Sacarello v. American Airlines, Inc.

Filing 90

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum and Order, the Motion for Reconsideration at Docket No. 83 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 9/16/2022. (mrr)

Case 3:20-cv-01661-RAM Document 90 Filed 09/16/22 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

CIVIL NO. 20-1661 (RAM)

VANESSA SACARELLO
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant

(LEAD CASE)

V.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
Defendant and Counterclaimant

CIVIL NO. 20-1684 (RAM)

SALLY PÉREZ-RODRÍGUEZ
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant

(MEMBER CASE)

V.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
Defendant and Counterclaimant

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendant American Airlines,
Inc.’s

(“Defendant”

or

“AA”)

Motion

for

Reconsideration

(“Motion”). (Docket No. 83). AA contends the Court erred in denying
its summary judgment request because the present case is not a
contract dispute and instead concerns constructive discharge. Id.
It posits that because Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendants Vanessa
Sacarello

(“Sacarello”)

and

Sally

Pérez-Rodríguez

(“Pérez-

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Page 2

Rodríguez”) (jointly, “Plaintiffs”) failed to prove they were
constructively discharged, summary judgment is proper. As seen
below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the
filing of motions for reconsideration. If a motion seeks to alter
or amend a judgement, courts may consider it under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See Ruiz-Justiniano v. United
States Postal Serv., 2018 WL 4562080, at *1 (D.P.R. 2018). However,
a

reconsideration

is

an

extraordinary

remedy

to

be

used

“sparingly.” U.S. ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 737 F.3d 116,
127

(1st

Cir.

2013)

(internal

quotation

omitted).

A

court

may only grant one if there is a manifest error of law, newly
discovered evidence, or in some narrow situations. See Biltcliffe
v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). It is unavailable if the request merely presents “a point
of disagreement between the court and the litigant, or rehashes
matters already properly disposed of[.]” Figueroa Carrasquillo v.
Drogueria Cent., Inc., 2018 WL 8584211, at *2 (D.P.R. 2018).
Here, the Court finds no manifest error of law or newly
discovered evidence which would warrant an alteration to the
finding

that

discharge

summary

claims

is

judgment
improper.

dismissing
There

the

remain

constructive

genuine

issues

regarding AA’s purported misrepresentation of material facts when
Plaintiffs

applied

for

AA’s

Voluntary

Early

Out

Program

for

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Management & Support Staff” (“VEOP”) and signed the General Release
(“Release”). (Docket No. 77).
AA

primarily

argues

that

even

if

the

Release

signed

by

Plaintiffs is invalid, Plaintiffs failed to establish constructive
discharge under Puerto Rico’s wrongful discharge law (“Act 80”),
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185e. (Docket No. 83 at 6-10). AA posits
that Plaintiffs purportedly failed to cite specific facts showing
that AA’s actions were intended to impair or harm their condition
as AA employees. Id. Conversely, Plaintiffs aver their discharge
occurred because their resignation was “caused by the actions of
the employer directed to induce or compel [them] to resign” and
that Act 80 provides only some examples of ways that an employee
can be compelled to resign. (Docket No. 87 at 3, 5). The Court
agrees. Moreover, Puerto Rico Supreme Court precedent supports
this finding. See Rivera Figueroa v. The Fuller Brush Co., 180
P.R. Dec. 894, 902 n. 27 (2011) (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §
185e and noting that the “examples of constructive discharge
supplied by the statute are not exhaustive.”) The jury may consider
AA’s omission in not telling Plaintiffs that they would be replaced
when deliberating whether AA’s conduct compelled them to resign.
(Docket No. 87 at 5).
AA

also

asserts

that

any

event

that

took

place

after

Plaintiffs applied for the VEOP is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’
constructive discharge claim. (Docket No. 83 at 10-11). The Court

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disagrees. On June 10, 2020, Plaintiffs applied to the VEOP.
(Docket No. 77, Facts ¶¶ 14-15). On June 16, they received an email stating their applications had been accepted and that their
last work day would be June 19. Id. Fact ¶ 21. On June 18, they
received an e-mail reminding them they “must review and sign the
general release of claims electronically … by 2 p.m. CT tomorrow,
Friday, June 19.” Id. Fact ¶ 22. If not, they risked being removed
from the VEOP and considered for involuntary separation. Id.
Plaintiffs signed the Release on June 19. Id. Fact ¶ 23.
As far as this Court can tell, Plaintiffs resignation from AA
was not complete until they signed the Release and had their last
work day on June 19. Any events that took place between June 10
through June 19 are thus relevant conduct to their claims of being
induced to resign from their jobs at AA. Accordingly, the Court
did not err when it relied on the June 11-19 e-mail chain between
upper management at the San Juan station to deny AA’s summary
judgment. (Docket No. 77 at 12-14). Id. Cf. Slater v. Town of
Exeter, 2009 WL 737112, at *7 n. 10 (D.N.H. 2009) (noting that
conduct which did not occur “until after [plaintiff] had already
cleaned out her office, and possibly after she had already tendered
her resignation as well . . .

could not have factored into her

decision to quit and is therefore essentially irrelevant to the
constructive discharge question.”) (citation omitted). The Court
stands by its finding in the Opinion and Order that, when viewed

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in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the above-referenced
emails support “an inference . . . that Defendant knew it was going
to replace Plaintiffs before even accepting their applications for
the VEOP and yet failed to inform Plaintiffs as much. If this is
the case, AA may have acted with dolo.” (Docket No. 77 at 16). AA
has not placed this Court in a position to reach an alternate
conclusion.
On a final note, the Court agrees with AA that Plaintiffs are
not entitled to any remedy under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and
Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”), let alone under its
Payroll Support Program Extension (“PSP”). (Docket No. 83 at 2-3,
16-17). Plaintiffs have failed to point to any part of the PSP or
CARES Act granting them such a right. While Circuit Courts of
Appeals have yet to rule on the issue, District Courts have held
there is no private cause of action under the CARES Act. See
Walters v. Mnunchin, 2021 WL 2105387, at *4 (N.D. Ind. 2021)
(“there is no suggestion there is a private cause of action under
the CARES Act for receipt of specific non-disbursed funds, and
‘[i]t is not this Court's function to raise up a cause of action
where a statute has not created one.’”) (quoting Harden v. Yellen,
2021 WL 1515478, at *2 (E.D. Wisc. 2021); Richards v. Ind. Dep't
of Corrs., 2022 WL 2952814, at *2 (N.D. Ind. 2022) (collecting
cases); Turner v. Hamilton Cnty. Tr. Ass'n, 2022 WL 1606289, at *4

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(S.D. Ind. 2022) (finding that Congress did not create a private
cause of action, expressly or impliedly, in the CARES Act).
Defendant has not articulated a manifest error of law, newly
discovered evidence, a change in controlling law, or any other
circumstance warranting the extraordinary remedy that is full
reconsideration of this Court’s Opinion and Order at Docket No.
77. The sole claims which are dismissed at this time are those
brought pursuant to the CARES Act. Accordingly, AA’s Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 16th day of September 2022.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge