Santiago- Rivera v. Menonita de Aibonito
Filing
71
OPINION AND ORDER granting 48 motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Silvia L. Carreno-Coll on 4/27/2021. (MCV) Modified on 4/27/2021 to correct document type (ecc).
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
GLORIA SANTIAGO-RIVERA
Plaintiff
CIV. NO.: 18-1084 (SCC)
v.
HOSPITAL GENERAL MENONITA
DE AIBONITO, ET AL.
Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gloria Santiago-Rivera (“Plaintiff SantiagoRivera” or “Plaintiff”) worked as a nurse at Hospital General
Menonita Aibonito (“Defendant HGMA”, “HGMA”, or
“Defendant”). She claims that she was unlawfully discharged
from her employment because of her depressive disorder
condition.
Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera
also
claims
that
Defendant HGMA’s managerial staff and her supervisor
harassed her and created a hostile work environment for her.
Pending before the Court is Defendant HGMA’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, see Docket No. 48, 1 which Plaintiff
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Second Amended Complaint includes Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. (“Liberty”) as a Co-Defendant, for it is Defendant
HGMA’s insurance company. See Docket No. 26. Because Liberty moved
to join Defendant HGMA’s Motion for Summary Judgment, see Docket
1
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Santiago-Rivera timely opposed (“Plaintiff’s Opposition”), see
Docket No. 58. Defendant HGMA subsequently filed a Reply.
See Docket No. 65. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant
HGMA’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera
filed
this
action
against
Defendant HGMA and its insurance company 2 under the
American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq. See Docket No. 26. 3 Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera also sued
Defendant HGMA under Puerto Rico law analogous statutes,
namely, Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 29,
§ 185(a) et seq. Law No. 44 of July 2, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
No. 51, and the Court “noted” said request, see Docket No. 54, for ease of
reference, throughout this Opinion and Order, the Court will address the
Co-Defendants as “Defendant HGMA” or “Defendant”.
2
See supra note 1.
The Original Complaint was filed on February 14, 2018. See Docket No.
1. A First Amended Complaint was subsequently filed on September 19,
2018. See Docket No. 17. On December 18, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.
See Docket No. 24. The same was filed separately the next day. See Docket
No. 26.
3
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1, § 500 et seq.; Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann.,
tit. 29, § 146 et seq. 4 Id.
Defendant HGMA moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the uncontested material facts show that
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera is not a qualified individual with a
disability under the ADA. See Docket No. 48 at 2. In addition
to its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant HGMA filed
a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“DSUMFs”). See
Docket No. 49. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera opposed Defendant‘s
Motion for Summary Judgment by stating that she has
established a prima facie case of disability discrimination
under the ADA. See Docket No. 58 at 18. She also contested
the DSUMF, (“Plaintiff‘s Opposition to DSUMF”) and filed a
Statement of Additional Material Facts (“PSAMF”). See
Docket No. 59. Subsequently, HGMA filed its Reply, see
Docket No. 65, and filed a separate response to Plaintiff’s
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera voluntarily dismissed her Fair Labor Standard
Act, 29 U.S.C § 201 et seq., and the Puerto Rico Working Hours and Days
Act, P.R. Laws Ann., tit 29, § 201 et seq., claims in her Opposition. Docket
No. 58 at 2.
4
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Opposition to DSUMF and PSAMF (“Response to Plaintiff’s
Opposition to DSUMF and PSAMF”), see Docket No. 64.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A party may move for summary judgment if the evidence
on the record “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The purpose of a
motion for summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings”
and evaluate the evidence to assess whether a trial is
necessary. Theriault v. Genesis HealthCare LLC, 890 F.3d 342,
348 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d
18, 21 (1st Cir. 2002)).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the judge
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Calvi v. Knox County, 470
F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006)). In conducting this review, “the
judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
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determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Finally, the Court
must deny a motion for summary judgment if it finds that a
genuine issue of material fact remains. Id. at 248.
III.
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Failure to Comply
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the
Sham Affidavit Rule
Before turning to the undisputed facts of this case there are
several matters that the Court must first address. In its
Response to Plaintiff’s Opposition to DSUMF and PSAMF,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to duly oppose its
DSUMF. See Docket No. 64 at 2-5. First, Defendant claims that
Plaintiff’s Opposition to DSUMF contains factual assertions
that are not supported by the record or by admissible
evidence. Id. at 3. Second, Defendant avers that Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s denials are lengthy, argumentative, and in
narrative form, contrary to the requirements of Local Rule 56.
Id. Third, Defendant contends that many of Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s denials and qualifications to Defendant’s DSUMF,
contain additional facts in violation of Local Rule 56(c). Id. at
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4. Finally, Defendant HGMA alleges that Plaintiff SantiagoRivera violated the sham affidavit rule by submitting a sworn
statement that was signed on the same day that she filed her
Opposition. Id. at 5. The Court will first address Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s violations of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 (“Rule 56”) and Local Rule 56(c) and then the
sham affidavit rule.
1. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Failure to Comply with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56(c)
To dispute a material fact, the nonmoving party must offer
“hard proof rather than spongy rhetoric.” Kearney v. Town of
Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2002). Specifically, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A) states that the nonmoving
party may use “depositions, documents, electronically stored
information,
affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials [,]” in
order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A). For its part, Local Rule 56(c) further zeroes-in
on this point and mandates that, the nonmoving party must,
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with his or her opposition, admit, deny or qualify the
statement of facts filed by the moving party. L. Cv. R. 56(c).
And “[u]nless a fact is admitted, the opposing statement shall
support each denial or qualification by a record citation[.]” Id.
In this case, many of Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s denials are
unsupported because they either lack record citations or
solely cite to the Second Amended Complaint. 5 To comply
with Local Rule 56(c) and properly create a factual dispute,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera had to deny Defendant HGMA’s
DSUMF with a reference to a record citation. See L. Cv. R.
56(c). As for Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s constant reliance on
the Second Amended Complaint, the Court notes that a
complaint is not proper evidence to oppose a motion for
summary judgment. The reason being that, “[o]rdinarily,
statements in a complaint are not part of the summary
judgment record[,]” unless the complaint has been verified,
for then it can be used to “consider factual averments based
on personal knowledge . . . as the equivalent of an affidavit
5
See, e.g., Docket No. 59 at ¶¶ 55, 63, 66, 67, 68, 72, 76, 79, 90, 115, 116.
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for purposes of summary judgment.” See Doherty v. Donahoe,
985 F. Supp.2d 190, 195 (D. Mass. 2013) (citing Sheinkopf v.
Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (1st Cir. 1991)). Here, the Second
Amended Complaint was not verified, as such, it cannot be
considered as the equivalent of a sworn statement. The Court
reminds Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera that the purpose of a
motion for summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings.”
Theriault, 890 F.3d at 348 (citing Kearney v. Town of Wareham,
316 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2002)). Therefore, the pleadings alone
do not suffice.
Furthermore, the Court does not need to consider Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s unsupported factual propositions. See
Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010)
(upholding district court’s decision to exclude plaintiff’s
unsupported denials because his did not provide appropriate
citations to the record). Hence, the Court will disregard
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s denials that contain unsupported
factual assertions. Id.; see also L. Cv. R. 56(e).
Besides requiring an opposing party to support its denials
with record citations, Local Rule 56(c) mandates an opposing
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party to comply with two additional requirements. First, an
opposing party’s statement of material facts must be short
and concise. L. Cv. R. 56(c). Second, additional facts are to be
submitted in a separate section. See id. Some of Plaintiff’s
denials do not comply with the short and concise mandate as
they are lengthy and argumentative.6 In this same vein, some
of these lengthy and argumentative denials contain
additional facts that were not filed in a separate section. 7 See
Natal Rivera v. Oriental Bank & Trust, 291 F. Supp.3d 215, 218
(D.P.R. 2018). Failure to submit additional facts in a separate
section allows the Court to disregard such facts. Carreras, 596
F.3d at 32. In light of Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s failure to
comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56(c), the Court
will not consider the argumentative denials and the
additional facts which were not submitted in accordance with
the aforementioned Local Rule.
6
See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 8, 47, 84, 87, 100, 116.
7
See id.
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2. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Sworn Statement
Besides violating Rule 56 and Local Rule 56(c), Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera also infringed the sham affidavit rule. This
rule posits that a nonmoving party cannot contest a motion
for summary judgment with a sworn statement that
contradicts what a party has answered unambiguously
during the discovery stage. Escribano-Reyes v. Professional Hepa
Certificate Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 2016). The only
exception to the rule is if the nonmoving party provides a
good explanation as to why his or her testimony changed. Id.
Here, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera submitted a sworn
statement tailored to contradict crucial facts in Defendant’s
DSUMF, without providing any explanation or justification
as to why her testimony changed. 8 See Docket No. 58-1. It is
particularly revealing that the sworn statement was signed
the same day that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera opposed
Defendant HGMA’s Motion for Summary Judgment. See id.
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s sworn statement attempts to controvert, inter
alia, Defendant HGMA’s DSUMFs at ¶¶ 3, 22, 47, 84, 91, 95.
8
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In brief, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s sworn statement states
that: (1) she did not authorize Hospital Menonita-CIMA 9
(“CIMA”) to release her medical records; (2) the person
responsible for administering a medication to a patient was a
fellow nurse and not her; (3) she was capable of performing
the duties that her job required despite her medical condition;
and (4) she never agreed to obtain a medical certificate from
her psychiatrist. Id.
Because Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s sworn statement
contains new information that is clearly made-to-order and
self-serving, with the sole purpose of controverting
Defendant HGMA’s DSUMF, the Court will strike Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s sworn statement at Docket Number 58-1
from the record for violation of the sham affidavit rule. See
Escribano-Reyes, 817 F.3d at 387 (affirming district court’s
decision to strike a post discovery sworn statement because it
violated the sham affidavit rule).
Hospital Menonita-CIMA (“CIMA”) is a psychiatric hospital owned by
Mennonite General Hospital, Inc. (“MGH”). Docket No. 49-1 at ¶¶ 7-8.
CIMA is independent from Defendant HGMA. Id.
9
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IV. Factual Findings
The Court next turns to its factual findings. After
reviewing Defendant HGMA’s DSUMF, see Docket No. 49,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMFs and her
PSAMF, see Docket No. 59, along with Defendant HGMA’s
Response to Plaintiff’s Opposition to DSUMF and PSAMF, see
Docket No. 64, in addition to the documentation cited thereto
in accordance with Local Rule 56(e), the Court finds that the
following facts are uncontested.
1. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Medical Condition
In 1995 Santiago-Rivera was diagnosed with a depressive
disorder. DSUMF at ¶ 4; Docket No. 49-2 at 35. Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s condition does not allow her to perform
major life activities such as the ability to concentrate, as her
mind often drifts to irrelevant matters. DSUMF at ¶ 5. Her
condition precludes her from carrying out every-day tasks
throughout her house such as cooking and cleaning. Id. Due
to her condition, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera also suffers from,
inter alia, insomnia, anxiety, loss of physical strength—which
makes it difficult for her to get out of bed—panic attacks, and
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low self-esteem. Id. at ¶ 6.
2. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Relationship with Defendant
HGMA
Defendant HGMA is a nonprofit corporation organized
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, whose
parent corporation is Mennonite General Hospital, Inc.
(“MGH”). Id. at ¶ 1; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶¶ 7-8. Besides
HGMA, MGH owns two other independent hospital
institutions, Hospital General de Cayey and CIMA. DSUMF
at ¶ 1; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 8. Each institution is separate from
the other. DSUMF at ¶ 2; Docket No. 49-1 ¶¶ 7-8. Hence, no
administrative personnel of one hospital has access to a
patient’s information in another hospital. DSUMF at ¶¶ 2-3 10;
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera denied Defendant HGMA’s DSUMF ¶ 2 and
admitted in part and denied in part DSUMF ¶ 3. The aforementioned
DSUMFs stand for the proposition that, because the hospitals owned by
MGH are independent from each other, no administrative personnel from
one hospital is privy to a patient’s information from another hospital
under the MGH umbrella. See DSUMF at ¶¶ 2-3. Moreover, patient
records are protected in accordance with the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act. Id. at ¶ 2. In her denial of DSUMF ¶ 2, Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera posits that, HGMA administrative personnel must have
had access to her medical records because her personnel record at HGMA
contains a copy of a medical certificate which indicates that she was
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partially hospitalized at CIMA between August 21, 2008 and September 4,
2008. See Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMF at ¶ 2. She
further notes that said certificate included a diagnosis of “major
depression”. Id. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera repeats this same argument in
her denial of DSUMF ¶ 3, and further argues that HGMA administrative
personnel had access to her CIMA medical records because the same were
produced as part of the instant litigation without Defendant HGMA
having secured prior authorization from her to obtain the same. See
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMF at ¶ 3. Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s denials are not responsive to Defendant HGMA’s DSUMFs at ¶¶
2-3. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera has not controverted the fact that, because
the hospitals under the MGH umbrella are independent from each other,
there is no comingling of patient records and therefore administrative
personnel from HGMA do not have access to a patient’s medical records
in another one of the hospitals. Moreover, while Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
refers to the medical certificate in her HGMA administrative personnel file
from her partial hospitalization at CIMA with the goal of showing that
HGMA administrative personnel had access to her CIMA medical records,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera overlooks the fact—as she herself admitted—
that she personally handed over the medical certificate noting her partial
hospitalization to the Office of Human Resources at HGMA. See Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMF at ¶ 20. Furthermore, Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera also attempts to transform the proposed fact at DSUMF ¶
3 into an issue regarding the authorization—or alleged lack thereof—to
obtain her CIMA medical records. However, DSUMF at ¶ 3 does not drive
at whether authorization was provided—or not provided—to obtain
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s CIMA medical records, but rather, it drives at
whether HGMA administrative personnel had access to her medical
records prior to the commencement of the instant litigation. A reference
to a medical certificate that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera herself handed over
to the HGMA Office of Human Resources does not controvert the
proposed facts at DSUMF at ¶¶ 2-3. As for Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s
argument that Defendant HGMA produced her CIMA medical records as
part of the instant litigation without seeking her authorization to do so, see
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMF at ¶ 3, Defendant
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Docket No. 49-1 at ¶¶ 7-9.
In February 2007, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera applied to
work at HGMA. DSUMF at ¶ 9; Docket No. 49-2 at 62. As part
of the application process, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera was
interviewed by Alejandro López (“López”). Id. At the time of
the interview, López served as the assistant to the director of
the nursing department at HGMA. DSUMF at ¶¶ 10-11;
Docket No. 49-3 at 12; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 14. Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera did not inform López that she had been
diagnosed with a major depressive condition, for she did not
deem this to be something that neither López nor HGMA
needed to know because she understood that her condition
would not affect her job. DSUMF at ¶ 13; Docket No. 49-2 at
62-63.
On March 13, 2007, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera began to
work at HGMA, specifically in the emergency room, as a
HGMA clarified in its Response to Plaintiff’s Opposition to DSUMF and
PSAMF, that it obtained the same through a subpoena, precisely as part of
the instant litigation. See Docket No. 64 at 15; see also Docket No. 64-1
(subpoena requesting CIMA medical records). The Court thus admits
DSUMFs ¶¶ 2-3.
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registered nurse, 11 with an associate degree in nursing.
DSUMF at ¶ 14; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 1. Plaintiff SantiagoRivera was transferred to HGMA’s Labor and Delivery
Department on January 14, 2009. DSUMF at ¶ 18; Docket No.
49-1 at ¶ 2-3. But on November 17, 2009, she began to work as
a registered nurse in HGMA’s Intermediate Unit. 12 DSUMF at
¶ 26; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 4. However, according to Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s deposition testimony, whenever a floor
was short-staffed or additional nurses were required, she
could be transferred to another floor in order to fill those
On February 11, 2009, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera was granted, by the
Nurses’ Examining Board of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a
permanent license to practice as an associate nurse. DSUMF ¶ 16; Docket
No. 29-4 at 20.
11
In their filings before this Court, the parties have referred to several
variations of the “Intermediate Unit” such as, “Intermediate Intensive
Unit”, “Intermediate Intensive Care Unit” and “Intermediate UnitTelemetry”, when referring to the unit that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera was
assigned to work as a nurse during the time that the alleged
discriminatory events took place. After reviewing the job description
included in Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s personnel file, see Docket No. 49-4
at 5 and HGMA’s Answers to Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Request for
Admissions, see Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 4, for ease of reference and for the
sake of uniformity, the Court will refer to the unit in question as the
“Intermediate Unit” throughout this Opinion and Order.
12
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voids. DSUMF at ¶ 45; Docket No. 49-2 at 172.
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s duties and responsibilities as a
nurse at the Intermediate Unit included: placing IV catheters,
administering medications, assessing patients, taking blood
samples, placing foleys, placing electrodes and installing
telemetry equipment if needed, providing resuscitation to
patients, and the rest of the duties and responsibilities she
carried out as an emergency room nurse. 13 DSUMF at ¶ 30.
Docket No. 49-2 at 95-99.
When Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera worked as a nurse at
HGMA, her job description for the Intermediate Unit required
that nurses work forty (40) hours a week, in day and night
shifts, according to the needs of the department. DSUMF at ¶
29; Docket No. 52-1 at 37. Nurses would also have to work on
weekends and on holidays, and they would be exposed to
risks in addition to tense situations. Id. The job requirements
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s responsibilities as an emergency room nurse
were to provide treatment to patients, take blood samples, place catheters;
place feeding tubes, give injections, take vital signs, conduct
electrocardiograms, make nurse’s notes, place foleys, and assist the
physician while examining or providing treatment to patients. DSUMF ¶
17; Docket No. 49-2 at 66-75.
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also mentioned that nurses would have to remain standing up
and walking for the majority of the shift. Id. They also had to
assist in transferring patients and be able to work in any area
of the nursing department. Id. At this time, Defendant HGMA
required all the nurses at the Intermediate Unit to work
consecutive night shifts during the weekend once a month.
DSUMF at ¶ 35; Docket No. 52-1 at 664.
3. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Partial Hospitalization
Between August 21, 2008 and September 4, 2008, Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera was partially hospitalized at CIMA. DSUMF
at ¶ 20; see Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 10. When a patient is partially
hospitalized at CIMA, the patient does not stay overnight, but
rather, receives outpatient services during the day. DSUMF at
¶ 21; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 10. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera states
that her partial hospitalization at CIMA was due to marital
problems and was not work related. DSUMF at ¶ 25; Docket
No. 49-2 at 80, 82-83, 89-90. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera provided
copies to HGMA’s Office of Human Resources of the medical
certificates which showed that she had been partially
hospitalized at CIMA between August 21, 2008 and
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September 4, 2008. See DSUMF at ¶ 20; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶
10.
4. Efigenia Lasanta’s Role as Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s
Supervisor at HGMA’s Intermediate Unit
Efigenia Lasanta (“Lasanta”), is the nursing supervisor at
HGMA’s Intermediate Unit. DSUMF at ¶ 40; Docket No. 49-6
at 7-8. From what Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera recalls, Lasanta
became her supervisor in 2015. DSUMF at ¶ 41; Docket No.
49-2 at 143-144. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera was evaluated once
per year by her supervisor. DSUMF at ¶ 36; Docket No. 49-2
at 144-145. During these evaluations, Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s performance was graded on a percentage basis. Id. at
145. Lasanta’s evaluations of Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera were
positive. DSUMF at ¶¶ 42-43; Docket No. 49-2 at 153-156, 193.
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s testimony emphasizes that
while Lasanta served as her supervisor, Lasanta: (1) ignored
her after she returned to work from a sick leave, DSUMF at ¶
46(a); Docket No. 49-2 at 174; (2) opted to socialize more with
other coworkers instead of with Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera, see
DSUMF at ¶ 46(c); Docket No. 49-7 at 16; (3) took some serums
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away from Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera without explaining why,
see DSUMF at ¶ 46(d); Docket No. 49-2 at 174-175; (4) accused
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera of talking negatively about her with
her former supervisor, see DSUMF at ¶ 46(e); Docket No. 49-2
at 177-178; (5) disproportionately transferred Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera to other hospital floors, in comparison to
other nurses, 14 see DSUMF at ¶ 46(g); Docket No. 49-2 at 191192; (6) reminded Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera of her daily
functions, see DSUMF at ¶ 46(i); Docket No. 49-7 at 36-37; and
(7) took some IV solutions—which had been classified by
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera in order to be administered to
It is uncontested that starting in February 2016 Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
was transferred about five (5) times per month but in September and
October she was transferred approximately ten (10) times per month.
DSUMF ¶ 46(h); Docket No. 49-2 at 196-197. The Court points out that
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera does not elaborate on whether the number of
times she was transferred exceeded the number of times her fellow nurses
were transferred. Other than her testimony stating that she understood
that she was disproportionately transferred, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
does not offer additional information regarding the context under which
the alleged transfers took place. Furthermore, during her deposition,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera stated she could not identify any fellow nurses
who had been transferred on more occasions than she had. See DSUMF at
¶ 46(g); Docket No. 49-2 at 192-193.
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patients—to the storage area, which Santiago-Rivera had to
later retrieve, see DSUMF at ¶ 46(j); Docket No. 49-7 at 37-39.
5. Failure to Administer Medication Incident
In March 2016, Lasanta scheduled a meeting between Ms.
Mariely Colón (“Ms. Colón”), a fellow nurse, and Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera, to talk about an incident involving the
failure to administer medication to a patient. DSUMF at ¶ 47;
Docket No. 49-6 at 30. At that meeting, Lasanta told both
nurses that they needed to follow up on the administration of
medications to a patient. DSUMF at ¶ 47; Docket No. 49-6 at
30. Due to the incident, Lasanta prepared an Incident Report
which Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera and Ms. Colón signed.
DSUMF at ¶ 49; Docket No. 52-1 at 498. While no adverse
employment action was taken against Plaintiff SantiagoRivera for this incident, she did not like how Lasanta
addressed her at the meeting and therefore, wrote a letter to
López, complaining about the incident. 15 See DSUMF at ¶¶ 51It is disputed if Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s letter to López is a complaint,
charge, or a report against Lasanta. See Docket No. 49-7 at 32-33, 35-36;
Docket No. 58-7 at 34. However, such determination is not material.
15
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53; Docket No. 49-7 at 33, 35-36; Docket No. 52-3 at 5; Docket
No. 49-3 at 12.
6. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Leave of Absences and Medical
Certificates
On April 4, 2016, after finishing her shift, Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera went to the HGMA’s employee clinic where
she was diagnosed with anxiety and recommended to rest
and return to work on April 11, 2016. DSUMF at ¶ 58; Docket
No. 49-2 at 204-205. She was also referred to the psychiatric
unit at CIMA, however, she did not go. DSUMF at ¶ 5916;
Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 20. No administrative personnel at
HGMA had access to the contents of Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s medical record from the employee clinic. DSUMF at
¶ 57 17; Docket No. 49-1 ¶¶ 19, 21.
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera denied DSUMF at ¶ 59 on the grounds that
while she did not visit the psychiatric unit at CIMA, she sought treatment
from her psychiatrist, Dr. Angel Gómez (“Dr. Gómez”). See Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMFs at ¶ 59. Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s denial is not responsive to the proposed DSUMF at ¶ 59. The
aforementioned proposed fact is admitted because it is uncontroverted
that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera did not visit the psychiatric unit at CIMA.
16
17
Defendant HGMA’s DSUMF at ¶ 57 stands for the proposition that
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On April 18, 2016, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera went to Dr.
Angel Gómez 18 (“Dr. Gómez”), her psychiatrist, who issued a
medical certificate recommending rest for ten days, that is
until April 28, 2016. See DSUMF at ¶¶ 61-62; Docket No. 52-3
at 189; Docket No. 49-7 at 46. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
followed Dr. Gómez’s recommendation and returned to work
HGMA administrative personnel did not have access to Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s medical record at HGMA’s employee clinic. But Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera denies DSUMF ¶ 57 on the grounds that HGMA
administrative personnel did have access to her medical record from
HGMA’s employee clinic because as part of the instant litigation
Defendant HGMA obtained and produced a copy of the same without first
having sought prior authorization from her. See Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s
Opposition to DSUMF at ¶ 57. This denial does not controvert the
proposed fact at DSUMF ¶ 57. The reason being that, in her denial,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera misreads the proposed fact set forth by
Defendant HGMA at DSUMF ¶ 57, for the same has nothing to do with
whether authorization was—or was not—granted by Plaintiff SantiagoRivera in order for Defendant HGMA to obtain a copy of her medical
records. As such, it remains uncontroverted that HGMA administrative
personnel did not have access to Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s medical
records from the HGMA employee clinic. Therefore, DSUMF ¶ 57 is
admitted.
Dr. Gómez first started treating Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera on May 5, 2014.
DSUMF at ¶ 103; Docket No. 49-11 at 21-22. Between May 2014 and April
2016, Dr. Gómez did not include anything related to Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s workplace in her medical record. DSUMF at ¶ 107; Docket No.
49-11 at 93.
18
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on April 29, 2016. DSUMF at ¶ 62; Docket No. 49-7 at 46. On
September 21, 2016, Dr. Gómez issued a second medical
certificate. DSUMF at ¶ 67; Docket No. 49-7 at 70; Docket No.
52-3 at 4. There, Dr. Gómez prescribed Plaintiff SantiagoRivera certain medication and recommended that she take a
second leave of absence, until September 29, 2016, in order to
rest. Id. It was during this visit on September 21, 2016, that Dr.
Gómez found that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera was depressed
and anxious. DSUMF at ¶ 109; Docket No. 49-11 at 104. Dr.
Gómez’s medical records do not reflect that Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s depression was caused by her work environment.
DSUMF at ¶ 110; Docket No. 49-11 at 106.
On October 3, 2016, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera abandoned
her workstation at HGMA, without requesting permission to
do so or informing that she would be stepping out in order to
visit the HGMA’s employee clinic a second time. See DSUMF
at ¶ 68; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶¶ 26-28. At HGMA’s employee
clinic, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera was treated by Dr. Marta
Vega (“Dr. Vega”). See DSUMF at ¶ 69; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶¶
26-28. Dr. Vega diagnosed Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera with a
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general anxiety disorder and referred her to the State
Insurance Fund (“SIF”). Id. The SIF’s physician recommended
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera to rest for several days, until October
14, 2016. DSUMF at ¶ 70; Docket No. 49-7 at 75. Moreover, the
SIF determined that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s mental health
condition was not work related. DSUMF at ¶ 97; Docket No.
49-7 at 102-103.
On October 13, 2016, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera visited Dr.
Gómez and told him that she was feeling anxious and
depressed because she was working consecutive night shifts.
DSUMF at ¶ 111; Docket No. 49-11 at 128-129. Based on
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s statement, Dr. Gómez concluded
that she should not work consecutive night shifts due to her
condition. Id. at 129. At that time, Dr. Gómez did not consider
necessary to prescribe a stress-free work environment for
Plaintiff. DSUMF at ¶ 113; Docket No. 49-11 at 124. That same
day, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera brought another medical
certificate, prepared by Dr. Gómez, to the HGMA Human
Resources Office. DSUMF at ¶ 71; Docket No. 49-9 ¶ 10. The
medical certificate included Dr. Gómez’s recommendation
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that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera should not be assigned
consecutive night shifts due to her mental health condition.
Id. The medical certificate contained a major depressive
affective disorder diagnosis code. 19 PSAMF at ¶ 33; Docket
No. 49-1 ¶ 32; Docket No. 58-2 at 666.
7. Meetings between Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera and HGMA
Personnel
On October 24, 2016, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera met with
López and Teresa Colón (“Colón”), Director of HGMA’s
Human Resources Department, to discuss her relationship
with Lasanta and her medical certificate. See DSUMF at ¶¶ 72,
75; Docket 49-10 at 27-29; Docket No. 49-7 at 98. In the
meeting, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera was offered working shifts
in the emergency room and labor department. DSUMF at ¶
72; Docket 49-10 at 29. But she refused to be transferred and
Defendant HGMA states that the diagnostic code for: major depressive
affective disorder, recurrent episode, moderate, at the time it received the
medical certificate, was improperly listed as 296.32, when it should have
been F.33.1. Docket No. 64 at ¶ 33; see also Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 32. The
meaning and appropriate interpretation of the diagnostic code 296.32 is in
dispute. However, establishing such fact is not material to the controversy
at hand.
19
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informed Colón and López that she would like to stay at the
Intermediate Unit albeit the situation with Lasanta. DSUMF
at ¶ 73; Docket No. 49-9 ¶ 10; Docket No. 49-7 at 84-86.
At the meeting, while discussing the medical certificate
dated October 13, 2016, which was prepared by Dr. Gómez,
Colón and López explained to Plaintiff that they could not
follow Dr. Gómez’s recommendation of not having her work
consecutive night shifts. DSUMF at ¶¶ 75, 77; Docket No. 497 at 98, 100. Specifically, Colón and López highlighted
HGMA’s policy requiring all nurses assigned to the
Intermediate Unit to work one weekend per month
consecutive night shifts. DSUMF at ¶ 74; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶
10. López and Colón also informed Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
that her absenteeism was causing problems to the
Intermediate Unit nurses’ schedules as they had to be
covering for her. DSUMF at ¶ 76; Docket No. 49-7 at 98-99.
Moreover, López and Colón stated that, in the event that
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera needed to visit the HGMA employee
clinic while on a shift, she had to notify her supervisor in
order for her patients to be assigned to other nurses. DSUMF
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at ¶ 79; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 10.
On November 3, 2016, Colón scheduled a meeting which
was attended by Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera and Lasanta.
DSUMF at ¶ 80; Docket No. 49-7 at 86. The purpose of the
meeting was for Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera and Lasanta to
resolve their differences. DSUMF at ¶ 80; Docket No. 49-7 at
87. At the meeting, Lasanta affirmed that her role at the
Intermediate Unit was that of a supervisor; thus, it was her
duty to ensure that all nurses comply with their
responsibilities. DSUMF at ¶ 81; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 12(c).
Lasanta confirmed that she had no problem with Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera and that they could start their relationship
anew. DSUMF at ¶ 81; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 12(c). According
to Lasanta, all she wanted was an excellent nursing team.
DSUMF at ¶ 81; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 12(c). Plaintiff SantiagoRivera replied that she wanted to continue working at the
Intermediate Unit. DSUMF at ¶ 81; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 12(c).
During an appointment that took place on November 29,
2016, Dr. Gómez understood that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
could not work under stress after she informed him that there
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was a lot of stress in her workplace and she preferred to work
in a more relaxed area. DSUMF at ¶ 115-116 20; Docket No. 4911 at 131. Dr. Gómez therefore recommended that Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera not work under stress and not work
consecutive night shifts. DSUMF at ¶ 117 21; Docket No. 49-11
at 142. During his deposition, Dr. Gómez stated that, if
HGMA did not comply with his recommendations regarding
the reasonable accommodation, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
could not work there. DSUMF at ¶ 11822; Docket No. 49-11 at
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera denied DSUMFs at ¶¶ 115-116. See Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMF at ¶¶ 115-116. In doing so, she
relied on her deposition testimony whereby she represented that, at the
time of her termination, she was able to perform the essential functions of
her position and was on equal footing with her fellow nurses. Id.
Nevertheless, these denials do not controvert Defendant HGMA’s
proposed facts at DSUMF at ¶¶ 115-116. Here, the proposed DSUMFs at
¶¶ 115-116 drive at what Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera informed Dr. Gómez
and his impressions and recommendations regarding said information.
20
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera denied DSUMF at ¶ 117. See Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s Opposition to DSUMF at ¶ 117. In her denial, Plaintiff SantiagoRivera stresses that Dr. Gómez’s recommendations were just that,
recommendations. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera argues that
during his deposition, Dr. Gómez did not state that she could not or was
not able to work. Id. These denials do not controvert the proposed fact at
DSUMF at ¶ 117.
21
22
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera denied DSUMF at ¶ 118. See Plaintiff Santiago-
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142. That same day, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera provided Colón
with another medical certificate prepared by Dr. Gómez,
stating that she was being treated for severe major depression.
DSUMF at ¶ 82; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 11; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶
35. Dr. Gómez’s medical certificate recommended that
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera not work under stress and that she
should not be assigned consecutive night shifts. DSUMF at ¶
Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMF at ¶ 118. She avers that during his
deposition testimony, Dr. Gómez did not state that she could not or was
not able to work. Id. A look at Dr. Gómez testimony reveals that he was
asked whether the recommendation for reasonable accommodation
entailed that she could not work at all. See Docket No. 58-9 at 143 (lines 1024). Dr. Gómez clarified that the recommendation did not entail that she
could not work at all. Id. at 143 (lines 24-25) and 144 (lines 1-3). Dr.
Gómez’s deposition testimony—as relied upon by Plaintiff SantiagoRivera—does not controvert the deposition testimony relied upon by
Defendant HGMA in support of its DSUMF ¶ 118, see Docket No. 49-11 at
142 (lines 19-25), inasmuch as there, when asked if his recommendations
entailed that if Defendant HGMA did not provide a stress free area and
continued to require Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera to do consecutive night
shifts, she could not work at HGMA, Dr. Gómez acknowledged that those
had in fact been his recommendations. While cumbersome to distinguish,
Dr. Gómez’s deposition testimony as relied upon by Defendant HGMA
shows that the circumstances under which Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera could
not work were limited an not all encompassing as an assertion such as
“could not work at all” would entail. The Court does not find Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s denial to be responsive to the proposed fact at DSUMF
at ¶ 118. The same is therefore admitted.
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82; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 11; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 35. This was
the first medical certificate which stated that Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera could not work under stress. DSUMF at ¶ 83;
Docket No. 49-7 at 94.
On December 1, 2016, Colón and López met with Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera to discuss the medical certificate dated
November 29, 2016. DSUMF at ¶ 85; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 11.
They clarified that HGMA did not have a nurse position that
met Dr. Gómez’s recommendations, that is, a nurse position
that did not entail being exposed to stress and that did not
require consecutive night shifts. DSUMF at ¶ 85; Docket No.
49-9 at ¶ 11.
At the meeting, Colón gave Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera a
letter addressed to Dr. Gómez noting that there were no job
positions at the nursing department with low stress or that
did not require consecutive night shifts once per month.
DSUMF at ¶ 86; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 11. Plaintiff SantiagoRivera was asked, in view of Dr. Gómez’s diagnosis of major
severe depression, to submit a medical certificate stating that
she was capable of working as a nurse. See DSUMF at ¶ 88-89;
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Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 11. Defendant HGMA required the
medical certificate to ensure that there was no risk to the
patient’s health and safety. DSUMF at ¶ 88; Docket No. 49-9
at ¶ 11.
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera agreed to obtain the medical
certificate. DSUMF at ¶ 91 23; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 11.
However, she did not return to work after December 1, 2016,
and she did not provide the medical certificate to justify her
absences. DSUMF at ¶ 92; Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 11. Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera admits that she could not have worked
without the reasonable accommodation contained in Dr.
Gómez’s medical certificate dated November 29, 2016.
DSUMF at ¶ 100; Docket No. 49-7 at 108-109. 24 On December
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera attempts to dispute the instant proposed fact
with a sworn statement signed by her. See Docket No. 58-1 at ¶ 4. Her
sworn statement states that she did not agree to deliver the medical
certificate to her psychiatrist. Id. She also cites to her deposition in support
of her denial, however, the deposition testimony cited to is not responsive
to the proposed fact at DSUMF ¶ 91. And since the Court has already
stricken Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s sworn statement from the record, it
admits Defendant HGMA’s proposed fact at DSUMF ¶ 91.
23
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera attempts to dispute the fact that she could not
perform the essential functions of her job without reasonable
24
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19, 2016, Defendant HGMA sent a letter to Plaintiff SantiagoRivera terminating her employment because she had not
complied with the hospital’s request. See DSUMF at ¶ 96;
Docket No. 49-1 at ¶ 43; Docket No. 52-1 at 776.
IV. Analysis
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff SantiagoRivera alleges that Defendant HGMA discriminated against
her on account of her disability, in violation of the ADA, by
allowing Lasanta to harass her; failing to provide reasonable
accommodation; suspending her and ultimately terminating
her employment. Docket No. 26 at 11-14. She also alleges
analogous claims under Puerto Rico Law. Id. The Court will
first discuss whether Defendant HGMA is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s ADA
claims and then on the Puerto Rico law claims.
accommodation. See Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s Opposition to DSUMFs at
¶ 100. Nonetheless, the Court will deem admitted Defendant HGMA’s
proposed fact at DSUMF at ¶ 100 because Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s
denial is written in a lengthy argumentative style and is not responsive to
the proposed fact.
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1. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s ADA Claims
a. Disability Discrimination
“The
ADA
prohibits
covered
employers
from
discriminating against a qualified individual with a
disability.” Colón-Fontánez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d
17, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). Disability
discrimination cases pursuant to the ADA are analyzed under
what has become known as the McDonnell Douglas 25 burdenshifting framework. See Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696
F.3d 78, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2012). As part of this framework, a
plaintiff is first tasked with satisfying a three-prong prima facie
case. Id. at 86. Specifically, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera is
required to prove that she “(1) is disabled within the meaning
of the ADA; (2) is qualified to perform the position’s essential
functions
of
[her]
job
with
or
without
reasonable
accommodation; and (3) was discharged or otherwise
adversely affected in whole or in part because of her
disability.” Id. at 87. If Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera satisfies all
25
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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three prongs required to set forth a prima facie disability
discrimination case, the burden then shifts to Defendant
HGMA to “articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for its employment decision and to produce credible evidence
to show that the reason advanced was the real reason.” Tobin
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2005). And if
Defendant HGMA succeeds at articulating such a reason and
proffers the required evidence, the burden shifts back to
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera to proffer evidence showing that
Defendant HGMA’s “non-discriminatory justification is mere
pretext, cloaking discriminatory animus.” Id.
Defendant HGMA does not dispute that Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera satisfies the first requirement of the prima
facie case under the ADA. Docket No. 48 at 7; see 42 U.S.C §
12102(1)(A). However, Defendant HGMA does argue that
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera does not satisfy the second
requirement, to wit, that she is a qualified individual under
the ADA. Docket No. 48 at 9. Specifically, Defendant HGMA
alleges that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera cannot perform the
essential functions of her job because she cannot work under
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stress or comply with HGMA’s requirement that she take on
consecutive night shifts at least once per month. Id.
The Court first notes that “[t]he qualified individual
criterion and the reasonable accommodation requirement are
interrelated.” Jones, 696 F.3d at 88 (citing H. Perritt, Jr.,
Americans With Disabilities Act Handbook § 4.18 at 124 (3d ed.
1997) (quotation marks omitted). The ADA defines a qualified
individual as “an individual who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). To prove that she is a qualified
individual under the ADA, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera bears the
burden of showing “(1) that she possesses the requisite skill,
experience, education and other job-related requirements for
the position; and (2) that she is able to perform the essential
functions of the position with or without reasonable
accommodation.” Echevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceutical LP,
856 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Mulloy v. Acushnet Co.,
460 F.3d 141, 147 (1st Cir. 2006)) (quotation marks omitted).
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The parties do not argue that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
meets the first prong of the qualified individual test. But to be
sure, the Court clarifies that it is undisputed that Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera possessed the requisite skill, experience, and
education required to be a nurse at the Intermediate Unit. The
record shows that during her tenure as a nurse at HGMA,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera met or exceeded her yearly
evaluations prepared by her previous supervisor and
Lasanta. See DSUMF at ¶¶ 37-38, 43; Docket No. 49-2 147-148,
150, 153-156.
Since Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera satisfies the first prong, the
Court turns to the second prong of the qualified individual
test, namely, whether Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera could perform
the essential job function required of her position with or
without reasonable accommodation. The Court will first
address the essential functions of Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s
nurse position at the Intermediate Unit and then whether she
could perform her job’s essential function with or without
reasonable accommodation.
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i. Essential functions
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera argues that working under stress
and working consecutive night shifts are not essential
functions of her job as a nurse at the Intermediate Unit.
Docket No. 58 at 19. She stresses that the correct interpretation
of the Intermediate Unit’s job description is that she could be
exposed to tense situations. Id. Regarding the night shifts,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera contends that the job description
does not require a nurse to work consecutive night shifts. Id.
An essential function under the ADA “is a fundamental
job duty of the position at issue.” Jones, 696 F.3d at 87 (1st Cir.
2012) (citing Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2001))
(quotation marks omitted). It is worth noting that, “[t]he term
does not include marginal tasks but may encompass
individual or idiosyncratic characteristics of the job.” Id. To
determine if a function is essential, a court may consider the
employer’s judgment, and the position’s written job
description. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (stating that
consideration shall be given to an employer’s judgment as to
what functions of the job are essential). Also, this Court must
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give a significant degree of deference to, Defendant HMGA’s
business judgment as to the job’s requirements. See Jones, 696
F.3d at 87 (citing Jones v. Walgreen Co., 679 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.
2012)).
Here, it is clear that working under stress is a fundamental
job duty of a nurse in the Intermediate Unit. It is undisputed
that the written job description for the nurse position at the
Intermediate Unit expressly noted that Plaintiff SantiagoRivera would be exposed to tense situations. DSUMF at ¶ 29;
see also Jones, 696 F.3d at 87 (stating that a factor to be
considered in determining an essential function is the
position’s written job description).
Furthermore, a nurse at the Intermediate Unit is required
to take close care of his or her patients. See DSUMF at ¶ 30;
Docket No. 49-2 at 95. At any given moment, a patient could
suffer a health emergency that a nurse would have to be
preprepared to attend. Such an emergency could be to
provide cardiac resuscitation to a patient. See DSUMF at ¶ 30;
Docket No. 49-2 at 98. An unannounced medical emergency,
such as cardiac resuscitation, necessarily entails working
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under stress. Thus, since a nurse’s duty at the Intermediate
Unit required a nurse to perform certain indispensable tasks
under pressure, the Court rules that working under tense
situations is an essential function of the position.
Similarly, here, working consecutive night shifts once per
month is also a fundamental job duty of a nurse at the
Intermediate Unit. It is important to mention that the
requirement to work consecutive night shifts is not explicitly
noted as a job requirement on the Intermediate Unit’s written
job description. DSUMF at ¶ 35; Docket No. 52-1 at 37.
However, the written job description does state that
employees need to work both day and night shifts as required
by the department. Docket No. 52-1 at 37. Thus, it is to be
expected that Defendant HGMA could adopt a policy for its
nurses at the Intermediate Unit requiring them to work
consecutive night shift. See Docket No. 49-9 at ¶ 10.
Also, Defendant HGMA asserts that it needs to require its
Intermediate Unit’s nurses to work consecutive night shifts
because it is essential for the proper administration of the
shifts and schedules, and to ensure equal work distribution
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between the nurses. Docket No. 48 at 10. The Court agrees
with Defendant HGMA. A twenty-four-hour hospital, such as
HGMA, needs to make sure that it has enough nurses for all
the shifts at all medical units at all times. Notably, a hospital
needs to ensure that it has enough nurses to cover all shifts,
including night shifts. See Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d
52, 59 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that a twenty-four-hour hospital
deserves deference in its decision to require nurses to work
under shift rotation).
Here, the Court has not been swayed to second guess
Defendant HGMA’s business strategy whereby it requires its
nurses to work consecutive night shifts. Mulloy v. Acushnet
Co., 460 F.3d 141, 147-148 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that a court’s
inquiry into an essential function is not to second guess an
employer’s business judgment); Laurin, 150 F.3d at 59. On the
contrary, it is tasked with awarding a great degree of
deference to Defendant HGMA’s business judgment. See
Jones, 696 F.3d at 87; see also Ward v. Massachusetts Health
Research, 209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2000) (“we generally give
substantial weight to the employer’s view of job requirements
SANTIAGO-RIVERA v. HOSPITAL GENERAL
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in the absence of evidence of discriminatory animus.”). Hence
the Court holds that, the ability to work consecutive night
shifts once a month is an essential function of the nurse
position at the Intermediate Unit.
ii. Reasonable accommodation
Having held that working under stress and that
consecutive night shifts once per month are part of an
Intermediate Unit nurse’s essential functions; the Court must
now determine if Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera could perform the
essential functions of her job with or without reasonable
accommodation. The Court will first address whether
Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera
could
perform
the
essential
functions without reasonable accommodation.
As part of her efforts to state that she could work without
reasonable accommodation, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera first
argues that a medical certificate stating that she was able to
carry out her duties as a nurse at the Intermediate Unit was
not necessary for her to comply with her job requirements.
Docket No. 58 at 19. She also states that Dr. Gómez did not
certify that she was not capable of working at the
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Intermediate Unit. Id. at 19-20. And she also argues that she
could have performed the essential functions of her job
without reasonable accommodation, as she had performed
her duties prior to her discharge and while already having
been diagnosed with major depressive disorder. Id. at 20.
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s arguments are unavailing.
First, under the ADA, an employer such as Defendant can
require an employee to undergo a medical examination if it
shows that the inquiry is “job-related and consistent with a
business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A); see also LópezLópez v. Robinson School, 958 F.3d 96, 105 (1st Cir. 2020) (“This
court has held that an employer may be justified in requiring
a medical examination of a current employee so long as it is
shown to be ‘job-related and consistent with business
necessity.’”). Here, HGMA’s petition for Plaintiff SantiagoRivera to undergo a medical examination is job-related and
consistent with a business necessity. Defendant HGMA
needed to know whether Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera could
continue working as a nurse, for in view of Dr. Gómez’s
recommendation, she should not be exposed to stressful
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environments such as the one that she is exposed to as a nurse.
It was reasonable for Defendant HGMA to have understood
that if Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera did not return with a medical
certificate, it meant that she could not work under stress and
could not complete consecutive night shifts at least once per
month.
Second, it is undisputed that Dr. Gómez clarified in his
deposition that, if HGMA did not comply with his reasonable
accommodation recommendation, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
could not work there. DSUMF at ¶ 118; Docket No. 49-11 at
142. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera also admitted this fact in her
deposition. DSUMF at ¶ 100; Docket No. 49-7 at 108109. Thus, in light of these undisputed facts, the Court rules
that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera could not perform either of
these
two
essential
functions
without
reasonable
accommodation.
The Court now turns to whether Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
could perform the essential functions with reasonable
accommodation. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera bears the “burden
of showing the existence of reasonable accommodation.”
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Echevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceutical LP, 856 F.3d 119, 127
(1st Cir. 2017). To comply with that burden, she must first
show that the proposed accommodation would enable her to
perform the essential functions of her job. See id. Second,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera is also tasked with showing that the
reasonable accommodation is feasible for the employer under
the circumstances. See id.
This Court has already ruled that being exposed to tense
situations and working consecutive night shifts at least once
per month are essential functions of a nurse at the
Intermediate Unit at HGMA. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s
petition for reasonable accommodation entails that she would
not be performing two essential functions required by her job.
Under these conditions, Defendant HGMA did not need to
accommodate Santiago-Rivera because employers are not
required to accommodate an employee “by foregoing an
‘essential function’ of the employment position.” See Laurin,
150 F.3d at 56. Having determined that Plaintiff SantiagoRivera does not satisfy the first prong of this test, the Court
need not delve into whether it was feasible for Defendant
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HGMA to implement and comply with the reasonable
accommodation that was recommended by Dr. Gómez.
In sum, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera failed to establish a prima
facie disability discrimination case. Therefore, the Court need
not continue with the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
analysis. Here, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera specifically failed to
satisfy the second prong of the prima facie disability
discrimination test, namely, that she is a qualified individual
under the ADA. Accordingly, the Court need not consider the
third prong of the prima facie disability discrimination test, to
wit, whether Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera was discharged or
otherwise adversely affected in whole or in part because of
her disability, and may therefore summarily dismiss Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera’s disability discrimination claims under the
ADA. See Caez-Fermaint v. State Ins. Fund Corp., 286 F. Supp.
3d 302, 311 (D.P.R. 2017) (explaining that “[a] plaintiff’s
failure to meet any of the three prima facie elements is
dispositive of the entire claim.”).
b. Reasonable Accommodation Claim
Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera
included
a
failure
to
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accommodate under the ADA claim in her Second Amended
Complaint. See Docket No. 26. Defendant HGMA’s Motion
for Summary Judgment also moved for Plaintiff SantiagoRivera’s claim that HGMA failed to accommodate her under
the ADA be summarily dismissed. See Docket No. 48 at 7-14,
19-23.
In order to succeed on a failure to accommodate claim,
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera should have furnished “evidence
that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; that
she was a qualified individual; and that her employer knew
about her disability yet neglected to accommodate it.” See
Trahan v. Mayfair Maine, LLC, 957 F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2020).
For the same reasons iterated above in this Court’s discussion
regarding reasonable accommodation, the Court finds that
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera has failed to set forth a failure to
accommodate under the ADA claim.
c. Disability
Harassment
Environment Claim
–
Hostile
Work
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The Court next turns to Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s
disability harassment claim. Defendant HGMA claims that
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s disability harassment claim should
be summarily dismissed because she is not a qualified
individual under the ADA. Docket No. 48 at 24. And because
the record does not contain evidence establishing that
Lasanta’s alleged harassment towards Plaintiff SantiagoRivera was based on her disability, as she was not aware of
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s disability. Id. at 24-25.
The First Circuit has yet to decide whether a hostile work
environment claim exists under the ADA. 26 It has, however,
held that the caselaw construing the ADA is generally
applicable to the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
(“Rehabilitation Act”), as both statutes share similar liability
standards. Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2006). Thus, given that both statutes are similar, and that the
The First Circuit in Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 5 n.1 (1st Cir.
2006), assumed for the purpose of that case that disability harassment was
a viable theory of recovery under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
There, the First Circuit also noted that this theory of recovery has been
accepted by other Circuits. Id.
26
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First Circuit has held that both statutes are analogous, the
Court will adopt the Rehabilitation Act’s hostile work
environment test to the ADA. See id.
Accordingly, Santiago-Rivera has to prove that: (1) she
was disabled under the ADA, “(2) she was subjected to
uninvited harassment, (3) her employer’s conduct was based
on her disability, (4) the conduct was so severe or pervasive
that it altered the conditions of her work and created an
abusive work environment, and (5) the harassment was
objectively and subjectively offensive.” See McDonough v.
Donahoe, 673 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating the hostile
work environment claim test under the Rehabilitation Act).
As explained earlier, it is uncontested that Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera is disabled under the ADA. However, even if
the Court assumes that Santiago-Rivera meets the second
requirement—that she suffered from uninvited harassment—
her claim fails against Lasanta at the third requirement
because the purported harassment was not based on her
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disability. 27 The undisputed facts show that the alleged
harassment by Lasanta does not present any signs of having
been based on her disability. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera has not
shown that when Lasanta allegedly ignored her, hid some IV
serums, accused her of talking ill about her, opted to socialize
more with other coworkers, and
reiterated her daily
functions at the Intermediate Unit, such actions were based
on her disability. See DSUMF at ¶ 46.
Further, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera does not point to any
evidence establishing that Lasanta knew about her depressive
disorder while she was her supervisor. It is also undisputed
that HGMA administrative personnel did not have access to
the medical files at the employee clinic or CIMA, for the
record establishes that both institutions are separate from
HGMA. See DSUMF at ¶¶ 2-3. In that same vein, Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera has not shown that Lasanta had access to her
See Marini v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 64 F. Supp.3d 317, 326 (D. Conn.
2014) (acknowledging that “[a] hostile work environment claim requires
more than just a hostile work environment—it requires proof that hostile
acts were based on plaintiff's protected status (e.g., his disability), rather
than other reasons.”).
27
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medical files either. Likewise, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera has
not offered evidence establishing that Lasanta had access to
her HGMA personnel file at the Human Resources
Department, which contained medical certificates with
diagnostic codes of her disability.
Similarly, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera has not shown that
Defendant HGMA’s managerial staff, Colón and López,
harassed her because of her disability when she worked at
HGMA. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera claims that Colón and
López harassed her because they falsely accused her of
abandoning her work, and of threatening to assault Lasanta.
Docket No. 58 at 30-31. She also asserts that Lasanta, Colón,
and López harassed her because they routinely summoned
her with unfounded accusations. Id. at 31. Plaintiff SantiagoRivera also alleges that she lost money because she was not
assigned some workdays she claims she deserved. Id.
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s harassment claims against
Colón and López fail for three reasons. First, Plaintiff
Santiago-Rivera uses as evidence her Second Amended
Complaint to support the vast majority of the aforementioned
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allegations. See Docket No. 58 at 30-31. But the Court has
already noted that, here, the Second Amended Complaint
cannot be used to contest or establish facts for it is unverified.
Second, it is undisputed that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera
abandoned her workplace on October 3, 2016. See DSUMF at
¶ 68; Docket No. 49-1 at ¶¶ 26-28. And third, although
Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s deposition states that Colón and
López falsely accused her of threatening to assault Lasanta,
and that Defendant HGMA did not assign her certain days
that she claims she should have been assigned, see Docket No.
58 at 31, such conduct does not rise to the levels of severity or
pervasiveness necessary to establish disability harassment.
See Colón-Fontánez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 4345 (1st Cir. 2011) (dismissing an employee’s harassment claim
because the alleged acts did not rise to the necessary levels of
severeness
and
pervasiveness).
This
conduct
entails
offhanded comments, or what appear to be isolated incidents,
which do not amount to a hostile or abusive work
environment. See id.
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In short, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera has failed to establish
her disability harassment claim under the ADA. Therefore,
her disability harassment claim is also summarily dismissed.
2. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s State Law Claims
The Court will decline to exercise supplementary
jurisdiction over Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera’s state law claims,
given that her ADA claims do not survive summary
judgment.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant HGMA’s Motion
for Summary Judgment at Docket Number 48 is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 27th day of April 2021.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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