Scotiabank v. Halais-Borges

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 12 Motion to Remand. Scotiabank's motion for remand is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of federal jurisdiction, and is REMANDED to the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, San Juan Superior Division, case number K CD 2012-1782. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 10/22/2018. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
SCOTIABANK DE PUERTO RICO,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 18-1350 (FAB)

v.
ERIC SANTIAGO HALAIS-BORGES,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.
Plaintiff Scotiabank de Puerto Rico (“Scotiabank”) requests
that the Court remand this action to the Puerto Rico Court of First
Instance, San Juan Superior Division.

(Docket No. 12.)

For the

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Scotiabank’s motion to
remand.
I.

Background
On

May

7,

2018,

defendant

Eric

Santiago

Halais-Borges

(“Halais”) submitted a notice of removal, invoking the Court’s
federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331.
(Docket

No.

“Commonwealth
foreclosure
Plaintiff.”

1.)

The

Court
and

notice

Action

collection

of

removal

concerns
of

monies

a

states

suit

owed

by

for

that

the

mortgage

Defendant

to

Id. at p. 1 (citing Scotiabank v. Eric Santiago

Halais-Borges, Civil Case No. K CD 2012-1782).

Halais sets forth

Civil No. 18-1350 (FAB)
a

myriad

of

statutes. 1
Instance.
II.

2

affirmative

defenses

pursuant

to

eight

federal

Scotiabank moves for remand to the Court of First
(Docket No. 12.)

Applicable Law
Removal of an action to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C.

section

1441

(“section

1441”).

Section

1441

provides

that

defendants may remove to the appropriate federal district court
“any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a).

“The propriety of removal thus depends on whether the

case originally could have been filed in federal court.”

City of

Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997); see
also Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir.
2000)

(“In

order

to

invoke

the

district

court’s

removal

jurisdiction, a defendant must show that the district court has
original jurisdiction over the action.”).
in

the

district

court

exists

where

a

Original jurisdiction
federal

question

claim

“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

1

Halais alleges that Scotiabank violated the: (1) Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. sections 1601 et seq., (2) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12
U.S.C. sections 2600 et seq., (3) the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C.
sections 2801 et seq., (4) the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. section 1639, (5) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. sections
1691 et seq., (6) the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C.
section 1681 et seq., (7) the Homeowner’s Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. sections
4901-4910, and (8) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. sections
1692 et seq. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 1—2.)

Civil No. 18-1350 (FAB)

3

States” is raised in the plaintiff=s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
section 1331, or where there is complete diversity of citizenship
among the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332.

See Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005).
As the party seeking removal, Halais shoulders the burden of
demonstrating that removal is appropriate. See Fayard v. Northeast
Vehicle Servs., LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2008).
1441

is

“strictly

construed”

against

removal,

and

Section

any

doubt

regarding the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of
remand.

Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32

(2002); Rosselló-González v. Calderón-Serra, 398 F.3d 1, 11 (1st
Cir. 2004) (remanding action because “[r]ead as a whole, we cannot
say

that

this

complaint

Constitution.
Constitution

No
or

any

presents

explicit
other

a

claim

reference
federal

law

to
is

under
the

the

United

contained

Federal
States
in

the

complaint; instead, all references are to Puerto Rico state laws,
regulations, and the Commonwealth Constitution”).

“If at any time

before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction [over a removed case], the case shall
be remanded.”
Because

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
“[f]ederal

courts

are

courts

of

limited

jurisdiction,” the Court must “begin by ensuring that [it has]
jurisdiction to reach the questions presented.”

Hochendoner v.

Civil No. 18-1350 (FAB)

4

Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016); see McCulloch v.
Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) (“It is black-letter law that
a federal court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its
own subject matter jurisdiction.”).

In general, “[t]he presence

or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the
‘well-pleaded

complaint

rule,’

which

provides

that

federal

jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on
the

face

of

the

plaintiff=s

properly

pleaded

complaint.”

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see BIW
Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers
of Am., IAMAW Dist. Lodge 4, 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“The

gates

of

federal

question

jurisdiction

are

customarily

patrolled by a steely-eyed sentry - the ‘well-pleaded complaint
rule’ - which, in general, prohibits the exercise of federal
question jurisdiction if no federal claim appears within the four
corners of the complaint.”).
complaint

and

may

“avoid

reliance on state law.”

Scotiabank is the “master” of its
federal

jurisdiction

by

exclusive

Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392.

III. Discussion
Remand and dismissal are warranted because the Court lacks
federal jurisdiction.

Halais failed to attach the underlying

complaint to the notice of removal.
28 U.S.C. section 1446:

(Docket No. 1.)

Pursuant to

Civil No. 18-1350 (FAB)

5

A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil
action from a State Court shall file . . . . a notice of
removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain
statement of the grounds for removal, together with a
copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon
such defendant or defendants in such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (emphasis added).

Although Halais omitted the

complaint, he concedes that Scotiabank set forth only two causes
of action: mortgage foreclosure and collection of monies.
No. 1 at p. 1.)

(Docket

Both claims arise pursuant to Puerto Rico law.

See P.R. Laws Ann. tit 31, § 5171 (“A debtor is liable for the
fulfillment of his obligations with all his present and future
property.”); Scotiabank de Puerto Rico v. Residential Partners
S.E., 350 F. Supp. 2d 334, 337 (D.P.R. 2004) (Pieras, J.) (denying
motion to remove action based on collection of monies and mortgage
foreclosure pursuant to Puerto Rico law because an affirmative
defense arising from the federal Bank Holding Company act was
“insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction”).

The absence of

any federal claim on the face of the complaint is fatal to Halais’
attempt to remove this case to federal court.
The

federal

statutes

that

Halais

raises

in

defense

of

Scotiabank’s Puerto Rico law claims are insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on this Court.
state

law,

litigants

cannot

In actions premised exclusively on
invoke

federal

asserting defenses pursuant to federal law.

jurisdiction

by

Rosselló-González,

Civil No. 18-1350 (FAB)

6

398 F.3d at 10 (“The existence of a federal defense is not
sufficient for removal jurisdiction.”) (citing Franchise Tax. Bd.
v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (“[A]
federal court does not have original jurisdiction over a case in
which the complaint presents a state-law cause of action, but also
asserts . . . a federal defense the defendant may raise is not
sufficient to defeat the claim.”)); Ten Taxpayer Grp. v. Cape Wind
Assoc., 373 F.3d 183, 191 (1st Cir. 2004) (“It is hornbook law
that

a

federal

defense

does

not

confer

‘arising

under’

jurisdiction, regardless whether that defense is anticipated in
the plaintiff’s complaint.”).
Because Halais failed to establish the existence of federal
jurisdiction, the Court GRANTS Scotiabank’s motion for remand. 2
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Scotiabank’s motion for

remand is GRANTED.

This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for

2

Scotiabank argued that Halais filed the notice of appeal “six years after the
complaint was filed.” (Docket No. 12 at p. 2.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
1446:
The notice of removal shall be filed within 30 days after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy
of the original pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon
which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after
the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading
has the been filed in court and is not required to be served on the
defendant, whichever period is shorter.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The Court need not address whether Halais filed a timely
notice of removal, because this case is remanded on jurisdictional grounds.

Civil No. 18-1350 (FAB)

7

lack of federal jurisdiction, and is REMANDED to the Puerto Rico
Court of First Instance, San Juan Superior Division, case number
K CD 2012-1782.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 22, 2018.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE