Gonzalez Berrios v. Mennonite General Hospital, Inc.

Filing 112

OPINION AND ORDER denying 55 Motion to Stay and/or Abstention of Supplemental Jurisdiction Claims. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 12/11/2019. (dv)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ANGÉLICA M. GONZÁLEZ BERRIOS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL NO. 18-1146 (RAM)

MENNONITE GENERAL HOSPITAL,
INC., et al.,
Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, District Judge
Pending before the Court is co-defendant Mennonite General
Hospital, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “the Hospital”) Motion Requesting
Stay

and/or

Abstention

of

Supplemental

Jurisdiction

Claims.

(Docket No. 55). Essentially, Defendant requests that this Court
abstain from considering the medical malpractice claims against
the Hospital pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine
because

Plaintiff

Angélica

González-Berrios

is

currently

litigating identical claims and allegations in a pending state
court claim. Id. ¶ 11.
In response, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Motion to Stay
Filed at Docket No. 55. (Docket No. 56). Plaintiff contends that
the request is untimely and that none of the Colorado River factors
are met. Id. at 1, 11. Moreover, while Plaintiff concedes that she
is litigating medical malpractice claims against the Hospital’s

Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

2

physicians in state court, she asserts that only her mother, who
is not a party in the present case, filed claims against the
Hospital in state court. Id. ¶¶ 4-7.
It is well established that the existence of a pending,
parallel action “in the state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning

the

same

matter

in

the

Federal

court

having

jurisdiction.” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910). See
e.g. Bacardi Int'l Ltd. v. V. Suarez & Co., 719 F.3d 1, 14 (1st
Cir. 2013) (holding that parallel litigation in state court is not
uncommon and will not in and of itself merit a stay in federal
court); Jimenez v. Rodriguez-Pagan, 597 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir.
2010)(citation omitted) (“Concurrent federal-state jurisdiction
over the same controversy does not generally lessen the federal
courts'

‘virtually

unflagging

obligation

...

to

exercise

the

jurisdiction given them.’”)
However, as an exception to this rule, in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. U.S., the United States Supreme Court
established that in exceptional cases, “the pendency of a similar
action in state court may merit federal abstention based on
‘considerations of wise judicial administration’

that counsel

against duplicative lawsuits.” Jimenez v. Rodriguez-Pagan, 597
F.3d at 27

(quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Regarding Colorado River,

Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

3

the First Circuit has cautioned that “[o]f all the abstention
doctrines, it is to be approached with the most caution.”
When determining if the Colorado River abstention doctrine
applies

to

a

case,

courts

must

conduct

the

“exceptional-

circumstances test”. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). Said test asks that a Court
entertaining the case consider the following eight (8) factors:
(1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over
a res; (2) the [geographical] inconvenience of the
federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding
piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the
forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether state or
federal law controls; (6) the adequacy of the state
forum to protect the parties' interests; (7) the
vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim;
and (8) respect for the principles underlying removal
jurisdiction.
Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 71–72 (1st
Cir. 2005). It is worth noting that “[n]o one factor is necessarily
determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into account
both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination
of factors counseling against that exercise is required.” Colo.
River, 424 U.S. at 818–19.
Of these factors, the Hospital only highlights two (2) as
support for abstention. First, Defendant contends that because
Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims are governed by state law,
“there is no reason to conclude that the state forum would not
adequately protect the interests of the parties in this case.”

Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

4

(Docket No. 55 at 8). Second, Defendant argues that abstention
would help avoid piecemeal litigation. Id. Neither of these factors
amount to exceptional conditions that warrant abstention pursuant
to Colorado River. Specifically, the First Circuit has held that
the adequacy of the state forum “does not militate in favor of
abstention” and is only relevant or important “when it disfavors
abstention”. United States v. Fairway Capital Corp., 483 F.3d 34,
43 (1st Cir. 2007). Additionally, Defendants are aware that it is
Plaintiff’s mother, not Plaintiff herself, who has claims against
the Hospital in state court. (Docket No. 55 ¶ 4(c)). Therefore,
there

is

no

risk

of

piecemeal

litigation

with

regards

to

Plaintiff’s claims against the Hospital.
Although they were not raised by Defendant, a careful analysis
of the remaining six (6) factors of the exceptional-circumstances
test also shows that this is not a special case in which the
limited conditions of the Colorado River abstention doctrine are
met.
In closing, it bears mentioning that in EMTALA lawsuits, such
as this one, where the federal court has supplemental jurisdiction
over

state

medical

malpractice

claims,

other

judges

in

this

District have repeatedly declined to abstain from said state law
claims despite the existence of an analogous malpractice suit
pending in state court. See Martinez-Rosado v. Instituto Medico
Del Norte, 145 F. Supp. 2d 164, 169-170 (D.P.R. 2001) (holding

Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

5

that a federal suit containing EMTALA and malpractice claims and
a state medical malpractice suit are not parallel proceedings
because they “do not allege substantially similar claims.”); see
also Morales-Ramos v. Hosp. Episcopal San Lucas Guayama, Inc., 261
F. Supp. 3d 122, 135-137 (D.P.R. 2016).
In light of the above Defendant’s Motion Requesting Stay
and/or Abstention of Supplemental Jurisdiction Claims at Docket
No. 55 is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 11th day of December 2019.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge