Puerto Rico Soccer League NFP, Corp., et.al., v. Federacion Puertorriquena de Futbol, et.al.,

Filing 138

OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth in this Opinion and Order, FIFA's Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 88 is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claim; GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' RICO Act claims; and GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' commonwealth-law claims. Plaintiffs' RICO Act claims and commonwealth-law claims against FIFA are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 11/25/2024. (mrr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
PUERTO RICO SOCCER LEAGUE NFP,
CORP., ET AL
Plaintiffs
CIVIL NO. 23-1203 (RAM)

v.
FEDERACIÓN PUERTORRIQUEÑA
FUTBOL, ET AL

DE

Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending

before

Internationale
Dismiss

the

the

Court

is

co-defendant

de

Football

Association’s

Third

Amended

Complaint

(“FIFA”)

(“Motion”

or

Fédération
Motion

to

“Motion

to

Dismiss”), as well as the corresponding opposition, reply, and
surreply. (Docket Nos. 88, 105, 113, and 117). For the reasons
below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART FIFA’s Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

FIFA seeks dismissal of the totality of Plaintiffs’ claims
against it, namely: violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
as well as tortious interference with a contract, abuse of process,
and breach of fiduciary duty under Puerto Rico law.
On September 30, 2024, the Court issued an Opinion and Order
describing the procedural background of this case and granting in

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)
part

a

motion

to

2
dismiss

by

co-defendants

Federación

Puertorriqueña de Fútbol, Inc. (“FPF”) and its directors. (Docket
No. 129). Specifically, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ RICO and
Puerto Rico law claims as to FPF and its directors. The Court
incorporates by reference that Opinion and Order in its entirety
for the purposes of the present Motion.
II.

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The Court begins by considering FIFA’s request that the Court
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)
for lack of personal jurisdiction.
A. Legal Standard
A federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant must satisfy both the long-arm statute of the forum in
which

the

tribunal

sits

and

the

Due

Process

Clause

of

the

Constitution. Baskin-Robbins Fran. LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc.,
825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016). The First Circuit has held, and
FIFA agrees, that Puerto Rico’s long-arm statute extends “up to
the point allowed by the Constitution.” Negron-Torres v. Verizon
Commc’ns.,

Inc.,

478

F.3d

19,

24

(1st

Cir.

2007)

(citation

omitted); (Docket No. 88 at 13). Therefore, the Court discusses
only the constitutional requirements.
Due

Process

requires

a

defendant

“have

certain

minimum

contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)
suit

does

not

offend

3
‘traditional

notions

of

fair

play

and

substantial justice.’” Baskin-Robbins Fran. LLC, 825 F.3d at 3435 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment
Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Such contacts can
establish either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction
over a defendant.
Under a theory of general jurisdiction, the minimum-contacts
requirement is satisfied by showing a defendant’s “continuous and
systematic activity” in the forum state or territory, regardless
of those contacts’ relation to the litigation at hand. FosterMiller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 144 (1st
Cir.

1995).

“[T]he

lodestar

corporation’s

general

sufficiently

continuous

of

business
and

the

inquiry

contacts

systematic

with
‘as

is

whether

the

forum

are

render

[it]

the
to

essentially at home in the forum State.’” Kuan Chen v. United
States Sports Acad., Inc., 956 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011)). “The paradigmatic examples of locales in which a defendant
corporation is considered at home are its state of incorporation
and the state that houses its principal place of business.” Id.
(citing BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017)).
However, there are rare cases where “a defendant corporation’s
general business operations in a state in which it is neither

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

4

incorporated nor headquartered ‘may be so substantial and of such
a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.’” Id.
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 761 n.19 (2014)).
On the other hand, specific jurisdiction requires the minimum
contacts be related to the plaintiff’s claims. PREP Tours, Inc. v.
Am.

Youth

Soccer

Org.,

913

F.3d

11,

17

(1st

Cir.

2019).

Specifically, a plaintiff must show:
(1) its claim directly arises out of or
relates to the defendant’s forum activities;
(2) the defendant’s forum contacts represent
a purposeful availment of the privilege of
conducting activities in that forum, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of the
forum’s laws and rendering the defendant’s
involuntary presence in the forum’s courts
foreseeable;
and
(3)
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction is reasonable.
Plixer Int’l, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2018) (citation omitted).
The conventional method for determining if the requirements
for jurisdiction are met is the prima facie approach, where a court
considers “only whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence that,
if credited, is enough to support findings of all facts essential
to personal jurisdiction.” Foster-Miller, Inc., 46 F.3d at 145
(citation omitted). “To make a prima facie showing of this calibre
[sic], the plaintiff ordinarily cannot rest upon the pleadings,
but is obliged to adduce evidence of specific facts.” Id.; see
also Plixer Int’l, Inc., 905 F.3d at 7; PREP Tours, Inc., 913 F.3d

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

5

at 16. The court accepts as true any properly documented proffers
of evidence, as well as any undisputed facts asserted by the
defendant. PREP Tours, Inc., 913 F.3d at 16-17 (citation omitted);
Plixer Int’l, Inc., 905 F.3d at 6 (citation omitted).
B. Forum-Related Contacts
Here, the Court applies the prima facie approach because there
are enough facts proffered by Plaintiffs or undisputed by FIFA to
determine whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over FIFA,
and fairness does not require holding a hearing to make that
determination. See Foster-Miller, Inc., 46 F.3d 138 at 145-46. The
Court considers only those contacts by FIFA that occurred leading
up to and around the time of Defendants’ allegedly illegal conduct,
beginning in March of 2018. See (Docket No. 33 at 14); Harlow v.
Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2005) (concluding
“proper focus” of specific-jurisdiction analysis is “contacts
leading up to and surrounding the claimed injury”). While the Court
has

considered

all

of

the

documents

attached

to

Plaintiffs’

Opposition and non-controverted contacts, it summarizes here only
those that are relevant to the Court’s discussion.
In 2002, FIFA, CONCACAF, and FPF signed an agreement creating
a normalizing commission to restructure FPF. (Docket No. 105-1 at
20). One of the commission’s tasks was to elect a new executive
committee. Id. Pursuant to this agreement, FIFA wrote in January

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

6

of 2003 to inform FPF that it viewed FPF’s recent election of an
executive

committee,

without

the

input

of

the

normalizing

commission, to be illegitimate. Id. at 23.
On January 31, 2003, FIFA wrote FPF to request the results of
a recent audit that had been conducted of FPF. Id. at 25.
On November 12, 2013, the Secretary General of FIFA, Jérôme
Valcke (“Valcke”), wrote to the president of FPF, Eric Labrador,
and referenced a recent two-day meeting in San Juan attended by
representatives of FIFA, CONCACAF, and FPF. (Docket No. 105-2 at
8). Valcke stated that at those meetings, FIFA “learned that
several

leagues

and

other

groups

active

in

Puerto

Rico

are

independent and operate outside the FPF.” Id. Therefore, Valcke
reminded FPF that the FIFA Statutes require FPF to “organize,
supervise and control football, whatever its form, at the national
level, and to recognize all leagues and groups, as well as to
guarantee their affiliation to the federation.” Id. (emphasis
added). Valcke urged FPF “to take measure to ensure the fulfillment
of its obligations” and requested FPF “keep us updated on any
developments in this regard.” Id. He asserted FPF “must fully
comply with the FIFA Statutes” and “any infringement may result in
penalties.” Id.

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

7

In the same letter, Valcke reminded FPF the FIFA Statutes
require Member Associations to “adopt Statutes that respect the
provisions of the FIFA Model Statutes.” Id. at 9. Valcke continued:
In this context, [t]he FIFA Associations
Committee has decided that its association
will have to conclude the process of revising
the statutes before the next elections for the
FPF leadership positions are held. To this
end . . . we proposed a new version of the FPF
Statutes and we hope to receive your comments
on it as soon as possible.
Id.
On September 27, 2019, Mattias Grafström (“Grafström”), who
Plaintiffs allege works for FIFA, responded to an email from FPF
regarding purported plans by several FIFA-affiliated teams in
Puerto Rico to participate in an unsanctioned event. (Docket No.
33 at 17-18). According to Plaintiffs, Grafström “inform[ed] FPF
that it can take action against members that participate in a
tournament that was not authorized by the Federation and that the
Federation was in a position to act in conformance with Article
14(1)(d) of the FPF Statutes.” Id. at 18. As discussed below, FIFA
does not dispute that this email exchange took place. See (Docket
Nos. 88 at 15-16 and 113 at 7-8).
As of fall of 2019, when PRSL was purportedly excluded from
the market for league tournaments, FIFA allegedly recognized FPF
as the “FIFA-affiliated sanctioning authority in Puerto Rico.”
(Docket No. 33 at 10). Also during that time, multiple soccer-

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

8

related entities in Puerto Rico were affiliated with FIFA. Id.
Plaintiffs allege each of these organizations, including FPF and
CONCACAF, as well as various leagues and clubs, were required to
comply with FIFA’s “rule that all league tournaments must be
sanctioned by the National Association in whose territory the match
will be played, Puerto Rico in this case.” Id. According to
Plaintiffs, and not disputed by FIFA, “[a]ny violation of FIFA
rules [by these organizations] [was] subject to discipline.” Id.
On August 16, 2021, the FIFA Director of Member Associations,
Kenny Jean-Marie (“Jean-Marie”), wrote to FPF’s then-president
Iván Rivera Gutiérrez. (Docket No. 105-2 at 12). Jean-Marie stated
that upon analyzing the 2019 edition of the FPF statutes, “we
consider that the next elections should be held in March 2023.”
Id.
On June 29, 2022, and October 2, 2023, FIFA posted information
on its website, as well as issuing a press release, regarding its
investments in Puerto Rico via the Forward Development program.
(Docket No. 105-1 at 4). The website and press release explained
FIFA had provided “technical and financial backing” for FPF to
purchase land, obtain sports facilities, and develop youth soccer
leagues. Id.
On November 11, 2022, Jean-Marie wrote to FPF again, stating
in part:

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

9

We acknowledge receipt of your email dated
October 7, 2022, which contains the ratified
version of the Statutes of the Puerto Rican
Football Federation (FPF) that was approved by
the FPF Congress held on October 5, 2022.
In this regard, we inform you that we have
reviewed this version and confirm that it
complies with the requirements and standards
of FIFA and Concacaf.
(Docket No. 105-2 at 16). Jean-Marie added that “these new statutes
should be used for the organization of the next [FPF] elections at
the beginning of 2023.” Id. Jean-Marie made two additional points
in the letter. First, “FPF must, at all times, manage its affairs
independently and ensure that there is no interference by third
parties in its internal affairs and respecting at all times the
statutes and guidelines of its international football governing
bodies.” Id. Second, FPF was to keep FIFA “informed at all times”
of any changes to FPF statutes. Id.
Around

the

time

of

the

representative

also

met

According

the

Declaration

to

in

November

person

with

of

2022

letter,

FPF

representatives.

María

E.

a

FIFA

Larracuente

(“Larracuente”), (Docket No. 105-3), a senior manager at FIFA
“tasked with political and diplomatic issues linked to Member
Associations” met with FPF representatives, officers and General
Assembly members to discuss FPF’s revised statutes. Id. at 6. These
meetings allegedly took place in October and November of 2022. Id.
at 6-7.

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

10

Finally, as of April 13, 2024, FPF sold a FIFA-branded office
chair in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 105-3 at 6).
C. General Jurisdiction
The Court begins by assessing Plaintiffs’ claim that FIFA is
subject to general jurisdiction in Puerto Rico. At the outset,
FIFA’s contacts with Puerto Rico fall outside the paradigm examples
of an organization “at home.” BNSF Ry. Co., 581 U.S. at 413.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that FIFA has no office, mailing address,
or phone number in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 105-1 at 2). It is
also undisputed that FIFA is not registered to do business in
Puerto Rico. Id. Nor does FIFA have any real property interest,
pay income taxes, hold accounts, keep books, or maintain records
in Puerto Rico. Id. Notwithstanding this, Plaintiffs assert FIFA
is subject to general jurisdiction in Puerto Rico based on a
potpourri of FIFA contacts with Puerto Rico since 2002. After
reviewing these, contacts, the Court finds FIFA is not subject to
general jurisdiction in Puerto Rico.
To

begin,

while

Plaintiffs

proffer

FIFA’s

role

in

restructuring FPF from 2002 to 2004, the next example of forumrelated contacts after that did not occur until 2013. See (Docket
Nos. 105-1 at 1-3 and 105-2 at 6). Given that roughly nine-year
gap, the activities of FIFA’s normalizing commission from 2002 to
2004 can hardly be considered evidence of FIFA’s continuous and

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

11

systematic activity in Puerto Rico today. See Worldwide Subsidy
Grp., LLC v. Fed’n Int’l de Football Ass’n, 2014 WL 12631652, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“These facts, all of which concern activity
in

which

FIFA

was

engaged

more

than

ten

years

ago,

do

not

demonstrate that such activity is ongoing now or that is has been
ongoing in the interim period.”).
Next, to the extent Plaintiffs argue FIFA is subject to
general jurisdiction by attributing FPF’s activities to FIFA, that
argument fails. In Daimler, the Supreme Court held that even if a
subsidiary’s actions in a forum were attributed to its parent
corporation, that would be insufficient to subject the parent
corporation to general jurisdiction. 571 U.S. at 136. Plaintiffs
make no attempt to distinguish this case, and they would have
trouble doing so; if a corporate subsidiary’s actions do not
automatically subject its parent to general jurisdiction, neither
do the actions of FPF, which is not a subsidiary of FIFA.
That leaves Plaintiffs’ argument for general jurisdiction
resting on an assortment of FIFA activities since 2013: FIFA’s
meetings and communications with FPF regarding implementation of
FIFA policy; review of FPF’ statutes and oversight of FPF’s
internal

elections;

ongoing

designation

of

FPF

as

FIFA’s

affiliating authority in Puerto Rico; recognition of other FIFA
affiliates in Puerto Rico; investment in Puerto Rico through the

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

12

Forward Development Program, and licensing or distributing FIFAbranded products to be sold by FPF in Puerto Rico. However,
Plaintiffs’ allegations make clear these contacts constitute only
a small fraction of FIFA’s activities as an organization. See
(Docket No. 33 at 7 (alleging FIFA has 211 affiliated national
federations around the world). Though a corporation may have many
homes, it cannot lay its head everywhere. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at
139 n.20. Rather, in determining where a corporation is subject to
general jurisdiction, courts should conduct “an appraisal of a
corporation’s activities in their entirety.” BNSF, 581 U.S. at
413.

Having

done

so,

the

Court

concludes

this

is

not

the

“exceptional case in which [FIFA’s] general business operations in
[Puerto Rico] are so unusually substantial that [FIFA] can fairly
be described as at home” here. Kuan Chen, 956 F.3d at 57.
D. Specific Jurisdiction
Because FIFA is not subject to general jurisdiction in Puerto
Rico, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs have put forward
sufficient

facts

to

showing

FIFA

is

subject

to

specific

jurisdiction. After considering the contacts with Puerto Rico
documented by Plaintiffs or undisputed by FIFA, the Court finds
they support a finding of specific personal jurisdiction as to
Plaintiffs’ section 1 claim but not their RICO Act claims.

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

13

1. Sherman Act Claim
i. Relatedness
The Court finds Plaintiffs have proffered multiple contacts
between

FIFA

and

Puerto

Rico

that

directly

relate

to

its

allegations of anticompetitive conduct. These include: FIFA’s 2013
in-person meetings with FPF officials less than six years prior to
the

cancellation

of

PRSL’s

2019-2020

tournament;

FIFA’s

2013

follow-up letter; Grafström’s 2019 email to FPF; FIFA’s ongoing
authorization of FPF as the local sanctioning authority for FIFA
in Puerto Rico; and the continuing recognition of FIFA affiliates
in Puerto Rico on the condition that they follow FIFA’s tournamentparticipation policy. By seeking compliance with FIFA statutes in
Puerto

Rico,

Plaintiffs

FIFA

sought

challenge

as

to

enforce

the

anticompetitive:

very
the

policies

that

proscription

on

sanctioning a league tournament not operated by FPF and the
prohibition on clubs or teams participating in non-sanctioned
events. (Docket No. 33 at 9-10, 44). Furthermore, its directive to
FPF

to

“organize,

control,

and

affiliate”

all

local

soccer

organizations in Puerto Rico relates to Plaintiffs’ allegation
that FPF and FIFA schemed for FPF to exercise its sanctioning
authority in an anticompetitive manner. (Docket Nos. 33 at 44 and
105-2 at 8).

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

14

FIFA points out that Plaintiffs’ allegations are that FPF
committed fraud when it warned clubs and teams from participating
in PRSL’s tournament, since PRSL was still affiliated with FIFA
and therefore not subject to the ban on participating in nonsanctioned events. (Docket No. 88 at 16-17). FIFA is correct to
the

extent

that

it

identifies

an

ambiguity

in

Plaintiffs’

Complaint. On the one hand, Plaintiffs allege FPF committed fraud
by telling clubs and players in Puerto Rico that PRSL was not
affiliated when it actually was. (Docket No. 33 at 18). On the
other hand, Plaintiffs allege they found out before the 2019-2020
season began that PRSL “would no longer be . . . sanctioned by
FIFA.” (Docket No. 33 at 19). They aver further that PRSL’s
affiliation was “unlawfully withheld” and that PRSL “has not been
able to obtain [FPF’s] affiliate status since.” Id. at 20.
For purposes of a 12(b)(2) motion, the Court must “constru[e]
disputed facts in the light most hospitable to [the] plaintiff.”
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir.
1994). Read from this perspective, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fairly
alleges FPF began announcing to clubs and players that PRSL was no
longer affiliated before it had formally revoked the affiliation,
but that FPF did in fact revoke the affiliation at a later date.
If so, FIFA’s tournament-participation policy would still have
directly

harmed

Plaintiffs.

Whether

FPF

lied

about

PRSL’s

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

15

affiliation first, then revoked it, or revoked it first and
continued to withhold it, the difference would not change the fact
that FIFA’s tournament-participation, as enforced in Puerto Rico
against PRSL, was the mechanism that allegedly excluded PRSL from
the market. As such, the Court is satisfied Plaintiffs have shown
a “nexus between [their] claim and the defendant[‘s] forum-based
activities.”

Rodriguez-Rivera

v.

Allscripts

Healthcare

Sols.,

Inc., 43 F.4th 150, 160-61 (1st Cir. 2022).
ii.
Since

Purposeful availment

FIFA’s

forum-related

contacts

are

related

to

Plaintiffs’ section 1 claim, the Court proceeds to consider whether
they also constitute purposeful availment of the privilege of doing
business in Puerto Rico. PREP Tours, Inc., 913 F.3d at 19. Because
FIFA’s business includes governing soccer, (Docket No. 88 at 9),
the Court asks in part whether FIFA purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of governing soccer here in Puerto Rico. See Hollins
v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 469 F. Supp. 2d 67, 73-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(finding that The International Tennis Federation’s “business is
sanctioning and regulating tennis tournaments” and collecting
similar cases); cf. Anderson v. Indiana Black Expo, Inc., 81 F.
Supp. 2d 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asking whether for purposes of
New York’s long-arm statute defendant had “purposefully avail[ed]

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

16

itself of the privilege of conducting activities” in the forum)
(emphasis added).
The Court finds that it has. FIFA “deliberately reached beyond
its home” into Puerto Rico in at least two ways. Rodriguez-Rivera,
43 F.4th at 163 (citation omitted). First, it chose to authorize
a local sanctioning authority in Puerto Rico, namely, FPF. This
authority

is

allowed

to

sanction

soccer

organizations

and

tournaments in Puerto Rico on the condition they comply with FIFA
rules. Second, FIFA has repeatedly contacted FPF in order to induce
it to enforce FIFA policies. This included sending FIFA personnel
to meet FPF personnel in San Juan, issuing a follow-up letter that
contained

both

directives

and

threats

of

penalties

for

non-

compliance, and encouraging FPF to enforce FIFA policy in Puerto
Rico. See Shields v. Fed’n Internationale de Natation, 419 F. Supp.
3d 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing meetings between representatives
of world swimming organization and national federation, along with
email

correspondence

between

the

two

organizations

and

world

organization’s request for follow-up as among the contacts that
supported personal jurisdiction over FINA).
Considered together, these activities “assure that personal
jurisdiction

is

not

premised

solely

upon

[FIFA’s]

‘random,

isolated, or fortuitous’ contacts.” Rodriguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at
163

(citation

omitted).

Rather,

FIFA’s

conduct

evinces

both

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

17

voluntariness and foreseeability. See Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at
207. There is no doubt FIFA activities in Puerto Rico have been
and continue to be voluntary. While FIFA is correct Grafström’s
email came in response to an email from FPF, there is no suggestion
Grafström was somehow tricked into misstating FIFA policy or how
it could be applied in Puerto Rico. See (Docket Nos. 33 at 18; 88
at 9-10 and 113 at 7). Nor is there reason to think Grafström would
have replied differently had FPF waited to contact him until after
PRSL’s affiliation was officially revoked. Grafström’s willingness
to field FPF’s email and his decision to respond by telling FPF it
could

take

action

against

noncompliant

members

both

show,

alongside the other facts proffered by Plaintiffs, that FIFA
availed itself of the privilege of conducting its business (i.e.,
soccer governance) in Puerto Rico. True, Grafström’s email alone
may not have allowed FIFA to foresee being haled into Puerto Rico.
Viewed together, however, FIFA’s ongoing efforts to enforce its
policy with regard to specific entities in Puerto Rico should have
allowed it to reasonably foresee that legal challenges to those
policies could potentially cause it to incur liability. As such,
the Court is satisfied Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing
purposeful availment by FIFA.

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

18

iii. Reasonableness
Finally, while the Court finds FIFA established the requisite
minimum

contacts

in

Puerto

Rico

to

subject

it

to

personal

jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction
if doing so would be unreasonable. See Harlow, 432 F.3d at 66. To
determine that question, courts consider the following gestalt
factors:
(1) the defendant’s burden of appearing, (2)
the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4)
the judicial system’s interest in obtaining
the
most
effective
resolution
of
the
controversy, and (5) the common interests of
all sovereigns in promoting substantive social
policies.
Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir.
1996). For FIFA to avoid personal jurisdiction on the basis of
these factors, it must make a “compelling case” that some or all
of these factors “would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” See
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
In this case, FIFA’s only argument about reasonability is
that the Grafström email was induced by fraud. (Docket No. 88 at
9 n.4). However, as the Court has already explained, none of the
facts alleged by Plaintiff suggest the substance of the policy
articulated by Grafström, nor his decision about how to respond to
a

report

of

participation

in

non-sanctioned

tournaments,

was

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

19

induced by fraud. More importantly, as indicated above, the Court’s
finding

that

FIFA’s

forum-related

contacts

are

related

to

Plaintiffs’ section 1 claim and constitute purposive availment is
based not just on Grafström’s email alone but on FIFA’s multiple
efforts to govern soccer in Puerto Rico ahead of PRSL’s alleged
exclusion.

Thus,

reasonableness
favors

the

with

already

exercise

FIFA’s

addressed,
of

sole
the

personal

argument

regarding

reasonableness

analysis

jurisdiction.

See

Knox

v.

MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685, 693 (1st Cir. 2019) (finding
personal

jurisdiction

after

disposing

of

defendant’s

single

argument concerning reasonableness).
Consideration

of

the

gestalt

factors

confirms

this

conclusion. First, while it is “almost always inconvenient and
costly for a party to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction,” “[FIFA]
alleges nothing special or unusual about its situation; indeed, it
does not even argue it would be burdened by litigating in Puerto
Rico.” Rodriguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at 166.
Second, Plaintiffs’ allegations of anticompetitive injury
raise the specter of ongoing harm to consumers in the market for
league

tournaments

in

Puerto

Rico,

potentially

dampening

the

output of tournaments played by top talent. Moreover, “[a] State
generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents
with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

20

of-state actors.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 473 (citation
omitted).
Third, Plaintiffs’ choice of forum should be afforded a
“degree of deference,” Foster-Miller, Inc., 46 F.3d 138 at 150,
and FIFA has not argued another forum would be more convenient for
Plaintiffs.
Fourth, the interest of the interstate judicial system in
obtaining efficient resolution of controversies points towards
exercising jurisdiction here in Puerto Rico, since the antitrust
allegations could lead to the need for local experts to analyze
the relevant Puerto Rico market.
Fifth, Puerto Rico has an interest in “affording its citizens
a convenient forum in which to bring their claims.” Nowak v. Tak
How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 719 (1st Cir. 1996). At the same
time,

Switzerland

has

its

own

interests

in

protecting

its

businesses and providing them a convenient forum. See id. This
last factor, then, does not cut in either direction. All the other
factors, however, weigh towards exercising personal jurisdiction.
Accordingly,

the

Court

finds

that

the

exercise

of

personal

jurisdiction over FIFA in this case is both authorized by Puerto
Rican law and in keeping with due process. FIFA’s Motion to Dismiss
as it relates to personal jurisdiction with regards to Plaintiff’s
Sherman Act claim is therefore DENIED.

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

21

2. RICO Act & Puerto Rico Law Claims
While the Court finds it has personal jurisdiction over FIFA
as to the section 1 claim, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ showing of
personal jurisdiction is insufficient as to their RICO Act and
commonwealth-law claims. That is because Plaintiffs have failed to
show the purported RICO or commonwealth-law violations arose from
or are related to FIFA’s forum-related contacts. See Plixer Int’l,
Inc., 905 F.3d at 7.
i. RICO Act claims
Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding purported RICO conduct are
that some or all of FPF Defendants (1) misrepresented PRSL’s and
the Pumas’ affiliation status; (2) misstated FPF rules during the
Pumas’

affiliation

process;

(3)

filed

fraudulent

complaints

against Cornejo within FPF and lied about the appeals process;
(4) used deceit to prevent Larracuente from bringing her own
complaints;

(5)

blocked

Larracuente

from

running

for

FPF

president; (6) misrepresented Larracuente’s availability to work
for CONCACAF; (7) misrepresented a candidate’s credentials during
an FPF election; (8) registered a travel agency as a front to hide
a conflict of interest; and (9) hired foreign nationals to work
illegally. Id. at 9-46.
Plaintiffs accuse only FPF Defendants of specific conduct
violating RICO. Plaintiffs’ RICO-related allegations against FIFA

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

22

are based on group pleadings or bald assertions. See, e.g., (Docket
No. 33 at 48) (alleging “Defendants devised, or intended to devise,
a scheme to defraud Plaintiffs of money”); id. at 49-50 (alleging
all Sherman and RICO Act violations “were done ‘in compliance with
FIFA and CONCACAF regulations and based on an initiative from FIFA
for the expansion of permanent federative national leagues’”).
Thus, to establish specific personal jurisdiction over FIFA as to
their RICO Act claims, Plaintiffs must show how FPF Defendants´
RICO violations arose from or are related to FIFA’s in-forum
contacts. Plaintiffs fail to meet this burden.
While Plaintiffs’ offer evidence to show FIFA’s oversight of
FPF’s statutes, none of the RICO violations is alleged to have
been caused by FPF’s compliance with a statute that was reviewed
or approved by FIFA. To the contrary, Plaintiffs allege frequently
throughout their Complaint that FPF Defendants’ RICO violations
were contrary to FIFA’s rules or directives. See, e.g., id. at 21
(“This

action

violated

the

Defendant

Federation

and

FIFA’s

statutory prohibition of conflict of interest . . . .”); see also
id. at 32, 33 and 49. Likewise, while Plaintiffs adduce evidence
showing

FIFA

exercised

oversight

of

FPF

elections,

none

of

Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest FIFA’s or FPF’s election rules
were

themselves

violations

of

RICO.

For

example,

Plaintiffs’

allegation that Larracuente was blocked from running for FPF

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)
president

is

based

on

23
the

“FPF

registry

department”

having

“fraudulently misrepresent[ed]” her qualifications. Id. at 36. If
anything,

such

allegations

suggest

contravention

of

election

rules, not compliance with them.
To

the

extent

Plaintiffs

assert

FPF

Defendants’

RICO

violations arose from compliance with FIFA’s rules or policy, see,
e.g. id. at 21-22, that argument fails for lack for lack of factual
support. To show specific jurisdiction over FIFA, it is not enough
to simply state in a conclusory fashion that any and all of FPF
Defendants’ illegal conduct was in compliance with, or required
by, FIFA’s rules. Such an assertion would need to be supported by
some allegations of fact. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ argument that
FIFA was made aware of FPF Defendants’ purported RICO violations
and allowed them to continue is also insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction, since the mere awareness of something does
not always entail in-forum contact. See (Docket No. 105 at 18).
ii.

Commonwealth law claims

Plaintiffs’ commonwealth-law allegations against FIFA are
based only on group pleadings. See (Docket No. 33 at 56, 57)
(referring to “Defendants” broadly without specifying which). The
same reasons for why Plaintiffs have failed to show specific
personal jurisdiction over the RICO Act claims apply here also.

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

24

In short, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to show the
alleged RICO Acts and Puerto Rico law claims arose from or are
related to FIFA’s in-forum contacts. Plaintiffs therefore fail to
meet

their

burden

of

proffering

facts

to

support

personal

jurisdiction over FIFA as to the RICO Act claims, and FIFA’s Motion
is therefore GRANTED as to personal jurisdiction over FIFA with
regards

to

Plaintiffs’

RICO

Act

claims

and

commonwealth-law

claims.
III. FIFA’s MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
A. RICO Act and commonwealth-law claims
Even if the Court did have personal jurisdiction over FIFA as
to Plaintiffs’ RICO Act and commonwealth-law claim, the Court would
still dismiss those claims for failure to state a claim. The Court
notes Plaintiffs have not alleged any violation by FIFA that they
did not also raise against FPF or its directors. As discussed at
length in the Opinion and Order at Docket No. 129, Plaintiffs
failed to adequately allege a claim under the RICO Act or Puerto
Rico law. Plaintiffs’ RICO Act claims and commonwealth-law claims
against FIFA are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Sherman Act Claim
FIFA argues Plaintiffs’ section 1 claim should be dismissed
because the relevant allegations are conclusory and fail to plead
that FIFA actually joined a conspiracy. (Docket No. 88 at 18-20).

Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM)

25

FIFA contends what Plaintiffs are really challenging is how FPF
used FIFA’s policy, not FIFA’s policy itself. Id. at 21. However,
the Court disagrees. Plaintiffs “challenge[] a specific policy” - “the rule that all league tournaments must be sanctioned by the
National Association in whose territory the match will be played.”
Relevent Sports, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 61 F.4th 299,
307, 309 (2d Cir. 2023); (Docket No. 33 at 10). Plaintiffs’
allegations

that

“all

Confederations,

National

Associations,

leagues, clubs, referees, game commissioners, venue mangers, and
players must comply” with this policy suggests it is both binding
and promulgated by FIFA. (Docket No. 33 at 10); Relevent Sports,
LLC, 61 F.4th at 307, 309. As such, the Court concludes Plaintiffs
have adequately plead concerted action by FIFA.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, FIFA’s Motion to Dismiss at Docket
No. 88 is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claim; GRANTED as
to Plaintiffs’ RICO Act claims; and GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’
commonwealth-law

claims.

commonwealth-law

claims

Plaintiffs’
against

FIFA

RICO

Act

claims

are

DISMISSED

and

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 25th day of November 2024.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge