Santiago-Rivera et al v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al

Filing 39

OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth in this Opinion and Order, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 30 . Judgment of dismissal without prejudice shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach on 3/7/2025. (mrr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ANIXA
SANTIAGO-RIVERA
and
MANUEL
GARCIA-CASTRO,
for
themselves and on behalf of
their daughter R.G.S.
CIV. NO. 24-1187 (RAM)

Plaintiffs,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO and
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
and

the

Department

of

Education’s

(“Defendants”)

Motion

to

Dismiss. (Docket No. 30). As more fully explained below, because
Plaintiffs’1 claims under various federal statutes are interwoven
with claims that first require administrative exhaustion. The
Court is unable to grant relief at this time and thus GRANTS
Defendants’

Motion

to

Dismiss.

Judgment

of

dismissal

without

prejudice shall be entered accordingly.
I.

BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint
alleging that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against their

Plaintiffs include Anixa Santiago Rivera and Manuel Garcia Castro, who bring
suit for themselves and on behalf of their daughter R.G.S.
1

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

2

minor child, R.G.S., on the basis of her disabilities, in violation
of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), and R.G.S.’s
constitutional rights. (Docket No. 20 at 1-2). Plaintiffs contend
that Defendants perpetrated a “persistent and systemic” pattern of
discrimination that included the failure to provide R.G.S. with
equal access to educational services and opportunities. Id. at 2.
According to the Amended Complaint, R.G.S. has a hearing
impairment (deafness) that requires her to use American Sign
Language for communication and lip-reading to understand spoken
language. Id. at 3-4. Due to her condition, medical evaluators
recommended

certain

reasonable

accommodations

to

ensure

the

progression of her educational and personal development. Id. at 4.
Specifically,

R.G.S.

was

referred

to

audiologists

for

amplification hearing aids and recommended the use of a frequency
modulation (“FM”) system to optimize her educational experience.
Id. In furtherance of this goal, Plaintiffs took steps with the
Department

of

Education

(“DoE”)

to

enroll

Individualized

Education

Program

(“IEP”)

to

R.G.S.
receive

in

an

special

education services. Id.
The Program and Placement Committee, associated with special
education program services, identified deficiencies in the use of

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

3

R.G.S.’s FM devices and recognized the need to address this issue.
Id. at 4-5. Plaintiffs aver that they first communicated with DoE
on November 14, 2022, about the problem, highlighting that the
hearing

aids

extremely

were

outdated

precarious,

and

resulting

that
in

their

functionality

significant

challenges

was
to

R.G.S. understanding her classes. Id. at 5. Since then, Plaintiffs
repeatedly requested that the DoE replace the FM device without
receiving a response. Id. In reply to their communication on March
7, 2023, Plaintiffs were told that the status of the FM devices
was under review. Id.
Following that update, Plaintiffs continued another string of
attempted communications with the DoE, alleging that due to the
lack of diligence and response of officials in charge, “only one
hearing aid had been provided for the child’s academic development”
in the more than four-month period since they initially filed a
request. Id. at 5-6. After a delayed attempt to schedule an
appointment to determine the device’s suitability on April 27,
2023, R.G.S. was evaluated by an audiologist on May 22, 2023, and
the results were delivered to the DoE. Id. at 6. However, as
Plaintiffs

contend,

“[d]espite

clear

medical

recommendations

specifying the needs for specific types of equipment,” the DoE
provided

hearing

devices

that

were

inadequate

and

caused

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

4

discomfort to R.G.S – forcing Plaintiffs to incur additional
expenses and seek alternative solutions. Id. at 6-7.
By July 20, 2023, Plaintiffs still had received no updates
regarding the status of the requested equipment; a follow-up led
to them being informed that the issue “had been escalated to a
central level,” but provided no further details or a concrete
timeline as the next school year approached. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs
continued their attempts to contact DoE departments and even
visited the physical offices, just to face “ongoing indifference
and inefficiency.” Id. at 7-8. Plaintiffs point to R.G.S.’s failing
grades in September and a published news report highlighting the
family’s “nearly year-long wait to receive appropriate hearing
equipment” as further evidence of the distressing situation. Id.
at 7-8.
On

September

19,

2023,

Plaintiffs

discovered

that

the

necessary FM systems and hearing aid molds – which DoE previously
claimed were ready for delivery – were not yet available. Id. at
8. On October 10, 2023, R.G.S. finally received the requested
devices. Id. Even with the arrival of the equipment, Plaintiffs
allege that “issues persisted with its use in the classroom” since
teachers were reluctant to manage the equipment – noting continuing
signs of academic decline and communicative setbacks. Id. at 910. Plaintiffs contend they were forced to intervene directly on

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

5

March 3, 2024, after several incidents where R.G.S. was “left
without

the

necessary

auditory

support

during

critical

assessments” and ongoing issues were compounded by DoE’s “direct
misrepresentations.” Id. at 10.
On April 10, 2024, a session involving DoE officials and
educational advocates took place to discuss “these prolonged and
repeated

failures”

and

other

systemic

issues

in

the

DoE’s

operations. Id. On April 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their original
Complaint in federal court. (Docket No. 1). The Amended Complaint
was filed on September 5, 2024. (Docket No. 20).
Plaintiffs request various forms of relief. First, Plaintiffs
seek an order instructing DoE to provide R.G.S. with the necessary
assistive technology services as outlined in her IEP, as well as
a declaratory judgment stating that DoE’s failure to do so already
violated IDEA and R.G.S.’s right to a free appropriate public
education (“FAPE”). Id. at 11-15, 19. Additionally, they contend
that the DoE’s pattern of inaction despite all of Plaintiffs’
efforts to obtain administrative solutions justifies any nonexhaustion of IDEA’s administrative remedies. Id. at 14-15.
Second,

Plaintiffs

seek

compensatory

damages

as

well

as

injunctive relief under the ADA and Section 504 for the “systemic
denial

of

nature”

to

necessary
the

services”

discrimination

that

demonstrate

against

R.G.S.

a

“deliberate

Id.

at

15-18.

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)
Specifically,

Plaintiffs

6
seek

compensatory

damages

for

the

“emotional harm caused to [R.G.S.] in her educational process, as
well

as

the

mental

anguish

and

distress

experienced

by

her

parents.” Id. at 20. Additionally, Plaintiffs request a permanent
injunction

requiring

Defendants

to

“take

remedial

efforts

to

mitigate the effects of their past and going violations.” Id. at
19. They also seek a declaratory judgment stating Defendants
subjected

Plaintiffs

to

unlawful

discrimination

and

nominal

damages pursuant to the same. Id. at 19-20. Third, Plaintiffs seek
attorney’s fees, reasonable costs, and litigation expenses. Id. at
20.
On December 11, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. (Docket No. 30). Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs’ ADA and Section 504 claims mirror their IDEA
claims for the denial of a FAPE, thus Plaintiff’s failure to meet
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement bars their pursuit of all these
claims in federal court. Id. at 7-10. Defendants contend that,
based on the facts, Plaintiffs have not first fulfilled the proper
administrative

procedures

for

seeking

relief,

nor

have

they

demonstrated they qualify for an exception to the exhaustion
requirement. Id. at 10-16. Specifically, Defendants highlight that

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

7

Plaintiffs could not have exhausted the required administrative
remedies in the thirteen days between when a meeting with DoE
officials was held on April 10, 2024, and when they filed their
original federal Complaint on April 23, 2024. Id. at 15.
Additionally, Defendants assert that neither ADA nor the
Rehabilitation Act provide broader remedies than those available
under IDEA when the claims mirror IDEA. Id. at 16-17. Thus,
Plaintiffs are not entitled to compensatory and nominal damages.
Id.
On December 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to
Defendants’

Motion

to

Dismiss

Defendants

“fundamentally

(“Response”),

mischaracterize[]”

arguing
this

case

that
by

narrowing the nature of their claims into the confines of an IDEA
exhaustion requirement. (Docket No. 32 at 1). While the Amended
Complaint includes allegations related to educational services,
Plaintiffs maintain that “at its core this case challenges systemic
discrimination and deliberate indifference that extends far beyond
mere denial” of FAPE. Id. at 1-2. The lack of a FAPE caused not
only educational harm, but had a “significant emotional impact on
R.G.S.” that reflects a broader systemic violation of rights than
a mere technical noncompliance with IDEA.

Id. 9-12. Plaintiffs

contend the alleged discriminatory conduct “could occur in any
public service context” and adults “with similar disabilities

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

8

could face identical discrimination.” Id. at 2. Thus, the DoE’s
prolonged

deliberate

indifference

goes

beyond

technical

IDEA

violations to constitute systemic discrimination that both Section
504 and ADA address. Id. at 2, 9-12.
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue the harm caused to R.G.S. due
to Defendants’ systemic pattern of negligence and lack of effective
responses

justifies

their

failure

to

exhaust

administrative

proceedings. Id. at 6-9. They also highlight the recent decision
in Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Sch., 598 U.S. 142 (2023), as support
for their claims seeking monetary damages – relief which IDEA
itself does not provide. Id. at 16. As such, Plaintiffs assert
they are entitled to nominal and compensatory damages for such
“emotional

suffering,

financial

burdens

placed

on

[R.G.S.’s]

parents, and lost educational opportunities” under ADA and Section
504, regardless of the claims’ intersection with an educational
context. Id. 13-14. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction and
the ability to craft a remedy. Id. at 3.
On January 22, 2025, Defendants filed a Reply, noting Luna
Perez found that courts would not allow students and families to
“bypass administrative procedures to strategically get monetary
damages,” rather, when those individuals allege violations of both
IDEA and ADA or Section 504, the ADA and Section 504 claims may be
deferred until exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Docket No.

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

9

37 at 3-7). Defendants re-highlight the two-question standard from
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017), contending
that Plaintiffs could not have brought the same claims against a
non-school public facility, nor could an adult visitor to the
school have brought the same claim. Id. at 7-9. While Plaintiffs
seek compensatory damages, they also allege the denial of FAPE and
relate to R.G.S.’s IEP; therefore, Defendants argue that all
Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to IDEA’s exhaustion requirements.
Id.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[t]he sole inquiry
. . .

is

whether,

construing

the

well-pleaded

facts

of

the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the
complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted.” OcasioHernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011). The
Court must first “isolate and ignore statements in the complaint
that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash
cause-of-action elements.” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership
Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Then,
the Court takes “the complaint’s well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory,
non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences
in the pleader’s favor,” to determine “if they plausibly narrate
a claim for relief.” Id. (citations omitted).

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

10

The analysis for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion “is essentially the
same as a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis: we accept the well-pleaded facts
alleged in the complaint as true and ask whether the plaintiff has
stated

a

plausible

claim

that

the

court

has

subject

matter

jurisdiction.” Cebollero-Bertran v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth., 4 F.4th 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). At this
juncture, “[t]he Court must decide whether the complaint alleges
sufficient facts to ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.’” Arroyo-Ruiz v. Triple-S Mgmt. Grp., 206 F.Supp.3d 701,
706 (D.P.R. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
III. APPLICABLE LAW
The purpose of IDEA is “to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs.” § 1400(d)(1)(A).
According to the Act, the special education and related
services that a FAPE is comprised of includes “both ‘instruction’
tailored

to

meet

a

child’s

‘unique

needs’

and

sufficient

‘supportive services’ to permit the child to benefit from that
instruction.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 158. The “primary vehicle” for
providing

each

eligible

child

with

the

promised

FAPE

is

an

“individualized education program.” Id.; see § 1414(d). Every IEP

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

11

is crafted by a team consisting of the child’s parents, teachers,
and group of school officials, working in conjunction to create a
personalized plan that meets all the child’s “educational needs.”
Id.;

see

§§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(bb),

(d)(1)(B).

The

plan

“documents the child’s current ‘levels of academic achievement,’
specifies ‘measurable annual goals’ for how she can ‘make progress
in the general education curriculum,’ and lists the ‘special
education and related services’ to be provided so that she can
‘advance appropriately toward [those] goals.’” Fry, 580 U.S. at
158; see §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I), (II), (IV)(aa). See also D.B. ex
rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012)
(“An IEP must be ‘individually designed’ to suit a particular
child, and must include, ‘at a bare minimum, the child’s present
level of educational attainment, the short- and long-term goals
for his or her education, objective criteria with which to measure
progress towards those goals, and the specific services to be
offered.’” (internal citations omitted)).
When a dispute arises between school representatives and
parents, IDEA establishes formal resolution procedures to address
such issues. First, dissatisfied parents may file a complaint
concerning
educational

the

provision

agency.

of

a

FAPE

§ 1415(b)(6).

with

the

state

or

local

Typically,

that

pleading

triggers a preliminary meeting between the contending parties.

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

12

§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i). Alternatively, or in addition to this, parties
may opt for a mediation process. § 1415(e).
If the parties remain at an impasse, the matter continues
before an impartial hearing officer in a “due process hearing.”
§ 1415(f)(1)(A); see § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i). Any decision granting
substantive relief must be “based on a determination of whether
the child received a [FAPE].” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). This ruling, if
the hearing is conducted at the local level initially, may be
appealed to the state agency. See § 1415(g). Lastly, a stilldissatisfied parent may seek judicial review of the administrative
process outcome by filing a civil action in state or federal court.
See § 1415(i)(2)(A). Section 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) directs courts to
“grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” This
“authorizes

courts

to

grant

‘as

an

available

remedy’

the

‘reimbursement’ of past education expenses.” Luna Perez, at 148
(quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dept. of Ed. of Mass., 471
U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985)).
Notably, other federal statutes also protect the interests of
children with disabilities – such as the ADA and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation

Act.

These

antidiscrimination

laws

cover

both

children and adults with disabilities in public schools as well as
other settings. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131; 29 U.S.C. § 794.

Title II

of the ADA forbids any “public entity” from discriminating based

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

13

on disability, and Section 504 applies that same prohibition to
any “program or activity” that is federally funded. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-32;

29

U.S.C.

§ 794(a).

“[B]oth

statutes

authorize

individuals to seek redress for violations of their substantive
guarantees

by

bringing

suits

for

injunctive

relief

or

money

damages.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 160. Regulations implementing Title II
require public entities to make “reasonable modifications” to
their “policies, practices, or procedures” as necessary to avoid
discrimination. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016). Similarly, courts
interpreted Section 504 as requiring “reasonable” modifications to
existing practices to “accommodate” persons with disabilities.
Fry, 580 U.S. at 160; Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299-300
(1985).
“In

short,

educational

the

IDEA

guarantees

services,

while

Title

II

individually
and

§ 504

tailored

promise

non-

discriminatory access to public institutions.” Fry, 580 U.S. at
170-71. This does not mean there is no overlap in coverage, rather
the “same conduct may violate all three statutes.” Id. at 171. For
example, a complaint brought under § 504 and Title II may “seek
relief for simple discrimination, irrespective of the IDEA’s FAPE
obligation.” Id.

The interaction between IDEA and these other

antidiscrimination laws is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l):

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

14

Nothing in [IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit
the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 . . . title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
. . . or other Federal laws protecting the rights of
children with disabilities, except that before the
filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief
that is also available under this subchapter, the
procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be
exhausted to the same extent as would be required has
the action been brought under [IDEA].
IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently related to the denial of a
FAPE to trigger the IDEA’s exhaustion provision.
The standard in Fry serves to provide some guidance as to
“whether the gravamen of a complaint against a school concerns the
denial

of

a

FAPE,

or

instead

addresses

disability-based

discrimination.” 580 U.S. at 171. The Court enumerated two key
questions: (1) “could the plaintiff have brought essentially the
same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility
that was not a school” and (2) “could an adult at the school
. . . have pressed essentially the same grievance.” Id. at 171. To
give an example, the Court proffered a scenario where a student
with a learning disability sues a school for failing to provide
remedial

tutoring

discrimination

on

–

which

the

could

school’s

be

cast

refusal

to

as

disability-based

make

a

reasonable

accommodation. Id. at 172. However, “can anyone imagine the student
making the same claim against a public theater or library?” Id.

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)
Additionally,

“[t]he

15
statutory

language

asks

whether

a

lawsuit in fact ‘seeks’ relief available under the IDEA – not, as
a stricter exhaustion statute might, whether the suit ‘could have
sought’ relief available under the IDEA (or, what is much the same,
whether any remedies ‘are’ available under that law).” Id. at 169.
The Court held that a complaint seeking redress for harms other
than the denial of a FAPE are not subject to § 1415(l)’s exhaustion
rule because “the only ‘relief’ the IDEA makes ‘available’ is
relief for the denial of a FAPE.” Id. at 168-69. Thus, even if a
“suit arises directly from a school’s treatment of a child with a
disability,” the school’s conduct might injure the child in ways
unrelated to a FAPE such that a claim could be brought under a
different

statute

seeking

redress

for

those

other

harms,

“independent of a FAPE denial,” and not require exhaustion of
IDEA’s procedures.2 Id. However, the Fry Court declined to address,

2

To further elaborate:
Suppose that a parent’s complaint protests a school’s failure to
provide some accommodation for a child with a disability. If that
accommodation is needed to fulfill the IDEA’s FAPE requirement,
the hearing officer must order relief. But if it is not, he
cannot – even though the dispute is between a child with a
disability and the school she attends. There might be good
reasons, unrelated to a FAPE, for the school to make the
requested accommodation. Indeed, another federal law (like the
ADA or Rehabilitation Act) might require the accommodation on one
of those alternative grounds. But still, the hearing officer
cannot provide the requested relief. His role, under the IDEA, is
to enforce the child’s “substantive right” to a FAPE. And that is
all.

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

16

within the meaning of § 1415(l), whether or not exhaustion is
”required when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE,
but the specific remedy she requests – here, money damages for
emotional distress – is not one that an IDEA hearing officer may
award?” Fry, 580 U.S. at 752 n.4.
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Luna Perez addressed the
extent

to

which

children

with

disabilities

must

exhaust

administrative procedures under IDEA prior to seeking relief under
other federal antidiscrimination statutes. 598 U.S. at 144. Under
its view, “a plaintiff who files an ADA action seeking both damages
and the sort of equitable relief IDEA provides may find his request
for equitable relief barred or deferred if he has yet to exhaust
§ 1415(f) and (g).” Id. at 150.
Specifically, the facts of Luna Perez concerned whether a
suit premised on the past denial of a FAPE may nonetheless proceed
without exhausting IDEA’s administrative processes if the remedy
sought is not one IDEA provides. Plaintiff, after settling his
administrative complaint, filed a lawsuit in federal district
court “seeking backward-looking relief in the form of compensatory
damages” under the ADA. Luna Perez, 598 U.S. at 145. The Court

For that reason, § 1415(l)’s exhaustion rule hinges on whether a
lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.
Fry, 580 U.S. at 167-68 (internal citations omitted).

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

17

held that the limiting language in § 1415(l) does not apply to all
suits seeking relief that other federal laws provide, but rather
IDEA’s “administrative

exhaustion requirement applies

only to

suits that ‘see[k] relief . . . also available under’ IDEA.” Id.
at 147. Therefore, when that condition is not met, as in Luna
Perez, the exhaustion requirement poses no bar to a non-IDEA
plaintiff suing for relief that is unavailable under IDEA. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s claims are so tightly interwoven with the
school’s failure to adequately follow the IEP in place, provide a
FAPE, and fulfill IDEA requirements, that a similar complaint could
not be lodged against other public facilities. See Fry, 580 U.S.
at 172. The claims are particularly tied to R.G.S.’s disability
and reasonable accommodations for her learning experience as a
child in a school setting; thus, (1) the same claim could not have
been made against another public facility, nor (2) could an adult
at the school have pressed the same charges. See id. at 171. The
entire

focus

inability

to

of

the

Amended

Complaint

timely

provide

the

is

the

educational

DoE’s

alleged

instruction

and

services that R.G.S. needs in the form of the assistive auditory
instruments, resulting in the denial of a FAPE. Accordingly, all
the alleged financial and emotional injuries that resulted from
the DoE’s practices and procedural failures – such as the claimed

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)
compensatory

damages

18
for

emotional

distress

and

additional

expenses - still ultimately stem from the denial of a FAPE.
Plaintiffs bring all these claims together in one Amended
Complaint, under both IDEA as well as ADA and Section 504. The
relief being sought here is a simultaneous ask for relief under
IDEA and other various federal statutes. Plaintiffs seek both an
order under IDEA to require that Defendants fulfill their FAPE
obligations, as well as injunctive relief under Section 504 and
ADA requiring Defendants to take remedial efforts. (See Docket No.
20 at 18-19). Although compensatory and nominal damages are also
sought – remedies not available under IDEA – in such an instance,
deferral of the requests under ADA and Section 504 is appropriate
until § 1415(f) and (g) are exhausted. See Luna Perez, 598 U.S. at
150 (“[A] plaintiff who files an ADA action seeking both damages
and the sort of equitable relief IDEA provides may find his request
for equitable relief barred or deferred if he has yet to exhaust
§ 1415(f) and (g).”)
B. Plaintiffs failed to adequately exhaust administrative remedies
under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 prior to bringing their claims.
The exhaustion requirements in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 are not judgemade hurdles that the Court may overlook, but rather a statutory
mandate the parties must follow. While the delay in receiving
responses

and

adequate

services

from

Defendants

may

well

be

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

19

frustrating, there is no evidence on the record that Plaintiffs
first attempted to go through the full grievance process delineated
in IDEA’s statute before proceeding to appeal the issue to the
federal court. Nor do Plaintiffs attempt to argue they satisfied
exhaustion

requirements,

but

instead

they

proffer

a

futility

argument. In some circumstances, if exhaustion is deemed futile,
parties can circumvent such administrative requirements. However,
the Luna Perez court did not address “whether IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement is susceptible to a judge-made futility exception and
whether the compensatory damages [defendant] seeks in his ADA suit
are in fact available under that statute.” Id. at 151.
Even

arguing

the

futility

exception

applies

to

these

circumstances, Plaintiffs fail to show that utilizing the proper
mechanisms for relief would have been ignored and overlooked. While
Plaintiffs allege a pattern of delay and negligence on behalf of
DoE, there is no evidence they ever lodged a formal complaint to
trigger the administrative exhaustion process and a preliminary
meeting that could lead to a due process hearing, as required in
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i). Bringing informal requests or grievances to
school administrators and the DoE regarding accommodations or
changes

to

a

special

commencing

a

formal

definitions

of

IDEA.

education

program

administrative
See

Fry,

580

are

not

procedure

U.S.

at

174

the

same

within
n.11

as
the

(noting

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

20

difference between informal requests to IEP team members or other
school

administrators

and

IDEA’s

formal

administrative

procedures). “After all, parents of a child with a disability are
likely to bring all grievances first to those familiar officials,
whether or not they involve the denial of a FAPE.” Id.
Furthermore, as Defendants point out, thirteen days prior to
filing the federal Complaint, there was a session involving DoE
officials and educational advocates to discuss systemic issues in
Defendants’ operations. (See Docket No. 30 at 15; see also Docket
No. 20 at 10). Any potential results from that meeting would not
have been given the opportunity to play out before Plaintiffs
proceeded directly to federal court. Additionally, there is no
evidence

this

was

a

“due

process

hearing”

as

delineated

in

§ 1415(f), nor was there an attempt to appeal any local level
decisions (or lack thereof) to the state agency under § 1415(g)
before Plaintiffs sought judicial review. Only after a parent is
unhappy with the outcome of this administrative process can they
seek review at a state or federal court pursuant to § 1415(i).
Accordingly, given the interwoven nature of all the claims
and the central gravamen being based on the denial of a FAPE,
Plaintiff should first exhaust administrative remedies, as laid
out in IDEA, prior to bringing those claims and associated ones
under the ADA and Section 504. Even though Plaintiffs are partially

Civil No. 24-1187 (RAM)

21

seeking a relief that is not able to be granted under IDEA, the
requests

are

being

brought

simultaneously

and

concern

the

resulting consequences of alleged discrimination that centers upon
the denial of a FAPE. Since Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided for in 20 U.S.C. § 1415, their
claims must be denied at this time.
V.
For

the

foregoing

CONCLUSION

reasons,

the

Court

GRANTS

Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 30. Judgment of dismissal without
prejudice shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 7th day of March 2025.
s/Raúl M. Arias-Marxuach_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE