Tirado-Velez v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority et al

Filing 34

OPINION AND ORDER: The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico's Orders of October 14, 2021 and November 22, 2021 are AFFIRMED. P3's Motion to Dismiss and Quanta's Motions to Dismiss at Docket Nos. 19 and 23 are GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 8/17/2022. (mrr)

Case 3:21-cv-01583-RAM Document 34 Filed 08/17/22 Page 1 of 19

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JEANNETTE TIRADO-VÉLEZ
Debtor

JEANNETTE TIRADO-VÉLEZ
Plaintiff-Appellant

CIVIL NO. 21-1583 (RAM)

v.
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER
AUTHORITY;
PUERTO RICO PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIP AUTHORITY;
LUMA ENERGY, LLC;
LUMA ENERGY SERVCO, LLC;
QUANTA SERVICES, INC.
Defendants-Appellees
OPINION AND ORDER 1
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Debtor and Plaintiff-Appellant
Jeannette Tirado-Vélez’s (“Tirado-Vélez” or “Appellant”) appeal
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto
Rico’s (the “Bankruptcy Court”) order denying Appellant’s Motion
for Reconsideration. (Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 84 and 88; Docket No.

Andrew Grant, a rising second-year law student at the Boston University School
of Law, assisted in the preparation of this Opinion and Order.
1

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2

8). 2 The Defendants-Appellees (“Appellees”) in this proceeding are
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”); the Puerto
Rico Public-Private Partnership Authority (“P3”); LUMA Energy, LLC
and

LUMA

Energy

Servco,

LLC

(together,

“LUMA”);

and

Quanta

Services, Inc. (“Quanta”). (Docket Nos. 8, 14, 19, 21 and 23).
Appellant

filed

her

Motion

for

Reconsideration

after

the

Bankruptcy Court entered its judgment dismissing with prejudice
her Amended Complaint in its entirety, having previously granted
PREPA

and

LUMA’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

as

to

Amended

Complaint as well as P3’s Motion to Abstain and Quanta’s Motion to
Dismiss. (Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 67, 72, 75, 76, and 84). Appellees
P3 and Quanta now seek dismissal of Appellant’s appeal, while
Appellees PREPA and LUMA seek affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court’s
order. (Docket Nos. 8, 14, 19, 21 and 23). For the reasons set
forth below, this Court GRANTS P3’s Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS
Quanta’s Motion to Dismiss, and AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s
orders that have been properly raised on appeal.
I.
On

March

22,

2021,

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tirado-Vélez

filed

a

complaint

(the

“Complaint”) commencing the Bankruptcy Court adversary proceeding
below. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 1). Tirado-Vélez alleged that PREPA

2 All record citations in this Opinion and Order are to this Court’s docket
unless specified otherwise. Citations to “Bankruptcy Docket” refer to Adversary
Case No. 21-00029 before the Honorable Mildred Caban Flores of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico.

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

3

willfully violated a discharge injunction issued pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) when it sought to collect a debt reflected in
Appellant’s

daughter’s

account

with

PREPA.

Id.

Tirado-Vélez

sought, among other things, an award of punitive damages and
attorney’s fees against PREPA and to have that debt stricken from
PREPA’s records. Id. PREPA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
(“First MSJ”) on May 4, 2021. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 13). Then, in
late June, Tirado-Vélez filed an amended complaint (the “Amended
Complaint”) naming five additional Defendants without materially
altering her claims against PREPA. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 23).
Consequently, PREPA’s First MSJ was mooted, leading PREPA to file
a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Amended Complaint (“Second
MSJ”) on July 16, 2021, which LUMA joined. (Bankruptcy Docket Nos.
38, 41 and 74). The Second MSJ primarily argued that the Amended
Complaint is meritless insofar as it is based on the mistaken
assertion that the debt at issue was actually Tirado-Vélez’s debt,
and not her daughter’s. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 41 at 7). According
to PREPA and LUMA, because the debt belonged to Tirado-Vélez’s
daughter, it was not discharged in the preceding bankruptcy case
and thus collection of that debt did not violate the discharge
injunction. Id.
On July 28, 2021, Tirado-Vélez filed a Motion to Quash as to
the Second MSJ, which the Bankruptcy Court denied on August 6,
2021. (Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 45 and 55). In its denial order, the

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4

Bankruptcy Court expressly instructed Tirado-Vélez to comply with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings
by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056, which required Tirado-Vélez to show “by
affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition” before the
Bankruptcy Court could consider denying the Second MSJ, allow time
to conduct discovery, or “issue any other appropriate order.”
(Bankruptcy Docket No. 55).
On September 3, 2021, despite the express instructions of the
Bankruptcy Court, Tirado-Vélez filed a Motion for Extension which
failed to comply with Rule 56(d), and which was subsequently denied
on September 29, 2021. (Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 62 and 68). TiradoVélez never filed an opposition to PREPA and LUMA’s Second MSJ.
(Bankruptcy Docket No. 84). Hence, PREPA requested that the Second
MSJ

be

deemed

submitted

and

granted

without

opposition.

(Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 66 and 71). PREPA first made this request
on September 21, 2021, in its opposition to Appellant’s Motion for
Extension. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 66 at 3). Thereafter, PREPA
reiterated its request in another motion dated October 11, 2021.
(Bankruptcy Docket No. 71).
Tirado-Vélez also failed to answer the dispositive motions of
other Appellees. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 84). Quanta had filed its
Motion to Dismiss on September 3, 2021, arguing that the Amended
Complaint should be dismissed as to Quanta because it was never

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5

served. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 63). The Bankruptcy Court awaited
Tirado-Vélez’s response for twenty-six (26) days before granting
Quanta’s Motion on September 29, 2021. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 67).
In a similar manner, the Bankruptcy Court waited thirty-four (34)
days before granting P3’s unanswered Motion to Abstain, in which
P3 requested that the Bankruptcy Court abstain from resolving the
request for declaratory relief against it pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(c)(1), as the precise matter at issue was addressed in
another case. (Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 65 and 72).
On October 14, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order
finding that

PREPA

and

LUMA’s

Second

MSJ

was

unopposed

(the

“Summary Judgment Order”). (Bankruptcy Docket No. 75). By that
date, the Bankruptcy Court had given Appellant ninety (90) days to
oppose

the

Second

MSJ.

(Bankruptcy

Docket

Nos.

41

and

75).

Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Summary Judgment Order
one hundred and sixty-three (163) days after PREPA filed the First
MSJ, which was substantially similar to the Second MSJ. (Bankruptcy
Docket Nos. 13 and 75). Thus, Tirado-Vélez had nearly half a year
to craft her opposition. Id. The Bankruptcy Court treated the facts
which Tirado-Vélez had failed to properly controvert as admitted
and

granted

the

Second

MSJ,

dismissing

Appellant’s

Amended

Complaint in its entirety with prejudice. (Bankruptcy Docket No.
75). The Judgment of the Bankruptcy Court was entered the following
day. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 76).

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6

Thereafter, on October 25, 2021, Tirado-Vélez filed a Motion
for

Reconsideration

regarding

the

Summary

Judgment

Order.

(Bankruptcy Docket No. 81). On November 22, 2021, the Bankruptcy
Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration (the “Reconsideration
Order”),

finding

that

the

local

bankruptcy

rules

invoked

by

Appellant did not alter the outcome, and that the Summary Judgment
Order had adequately considered the record. (Bankruptcy Docket No.
84). Then, on December 2, 2021, Tirado-Vélez filed her notice of
appeal from the Reconsideration Order, bringing the matter before
this Court. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 88; Docket No. 1). Appellant
filed her appellate brief on February 2, 2022, raising three
issues: (1) the Bankruptcy Court failed to grant the remedies
requested in the Complaint and the Amended Complaint; (2) the
Bankruptcy Court failed to properly consider the Complaint, the
Amended Complaint, and the Answer to the Complaint when ruling on
the Second MSJ; and (3) the existence of a cryptically-explained
“situation” concerning LUMA, Quanta, and P3 vis-à-vis PREPA’s
invoices. (Docket No. 8 at 6-7).
II.

SCOPE OF APPEAL

In her notice of appeal, Appellant solely designated the
Reconsideration Order issued on November 22, 2021. (Docket No. 1
at 16). A court reviewing a bankruptcy appeal “is ‘duty-bound’ to
determine its jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits, even
if not raised by the litigants.” In re Nieves Guzman, 567 B.R.

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7

854, 860 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Thus, the
Court must determine the scope of this appeal and the standard of
review applicable to any order or orders properly before the Court.
A. An Appeal from an Order Denying Reconsideration Generally
Does Not Encompass Any Underlying Orders
In

the

jurisdiction

First
is

Circuit,

limited

to

“[a]s
review

a

general
of

orders

rule,

appellate

and

judgments

specifically described in the notice of appeal.” Biltcliffe v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 929 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[F]ailure to include a
particular issue in a notice of appeal can [thus] be fatal to [a
reviewing]

court’s

jurisdiction

over

that

issue.”

Id.

Consequently, “[a]n appeal from an order denying reconsideration
is ‘generally not considered to be an appeal from the underlying
judgment.’” Nieves Guzmán, 567 B.R. at 860 (quoting Batiz Chamorro
v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002)).
B. An Appeal from an Order Denying
Encompass the Underlying Judgment
Intertwined

Reconsideration
if the Issues

May
Are

Despite this general rule of appellate jurisdiction, the
First Circuit’s case law “has some looseness in its joints.” Comité
Fiestas De La Calle San Sebastián, Inc. v. Soto, 925 F.3d 528, 531
(1st Cir. 2019). The First Circuit has recognized that “courts
have some latitude to consider other grounds originally urged
against the underlying dismissal, especially where the issues on

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

8

original dismissal and the reconsideration order overlap or are
intertwined.” Díaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport Aviation Servs.,
Inc., 716 F.3d 256, 262 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). The “touchstone” in this analysis “is
whether the appellant has indicated an intent to seek review of
those orders through [her] notice of appeal and accompanying
documents.” Id.; see also Nieves Guzmán, 567 B.R. at 861 (“[B]oth
orders may be reviewed only when it is clear that the appellant
intended to appeal both orders, and where both parties brief issues
relating to the underlying judgment.”). Courts generally find such
intent where the appellant’s arguments on appeal raise “mere
elaborations of claims already presented” and therefore “largely
rehash” claims which the appellant previously raised in their
opposition

to

summary

judgment

and

in

their

motion

for

reconsideration. Soto, 925 F.3d at 532; see also Díaz Aviation,
716 F.3d at 262. The First Circuit also gives “particular weight
to whether the defect in the notice of appeal has prejudiced the
appellee[.]” Caribbean Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Erikon LLC, 966 F.3d
35, 41 (1st Cir. 2020).
C. This Appeal Does Not Encompass P3’s Motion to Abstain or
Quanta’s Motion to Dismiss
As an initial matter, it cannot plausibly be asserted that
Appellant’s notice of appeal is intertwined with, and therefore
encompasses,

the

Bankruptcy

Court’s

orders

granting

P3’s

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

9

unanswered Motion to Abstain or Quanta’s unanswered Motion to
Dismiss. (Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 63, 65, 67 and 72). Appellant’s
notice of appeal and appellate brief make no mention of either of
these motions, or of the Bankruptcy Court’s orders dismissing P3
and Quanta from the bankruptcy proceeding. (Docket Nos. 1 and 8).
Moreover, Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration is devoid of any
challenge to those orders. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 81). Thus,
Appellant has not clearly indicated her intent to seek review of
those

orders

through

her

notice

of

appeal

and

accompanying

documents. See Díaz Aviation, 716 F.3d at 262. Accordingly, P3 and
Quanta are not proper parties to this appeal, and their respective
motions are both GRANTED.
D. The Court Can Bypass the Jurisdictional Inquiry Concerning
the Summary Judgment Order at This Juncture
It is more difficult to assess whether this appeal, formally
directed to the Reconsideration Order, encompasses the underlying
Summary

Judgment

Order

as

well,

or

solely

disputes

the

Reconsideration Order. On the one hand, Appellant’s appellate
brief

clearly

includes

arguments

challenging

the

Bankruptcy

Court’s summary judgment decision. (Docket No. 8). And Appellees
briefed the substantive issues underlying the Summary Judgment
Order, which undercuts any claim of prejudice or surprise. (Docket
Nos. 14 and 21). On the other hand, however, this case differs
from the above-cited cases because Appellant’s arguments on appeal
do not “raise mere elaborations of claims already presented” or

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10

“largely rehash” claims the appellant raised in its opposition to
summary judgment and in its motion for reconsideration. See Soto,
925 F.3d at 532. To that point, Appellant did not raise any
arguments

in

opposition

to

PREPA

and

LUMA’s

Second

MSJ,

and

further, her arguments on reconsideration do not precisely mirror
her stated issues on appeal. (Compare Docket No. 8 with Bankruptcy
Docket No. 81).
Despite the potential for confusion created by the mismatch
between Appellant’s notice of appeal and her appellate briefing,
“the rigors of this case do not demand that we conclusively
resolve” this issue. Caribbean Mgmt. Grp., 966 F.3d at 41. “When
an appeal raises an enigmatic question of statutory jurisdiction
and the merits are easily resolved in favor of the party who would
benefit from a finding that jurisdiction is wanting, we may bypass
the jurisdictional inquiry and proceed directly to the merits.”
Id. The Court will follow this procedure and “assume for argument’s
sake that [Appellant’s] notice of appeal confers jurisdiction”
upon this Court to review both the Summary Judgment Order and the
Reconsideration Order. Id. at 42.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Having found that review may be had of the Summary Judgment
Order and the Reconsideration Order despite Appellant’s failure to
designate both orders in her notice of appeal, the Court must
determine the proper standard of review. In the bankruptcy context,

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11

“[t]he standard of review on appeal from a grant of summary
judgment is de novo.” In re Kirby, 599 B.R. 427, 438 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). However, this Court’s review of
the

Reconsideration

Order

remains

limited

to

the

abuse

of

discretion standard, which is “quite deferential.” Nieves Guzmán,
567 B.R. at 861-62. Under this standard, reviewing courts “defer
broadly to the [bankruptcy] court’s informed discretion” because
the

bankruptcy

court

“typically

has

an

intimate,

first-hand

knowledge of the case, and, thus, is best positioned to determine
whether

the

reconsideration

justification
motion

should

proffered
serve

to

in

support

override

the

of

a

opposing

party’s rights and the law’s institutional interest in finality.”
Id. at 862 (quoting Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19
(1st Cir. 2002)). In this case, the Court may set aside the
Reconsideration Order “only if it appears the [Bankruptcy Court]
relied upon an improper factor, neglected a factor entitled to
substantial weight, or considered the correct mix of factors but
made a clear error of judgment in weighing them.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Appellant Waived Certain Arguments Raised for the First
Time in Her Motion for Reconsideration or On Appeal
Although this Court will review the Summary Judgment Order
and the Reconsideration Order, the Court cannot consider some of
the specific arguments raised by Appellant in her appellate brief.

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

12

Appellant raised these issues for the first time in her Motion for
Reconsideration or on appeal, and thus waived them. As the First
Circuit has routinely noted, “[a] motion for reconsideration is
not a venue to undo procedural snafus or permit a party to advance
arguments

it

should

have

developed

prior

to

judgment[.]”

Biltcliffe, 772 F.3d at 930. Additionally, it is well established
that arguments that could have been raised before the bankruptcy
court, but were not raised, are waived on appeal. See, e.g., In re
Aja, 441 B.R. 173, 178 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011).
As detailed above, Tirado-Vélez failed to oppose the Second
MSJ in the bankruptcy proceedings below. Tirado-Vélez then filed
a thirty-page Motion for Reconsideration which raised numerous
arguments for the first time. Appellant now seeks to litigate the
substance of the summary judgment dispute on appeal — something
she cannot procedurally do. Thus, the Court will review the Summary
Judgment Order and the Reconsideration Order only insofar as they
concern

issues

which

could

not

have

been

presented

to

the

Bankruptcy Court prior to judgment and thus are properly preserved
on appeal.
B. The Bankruptcy Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment
It is well established that an appellate court “may affirm
[a] judgment on any ground revealed by the record.” Cordi-Allen v.
Halloran, 470 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s Summary

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

13

Judgment Order de novo, the Court finds that: (1) the Bankruptcy
Court followed the proper procedure in handling the unopposed
motion for summary judgment, and (2) the evidence in the record
supports the Summary Judgment Order. Thus, for the reasons outlined
below, the Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of summary
judgment on the merits.
First, the Bankruptcy Court was entitled to consider the
Second MSJ as unopposed. The First Circuit has made clear that
“[w]hen a non-moving party fails to file a timely opposition to an
adversary’s motion for summary judgment, the court may consider
the summary judgment motion unopposed, and take as uncontested all
evidence presented with that motion.” Perez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart
Puerto

Rico,

440

F.3d

531,

533-34

(1st

Cir.

2006)

(citation

omitted). “In most cases, a party’s failure to oppose summary
judgment is fatal to its case.” Id. Here, the Bankruptcy Court
provided Tirado-Vélez ninety (90) days to oppose the Second MSJ.
Moreover, Appellant had one hundred and sixty-three (163) days to
prepare an opposition from the date PREPA filed the First MSJ,
which was substantially similar to its Second MSJ and thus gave
Appellant early notice of its contents. That constituted more than
adequate time for Tirado-Vélez to craft an opposition to PREPA and
LUMA’s Second MSJ or to file her own compliant motion.
Second, the Bankruptcy Court properly rejected Appellant’s
Motion to Quash PREPA’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment as well

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

14

as her Motion Requesting Additional Time to Reply to PREPA’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 45 and 62). Neither
motion complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), as made applicable to
bankruptcy proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056, despite the
Bankruptcy Court’s clear directive to Appellant that it could not
grant her request for additional time if she failed to comply with
Rule 56(d). (Bankruptcy Docket No. 55). The First Circuit has
clearly warned litigants that “the prophylaxis of Rule 56[(d)] is
not available merely for the asking” and that “[a] litigant who
seeks to invoke the rule must act with due diligence to show that
[her] predicament fits within its confines.” Rivera-Torres v. ReyHernandez, 502 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 2007). 3 Thus, Appellant cannot
argue that her noncompliant motions constituted proper requests
for additional time or proper oppositions to the Second MSJ.
Third, the Bankruptcy Court correctly deemed the statement of
uncontested facts in the Second MSJ as admitted by Appellant when
ruling on the motion. District of Puerto Rico Local Rule 56(e)
clearly states that “[f]acts contained in a supporting . . .
statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as
required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly
controverted.” L. CV. R. 56(e) (emphasis added). “The purpose of
Rivera-Torres addresses Rule 56(f), which later became Rule 56(d). However,
“the textual differences between current Rule 56(d) and former Rule 56(f) are
purely stylistic” and thus, “case law developed under former Rule 56(f) remains
controlling[.]” In re PHC, Inc. S'holder Litig., 762 F.3d 138, 143 n.2 (1st
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
3

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

15

this rule is to relieve the district court of any responsibility
to ferret through the record to discern whether any material fact
is genuinely in dispute.” CMI Cap. Mkt. Inv., LLC v. GonzalezToro, 520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008). The First Circuit has
expressly upheld the application of this rule, and bankruptcy
courts in this District likewise apply it. Id. at 62-63; see e.g.,
In re Pulsar Puerto Rico Inc., 2013 WL 5658697, at *2 (Bankr.
D.P.R. 2013). Thus, all material facts that were supported by
record citations were properly deemed admitted by the Bankruptcy
Court. This included uncontested material fact number twelve (12),
which stated:
The $8,335.20 debt which Plaintiff wrongfully
claims was discharged is a debt for charges
incurred under Alicea’s account #6151******
for electric power supplied by PREPA to Alicea
between March 19, 2010 and February 25, 2011
and related charges and not for charges
incurred by Plaintiff under any of Plaintiff’s
accounts with PREPA.
(Bankruptcy Docket No. 14 at 3) (citing Bankruptcy Docket No. 141, ¶ 12).
Finally, after determining that the Second MSJ was unopposed
and properly deeming as admitted supported statements of fact, the
Bankruptcy Court correctly “test[ed] the undisputed facts in the
crucible of the applicable law in order to ascertain whether
judgment [was] warranted.” Velez v. Awning Windows, Inc., 375 F.3d
35, 42 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that, “even when faced with an

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)
unopposed

motion

for

16
summary

judgment,”

a

court

may

not

automatically grant summary judgment). At the heart of this dispute
is whether Appellant or her daughter owed the debt at issue.
Generally,

a

bankruptcy

court

may

only

sanction

a

party

for

violating a discharge injunction “if the party took some action
prohibited by § 524(a)(2) – i.e., an action ‘to collect, recover
or offset any discharged debt . . . of the debtor.’” In re Paul,
534 F.3d 1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). A
discharge injunction generally does not impact third parties. See
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (“Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) of
this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect
the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other
entity for, such debt.”). To determine who owed the debt in
dispute, the Bankruptcy Court reviewed not only the uncontroverted
facts presented by PREPA, but also looked to an exhibit attached
to Appellant’s own Amended Complaint which “clearly establishe[d]
that these debts are not owed by [Tirado-Vélez] and that any
collection action by PREPA of that money is not stayed by the
discharge injunction, because they are owed by [Tirado-Vélez’s
daughter].” (Bankruptcy Docket No. 75 at 2-3).
Simply

put,

“[b]y

[her]

inaction,

[Tirado-Vélez]

allowed

[PREPA] to configure the summary judgment record. Confronted with
a set of facts that pointed unerringly in one direction, the
[bankruptcy] court did its duty.” Velez, 375 F.3d at 42. Thus,

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

17

this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of summary judgment
on the merits. The Court will “refrain from writing at length to
no other end than to hear its own words resonate.” Id.
C. There Was No Abuse of Discretion in the Bankruptcy Court’s
Order Denying Reconsideration
Upon review of the Bankruptcy Court’s Reconsideration Order,
the Court finds no abuse of discretion. First, to the extent
Appellant challenged the substance of the Summary Judgment Order
in her Motion for Reconsideration, the Court’s affirmance under
the stricter de novo standard “necessarily entails there was no
abuse of discretion.” Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Ceramica Europa II,
Inc., 160 F.3d 849, 852 (1st Cir. 1998).
Second, despite Appellant’s contentions to the contrary in
her Motion for Reconsideration, the Bankruptcy Court did not
violate local bankruptcy rules when it denied her request for
additional time to respond to PREPA’s motion requesting that the
Bankruptcy Court grant the Second MSJ. Appellant primarily relied
on Local Bankruptcy Rule 7055-2, which she argued “entitled [her]
to reply [to] the dismissal Order.” (Bankruptcy Docket No. 81 at
3). However, Local Bankruptcy Rule 7055-2 governs dismissal for
want of prosecution, and by its terms applies when “no action has
been taken by any party during the preceding six (6) months.” L.
Bankr. R. 7055-2(a). The Bankruptcy Court did not grant the Second
MSJ for want of prosecution, and therefore Appellant’s reliance on
that rule was misplaced. Next, Appellant’s reliance on Local

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Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)
Bankruptcy

Rule

18

9013-1(c)(3)(A)

was

similarly

unavailing.

Appellant argued that said rule entitled her to formal notice of,
and fourteen days to reply to, PREPA’s motion. (Bankruptcy Docket
No. 81 at 3). However, as explained by the Bankruptcy Court in the
Reconsideration Order, Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(c)(3)(A) did
not apply in this situation either, as the rule specifically
pertains to initial motions. Appellant’s argument was directed to
PREPA’s motion dated October 11, 2021, which reiterated PREPA’s
prior

request

that

the

Second

MSJ

be

granted

as

unopposed.

(Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 66 and 71). This was not an initial motion.
Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(c)(3)(A) clearly establishes that a
motion for entry of an order when the initial motion has not been
timely opposed does not require objection language or time to
respond. (Bankruptcy Docket No. 84 at 2). Thus, Appellant was not
entitled to additional notice of, or time to respond to, PREPA’s
motion

for

entry

of

an

order

granting

the

Second

MSJ.

The

Bankruptcy Court therefore did not err in denying her requests for
such relief.
For these reasons, the Reconsideration Order is AFFIRMED.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, P3’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED,
Quanta’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Bankruptcy Court’s
Summary Judgment Order and Reconsideration Order are AFFIRMED.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

Case 3:21-cv-01583-RAM Document 34 Filed 08/17/22 Page 19 of 19
Civil No. 21-1583 (RAM)

19

IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 17th day of August 2022.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge