Arana-Santiago v. Tapia-Maldonado et al

Filing 40

OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Silvia L. Carreno-Coll on 6/3/2021. (MCV)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

DR. LUIS S. ARANA-SANTIAGO,
Plaintiff,
v.
LUIS TAPIA-MALDONADO ET AL.,

CIV. NO.: 19-2128 (SCC)

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Dr. Luis S. Arana-Santiago brought this action
pursuant to the Court’s original jurisdiction against
Defendants Luis Tapia-Maldonado, José Heredia-Rodríguez.
Marisol Díaz-Ocasio and Vivian Vélez-Vera 1 for alleged
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (“§ 1985(3)”) and, pursuant to the Court’s
supplemental jurisdiction, violations of the Puerto Rico
Constitution and the Puerto Rico Civil Code. Pending before
the Court is Defendants Tapia, Heredia and Díaz’s Motion to

Plaintiff also originally brought this action against Dr. María RodríguezSierra but has since removed her as a defendant to this action in the Second
Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint at this time. See
Docket Nos. 1, 22.

1

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Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
(“Rule 12(b)(1)”) and 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), to which
Defendant Vélez joined. See Docket Nos. 24, 26. Plaintiff
opposed. See Docket No. 25. For the reasons stated herein,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a former tenured professor at the University of
Puerto Rico in Utuado, Puerto Rico (the “University”). See
Docket No. 22, pg. 3. In the academic year of 2017-2018, he
was chosen to teach a pre-calculus course, a decision to which
Defendant Vélez, the then-acting Dean of Academic Affairs,
allegedly opposed. See id. at pg. 4. Plaintiff also alleges that,
by the last day for students to partially withdraw from their
courses, all eight of the students enrolled in the pre-calculus
course were failing. See id. at pg. 5. The students went to
Defendant Vélez seeking her intervention with Plaintiff to
prevent their imminent failure. See id. Later that day,
Defendant Vélez and Dr. Rodríguez asked Plaintiff if
“something could be done” about the students failing his
course. See id. Plaintiff replied in the negative and assigned
the students a failing of grade of “F.” See id.
Shortly after the students’ meeting with Defendant Vélez
and Dr. Rodríguez, a female student made a complaint of
sexual harassment against Plaintiff to Defendant Vélez and

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Dr. Rodríguez. See id. at pg. 6. Defendants Vélez and Díaz, the
student advocacy officer at the time, conducted an informal
investigation into the complaint. See id. at pg. 7. This evolved
into a formal administrative complaint against Plaintiff,
which was issued by the acting rector of the University at the
time, Defendant Heredia, on behalf of the University. See id.
at pg. 6. By the time Plaintiff received the administrative
complaint and a formal investigation had been conducted,
Defendant Tapia had succeeded Defendant Heredia as rector.
See id. at pg. 7. A hearing was eventually held in the fall of
2019, for which Plaintiff hired legal counsel, who presented at
least twenty violations of University regulations and due
process by Defendants. See id. at pg. 8. At the hearing, Plaintiff
discovered that the University had changed the students’
failing grade of “F” to a passing grade of “C,” allegedly with
the help of Defendants Vélez and Díaz. See id. at pg. 10. After
the hearing, the examining officer determined that the
accusations of sexual harassment against Plaintiff were not
properly proven, his alleged conduct was not sexual in nature
and recommended that the rector dismiss all of the charges
against Plaintiff in the administrative complaint. See id. at pg.
11. The examining officer also found that the procedure
outlined in University regulations was not followed by the
officials who conducted the investigation against Plaintiff. See
id. Plaintiff alleges that, despite this recommendation,

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Defendant Tapia terminated Plaintiff’s employment with the
University. See id.
Plaintiff further alleges that, prior to these incidents, he
had been appointed to teach two courses during the summer
of 2018 and, in retaliation for Plaintiff failing the students in
his pre-calculus course, Defendant Heredia denied Plaintiff
the opportunity to teach those courses. See id. at pg. 7. He also
alleges that Defendant Tapia refused to assign courses to
Plaintiff in the summer of 2019 in light of the ongoing
investigation against him. See id. at pg. 10. Plaintiff alleges
that, at some point in 2019, Defendant Tapia had restricted
Plaintiff’s entry to the University and on several occasions
University guards stopped Plaintiff from entering the
campus, even escorting him to his office in a golf cart. See id.
at pg. 9. On one occasion, Plaintiff was told to leave the
premises altogether. See id. at 10.
Plaintiff brought his action under § 1983 against
Defendants alleging violations of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his property and
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause by denying
him the opportunity to teach summer courses in 2018,
denying him entrance to the University campus, damaging
his reputation and terminating his employment without
sufficient due process. Plaintiff also seems to allege that

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Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause by putting
him through an administrative investigation that was based
on retaliation rather than legitimate charges. He also alleges a
civil rights conspiracy in violation of § 1985(3), violations of
the First Amendment of the Constitution for interference with
his right to peaceful assembly and various violations of the
Constitution of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Civil Code.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff has failed
to allege an actionable constitutional violation. They also
argue that they are immune to those claims based on the
doctrine of qualified immunity, that Plaintiff has not
exhausted all post-deprivation remedies and that certain
claims are time-barred. 2
II.

Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Because dismissal under these
two rules takes into consideration “the same basic principles,”
we need only articulate those principles once, under the well-

Because we find that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a constitutional
violation and therefore dismiss his claims on the merits, we do not address
the validity of these defenses.

2

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established Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d
351, 359-60 (1st Cir. 2020).
The First Circuit has devised a two-step analysis for
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under the
context-based “plausibility” standard established by the
Supreme Court. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
First, the court must “isolate and ignore statements in the
complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or
merely rehash cause-of-action elements.” Schatz c. Republican
State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). While a
complaint need not give detailed factual allegations,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Second, the court must then “take the complaint’s well[pleaded] (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true,
drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor, and
see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.” Schatz, 669 F.3d
at 55. Plausible means something more than merely possible,
an assessment the court makes by drawing on its judicial
experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 67879). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege
more than a mere “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. However, the
Supreme Court has clarified that it does “not require
heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
III.

Analysis
Plaintiff launches a plethora of claims under the Due

Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the First Amendment’s
right to peaceful assembly, all under § 1983 3; a civil rights
conspiracy under § 1985(3); and several state-law claims. We
address each provision in turn.
A. Due Process Clause
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Heredia’s denial of
Plaintiff’s opportunity to teach summer classes in 2018, his
denial of entry to the University and the resulting damaging
of his reputation and his ultimate termination by Defendant
Tapia violate his property and liberty interests under both
substantive and procedural due process afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. While we find that these first three
alleged interests are not constitutionally-protected interests,
we conclude that his termination by Defendant Tapia did
interfere with a property interested protected by the

To clarify, § 1983 does not create any independent substantive rights;
rather, it is a procedural vehicle to vindicate “other federal rights
elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).

3

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Fourteenth Amendment and we therefore limit our analysis
to that claim.
The due process guarantee includes both procedural and
substantive aspects. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 101 (1st
Cir. 2008). In order to establish a procedural due process claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege first that it has a
property interest as defined by state law and, second, that the
defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived it of that
property interest without constitutionally adequate process.”
Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007); see also
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950) (explaining that an essential principle of due process is
that a deprivation of life, liberty or property “be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature
of the case”). To establish a constitutionally protected interest
in public employment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she
has a legally-recognized expectation that she will retain her
position. Santana v. Calderon, 342 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2003).
Under the laws of Puerto Rico, “career or tenured employees
have property rights in their continued employment.” Id.
(citing Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family Dep’t, 377 F.3d 81, 86 (1st
Cir. 2004); Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 2000) (Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st
Cir. 1988)).

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Because the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was a
tenured professor at the University, and therefore possessed
a

constitutionally-protected

property

interest

in

his

employment, 4 our inquiry is limited to whether he received
constitutionally adequate due process before his termination.
We find that he did. Due process requires that the pretermination hearing fulfill the purpose of “an initial check
against mistaken decisions – essentially, a determination of
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
charges against the employee are true and support the
proposed action.” Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 41 F.3d 124, 135
(1st Cir. 2005) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985)); see also Gorman v. Univ. of Rhode Island,
837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that a pre-termination
hearing is considered “fair” if the individual to be discharged
has the “opportunity to respond, explain and defend”).
Here, Plaintiff was subjected to years-long procedural
process, and therefore given substantial notice of the
possibility of his termination, as a result of a claim of sexual
harassment against him. A hearing was conducted, at which
Plaintiff was represented by counsel and was able to fully
refute the charge before University officials. Student
testimony as to Plaintiff’s conduct was given and the merits
Indeed, Defendants directly concede as much in their Motion to Dismiss.
See Docket No. 24, pg. 8.

4

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of the claims against him were fully analyzed. Though
Defendant Tapia decided to terminate Plaintiff despite the
recommendation by the examining officer that the charges be
dropped, such action does not take away from the fact that
Plaintiff was afforded thorough due process that led to
Defendant’s Tapia’s decision.
Plaintiff also argues that his termination was in violation
of substantive due process. The First Circuit has recognized
two approaches to substantive due process claims: (1) the
“conscious-shocking acts” approach, under which a plaintiff
can allege a violation of substantive due process without
having to show the violation of a specific liberty or property
interest, but only if the state’s conduct is “conscience
shocking”; and (2) “arbitrary and capricious acts” approach,
under which a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of an
identified liberty or property interest protected by the due
process clause. Pandolfi de Rinaldis v. LLavona, 62 F. Supp. 2d
426, 433 (D.P.R. 1999) (citations omitted). The first approach
is inapplicable, as Plaintiff has shown a violation of a specific
property interest. Regarding the second approach, Defendant
had been subject to a claim of sexual harassment and a
protracted and very public investigation ensued. While,
again, the examining officer recommended the charges be
dismissed after the hearing, we do not find Defendant Tapia’s
decision to terminate Plaintiff to be arbitrary and capricious

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given the complicated circumstances. The crux of Plaintiff’s
due process claim is essentially an appeal of the University’s
administrative decision; unfortunately, this Court is not the
appropriate forum for such a review. While University
guidelines may not have been followed, we cannot say that
Plaintiff was deprived of constitutional due process – a
decision that is within the purview of this Court. Therefore,
Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of his substantive due
process rights sufficient to survive the strictures of Rule
12(b)(6).
B. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause requires states to treat alike
all persons similarly situated. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
(1982). Thus, a requirement for stating a claim under that
Clause is that “the plaintiff make a plausible showing that he
or she was treated differently from others similarly situated.”
Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 166 (1st Cir. 2008).
To survive a motion to dismiss, an equal protection claim
“must outline facts sufficient to convey specific instances of
unlawful discrimination,” and a plaintiff “may not prevail by
asserting an inequity and tacking on the self-serving
conclusion

that

the

defendant

was

motivated

by

discriminatory animus.” Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d
440, 444 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted).

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Here, Plaintiff alleges that the violations of the Equal
Protection Clause perpetrated by Defendants were that they
subjected him to an administrative process that was in
violation of University regulations and that he was fired from
his employment despite being found not guilty of those
charges. Such a claim is not cognizable under the Equal
Protection Clause; Plaintiff must claim that he was treated
differently from others similarly situated, i.e., that he was not
protected equally under the law. His failure to do so rings the
death knell to his Equal Protection Clause claims.
C. First Amendment Right to Peaceful Assembly
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble . . . .” U.S. Const. Amend. I.
However, Defendant has not alleged how his walking onto
the University campus to go about his day-to-day job
constitutes protected “peaceable assembly” under the First
Amendment. In fact, Plaintiff has not developed his peaceable
assembly claims at all in his pleadings and we therefore
decline to embark on the complicated journey that is First
Amendment analysis. Plaintiff’s claim under this provision
constitutes the kind of conclusory allegation barred by Rule
12(b)(6) and therefore fails.

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D. Civil Rights Conspiracy under § 1985(3)
The First Circuit has held that a claim under § 1985(3) must
contain four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) a conspirational
purpose to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the
laws; (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4)
either injury to person or property, or a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected right. Pérez-Sánchez v. Pub. Bldg.
Auth., 531 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Aulson v.
Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)). It has long been
established that the second element – the intent to deprive the
plaintiff of equal protection – requires “some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus

behind

the

conspirators’

action.”

Griffin

v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Plaintiff here makes no
such allegation; his § 1985(3) claim is based solely on an
alleged personal vendetta against Plaintiff rather than
Plaintiff’s membership within any protected class. For that
reason, it must fail.
E. Pendant State-Law Claims
Having addressed all of Plaintiff’s federal-law claims, all
that remains are his claims under the Puerto Rico Constitution
and Puerto Rico tort law. The Court has supplemental
jurisdiction to hear state-law claims when, and if, the federal
court has original jurisdiction in the action and the claims
“form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. §

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1367(a). However, the Court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. at § 1367(c)(3); see also
Redondo Const. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2011).
Having dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims over which the
Court has original jurisdiction, we, in our discretion, decline
to exercise jurisdiction over the pendant state-law claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at Docket Number 24 is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 3rd day of June, 2021.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE