Gonzalez Berrios v. Mennonite General Hospital, Inc.

Filing 242

OPINION AND ORDER denying 209 Plaintiff's Motion in Compliance with Order to Show Cause. Judgment of dismissal without prejudice regarding the Third-Party Complaint against Triple-S at Docket No. 70 shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 3/10/2021. (mrr)

Case 3:18-cv-01146-RAM Document 242 Filed 03/10/21 Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ANGÉLICA M. GONZÁLEZ BERRIOS
Plaintiff
v.
MENNONITE GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC.,
et al.
Defendants
CIVIL NO. 18-1146 (RAM)
MENNONITE GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC.,
et. al.
Third Party Plaintiffs
v.
TRIPLE S PROPIEDAD, INC.
Third Party Defendant

OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, District Judge
I.
In

March

(“Plaintiff”

or

2018,

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff

“González-Berrios”)

Angélica
filed

the

González-Berrios
present

action

against Mennonite General Hospital (“MGH” or “the Hospital”),
Emergency Services Group, Inc. (“ESG”), and five (5) individual
doctors, as well as their spouses and conjugal partnerships, when
applicable. (Docket No. 4 ¶¶ 18, 24, 25, and 27). Plaintiff sought
damages for alleged medical malpractice invoking the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. §

Case 3:18-cv-01146-RAM Document 242 Filed 03/10/21 Page 2 of 8
Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

2

1395dd, and Puerto Rico’s general tort statute, Article 1802 of
the Puerto Rico Civil Code. Id. ¶¶ 159, 169, 186, 199, 206, 215,
228,

and

239.

In

the

early

stages

of

litigation,

Plaintiff

voluntarily dismissed her claims against ESG (i.e. the entity that
operated

the

Hospital’s

emergency

room)

and

the

physicians.

(Docket Nos. 14 and 21).
Meanwhile, MGH filed an Amended Third-Party Complaint against
ESG and Triple-S Propiedad, Inc. (“Triple-S”), in its capacity as
ESG’s insurer. (Docket No. 70).1 The Hospital posits therein that
it is “entitled to recover from ESG or Triple S, as insurer for
ESG, any amount of money that MGH may be obliged to pay plaintiffs
for their alleged negligence malpractice[.]” Id. ¶ 37.
On February 4, 2020, after extensive settlement negotiations,
Plaintiff reached a confidential settlement agreement with MGH
before jury selection had commenced. (Docket No. 169). GonzálezBerrios and MGH subsequently filed a Joint Motion for Dismissal
with Prejudice which was promptly granted by the Court. (Docket
Nos. 177 and 179). Accordingly, all federal law claims in the case
at bar have since been dismissed.
However, pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement,
MGH assigned and transferred to Plaintiff:

1

Throughout this litigation, ESG has been in bankruptcy. (Docket No. 104). It
is worth noting that the Hospital also filed Third-Party Complaints against
other entities that are no longer parties in the litigation. (Docket Nos. 16
and 18).

Case 3:18-cv-01146-RAM Document 242 Filed 03/10/21 Page 3 of 8
Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

3

[A]ll rights over all the claims asserted
against Emergency Services Group, Inc. and
Triple S Propiedad, Inc. as their insurer in
[…] the Amended Third Party Complaint (Docket
#70), as well as those similarly filed in the
state court proceedings currently pending
against those same third-party defendants in
María Angelica Berrios Rodríguez v. Hospital
General Menonita, Inc, et. al., Civil Number
EDP2017-0263 (704).
[…]
Thus, with this assignment, all appearing
parties recognize that Plaintiff has the
exclusive right to pursue the actions asserted
by MGH against Emergency Services Group, Inc.
and Triple S Propiedad, Inc, and, if the time
comes to request payment or collect any and
all amounts, it could be done directly between
Plaintiff and Emergency Services Group, Inc.
and Triple S Propiedad, Inc.
(Docket No. 176 ¶¶ 1, 3). The assigned and transferred state law
claims which were made in MGH’s Third-Party Complaint against
Triple-S are the only claims remaining before this Court. (Docket
Nos. 70, 185 and 191)
Thus, the Court ordered the parties to “show cause as to why
the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” (Docket No. 187). Plaintiff filed a Motion in
Compliance with Order to Show Cause (Docket No. 209) and Triple-S
filed a response in opposition (Docket No. 221) to which Plaintiff
subsequently replied (Docket No. 229).
No trial date is currently scheduled due to the Covid-19
pandemic.

Case 3:18-cv-01146-RAM Document 242 Filed 03/10/21 Page 4 of 8
Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

4
II.

A

District

Court

“may

APPLICABLE LAW
decline

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim” if the court “has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
In

federal-question

cases,

the

dismissal

of

a

“foundational

federal claim” does not automatically “deprive a federal court of
authority

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction

over

pendent

state-law claims. Instead, such a dismissal ‘sets the stage for an
exercise’

of

the

district

court's

broad

discretion.”

Sexual

Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 899 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2018)
(quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249,
256-57 (1st Cir. 1996)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added). When exercising said broad and “informed discretion[,]”
courts should engage in a “pragmatic and case-specific” analysis.
Roche, 81 F. 3d, 256-57. While “[n]o categorical rule governs the
analysis; a court must weigh concerns of comity, judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness.” Redondo Const. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662
F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2011).
Notably, the First Circuit has cautioned that “when all
federal claims have been dismissed, it is an abuse of discretion
for a district court to retain jurisdiction over the remaining
pendent state law claims unless doing so would serve the interests
of fairness, judicial economy, convenience, and comity.” Zell v.
Ricci, 957 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Wilber v. Curtis,

Case 3:18-cv-01146-RAM Document 242 Filed 03/10/21 Page 5 of 8
Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

5

872 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2017)) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis added). See also Carnegie–Mellon University v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988) (“in the usual case in which all
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of
factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.”).
III. DISCUSSION
All of Plaintiff’s personal claims, including those under
EMTALA,

have

been

dismissed

pursuant

to

her

confidential

settlement agreement with MGH. (Docket Nos. 177 and 179). Thus,
the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The sole remaining causes
of action are MGH’s Puerto Rico law claims against third-party
defendant Triple-S, which pursuant to said settlement agreement,
have since been transferred and assigned to Plaintiff. (Docket
Nos. 176 and 185). After conducting the pragmatic and case-specific
analysis required by First Circuit case law, the Court concludes
that it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to
the pending state law claims for reasons set below.
MGH unequivocally assigned and transferred to Plaintiff “all
rights over all claims” asserted against Triple-S both in the
Amended-Third Party Complaint before this Court “as well as those
similarly filed in the state court proceedings currently pending
against

those

same

third-party

defendants

in

María

Angelica

Case 3:18-cv-01146-RAM Document 242 Filed 03/10/21 Page 6 of 8
Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

6

Berrios Rodríguez v. Hospital General Menonita, Inc, et. al., Civil
Number EDP2017-0263 (704).” (Docket No. 176 ¶ 1).
Under the terms of the settlement agreement between Plaintiff
and MGH, and in light of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s Opinion
in Szendrey v. Hospicare, MGH’s proportionate share of liability
to Plaintiff has been released and thus MGH will not pay any
damages to Plaintiff in excess of its proportionate share if MGH
and Triple-S’ insured are found to be joint tortfeasors who
produced Plaintiff’s alleged damages. See Szendrey v. Hospicare,
158 D.P.R. 648 (2003). Accordingly, MGH should have no claim for
contribution against Triple-S. If Plaintiff has a novel legal
theory that sidesteps Szendrey’s impact on the assigned claims,
the task of evaluating it is best addressed by the Courts of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
González-Berrios has shown that her claims against three
physician-defendants

in

the

state

court

action,

i.e.

María

Angelica Berrios Rodríguez v. Hospital General Menonita, Inc, et.
al., Civil Number EDP2017-0263 (704), have been dismissed. (Docket
No. 213). This Court is not privy to the grounds for the dismissal
and cannot discern its legal implications for this federal lawsuit,
if any. Be that as it may, Plaintiff has neither accredited nor
alleged that she is no longer a plaintiff in said case. (Docket
No. 229 at 6). Consolidating all pending Puerto Rico law claims in
the state court proceeding would avoid inconsistent outcomes and

Case 3:18-cv-01146-RAM Document 242 Filed 03/10/21 Page 7 of 8
Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

7

unnecessary redundancy and would promote that any novel Puerto
Rico issues posed by MGH’s assignment of its claims against TripleS or the dismissal of the claims against its insured are resolved
by the Courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Although presumably conducted in English, discovery obtained
in the case at bar can be readily used in the Court of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as Rule 8.7 of the Puerto Rico Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that it is not necessary to translate
documents originally in English. See 32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V, R. 8.8.
Thus, there should be little to no need to redo any discovery that
has already been conducted in furtherance of this federal case.
This also militates against retaining jurisdiction.
The case has been pending for three years, but this fact in
and of itself is insufficient to warrant extending supplemental
jurisdiction. In Santana-Vargas v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico,
the First Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion

in

declining

to

exercise

continued

supplemental

jurisdiction despite the fact that the litigation “was well beyond
its nascent stages, having been pending for three years by the
time it was dismissed[,] […] discovery was complete, presumably
largely in English[,] [a]nd there is clearly some substantive
overlap between the federal and Commonwealth claims.” SantanaVargas v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 948 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir.
2020). Here, as in Santana-Vargas, there is no trial date set. In

Case 3:18-cv-01146-RAM Document 242 Filed 03/10/21 Page 8 of 8
Civil No. 18-1146 (RAM)

8

light of the settlement agreement and the nature of the remaining
litigation,

Triple-S

should

applicable

defenses,

have

both

the

opportunity

contractual

and

to

develop

otherwise.

The

particular procedural background of the case at bar, coupled with
the pending action before a Puerto Rico Court, favor declining
supplemental jurisdiction.
Lastly, any expense or inconvenience to Plaintiff caused from
redoing trial preparation will stem exclusively from her informed
decision to settle the federal claim with MGH, on what would have
been the first day of trial, rather from this Opinion and Order.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, and in an exercise of its discretion,
the Court hereby declines to extend supplemental jurisdiction to
the

remaining

Puerto

Rico

law

claims.

Plaintiff’s

Motion

in

Compliance with Order to Show Cause at Docket No. 209 is DENIED.
The

Court

shall

retain

jurisdiction

exclusively

over

the

confidential settlement agreement. (Docket No. 207).
Judgment of dismissal without prejudice regarding the ThirdParty Complaint against Triple-S at Docket No. 70 shall be entered
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 10th day of March 2021.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge