Rodrguez-Gonzlez et al v. American Airlines, Inc. et al
Filing
30
OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER granting 14 Motion to Dismiss; granting 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; and denying 26 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief. Signed by Judge Silvia L. Carreno-Coll on 3/27/2024. (mcv)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
AMALIA E. RODRÍGUEZ-GONZÁLEZ
AND JOSÉ A. CRUZ-SANTIAGO,
Plaintiffs,
CIV. NO.: 23-1306 (SCC)
v.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. AND
IBERIA LÍNEAS ÁREAS DE ESPAÑA,
S.A. D/B/A IBERIA AIRLINES,
Defendants.
OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by
Iberia Líneas Áreas de España, S.A. d/b/a Iberia Airlines
(“Iberia”) and American Airlines, Inc. (“American Airlines”),
respectively. See Docket Nos. 14 and 15. Plaintiffs Amalia E.
Rodríguez-González and José A. Cruz-Santiago opposed the
same. See Docket Nos. 16 and 22. For the reasons set forth
below, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual predicate underpinning the Plaintiffs’
Complaint is straightforward. Plaintiffs claim that they
purchased two roundtrip tickets from San Juan, Puerto Rico to
Rome, Italy. Docket No. 1, pg. 3. Once in Rome, they would
board a cruise. Id. The San Juan to Rome leg of the trip included
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a layover in Philadelphia. Id. The San Juan to Philadelphia flight
departed on December 11, 2022 and was operated by American
Airlines. Id. Shortly after arriving at the Philadelphia airport,
the boarding process for the Iberia operated flight bound for
Rome began. Id. at pg. 4. Nevertheless, while Plaintiff CruzSantiago made his way through the boarding tunnel and was
set to board the aircraft, he noticed that Plaintiff RodríguezGonzález remained at the boarding lounge terminal counter. Id.
This prompted Plaintiff Cruz-Santiago to return to the boarding
lounge terminal counter to inquire about why Plaintiff
Rodríguez-González remained there. Id.
At the boarding lounge terminal counter, Plaintiff CruzSantiago was informed by an Iberia employee that Plaintiff
Rodríguez-González did not have a return ticket and her
passport was set to expire on February 12, 2023. Id. At that
point, Plaintiffs allege that they attempted to show the return
tickets to the Iberia employee, but he refused to look at them.
Id. Plaintiff Cruz-Santiago claims that the Iberia employee then
turned his attention to him and accused him of not having the
necessary “papers” to board. Id. at pg. 5. According to Plaintiff
Cruz-Santiago, that accusation did not make sense considering
he had been allowed to go through the boarding gate. Id.
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Plaintiff Rodríguez-González then reportedly told the Iberia
employee that Iberia had to reimburse them for the costs of the
plane tickets and the cruise. Id. Plaintiffs were therefore
directed to Iberia’s customer service counter. Id.
At the customer service counter, another Iberia
employee stated that there were no return tickets on file for the
Plaintiffs and that Iberia could not issue the refund that they
were requesting. Id. Plaintiffs then made their way to the
American Airlines counter where they were informed by an
American Airlines employee that their documents were in
order. Id. at pg. 6. At this point, the Plaintiffs decided to return
to Puerto Rico. Id. But since their return flight would not depart
until the next day, they asked American Airlines about hotel
accommodations. Id. American Airlines reportedly replied that
it did not provide hotel accommodations. Id. Plaintiffs
eventually made their way to a hotel at the airport where they
paid for their overnight stay out of pocket. Id. Throughout this
situation, Plaintiff Rodríguez-González broke down crying on
multiple occasions because she could not believe this was all
happening to her. Id. at pgs. 5-6.
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On June 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint
against Iberia and American Airlines based on purported
violations to the Air Carrier Access Act (“ACAA”). Id. at pg. 1.
They also advanced discrimination (pursuant to Puerto Rico
Law 100) and negligence (pursuant to Puerto Rico’s general tort
statute) claims. Id. at pg. 2. Instead of answering the Complaint,
Iberia and American Airlines moved to have it dismissed. See
Docket Nos. 14 and 15.
Having gone over the background of this case, the Court
turns to the motions to dismiss.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 1
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded facts set
forth in a plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom to his behoof.” Burt v. Bd. of Trustees of
Univ. of Rhode Island, 84 F.4th 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2023). This logically
follows that “[if] the complaint fails to include ‘factual
The Court is aware that American Airlines also argued, in the alternative,
for dismissal based on improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(3). See Docket No. 15, pgs. 10-15. But because the Court will
dispose of all federal claims via the failure to state a claim route and all
Puerto Rico law claims by not exercising supplemental jurisdiction, there is
no need for the Court to rehearse (or apply) 12(b)(3)’s standard here.
1
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allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material
element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable
legal theory,’ it should be dismissed.” Pitta v. Medeiros, 90 F.4th
11, 17 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301,
305 (1st Cir. 2008)). In conducting this exercise, the Court will
not consider “neither conclusory legal allegations, nor factual
allegations that are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove
the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture.” Legal
Sea Foods, LLC v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 36 F.4th 29, 33-34 (1st Cir.
2022) (cleaned up).
III. ANALYSIS
The arguments advanced by Iberia and American
Airlines in support of their request for dismissal are pretty
much the same. Specifically, Iberia and American Airlines
contend that dismissal is warranted based on the following
grounds: (1) the Montreal Convention preempts Plaintiffs’
federal and state law claims; and (2) the ACAA does not
provide for a private cause of action. 2 Admittedly, the motions
to dismiss contain additional arguments, but those are best
characterized as white noise since, ultimately, the Court reaches
The terms “private cause of action” and “private right of action” are used
interchangeably throughout this Omnibus Opinion and Order.
2
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the conclusion that dismissal is warranted by resolving the
threshold question regarding whether the ACAA establishes a
private cause of action.
a. ACAA Claims
The First Circuit has yet to decide whether the ACAA’s
enforcement scheme includes a private right of action. The clear
text of the statute does not contain such a right. So the question
then lingers as to whether the ACAA contains an implied
private right of action. Iberia and American Airlines brought to
the Court’s attention a handful of decisions that have come out
of the District of Massachusetts which support the proposition
that the ACAA does not provide a private right of action. See
Docket No. 14, pg. 11 and Docket No. 15, pg. 5. Those decisions,
in turn, relied on the decisions issued by the circuits that have
considered this matter. Naturally, the Court took on the task of
examining those circuit court decisions. And what became
immediately clear to the Court was that to reach their respective
decisions, those circuit courts employed the analytical
framework advanced by the Supreme Court in Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
Following Sandoval, the Second, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and
Eleventh circuits considered the ACAA’s text and regulatory
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structure to ascertain if Congress intended to create a private
right of action to enforce the ACAA. After running that
analysis, those circuit courts concluded that the ACAA does not
grant a private right of action. See Segalman v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
895 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2018) (so holding and underscoring
that “[a]pplying [Sandoval], we hold that the ACAA does not
create an implied private cause of action.”); Stokes v. Sw.
Airlines, 887 F.3d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 2018) (concluding that “[t]he
ACAA confers no private right to sue in federal district court.”);
López v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2011)
(holding that the ACAA “does not expressly provide a right to
sue the air carrier, and that right should not be implied because
the statute provides an administrative enforcement scheme
designed to vindicate fully the rights of disabled passengers.”);
Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir.
2004) (holding that “Congress’s creation of specific means of
enforcing the statute indicates that it did not intend to allow an
additional remedy—a private right of action—that it did not
expressly mention at all.”); Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347,
1354 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “taken together, the text
of the ACAA itself . . . and the surrounding statutory and
regulatory structure create an elaborate and comprehensive
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enforcement scheme that belies any congressional intent to
create a private remedy. Notably absent from that scheme is a
private right to sue in a federal district court.”)
While, as the Boswell court noted, “a private right of
action may well afford a given individual more comprehensive
relief for an ACAA violation,” 361 F.3d at 1270, Sandoval
remains good law. And at the end of the day, “private rights of
action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286. This follows that the Court’s role will
be limited “to interpret[ing] the statute Congress has passed to
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a
private right but also a private remedy.” Id. The Court is bound
by that precedent.
Here, after the Court carried out the Sandoval analysis,
which the First Circuit has recognized must guide the Court’s
analysis in situations like the one pending, see Allco Reneweable
Energy Ltd. v. Mass. Elec. Co., 875 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2017), the
Court is persuaded by the analysis espoused by the Segalman,
Stokes, López, Boswell, and Love courts and finds that it should be
followed here. Accordingly, the Court holds that the ACAA
does not establish a private right of action. This indubitably
follows that the Plaintiffs’ claims alleging violations to the
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ACAA must be dismissed. Furthermore, because the Court has
answered the lingering threshold question (concerning
whether the ACAA provides a private right of action) in the
negative, there is no need for the Court to consider if the
Montreal Convention preempts Plaintiffs’ federal and state law
claims. To say more would be supererogatory.
b. Puerto Rico Law Claims
In addition to their ACAA claims, Plaintiffs’ Complaint
includes a Puerto Rico law discrimination claim pursuant to
Law 100 (identified as the Third Cause of Action in the
Complaint) and general tort claims under Puerto Rico law
(identified as the Fourth Cause of Action in the Complaint). See
Docket No. 1, pgs. 8-9. Having dismissed the federal claim,
because the Court found that a private right of action for
violations to the ACAA does not exist, the Court is now faced
with the following question: should it exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Puerto Rico law claims?
The general rule “is that the dismissal of a foundational
federal claim does not deprive a federal court of authority to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state-law
claims.” Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 899 F.3d 24, 35 (1st
Cir. 2018). But general rules have exceptions, and the First
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Circuit has instructed that when a district court is faced with
the situation that this Court now faces, the stage is set “for an
exercise of the court’s informed discretion.” Senra v. Town of
Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2013). As part of that
discretion, to determine if it will (or will not) exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Puerto Rico law claims, the
Court must consider a host of factors. Therefore, since “[n]o
categorial rule governs the analysis; a court must weigh
concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, and
fairness.” See Redondo Const. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 49
(1st Cir. 2011).
When the comity, convenience, fairness and judicial
economy factors are weighed vis-à-vis the record, the Court
finds that it need not exercise supplemental jurisdiction here.
This case is still in its infancy and is not “well beyond its nascent
stages.” Santana-Vargas v. Banco Santander de Puerto Rico, 948
F.3d 57, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotations and citations omitted).
No answers to the Complaint have been filed and no discovery
has been conducted. This case was just getting started when the
pending motions were filed. Moreover, should Plaintiffs take
their Puerto Rico law claims to state court, and should Iberia
and American Airlines once again argue that those claims are
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preempted by the Montreal Convention, the Court understands
that the state court would be able to address the preemption
argument. Bearing all of this in mind, the Court sees only one
logical outcome: it must decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ Puerto Rico law claims.
c. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Surreply
American Airlines filed a reply in support of its motion
to dismiss. See Docket No. 25. 3 That reply zeroed in on the
laundry list of case law that the Plaintiffs relied on in their
responses to the motions to dismiss. 4 According to American
Airlines, the bulk of the case law cited by the Plaintiffs was
either inapposite or misleading. Id. at pg. 4. Additionally,
American Airlines argued that some of the citations were
incorrect since they would redirect American Airlines to other
cases. Id. at pgs. 2-3.
Considering American Airline’s reply, Plaintiffs wanted
to clear the air and so they filed a motion for leave to file a
American Airlines timely sought leave of Court to file its Reply at Docket
No. 23. The request was granted. See Docket No. 24.
3
It is worth mentioning that when the Plaintiffs opposed the motions to
dismiss, it did so separately, but with two nearly identical responses. See
Docket Nos. 16 and 22.
4
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surreply. See Docket No. 26. There, they explained that they
needed to file a surreply because “citations need to either be
corrected and/or eliminated in order for the Honorable Court
to make a proper judicial determination.” Id. at pg. 2. American
Airlines and Iberia 5 opposed the Plaintiffs’ motion for leave. See
Docket No. 27. In that motion, American Airlines and Iberia
argue that the request should be denied for two reasons. First,
they contend that the motion for leave does not comply with
Local Rule 7(d) since a surreply will only be considered if “the
reply raises new arguments not previously presented in the
movant’s opening motion.” Id. at pg. 2 (quoting Local Rule
7(d)). And here, they claim, the Plaintiffs are not addressing
new arguments that were raised in the reply, instead, they wish
to correct and amend the citations and case summaries that they
erroneously included in their responses. Id. at pgs. 2-3. Second,
American Airlines and Iberia appear to argue in favor of the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. Id. at pg. 2. According to American Airlines and
Iberia, by including the improper citations in their response,
Plaintiffs violated Rule 11. Id.
Iberia filed a motion to join American Airlines’ response. See Docket No.
28. The Court granted the request to join. See Docket No. 29.
5
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To the extent that the reply filed by American Airlines
raised new arguments by pointing out the improper citations in
the Plaintiffs’ responses, the Court finds that the filing of a
surreply would be futile. Indeed, the Court does not possess the
ability to foretell the future or guess the case law that Plaintiffs
would have brought forth had they been granted the
opportunity to file the surreply. But while Plaintiffs could have
very well corrected their improper citations, the only way that
those corrections would have altered the Court’s determination
today would have been if the cases that Plaintiffs were to
advance were either First Circuit or Supreme Court cases that
strayed from the decisions that have been issued by the circuit
courts which have found that the ACAA does not provide a
private right of action. As the Court stated above, the First
Circuit has yet to address that question. And the Court has not
identified a Supreme Court decision stating that the ACAA
includes a private right of action. Therefore, the Court denies
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a surreply.
One loose end remains. American Airlines and Iberia
appear to have moved for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.
Nevertheless, that request will be denied. For starters, when a
party seeks sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, that party “must
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serve the Rule 11 motion on the opposing party at least twentyone days before filing the motion with the district court, and
[second,] sanctions may be sought only if the challenged
pleading is not withdrawn or corrected within twenty-one days
after service of the motion.” Triantos v. Guaetta & Benson, LLC,
91 F.4th 556, 561 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Brickwood Contractors,
Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004)).
Here, there is no indication that American Airlines or Iberia
served the Plaintiffs with such a motion. Moreover, the
opposition filed at Docket No. 27 contains a twofold request
since it is asking the Court to deny the motion for leave and to
sanction the Plaintiffs. However, motions for sanctions
pursuant to Rule 11 “must be made separately from any other.”
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P 11(c)(2)). And that was not done here.
In short, the request for sanctions is not properly before this
Court.
The Court’s discussion could very well end here.
However, it is imperative for the Court to conclude with some
parting words. The Court, just like American Airlines, took the
time to review the cases cited by the Plaintiffs in their responses
to the motions to dismiss. While the Court always thoroughly
reviews the briefs and documents submitted by parties, here,
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because the responses did not contain mere clerical errors, an
unnecessary burden was imposed on the Court. Not only were
the responses riddled with improper citations, but they were
also riddled with improper summaries of the cases cited.
Therefore, the Court reminds attorneys to be more mindful
when they submit their work product to the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Motions to Dismiss at Docket Nos. 14 and 15
are GRANTED. Consistent with the Court’s ruling, the ACAA
claims (identified as the First and Second Causes of Action in
the Complaint) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the
Puerto Rico law claims (identified as the Third and Fourth
Causes of Action in the Complaint) are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Lastly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’
Motion for Leave to File a Surreply at Docket No. 26.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 27th day of March 2024.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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