
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 3 of 15
funds for the private home of Attorney Noemí Caraballo López and a tire for a private truck.
See id. at 3-4. At an undisclosed date, Rosario-Méndez received a telephone call from a radio
commentator, José Cruz Jiménez (henceforth “Cruz-Jiménez”), requesting information about
the use of public municipal funds for private use and she felt compelled to tell the truth. See id.
at 4. Cruz-Jiménez made the information public, and he subsequently filed several stillpending complaints against the Municipality of Río Grande, Mayor González-Damudt and
other municipal officers for the use of public municipal funds for private use.
At some point on September 2016, Adorno-Aponte allegedly told another purchasing agent,
Elizabeth Sánchez, “that by orders from the top (referring to Mayor González-Damudt), Ivelisse
Rosario Méndez would not perform any work, and no telephone calls could be received by her
at work.” Id. Subsequently, on September 29, 2016, co-defendant Adorno-Aponte demoted
Rosario-Méndez within the Purchasing Office by eliminating some of her duties. See id.
Additionally, on October and December 2016, Rosario-Méndez provided, under oath,
information on the illegal use of private funds to Justice Department investigators. As a result
of these events, Rosario-Méndez was not assigned any work from September 2016 until
December 31, 2016, when Adorno-Aponte resigned and was replaced by co-defendant
González-Robles, who began to assign Rosario-Méndez “irrelevant jobs” once every one or two
weeks. This situation continued until she was terminated on August 31, 2017. See id. at 5-6.
Additionally, Torrens-Osorio, conjugal partner of Rosario-Méndez, claims damages under
Puerto Rico’s Torts statute for the persecution and discrimination that he purportedly suffered
in his workplace at the Public Works Department of the Municipality of Rio Grande due to his
wife’s public interest expressions. See Docket No. 27 at pages 7-8.
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 4 of 15
Because of the events outlined above, Plaintiffs filed the present complaint requesting
compensatory and punitive damages of no less than $300,000 for Rosario-Ramos, $300,000
for Rosario-Méndez, $50,000 for Torrens-Osorio, and a final $50,000 for their conjugal
partnership. See id. at 9. Furthermore, Plaintiffs request equitable relief in the form of a
permanent injunction ordering Defendants to reinstate plaintiffs Rosario-Ramos and RosarioMéndez at their previous positions, as well as any attorney’s fees, costs and expenses incurred
in connection to the present action. See id. at 9-10.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court
must “accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor, and determine whether the complaint, so read,
limns facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable theory.” Rivera v. Centro Medico de
Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142
F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir. 1998)). Even though detailed factual allegations are not necessary for a
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). Those nonconclusory factual allegations that the court accepts as true must be
sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility. See Quiros v. Muñoz, 670 F.Supp.2d 130, 132
(D.P.R. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Furthermore, “[t]he plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 5 of 15
III.
DISCUSSION
On August 23, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 1 Each of Defendants’ arguments
for dismissal will be discussed in turn.
A. Defendants’ Argument that Plaintiffs’ Claims are Duplicative
Plaintiffs Rosario-Ramos and Rosario-Méndez request injunctive and monetary relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2 contending that they have been deprived of their First Amendment
rights. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants request the dismissal of all claims brought
against co-defendants Mayor González-Damudt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, AdornoAponte, and González-Robles in their official capacities. In sum, they contend that “suing the
mayor of the Municipality of Río Grande or any other official in their official capacity while the
Municipality of Río Grande is being included as a defendant is redundant and unnecessary.”
Docket No. 18 at page 14.
Defendants’ argument is correct, as “[w]hen a municipality is sued directly, claims against
municipal employees in their official capacities are redundant and may be dismissed.” DiazGarcia v. Surillo-Ruiz, 13-cv-1473-FAB, 2014 WL 4403363 at *5 (D.P.R. Sept. 8, 2014). See
Trafford v. City of Westbrook, 256 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.Me. 2009) (explaining how “an official
capacity claim is not necessary when a Section 1983 claim is brought against a municipality”);
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (explaining that “[t]here is no longer a need
1
Rule 12(b)(6) enables a party to present as a defense that the other party has failed “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2 Section 1983 states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 6 of 15
to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, local
government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief”)
(referencing Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Plaintiffs failed to
distinguish how the relief that they may obtain from their official capacity claims against the
individual defendants is any different from that which they may obtain through their § 1983
claims against the Municipality of Río Grande. Thus, this court finds those claims are indeed
duplicative and the motion to dismiss all claims against co-defendants Mayor GonzálezDamudt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, Adorno-Aponte, and González-Robles in their
official capacities is hereby GRANTED.
B. Defendants’ Claim that the Municipality of Rio Grande is Immune to Punitive Damages
Defendants also contend that municipalities are immune from punitive damages pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1) 3 and applicable case law, therefore Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive
damages against the Municipality must be dismissed with prejudice. See Docket No. 18 at page
23.
The Supreme Court held in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), that
“considerations of history and policy do not support exposing a municipality to punitive
damages for the bad-faith actions of its officials.” Id. at 271. However, as admitted by the
Defendants themselves, “[p]unitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 against a state or
municipal officer in her individual capacity.” Docket No. 18 at page 23 (emphasis added).
See Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that “[p]unitive damages may be
3 Section 1981(a)(b)(1) states that “[a] complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against
a respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if the complaining
party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with
malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a)(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 7 of 15
awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where ‘the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated
by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others.’”) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Thus, Plaintiffs
cannot claim punitive damages against the Municipality, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss
those claims for punitive damages against the Municipality of Río Grande is hereby
GRANTED.
C. Rosario-Ramos’ Claim of Political Discrimination
To make a prima facie case of political discrimination, Plaintiffs must show that “(1) the
plaintiff and the defendant belong to opposing political affiliations; (2) the defendant has
knowledge of the plaintiff’s affiliation; (3) a challenged employment action occurred; and (4)
political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the challenged employment
action.” Lopez-Rosado v. Molina-Rodriguez, No. 11-cv-2198-JAG, 2012 WL 4681956 at *4
(D.P.R. Sept. 28, 2012) (quoting Juarbe-Velez v. Soto-Santiago, 558 F.Supp.2d 187, 199 (D.P.R.
2008)).
Although Plaintiffs, at the motion to dismiss stage, do not need to present sufficient facts to
establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, “the elements of a prima facie case may
be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.” Rodriguez-Reyes v. MolinaRodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). Furthermore, “[t]here need not be a one-to-one
relationship between any single allegation and a necessary element of the cause of action. What
counts is the ‘cumulative effect of the [complaint’s] factual allegations.’” Id. at 55 (quoting
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011)).
When applying the above test to the totality of the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint, it
can be inferred that Rosario-Ramos has presented a plausible claim of political discrimination.
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 8 of 15
In his complaint, Rosario-Ramos presented three non-conclusory factual allegations, to wit: 1)
that on September 25, 2016 he wrote a Facebook message implying that he was a former PDP
affiliate who now supported the NPP party; 2) on September 26, 2016 the PDP administration
of Río Grande was ordered by Mayor González-Damudt to persecute him, and 3) that his
contract was not renewed by the PDP administration of the Municipality of Río Grande on
January 31, 2017, subsequent to that Facebook post. Based on these non-conclusory facts, the
court can construe that Rosario-Ramos and the Defendants are plausibly affiliated with
opposing political parties, as the former prefers the NPP whereas the latter belong to the PDP.
Additionally, the facts contained in Plaintiffs’ complaint, when taken as true, point to the
conclusion that Rosario-Ramos was subject to an adverse employment action when his
temporary contract was not renewed by the Defendants on January 31, 2017. See Docket No. 1
at page 2. See also Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990) (explaining how
the government may not rely on certain reasons to deny a person a valuable government
benefit, even if he has no right to it, for example: “[i]t may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom
of speech”) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972)).
Rosario-Ramos does not allege any “discrete factual events” showing that the individual
Defendants were aware of his political beliefs. See Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 14-15. 4
However, “[t]he relevant question for a district court in assessing plausibility is not whether
the complaint makes any particular factual allegations but, rather, whether ‘the complaint
warrant[s] dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief
4
Examples of such “discrete factual events” include: “(1) that a plaintiff was asked by defendants about the
circumstances relating to how the plaintiff obtained his or her job; (2) that the clerical staff directly asked about a
plaintiff’s political affiliations; and (3) that employees knew about and frequently discussed the political
affiliations of their co-workers.” Aguiar-Serrano v. Puerto Rico Highways and Transp. Authority, 916 F.Supp.2d
223, 230 (D.P.R. 2013).
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 9 of 15
plausible.’” Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013). This court
finds that it is certainly plausible that the Defendants knew of Rosario-Ramos’ Facebook
message announcing his support of the NPP party, taking into account that Facebook is a widely
used social media platform, the speed at which information can spread across the relatively
small population of the Municipality of Río Grande, 5 as well as Rosario-Ramos’ contention that
Mayor González-Damudt ordered a campaign of discrimination against him the very next day
after the announcement was made.
Rosario-Ramos does not provide any particular facts hinting at what the Defendants’
continuous acts of persecution, harassment and discrimination consisted of, other than the fact
that he was terminated on January 31, 2017. See Docket No. 1 at page 2. Nonetheless, this court
can infer the plausible existence of a causal link between the Defendants’ knowledge of RosarioRamos’ political affiliation and their subsequent decision to terminate him. See RodriguezReyes, 711 F.3d at 56 (reminding that at the motion to dismiss stage “plaintiffs, for pleading
purposes, need not establish this element; the facts contained in the complaint need only show
that the claim of causation is plausible”). The alleged timeline of events is once again instructive
here, as the Facebook message was published on September 25, 2016 and Rosario-Ramos was
terminated on January 31, 2017, shortly after the general elections in November. As such, it is
plausible that Rosario-Ramos’ political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in the
Defendants’ decision to terminate his contract.
5 It has been previously held that “[w]here there exists a relatively small community where most everyone knew
who everyone else was and political affiliations were common knowledge . . . a reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s political affiliations.” Davila-Torres v. Feliciano-Torres, 924 F.Supp.2d 359, 371
(D.P.R. 2013) (quoting Torres-Santiago v. Municipality of Adjuntas, 693 F.3d 230, 237 (1st Cir. 2012)); See also
Diaz-Garcia v. Surillo-Ruiz, 113 F.Supp.3d 494, 517 (D.P.R. 2015).
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
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Here, Rosario-Ramos has alleged sufficient facts which, if taken in their entirety and in the
light most favorable to his argument, renders his claim of political discrimination plausible.
Consequently, Rosario-Ramos stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the court
hereby DENIES the Defendants’ motion to dismiss his claims for equitable relief and
compensatory damages against the Municipality and Mayor González-Damudt, CaraballoRodríguez, and Ortiz-Sánchez in their personal capacities.
D. Ivelisse Rosario Méndez’ Claim of Free-Speech Retaliation
Public employees retain their First Amendment right to speak on matters of public concern.
See Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, “[g]overnment employers,
like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and
actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). In order to establish a claim of free-speech
retaliation, “a plaintiff must show that [s]he spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern,
that [her] interest in speaking outweighed the government’s interest, as [her] employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it provides . . . and that [her] speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in [her] firing.” Cruz v. Puerto Rico Power Authority, 878
F.Supp.2d 316, 324 (D.P.R. 2012) (quoting Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d
168, 180 (1st Cir. 2011)). Furthermore, “[i]f all three parts of the inquiry are resolved in favor
of the plaintiff, the employer may still escape liability if it can show that ‘it would have reached
the same decision even absent the protected conduct.’” Decotiis v. Whittermore, 635 F.3d 22,
29-30 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 756, 765-66 (1st
Cir. 2010)).
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
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Defendants’ motion to dismiss solely attacks the plausibility of Rosario-Mendez’ claim with
respect to the first element. See Docket No. 18 at pages 21-22. Specifically, Defendants claim
that, upon Rosario-Méndez’ own admission, it was the radio commentator, José Cruz Jiménez,
who made the public comments that allegedly provoked the Defendants’ retaliatory conduct.
Additionally, regarding Rosario-Méndez’ declarations under oath before the Department of
Justice, Defendants contend that she “makes no factual allegations regarding defendant’s
knowledge of it anytime before the Municipality took affirmative action to prevent further
disclosure of Municipality’s sensitive and confidential information.” Id. at 22. In sum,
Defendants contend that Rosario-Méndez failed to allege enough facts that would allow this
court to infer that they knew that she was the source of the information revealed by CruzJiménez.
This court rejects Defendants’ argument, as it can be reasonably inferred from the
nonconclusory facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint that Defendants could have plausibly
known that Rosario-Méndez was the source of the information revealed by the radio host. In
their original complaint, Plaintiffs established that it was co-defendant Mayor GonzálezDamudt’s special assistant and Rosario-Méndez’ superior, co-defendant Adorno-Aponte, who
ordered her to engage in the allegedly illegal conduct that she subsequently revealed to CruzJiménez. See Docket No. 1 at pages 3-4. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that after the radio
broadcast, Adorno-Aponte “told another purchasing agent, Elizabeth Sánchez, that by orders
from the top (referring to the Mayor González-Damudt), Ivelisse Rosario Méndez would not
perform any work, and no telephone calls could be received by her at work.” Id. at 4. The final
nail in Defendants’ claim of ignorance was placed by the Defendants themselves, upon
admitting in their motion to dismiss that the conduct that Rosario-Méndez complains of was
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 12 of 15
an “affirmative action to prevent further disclosure of Municipality’s sensitive and
confidential information.” Docket No. 18 at page 22 (emphasis added).
Based on the above, it can be reasonably inferred that Adorno-Aponte knew that RosarioMéndez was the source of the information revealed by Cruz-Jiménez because Adorno-Aponte
himself ordered her to engage in the acts that were revealed by the radio broadcast.
Furthermore, the fact that Adorno-Aponte and Mayor González-Damudt ordered that RosarioMéndez not be assigned work, coupled with the Defendants’ admission that the Municipality
took steps to prevent further disclosure of confidential information, leads to the plausible
conclusion that they sought to prevent Rosario-Méndez from leaking even more information
in the future. As a result, this court finds that Rosario-Méndez presented enough facts to
establish the first element of a free-speech retaliation claim at this stage.
The second element, that Rosario-Méndez’ interest in speaking outweighs the government’s
interest in preserving the efficiency of the workplace, is more than adequately met as the
conduct that she revealed to Cruz-Jiménez, if true, consists of an illegal act that the government
should have little to no interest in concealing. See Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 241 F.Supp.2d
78, 91 (D.Mass. 2003) (pointing out that “[a]s the Supreme Court has noted, speech on public
issues is ‘the essence of self-government’ and ‘occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values’”) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)); see also O’Connor
v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 915 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that official misconduct is “a topic of
inherent concern to the community”).
The third element, that Rosario-Méndez’ speech was a substantial motivation or factor in
the termination of her contract, was also met as she presented a series of facts that renders her
claims of discrimination and retaliation plausible. Specifically, Rosario-Méndez claims
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
Page 13 of 15
Adorno-Aponte stripped her of some of her functions shortly after the radio broadcast. She was
then assigned insignificant tasks after co-defendant González-Robles replaced Adorno-Aponte,
culminating with her termination on August 31, 2017. These claims enable this court to infer
that a causal relation could plausibly exist between Rosario-Méndez’ statements to CruzJiménez and Defendants’ subsequent decision to terminate her contract. As a result, this court
hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Rosario-Méndez’ claims for equitable relief
and compensatory damages against the Municipality and Mayor González-Damudt, AdornoAponte, and González-Robles in their personal capacities.
E. Torrens-Osorio’s local Torts claims
Plaintiffs claimed that Torrens-Osorio, conjugal partner to co-plaintiff Rosario-Méndez,
“has also been persecuted and discriminated because his wife made public interest expressions.
He is treated as an enemy, given the worst jobs at the Municipality of Rio Grande where he
works at the Public Works Department.” Docket No. 1 at page 5. In light of this allegation, it is
unclear whether Torrens-Osorio brings claims pursuant to § 1983 or Art. 1802 of Puerto Rico’s
Civil Code. This lack of clarity is demonstrated by the fact that the Defendants interpreted
Torrens-Osorio’s claim as one of political discrimination under § 1983 (Docket No. 18 at pages
11-12), while the Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss clarifies that
Torrens-Osorio is actually claiming damages under Article 1802 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code.
See Docket No. 27 at pages 7-8. As such, the Plaintiffs failed to clearly articulate the statutory
basis pursuant to which Torrens-Osorio is claiming relief, and as a result the Defendants could
not adequately defend themselves via their motion to dismiss.
In order to give Plaintiffs a chance to amend their complaint and clarify Torrens-Osorio’s
argument, this court will employ its sua sponte authority to convert Defendants’ motion to
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
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dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) into a motion for a more definite statement
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 6 See Carter v. Newland, 441 F.Supp.2d 208, 214 (D.Mass.
2006) (stating that when a complaint presents a plausible legal theory but “is so unclear that
the opposing party cannot respond to the complaint or frame an answer, a court has the option
of converting, sua sponte, a motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to a motion for a
more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)”). The Plaintiffs should take this
opportunity to clarify Torrens-Osorio’s claims for damages pursuant to Article 1802 of Puerto
Rico’s Civil Code. 7 This court believes that a more definite statement as to Torrens-Osorio’s
claims will grant Defendants the opportunity to adequately respond.
In sum, this court hereby converts the present motion to dismiss Torrens-Osorio’s claims
into a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) and will allow the converted
motion. The Plaintiffs have fourteen (14) days after notice of this order to file their amended
complaint in accordance with this ruling. Failure to comply will result in the dismissal of
Torrens-Osorio’s claims.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss WITH
PREJUDICE as to co-plaintiffs Rosario-Ramos and Rosario-Méndez’ claims for punitive
damages against the Municipality and all claims against defendants Mayor González-Damudt,
Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, Adorno-Aponte, and González-Robles in their official
Rule 12(e) provides in relevant part that “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which
a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a
response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
7 In order to recover damages under Article 1802 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code, Plaintiff must show: “first, proof of
the reality of the damage suffered; second, a causal relation between the damage and the action or omission of
another person; and third, said act or omission is negligent or wrongful.” Sociedad Gananciales v. Gonzalez Padin
Co., Inc., 17 P.R. Offic. Trans. 111, 125 (1986) (quoting Hernandez v. Fournier, 80 P.R.R. 94, 97 (1957)).
6
Civ. No. 18-1050 (PG)
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capacities. Additionally, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to co-plaintiffs
Rosario-Ramos and Rosario-Méndez’ claims for equitable relief and compensatory damages
against the Municipality and Mayor González-Damudt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez,
Adorno-Aponte, and González-Robles in their personal capacities. Finally, Defendants’ motion
to dismiss Torrens-Osorio’s claims is converted into a motion for a more definite statement and
is ALLOWED. The court thus orders Plaintiffs to file a more definite statement of TorrensOsorio’s claims in compliance with this order within fourteen (14) days upon receiving notice
of the same.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 22, 2019.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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