Rodriguez Acevedo v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.

Filing 62

OPINION AND ORDER granting 52 Motion for Summary Judgment. See attached. Judgment of Dismissal shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Gina R. Mendez-Miro on 1/7/2025. (GMN)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
Edgardo Rodríguez Acevedo,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 22-01539 (GMM)

v.
DHL Express (USA), Inc.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
At its heart, this is a wrongful termination lawsuit in which
Plaintiff Edgardo Rodríguez Acevedo (“Rodríguez”) alleges that his
employment with DHL Express (USA), Inc. (“DHL”) was terminated
without just cause. Rodríguez specifically claims that DHL failed
to accommodate his disability and discriminatorily terminated his
employment.
Before the Court is DHL’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket
No. 52). The Court GRANTS DHL’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rodríguez started the litigation of this dispute on September
7, 2022, in state court.1 The case was removed to this Court under
diversity jurisdiction on November 14, 2022. (Docket No. 1).
Critically, Rodríguez’s initial complaint was limited to a claim

The initial complaint was identified as civil action case number CA2022CV02935
and was brought before the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Carolina
Superior Court. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 2).
1

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -2for severance, back-pay, and compensatory and punitive damages for
DHL’s termination of his employment without just cause in violation
of Law 80 of May 30, 1976, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 185a et seq., (“Law 80”).
(Docket No. 10-1). On July 17, 2023, Rodríguez filed an Amended
Complaint

against

DHL.

(Docket

No.

33).

Therein,

Rodríguez

reiterated his Law 80 claims and added two discrimination causes
of action alleging failure-to-accommodate and wrongful employment
termination in violation of Puerto Rico Act No. 44 of July 2, 1985,
1 L.P.R.A. §§ 501 et seq. (“Law 44”) and Puerto Rico Act No. 100
of June 30, 1959, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 146 et seq. (“Law 100”). (Docket
No. 33 ¶¶ 36-37).
On

September

18,

2023,

DHL

filed

a

Motion

to

Dismiss

Discrimination Claims under Rule 12(b)(6) (“Motion to Dismiss”).
DHL asks that the Court dismiss Rodríguez’s discrimination causes
of action under Law 100 and Law 44. DHL argues the claims are both,
time-barred

under

the

applicable

statute

of

limitations

and

because, in any event, Act 100 does not apply to disability
discrimination claims. (Docket No. 35). On January 26, 2024, the
Court issued an Opinion and Order. It granted in part and denied
in part the Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 43). Thus, the Court
dismissed Rodríguez’s discrimination claim under Law 100.
On March 27, 2024, the Court amended it Case Management Order
and extended, among others, the deadline to file motions for
summary judgment. (Docket No. 47). Subsequently, DHL filed a Motion

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -3for Summary Judgment on August 12, 2024. (Docket No. 52). Therein,
DHL denies having discriminated against Rodríguez based on his
impairment or for any other illegal reason. DHL argues that
Rodríguez fails to meet the prima facie elements of his disability
discrimination claim insofar as he was unable to perform the
essential functions of his job. (Docket No. 52-1 at 11-17).
Further,

DHL

posits

that

Rodríguez’s

employment

was

terminated because he was unable to work. (Id.) According to DHL,
Rodríguez went on leave for his medical condition on May 29, 2020.
Upon his return in August 2021, Rodríguez requested reasonable
accommodations. In DHL’s view, this amounted to an indefinite
leave, since: (a) Rodríguez was still unable to work; and (b) had
no medical recommendation or prognosis as to when he would be able
to return to work in the future. (Id. at 52-1 at 2).
DHL

also

avers

that

although

Rodríguez

alleges

that

he

informed that he was willing or able to occupy another less
demanding position, there is no evidence to that effect. First,
Rodríguez never applied for any vacant positions in DHL. Second,
he did not establish that he was qualified to perform the functions
of the two existing vacant positions. Third, he did not establish
that he was able to work at all. (Id. at 15-17).
On

September

23,

2024,

Rodríguez

filed

his

Motion

in

Opposition for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 55). Therein, he and
his wife Jaqueline Betancourt Rivera submitted sworn statements in

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -4response to DHL’s proposed uncontested facts. (Docket No. 55-1;
55-2). Rodríguez alleges that DHL “has been gerrymandering the
reasonable accommodation process to justify the fact that it had
no precedent in the company as to how to reasonably accommodate
Mr. Rodríguez within the company and relied on the fact that he
could not or would not return to his last position as Area
Operations Manager, which covered all Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin
Island branches.” (Docket No. 55 at 2).
Rodríguez

further

argues

that

DHL

never

adopted

written

procedures to address a situation like his, where an employee in
an executive position requests a demotion or reassignment as
reasonable accommodation. (Id.). Related to this, he posits that
DHL

never

offered

continuously

him

a

different

position,

requested

a

“reassignment

to

a

even

though

he

less

stressful

position.” (Id. at 4). In addition, he asserts that when he was
being processed for a reasonable accommodation, there was no skill
or qualification requirement for any of the two allegedly available
positions as informed by DHL. Consequently, “DHL could have at
least, given or offered him the opportunity to apply for any of
those positions.” (Id. at 11).
On October 21, 2024, DHL filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Motion
in Opposition to Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 61). DHL asserts
that

Rodríguez

failed

to

comply

with

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure Rule 56 (“Rule 56”) and Local Rule 56 by not properly

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -5responding to Defendant’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts
and failing to establish the presence of any genuine issue of
material fact. DHL reiterates that Rodríguez has no legal cause of
action

since

he

has

not

met

his

prima

facie

burden

of

his

disability claim, and his inability to work constituted just cause
for his employment termination. (Id. at 2).
II.
A.

LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure Rule 56 (“Rule 56”). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
There is a genuine dispute of material fact “if the evidence ‘is
such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of
the non-moving party.’” Taite v. Bridgewater State University,
Board of Trustees, 999 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Ellis
v. Fidelity Management Trust Company, 883 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2018)). A fact is material “if it ‘has the potential of affecting
the outcome of the case.’” Id. (quoting Pérez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart
P.R., Inc., 656 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2011)). In reviewing a motion
for

summary

judgment,

a

court

considers

“the

pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and
any affidavits. . .” Johnson v. University of Puerto Rico, 714

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -6F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522
F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008)).
The moving party “bears the initial burden of showing that no
genuine

issue

of

Rebarber-Ocasio,

material

970

F.3d

fact
52,

62

exists.”
(1st

Feliciano-Muñoz

Cir.

2020)

v.

(citation

omitted). “Once a properly supported motion has been presented,
the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that a
trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor.” RodriguezReyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 21 F.Supp.3d 143, 144 (D.P.R. 2014)
(citing Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d
46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal citation omitted). “The nonmovant
may defeat a summary judgment motion by demonstrating, through
submissions of evidentiary quality, that a trial worthy issue
persists.” Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.
2006). However, the nonmovant “cannot merely ‘rely on an absence
of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific
facts that demonstrate the evidence of an authentic dispute.’”
Feliciano-Muñoz, 970 F.3d at 62 (quoting McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines,
Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995)); see also River Farm Realty
Tr. v. Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co., 943 F.3d 27, 41 (1st Cir. 2019)
(holding that a nonmovant similarly cannot rely on “conclusory
allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation”
to defeat summary judgment).

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -7In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a Court shall
admit

facts

that

are

properly

supported

and

not

properly

controverted. See Rodríguez-Severino v. UTC Aerospace Sys., Civil
No. 20-1901, 2022 WL 15234457, at *5 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2022).
However, a Court must simultaneously abstain from “[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences. . .[since these are] jury functions, not
those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000).
B.

Local Civ. R. 56
In this District, summary judgment is also governed by Local

Rule 56. See Local Civ. R. 56. “A party moving for summary judgment
must submit factual assertions in a separate, short, and concise
statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs.”
Rosado v. Adorno-Delgado, No. CV 22-01182 (MAJ), 2024 WL 1076673,
at *3 (D.P.R. Mar. 12, 2024) (quoting Loc. Rule 56(b)) (internal
quotations omitted). This rule provides that a non-movant must
then “admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for
summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the
moving party’s statement of material facts.” Local Civ. R. 56(c).
“Pursuant to Local Rule 56(e), the parties must submit statements
of

fact

and

oppositions

thereto,

and

facts

contained

in

a

supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -8by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed
admitted unless properly controverted.” Ramirez-Rivera v. DeJoy,
No. 3:21-CV-01158-WGY, 2023 WL 6168223, at *1 (D.P.R. Sept. 22,
2023)

(quoting

Local

Rule

56(e))

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
Failure to comply with Local Rule 56(c) allows the Court to
accept a party’s proposed facts as stated. See López-Hernández v.
Terumo Puerto Rico LLC, 64 F.4th 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2023); see also
Natal Pérez v. Oriental Bank & Trust, 291 F.Supp.3d 215, 219
(D.P.R. 2018) (“If a party improperly controverts the facts, Local
Rule 56 allows the Court to treat the opposing party’s facts as
uncontroverted.”). Litigants ignore Local Rule 56(c) at their
peril. See López-Hernández, 64 F.4th at 26.
III. UNCONTESTED FACTS
The Court examined DHL’s Statement of Uncontested Facts in
Support

of

Uncontested

Motion
Facts”)

for
and

Summary

Judgment

Rodríguez’s

(“DHL’s

Motion

in

Statement

of

Opposition

for

Summary Judgment and accompanying exhibits. (Docket Nos. 52-2;
55). The Court notes that Rodríguez filed a sworn statement,
subscribed by him, in which he stated his “statements and replies
to each and every one of the premises of the defendant broken down
in

the

document

number

52-2

filed

on

August

12,

2024

named

‘STATEMENT OF UNCONSTESTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -9JUDGMENT’.”

(Docket No. 55-2). However, Rodríguez did not submit

with his opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of
material facts. As stated, he only submitted a sworn statement,
which

does

supporting

not

directly

summary

accepted

this

material

facts,”

admit,

judgment.

sworn

In

statement

Rodríguez

deny,

addition,

as

does

or

his
not

qualify

the

facts

even

the

Court

if

“separate

provide

in

statement
the

of

opposing

statements included therein support for each factual assertion
with a citation to the evidentiary record as required by the Rule.
Here,

Rodríguez

failed

to

properly

address

Defendant’s

assertions of fact as required by Rule 56(c). Thus, this Court may
consider Defendant’s proposed facts undisputed for purposes of the
motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Rule 56(e) establishes “that a
party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment
‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
but. . .must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)).
Furthermore, Local Civil Rule 56(e) provides that parties
must submit statements of fact and oppositions thereto, and thus
“[f]acts

contained

in

a

supporting

or

opposing

statement

of

material facts, if supported by record citations as required by
this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.”

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -10Local Civ. R. 56(e).

Local Rule 56 is an “anti-ferret rule. . .

intended to protect the district court from perusing through the
summary judgment record in search of disputed material facts and
prevent litigants from shifting that burden onto the court.” VCI,
Inc. v. TForce Freight, Inc., No. CV 23-1148 (RAM), 2024 WL
4651017, at *3 (D.P.R. Nov. 1, 2024) (citing Lopez-Hernandez, 64
F.4th at 26). Accordingly, “[u]nder Local Rule 56, a district court
is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion to accept the
moving party’s facts as stated. . .when the statements contained
in the movant's Statement of Uncontested Facts. . .are not properly
controverted.”

Id.

“[V]iolations

of

this

local

rule

are

astoundingly common and constitute an unnecessary burden to the
trial court’s docket and time.” Id. Decisively, “[t]he First
Circuit’s repeated admonition on this issue in the last few years,
places the Puerto Rico federal bar on clear notice that compliance
with Local Rule 56 is a mandate, not a suggestion.” Ramirez-Rivera
v. DeJoy, 693 F.Supp.3d 210, 213 (D.P.R. 2023) (emphasis added).
Rodríguez failed to comply with Local Rule 56(c). He did not
submit an opposing statement admitting or controverting DHL’s
Statement of Uncontested Facts nor did he support his opposition
with reference to record citations as required by Local Rule 56(C).
“The court shall have no independent duty to search or consider
any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties’
separate statement of facts.” Local Civ. R. 56(e). As such, the

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -11Court finds all of DHL’s uncontested facts (Docket No. 52-2) to be
uncontroverted and admits those properly supported by a record
citation.
Accordingly, the Court makes the following findings of fact:
1. DHL is a worldwide logistics company that provides
courier, package delivery, and express mail services to
its customers. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 1; 52-4).
2. In Puerto Rico, DHL’s main station is in San Juan, with
two (2) satellite stations located in Ponce and
Aguadilla. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 2; 52-19 at 24 ¶¶ 9-18).
3. Rodríguez began working for DHL on August 9, 1991.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 3; 52-19 at 20 ¶¶ 2-6).
4. According to Plaintiff’s employee file, Rodríguez
occupied the following positions during his employment
at DHL:
a. Customer Service Agent: 1991
b. International Service Agent: 1991-1995
c. Courier Guard: 1996-1998
d. Lead Courier Guard: 1998-2000
e. City Service Supervisor I/II: 2000-2004
f. Field Services Supervisor: 2004-2006
g. District Field Services Manager: 2006-2008
h. Station Services Manager: 2008-2010
i. Area Operations Manager: 2010-2021
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 4; 52-4 at ¶ 6; 52-20 at 2 ¶ 2).
5. As Area Operations Manager, Rodríguez oversaw DHL’s
operations in his district, which included Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 5; 5219 at 21).
6. In general terms, as Area Operations Manager, Rodríguez
was responsible for the overall operations regarding
pick-up and delivery personnel and services in his
district. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 6; 52-22).
7. As Area Operations Manager, Rodríguez reported to
several Regional Service Directors, the last being Juan

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -12Cucalón (“Cucalón”). (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 7; 52-19 at 23
¶¶ 1-16).
8. As
Area
Operations
Manager,
Rodríguez
directly
supervised four (4) managers in San Juan, while the Ponce
and Aguadilla station personnel reported indirectly to
the San Juan station to maintain service levels. (Docket
Nos. 52-2 ¶ 8; 52-19 at 24 ¶¶ 1-24).
9. As Area Operations Manager, Rodríguez was DHL’s highestranking officer in Puerto Rico since the Regional
Service Directors he reported to were located in Miami.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 9; 52-19 at 28 ¶¶ 11-21).
10. During the COVID-19 pandemic, DHL’s operation increased
due to the lockdown, which caused everyone to stay at
home and make more orders. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 10; 52-19
at 29-30).
11. Rodríguez was diagnosed with high blood pressure, or
hypertension, between September and October 2018. (Docket
Nos. 52-2 ¶ 11; 52-19 at 44 ¶ 23-24; 45 ¶¶ 1-3).
12. After his diagnosis, Rodríguez was placed on short-term
disability leave for about nine (9) months, returning in
August 2019. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 12; 52-19 at 45 ¶¶ 724).
13. Rodríguez did not request any reasonable accommodation
upon his return to work in August 2019. (Docket Nos. 522 ¶ 13; 52-19 at 57 ¶¶ 19-22).
14. DHL partners with Sedgwick CMS (“Sedgwick”) to assist in
reasonable accommodation request determinations and
short-term disability benefit evaluations. (Docket Nos.
52-2 ¶ 14; 52-19 at 57 ¶¶ 5-18 and 58 ¶¶ 10-18).
15. DHL partners with UNUM Insurance (“UNUM”) for the
payment of short- and long-term disability leave
benefits. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 15; 52-19 at 57 ¶¶ 8-19).
16. DHL’s
Employee
Handbook
contains
its
Reasonable
Accommodation Policy, which Rodríguez received. (Docket
Nos. 52-2 ¶ 16; 52-4 at ¶ 16; 52-19 at 60 ¶¶6-15).
17. DHL’s Reasonable Accommodation Policy states:

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -13-

If you believe that you may need a reasonable
accommodation in order to perform the essential
functions of your position, you shall inform your
manager and/or Human Resources of the need for an
accommodation. You will then be required to file a
request for an accommodation with Sedgwick CMS by
calling
877-365-4345.
Once
a
request
for
accommodation has been made, Human Resources will
partner
with
Sedgwick
CMS
to
conduct
an
individualized assessment to determine possible
accommodations that will allow the employee to
perform the essential functions of their position
without creating an undue hardship on the operation
of the business.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 17; 52-4 at ¶ 17; 52-23 at 3).
18. On May 28, 2020, Rodríguez suffered a hypertensive
episode in the workplace, which required his wife to pick
him up and take him to the emergency room. (Docket Nos.
52-2 ¶ 18; 52-19 at 63 ¶¶ 1-23; 64).
19. After stabilizing his high blood pressure, Rodríguez was
referred to a cardiologist for treatment, Dr. Hector L.
Banchs Pieretti (“Dr. Banchs”). (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 19
at 66 ¶¶ 1-19).
20. On June 1, 2020, Rodríguez began his request for shortterm disability benefits with Sedgwick. (Docket Nos. 522 ¶ 20; 52-19 at 69 ¶¶ 14-21; 71 ¶¶ 2-14).
21. DHL retroactively approved
Rodríguez’s short-term
disability benefits to May 29, 2020, the day after the
hypertensive episode that landed him in the hospital.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 21; 52-19 at 76 ¶¶ 4-10).
22. Rodríguez received short-term disability benefits from
May 29, 2020, to August 7, 2020. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 22;
52-19 at 80 ¶¶ 5-18).
23. Because the hypertensive episode on May 28, 2020,
happened in the workplace, DHL referred him to the State
Insurance Fund (“SIF”) for evaluation and treatment.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 22; 52-19 at 80 ¶¶ 5-18).

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -1424. Rodríguez went to the SIF on September 2020. The SIF
initially released him while on “CT” or under treatment.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 23; 52-19 at 86 ¶¶ 1-15).
25. In that same month, September 2020, the SIF’s doctors
told Rodríguez that he could not return to work and placed
him on full rest. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 24; 52-19 at 88 ¶¶
6-24 and 89 ¶¶ 1-3).
26. Almost one year later, on August 17, 2021, the SIF
discharged Rodríguez. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 25; 52-19 at
98 ¶¶ 9-15).
27. In August 2021, Rodríguez, again, requested short-term
disability benefits. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 26; 52-19 at 102
¶¶ 12-24 and 103 ¶¶ 1-6).
28. As part of the request for short-term disability
benefits, Rodríguez submitted two (2) fitness for duty
certifications: one from his cardiologist, Dr. Banchs,
and one from his psychiatrist, Dr. Ramses Normandía (“Dr.
Normandía”). (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 27; 52-19 at 103 ¶¶ 1424; 104 ¶¶ 1-5; 52-26).
29. Both, Dr. Banchs and Dr. Normadía stated in their fitness
for duty certifications that Rodríguez was unable to
return to work. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 28; 52-19 at 104 ¶¶
6-12).
30. The “Fitness for Duty Certification” filled out by Dr.
Banchs in August 2021 stated that:
a. Rodríguez stopped working, beginning on May 29,
2020. (Docket No. 52-26 at 2 Section B).
b. Rodríguez did not return to work. (Docket No. 5226 at 3 Section B).
c. Rodríguez “continued with arterial hypertension
which was triggered by emotional -stress work
environment.
Arterial
hypertension
has
been
difficult to control. He has continued with
shortness of breath and functional capacity
limitation.” (Docket No. 52-26 at 3 Section C).

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -1531. The “Short Term Disability Claim Form” filled out by Dr.
Normandía on August 12, 2021, stated that:
a. Rodríguez was not advised to return
(Docket No. 52-27 at 2 Section B).

to

work.

b. Rodríguez “is depressed, crying, sad, unsocial,
anxious, nervous, restless, cannot concentrate,
cannot sleep, worried, has panic attacks that cause
vomiting, chest pain, sweating and headache[s]. He
is very stressed.” (Docket No. 52-27 at 2 Section
C).
c. Rodríguez’s restriction to work would last until
August 5, 2022. (Docket No. 52-27 at 2 Section C).
32. Dr. Normandía also sent a medical certificate to DHL
dated August 5, 2021, stating that Rodríguez was his
patient, and that he “is not emotionally stable to return
to work. Will be out on sick leave from August 5th, 2021
to August 5th, 2022. He will continue in psychiatric
treatment. . .” (Docket No. 52-28).
33. UNUM approved Rodríguez’s short-term disability benefits
from August 25, 2021, through September 2, 2021. (Docket
Nos. 52-2 ¶ 32; 52-19 at 111 ¶¶ 4-6; 52-29).
34. On August 17, 2021, Sedgwick sent a letter to Rodríguez
indicating that he had submitted a request for reasonable
accommodation, and that he had to send the provided
accommodation substantiation form. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶
33; 52-19 at 106 ¶¶ 5-9; 52-30).
35. The “Accommodation Substantiation Form” that Rodríguez
submitted to Sedgwick, filled out by Dr. Banchs, stated
that:
a. Rodríguez’s
impairment
was
“uncontrolled
hypertension.” (Docket No. 52-31 at ¶ 1).
b. The
duration
of
Rodríguez’s
“undefined.” (Id. at ¶ 2).

impairment

was

c. Rodríguez’s impairment affected the following major
life activities: bending, breathing, caring for
self, concentrating, interacting with others,

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -16lifting,
performing
manual
tasks,
sleeping and walking. (Id. at ¶ 8).

reaching,

d. Rodríguez’s impairment affected the following
bodily functions: brain, cardiovascular, and
respiratory. (Id. at ¶ 11).
e. Rodríguez could not perform his job,
without accommodation. (Id. at ¶ 12).

with

or

f. Rodríguez’s return to work date
determined. (Id. at ¶ 12(a)).

not

be

could

g. Dr. Banchs’ level of confidence for Rodríguez to be
able to return to work was “less than 25%.” (Id. at
¶ 13).
h. Rodríguez was “not released to work.” (Id. at ¶ 14,
15).
i. In an eight (8) hour workday, Rodríguez could only
lift/carry or push/pull objects between 0-5 pounds.
(Id. at 2).
j. In an eight (8) hour workday, Rodríguez could
“never” bend/stoop/crouch, climb, balance, twist
upper body, reach at shoulder level, squat/kneel,
use hands repetitively, use vibrating tools or
equipment, or flex/extend neck. (Id.).
k. In an eight (8) hour workday, Rodríguez could
“occasionally” use a keyboard with his left hand,
use a mouse, speak, or use his hands to
grip/grasp/turn. (Id.).
l. Rodríguez could sit/stand for up to 1 hour a day
and walk up to half an hour per day. (Id. at ¶ 16).
m. Rodríguez was incapacitated since May 29, 2020, and
the period of his incapacity was “undefined.” (Id.
at ¶ 18).
n. Rodríguez’s impairment would cause episodic flareups every two (2) to four (4) weeks, which would
prevent him from performing his job functions. (Id.
at ¶ 23).

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -17o. Rodríguez’s performance of his job functions would
result in a direct safety and health threat to him
and to others. (Id. at ¶ 25).
p. On the same date Dr. Banchs treated Rodríguez and
filled out the “Accommodation Substantiation Form,”
Rodríguez was referred to the hospital due to his
“symptomatic, uncontrolled hypertension.” (Id. at
¶ 26,27).
36. Sedgwick informed DHL that Rodríguez’s accommodation
request was to be kept on continuous leave. (Docket Nos.
52-2 ¶ 35; 52-4 ¶ 29).
37. On September 22, 2021, Sedgwick informed Rodríguez that
“[a]s of today, your request for an accommodation will
be closed because, employer is unable to accommodate
request.” (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 36; 52-19 at 115 ¶¶ 8-23;
52-32).
38. Cucalón and Maureen Barr (“Barr”), DHL’s former Human
Resources
Manager,
informed
Rodríguez
that
his
accommodation request had been denied, given that his
condition as certified by his physician stated that he
was unable to work, and the duration of his impairment
was indefinite at the time. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 37; 524 ¶ 31).
39. On September 28, 2021, Rodríguez was informed via e-mail
that his short-term disability benefits were ending, and
that he was being considered for the approval of longterm disability benefits. (Docket No. 52-2 ¶ 38).
40. Dr. Banchs filled out another “Disability Claims Form,”
dated October 18, 2021. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 39; 52-33).
41. The “Disability Claims Form” filled out by Dr. Banchs on
October 18, 2021, stated that:
a. Rodríguez’s primary diagnosis was hypertensive
cardiovascular disease, and his secondary diagnosis
was anxiety. (Docket No. 52-33 at 1, Section B).
b. He did not advise Rodríguez to return to work. (Id.
at 2, Section B).

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -18c. He instructed Rodríguez to “[a]void emotional job
stressors –this can cause worsening of blood
pressure control.” (Id. at 2, Section C).
d. As to the duration of this restriction, he stated
that
Rodríguez’s
restriction
to
work
was
“indefinite.” (Id.).
42. Rodríguez began receiving long-term disability benefits
on October 25, 2021, with the first payment covering the
period from November 27, 2020, through October 26, 2021.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 41; 52-34).
43. UNUM’s letter informing Rodríguez of the approval of his
long-term disability benefits defined “disability” for
purposes of receiving long-term disability benefits:
You are disabled when Unum determines that:
- you are limited from performing the
material and substantial duties of your
regular occupation due to your sickness or
injury; and
- you have a 20% or more loss in your indexed
monthly earnings due to the same sickness or
injury.
After 24 months of payments, you are disabled
when Unum determines that due to the same
sickness or injury, you are unable to perform
the duties of any gainful occupation for
which you are reasonably fitted by education,
training or experience.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 42; 52-34 at 3).
44. On October 29, 2021, Barr contacted Rodríguez to inform
him that they had verified his disability benefits status
with UNUM, and that Cucalón would contact him soon.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 43; 52-19 at 156 ¶¶ 7-12).
45. On November 2, 2021, Rodríguez met with Cucalón and Barr,
who informed him that DHL had decided to terminate his
employment because they needed to occupy his position of
Area Operations Manager and because his return-to-work
date at the time could not be determined. (Docket Nos.
52-2 ¶ 44; 52-4 at ¶ 34; 52-19 at 159 ¶¶ 8-12).

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -19-

46. At the time of Rodríguez’s employment termination, DHL
had the following vacant administrative positions:
a. Station Service Manager (San Juan Office):
this position was opened on June 30, 2020,
and closed on November 30, 2021. DHL never
filled the vacancy.
b. Field Services Supervisor (Ponce Office):
this position was opened on July 7, 2020, and
closed on May 11, 2022. DHL never filled the
vacancy.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 45; 52-4 at ¶ 35).
47. Both positions previously mentioned were physically
demanding, requiring more physical presence in the ramp
area overseeing the loading and unloading of merchandise.
(Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 46; 52-4 at ¶ 36).
48. Rodríguez never applied for either of the vacant
positions. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 47; 52-4 at ¶ 37).
49. On Nov 29, 2021, the position of Area Operations Manager,
previously occupied by Rodríguez, was opened for hire,
which was eventually occupied on February 25, 2022, when
Rafael Medina was internally hired from the Houston
office. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 48; 52-4 at ¶ 38).
50. Rodríguez continued to receive long-term disability
benefits until December 12, 2022. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 49;
52-19 at 154 ¶¶ 1-24; 52-35).
51. Rodríguez did not return to work after the termination
of his long-term disability benefits. (Docket Nos. 52-2
¶ 50; 52-19 at 177 ¶¶ 9-14).
52. After his long-term disability benefits ended, Rodríguez
applied for and began receiving Social Security
disability benefits. (Docket Nos. 52-2 ¶ 51; 52-19 at 182
¶¶ 7-11).

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -20IV.
A.

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

Law 44 — Failure to Accommodate Claim
In his Amended Complaint, Rodríguez claims that DHL violated

its duty to provide him with a reasonable accommodation for his
uncontrolled arterial hypertension and anxiety disorder under Law
44. DHL requests summary judgment. It argues that Rodríguez’s
failure to accommodate claim fails as a matter of law since he was
unable to return to work and, therefore, could not show that he
was a qualified individual who could perform the essential duties
of his position as Area Operations Manager.
Law 44 is the Puerto Rico law analogue of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq, and requires
the same elements of proof. Lahens v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico,
Inc., 28 F.4th 325, 337 (1st Cir. 2022) (“[Law 44] was modeled
after the ADA. It was intended to harmonize Puerto Rico law with
the federal statutory provisions of the ADA. Thus, the elements of
proof for a claim under Law 44 are essentially the same as for a
claim under the ADA.”) (internal citations omitted) (citing Torres
v. House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of P.R., 858
F.Supp.2d 172, 194 (D.P.R. 2012)).
Under ADA and Law 44, a “qualified individual” is a person
“who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential

functions

of

the

employment

position

that

such

individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 1211(8); 1 L.P.R.A. §

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -21501

(e).

“Under

the

ADA,

employers

are

required

to

provide

reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified applicant or
employee with a disability, unless the employer can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
employer’s business.” Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d
100, 106 (1st Cir. 2005).
The

First

Circuit

has

stated

that

“whether

a

requested

accommodation is reasonable or whether it imposes an undue hardship
are questions typically proved through direct, objective evidence.
Accordingly,. . .the McDonnell Douglas model does not apply to ADA
discrimination claims based on failure to reasonably accommodate.”
Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 n.3 (1st Cir.
2001) (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d
252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999)). The Court, therefore, applies the First
Circuit’s reasonable accommodation framework, rather than the
McDonnell Douglas framework to the extent that Rodríguez bases his
discrimination

claims

on

DHL’s

alleged

failure

to

reasonably

accommodate his disability. See Tobin, 433 F.3d at 106-107.
To survive a motion for summary judgment on a reasonable
accommodation claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he was able to
perform the essential functions of his job, either with or without
a reasonable accommodation; and (3) the employer knew of his
disability yet failed to reasonably accommodate it. Audette v.

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -22Town of Plymouth, 858 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Lang v.
Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 454 (1st Cir. 2016));
Valle-Arce v. P.R. Ports Authority, 651 F.3d 190, 198 (1st Cir.
2011).
Turning to the first prima facie element, the Court will
assume, without deciding, that Rodríguez had a disability within
the meaning of the ADA, hence Law 44. For purposes of this
discussion, therefore, Rodríguez met the first prong.
As for the second element —the essential functions issue—
Rodríguez had to show that he could perform the essential duties
of his position, either with or without a reasonable accommodation.
“An essential function is a ‘fundamental job duty of the position
at issue. The term does not include marginal tasks, but may
encompass individual or idiosyncratic characteristics’ [sic] of
the job.’” Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 88 (1st
Cir. 2012) (quoting Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir.
2001)). Courts consider factors such as “the employer’s judgment,
written job descriptions, the work experience of past incumbents
of the job, and the current work experience of incumbents in
similar jobs,” and give a “significant degree of deference to an
employer’s business judgment about the necessities of a job.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, courts consider
“evidence of the amount of time spent performing the particular
function.” Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 25

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -23(1st Cir. 2002). “Courts take into consideration factors other
than the employer’s determination of the essential functions of
the job not ‘to second-guess legitimate business judgments, but,
rather, to ensure that an employer’s asserted requirements are
solidly anchored in the realities of the workplace, not constructed
out of whole cloth.’” Gillen, 238 F.3d at 25.
In this case, as per the job description on the record
submitted by DHL, an Area Operations Manager “provides operational
management and support at various service center locations to
ensure efficient and timely pick-up and delivery handling of
customer materials and shipments. Ensures compliance with safety,
security, regulatory, and company policies.” (Docket No. 52-22).
Furthermore, as per Rodríguez’s testimony during his deposition,
he was DHL’s highest-ranking officer in Puerto Rico. (Docket No.
52-19 at 28).
DHL argues that Rodríguez’s medical restrictions limited him
in such a way that he could not perform any of the essential duties
of his position, with or without an accommodation, because he was
simply unable to work. The record shows that according to his own
physicians, Rodríguez’s medical conditions limited him to the
extent that he could not perform the essential duties of his
position

of

Area

Operations

Manager,

with

or

without

an

accommodation, to the point that he was never released to return
to work. It is uncontested that Rodríguez’s doctors consistently

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -24informed DHL —through the forms they certified— that his medical
condition

did

not

allow

him

“Accommodation

Substantiation

cardiologist,

Dr.

Banchs,

to

work.

Form”

stated

Specifically,

Rodríguez

that

his

in

the

submitted,

his

medical

condition

affected the following major life activities: bending breathing,
caring for self, concentrating, interacting with others, lifting,
performing manual tasks, reaching, sleeping and walking; that in
an eight (8) hour workday, he could “never” bend/stoop/crouch,
climb,

balance,

squat/kneel,

use

twist
hands

the

upper

body,

repetitively,

reach

use

shoulder

vibrating

level,

tools

or

equipment, or flex/extend neck; that he could “occasionally” use
a keyboard with his left hand; that a return to work date could
not be determined; and more importantly, that he was not able to
perform his job, with or without accommodation. Moreover, the
reasonable accommodation request clearly states that the duration
of Rodríguez’s impairment was “undefined,” and the period of
incapacity ranges from May 29, 2020, to “undefined.” See (Docket
No. 52-31).
In addition, as part of the process of requesting short-term
disability benefits, Rodríguez submitted two (2) “Fitness for Duty
Certifications,” one from Dr. Banchs and one from his psychiatrist,
Dr. Normandía, in which both physicians concluded that Rodríguez
was unable to work. See (Docket Nos. 52-26; 52-27). Rodríguez did
not provide evidence as to how his inability to work for purposes

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -25of obtaining disability benefits is consistent with his argument
that he is a qualified individual for his disability discrimination
claim. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S.
795 (1999); Thompson v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc., 989 F.3d 135 (1st
Cir. 2021).
Furthermore, the First Circuit has held that “attendance is
an essential function of any job.” Rios–Jimenez v. Principi, 520
F.3d

31,

42

(1st

Cir.

2008)

(holding

that

an

employee

who

frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to
perform the essential functions of her job, either with or without
a reasonable accommodation, as required to support disability
discrimination

and

reasonable

accommodation

claims

under

the

Rehabilitation Act). It is uncontested that Rodríguez had been on
various forms of leave for over a year, since May 29, 2020. Even
if his absenteeism was tied to his illness, the “[i]nability to
work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class
protected by the ADA.” Byrne v. Avon Products, Inc., 328 F.3d 379,
381 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). See also Perkins v. Ameritech
Corp.,

161

Fed.Appx.

578

(7th

Cir.

2006)

(affirming

summary

judgment dismissing ADA claims of former employee who suffered
depression,

anxiety,

and

fibromyalgia

because

her

failure

to

appear regularly for work removed her from the class of “qualified
individuals” protected by the ADA). Simply put, “one who does not
come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -26otherwise.” Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F.Supp. 481 (W.D.Tenn.1986),
aff’d, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1987). In fact, “[i]f the plaintiff,
with

or

without

essential

reasonable

function

of

the

accommodation,
job,

then

he

cannot
is

not

perform
a

an

qualified

individual and there is no duty to accommodate.” Calef v. Gillette
Co., 322 F.3d 75, 86 n. 8 (1st Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing
Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 753–54 (1st Cir. 1995)).
Rodríguez’s failure to accommodate claim requires sufficient
evidence that he was a “qualified individual.” See Tobin, 433 F.3d
at 107; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). He has not presented such evidence.
Even if the Court examines the facts in the light most favorable
to Rodríguez, it finds that he has failed to establish that he
could perform his essential job functions. Rather, the undisputed
evidence,

as

discussed

earlier,

includes

admissions

at

his

deposition and in his briefing that he was not a “qualified
individual.”
The Court’s analysis could end here. Nevertheless, Rodríguez
claims that he could have done his job had DHL granted him a
reasonable accommodation. To this extent, Rodríguez avers that DHL
could have reasonably accommodated him by either: (1) keeping him
on continuous leave; or (2) reassigning him to a “lower-level
position.”

DHL

challenges

both

proposed

accommodations

as

unreasonable. It argues that an employer is neither required to

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -27provide an employee with an accommodation of his choice nor to
accommodate an otherwise “unqualified individual.”

1. Request for an indefinite leave
At the outset, it is correct that an employer is not obliged
to provide an employee with the accommodation he requests or
prefers;

the

employer

needs

only

to

provide

some

reasonable

accommodation. See Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499
(7th Cir. 1996); Schmidt v. Methodist Hospital, 89 F.3d 342, 34445 (7th Cir. 1996). Rodríguez bears the burden of showing the
existence

of

a

reasonable

accommodation.

See

Reed

v.

LePage

Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 2001). To satisfy that
burden, “a plaintiff needs to show not only that [(1)] the proposed
accommodation would enable him to perform the essential functions
of her job, but also that, [(2)] at least on the face of things,
it is feasible for the employer under the circumstances.” Id. at
259. The First Circuit has referred to the second aspect of this
burden as an obligation to show that the requested accommodation
is “facially reasonable.” Reed, 244 F.3d at 260; see also DelgadoEchevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119, 127 (1st Cir.
2017). This is where Rodríguez’s arguments fall short.
Turning

to

Rodríguez’s

requested

accommodation

for

a

continued leave, it is settled that a leave of absence or extension
can constitute a reasonable accommodation under the ADA “in some

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -28circumstances.” García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212
F.3d 638, 647 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Criado v. IBM Corp., 145
F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998). “Whether [a] leave request is
reasonable turns on the facts of the case.” García-Ayala, 212 F.3d
at 647 (alterations in original) (quoting Criado, 145 F.3d at 443).
Yet, as the First Circuit has stated, “the fact-intensive nature
of

the

reasonable-accommodation

inquiry

does

not

insulate

disability-discrimination cases from summary judgment.” DelgadoEchevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d at 128. To the
contrary, a plaintiff must show that the requested accommodation
is facially reasonable even at the summary-judgment stage. See
Reed, 244 F.3d at 259-60. And, where a plaintiff fails to show
facial

reasonableness,

summary

judgment

for

the

defendant

is

appropriate. Delagdo-Echevarría, 856 F.3d at 128.
The First Circuit has further stated that “[c]ompliance with
a request for a lengthy period of leave imposes obvious burdens on
an employer, not the least of which entails somehow covering the
absent

employee’s

extended

leave.”

job

responsibilities

Delgado-Echevarria,

856

during

the

F.3d

at

employee’s
131.

“Undue

hardships are not limited to financial impacts; the term includes
accommodations

that

are

disruptive,

that

would

or

unduly

extensive,

fundamentally

alter

substantially
the

nature

operation of the business.” Garcia-Ayala 212 F.3d at 650.

or

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -29Here, it is uncontested that at the time of his termination
of employment on November 2, 2021, Rodríguez had been absent from
his job since May 2020, well over one year. During that time, he
was afforded different leaves, and none of his doctors ever cleared
him to return to work. On the contrary, every medical certification
that is on record states that he could not return to work because
of his medical condition and that the duration of his incapacity
was “undefined.” After examining his “Accommodation Substantiation
Form,” together with all the uncontested facts and evidence on
record, it is clear that Rodríguez’s request amounted to an
indefinite leave. To this point, the First Circuit has undoubtedly
acknowledged that “a request for an extended leave could indeed be
too long to be a reasonable accommodation and no reasonable
factfinder could conclude otherwise.” García-Ayala, 212 F.3d at
649. Most recently, the First Circuit reiterated that “[c]ourts
confronted with similar requests. . .have concluded that such
requests are not facially reasonable.” Sarkisian v. Austin Prep.
Sch., 85 F.4th 670, 676 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Delgado-Echevarria,
856 F.3d at 130 (collecting cases)).
Our sister circuits have similarly found requests for an
extended leave to be unreasonable accommodation requests. See
Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014)
(Gorsuch, J.); Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No.
15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -30Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave,
after the employee had already received nine months of leave, was
an unreasonable accommodation request where the employee would
remain unable to perform essential functions for another six
months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 F. App’x 221, 22627 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher’s request for four months’
leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine
Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months
of leave was reasonable); Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc.,
518 F. App’x 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n indefinite, but at
least six-month long, leave of absence to permit [the employee] to
fulfill

the

recommendations
qualified

under

[substance-abuse
so

that

the

DOT

he

might

professional’s]

treatment

eventually

be

physically

a

reasonable

regulations

is

not

accommodation.”); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 38081 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away
from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify
as reasonable accommodation because “[i]nability to work for a
multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by
the ADA.”).
Rodríguez was DHL’s highest-ranking officer in Puerto Rico
and was responsible for DHL’s operations throughout the Island.
Certainly, an 18-month absence from work, followed by an indefinite

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -31leave request with no foreseeable return date, cannot be deemed
reasonable. Therefore, the Court concludes that Rodríguez has not
carried his burden to demonstrate that his request for a further
leave

of

absence

was

facially

reasonable.

Rodríguez’s

claims

cannot survive summary judgment if he cannot show, at a minimum,
that his proposed accommodation “seems reasonable on its face,” US
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
2. Request for reassignment to a “lower-level position”
Rodríguez also claims that DHL could have reassigned him to
a “lower-level position” as a reasonable accommodation. Certainly,
the ADA provides that a “reasonable accommodation” may include
“reassignment to a vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
However, as a first step, the employee must demonstrate that there
is an actual vacant position to which he can transfer. Lang v.
Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d at 456. Failure-to-reassign
claims are nuanced and differ from other causes of action arising
from requests for reasonable accommodations. Audette v. Town of
Plymouth, 858 F.3d 13, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2017). “[The] burden for
the employee at the second step of the inquiry changes slightly
when an employee becomes disabled, can no longer perform the
essential functions of [his] job, and requests as an accommodation
a transfer or complete reassignment of duties.” Id. at 20. “Instead
of addressing the essential functions of [his] current position,

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -32an employee must demonstrate that [he] can perform the essential
functions of the position [he] desires.” Id. at 21.
As to this reasonable accommodation request, the record is
devoid of any evidence that establishes a valid claim. First,
Rodríguez has failed to identify, much less demonstrate, which —
if any— vacant position existed at DHL at the time. Second, he has
failed to show that he could perform the essential functions of
the “lower-level position” he desired. On the contrary, the record
reflects that at the time of Rodríguez’s termination, two vacant
administrative-level positions existed, which were more physically
demanding than the Area Operations Manager position he held.
Therefore, this failure to accommodate claim also fails.
Having found that Rodríguez failed to establish a valid claim
under the ADA because he failed to meet the requisite elements of
a prima facie failure to accommodate claim, his claim under Law 44
—which has essentially the same elements of proof as an ADA claim—
suffers the same fate. Consequently, his claims under Law 44 shall
be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Law 80 — Wrongful Termination
Law 80 is Puerto Rico’s unjust dismissal statute. 29 L.P.R.
§ 185a et seq.; Otero-Burgos v. Inter American University, 558
F.3d 1, 7-9 (1st Cir. 2009). It defines just cause for dismissal
and provides a severance-payment remedy for those employees who

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -33can establish that they were wrongfully dismissed pursuant to that
statute. According to this statute, “[j]ust cause for discharge of
an employee shall be understood to be that which is not based on
legally prohibited reasons and on a whim of the employer.” 29
L.P.R.A. § 185b. Law 80 specifies, among others, that the following
grounds are considered good cause for termination:

when the

employee “indulges in a pattern of improper or disorderly conduct,”
id. §185b(a); “the employee engages in a pattern of deficient,
inefficient, unsatisfactory, poor, slow or negligent performance,”
which “includes noncompliance with the employers’ quality and
safety rules and standards, low productivity, lack of competence
or ability to perform the work at reasonable levels as required by
the

employer

customers,”

and

id.

repeated

§185b(b);

complaints

and

there

are

from

the

employer’s

“[t]echnological

or

reorganization changes as well as changes of style, design, or the
nature of the product made or handled by the [company],” id.
§185b(e).
Moreover,

the

following

burden-shifting

framework

applicable to Law 80 claims:
(1) the employee must [first] show that he or she has
been discharged and allege that the dismissal was not
justified; (2) the burden then shifts to the employer to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
dismissal was justified; and (3) if the employer
shoulders that burden, the employee must rebut the
showing of good cause.

is

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -34García-García v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 878 F.3d 411, 420 (1st
Cir. 2017).
In the case at hand, Rodríguez has met his initial burden
under Law 80. It is undisputed that he was terminated from his
employment with DHL, and he alleges in his Amended Complaint that
such discharge was not justified. “Under Law 80, once an employee
proves that he was discharged and alleges that his dismissal was
unjustified, his employer must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the discharge was for good cause.” Hoyos v. Telecorp
Comm., Inc., 488 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing 29 L.P.R.A. §
185b).
“Good cause for dismissal is related to the proper and normal
operation of the establishment.” Id.; see also Álvarez-Fonseca v.
Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 1998)
(“A discharge made by mere whim or fancy of the employer or without
cause

related

to

the

proper

and

normal

operation

of

the

establishment shall not be considered as a discharge for [just]
cause.”).

Construing

Puerto

Rico

law,

the

First

Circuit

has

described what an employer must show “to establish just cause under
Law 80.” See Pérez v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 804 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
2015).

“[A]n

employer

need

only

demonstrate

that

it

had

a

reasonable basis to believe” that the case’s circumstances fit
within an example of just cause listed in the statute. See id.
“Law 80’s language forbidding ‘an employer [from] act[ing] on a

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -35‘whim’’ suggests ‘that a ‘just’ discharge is one where an employer
provides a considered, non-arbitrary reason for an employee’s
termination

that

bears

some

relationship

to

the

[company’s]

operation.’” Villeneuve v. Avon Products, Inc., 919 F.3d 40, 48
(1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Horizon Lines, Inc., 804 F.3d at 9).
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that judges do not
serve “as [a] super personnel department[ ], assessing the merits—
or even the rationality—of employers’ nondiscriminatory business
decisions.” Id. at 48 (quoting Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d
816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991)).
In the case at hand, the Court analyzed Rodríguez’s ADA claims
and found that he was not a covered qualified individual and
further that his request for indefinite leave and for reassignment
was

unreasonable.

Therefore,

Rodríguez’s

discrimination

and

failure to accommodate claims under ADA were not established. In
addition, DHL proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Rodríguez was discharged as a result of his continued absence for
almost 18 months and his inability to return to work at DHL, where
his leadership was required as he occupied the highest-ranking
position

in

the

business.

Specifically,

DHL

established

that

Rodríguez was unable “to perform the work at reasonable levels as
required by the employer” in a job as Area Operations Manager,
which among other things “provides operational management and
support”

and

“ensures

compliance

with

safety,

security,

Civil No. 22-01539(GMM)
Page -36regulatory, and company policies.” See (Docket No. 52-22); 29
L.P.R. § 185b(b). This constitutes just cause under Law 80.
Finally, Rodríguez has not set forth on the record anything
that rebuts this showing of just cause. To satisfy this burden and
withstand summary judgment, Rodríguez was required to do more than
“cast doubt” on DHL’s proffered reason for his discharge; instead,
Rodríguez had to “adduce probative evidence that [DHL] did not
genuinely believe in or did not in fact terminate [Rodríguez] for
the given reason.” García-García v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 878
F.3d 411, 421 (1st Cir. 2017).
As such, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to Rodríguez, DHL has sufficiently established that it terminated
him for just cause under Law 80.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS DHL’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Rodríguez’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. Judgment of Dismissal shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 7, 2025.

s/Gina R. Méndez-Miró
GINA R. MÉNDEZ-MIRÓ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE