Mattatall v. State of Rhode Island et al

Filing 28

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 19 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint filed by Rhode Island Parole Board, State of Rhode Island recommending that motion be granted - Objections to R&R due by 10/21/2009- So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian on 10/6/09. (Barletta, Barbara)

UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND STEPHEN R. MATTATALL

v.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND ET AL. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacob Hagopian, Senior United States Magistrate Judge

C.A. No. 07-234 ML

Pro se plaintiff, Stephen R. Mattatall, an inmate confined at the Adult Correctional
Institutions in Cranston, Rhode Island, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging violations to his Constitutional rights. Plaintiff names as defendan ts : the State of Rhode Island ; the Rhode Island Parole Board (the " Parole Board ") ; and Lisa S. Holley , Chairwoman o f the Parole Board; Bennett R. Gallow, member o f the Parole Board; and Frederic G. Reamer , member o f t h e Parole Board (together , the "P aro le Board Members ") . Presentl y before the Court is defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) o f the Federal Rules o f Civil Procedure (the " Federal Rules") (Docket # 19). Plaintiff has filed an objection thereto (Docket # 21). This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l)(B) for a report and recommendation. As discussed below , I recommend the motion to dismiss be granted and p l a i n t i f f s claims be dismissed with prejudice .

BACKGROUND
The factual allegations , taken as true froin the Complaint for the purposes o f the instant motion , are as follows. Plaintiff was arrested in September 1982 and found guilty o f second degree murder in September 1988. He was sentenced to sevent y years in prison (fifty years for murder and twenty additional years for being deemed a habitual offender).

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Plaintiff first appeared before the Parole Board in January 2002,) at which time his application for parole was denied. Parole was again denied w h e n p l a i n t i f f appeared before the Parole Board for a second time five years later in January 2007. P l a i n t i f f filed this action in June 2007, alleging that the Parole Board Members violated the equal protection and due process clauses o f the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying his second application for parole. He claims that the Parole Board

Members (i) treated him unfairly compared to similarly situated inmates; (ii) failed to consider the parole criteria set forth in the Parole Board guidelines and R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-14 and § 13-8-14.1; and (iii) failed to state specific reasons for denying his application. Additionally, plaintiff complains that the Parole Board Members improperly considered his status as a habitual offender in denying his parole application. He explains that he was deemed a habitual offender based, in part, on his 1979 nolo contendere p l e a to a reckless driving charge (the " 1979 Plea"). He alleges that the trial judge in the 1979 case overturned the j u r y 's guilty verdict against plaintiff because the judge was persuaded by the evidence that p l a i n t i f f had not been driving the vehicle. P l a i n t i f f claims that the trial j u d g e should not have accepted

p l a i n t i f f s 1979 Plea and concludes that it was invalid to use the 1979 Plea as a basis to deem him a habitual offender. Plaintiff alleges that therefore the Parole Board Members ' consideration o f his status as a habitual offender was improper. As r e l i e f for the alleged wrongful conduct, p l a i n t i f f seeks " dam a ges and injunctive relief." Complaint, at p. 1. Although he does not expand on the damages request, as injunctive relief he seeks this Court to Order the Parole B o a r d to: (i) grant him parole immediately, (ii)

'Although p l a i n t i f f states in the body o f the Complaint that his first parole hearing was in January 2001, the minutes from the parole board hearing which he attaches as Appendix 1 to his C o m p l a i n t show that the hearing occurred in January 2002 .

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convene a new hearing on his application , (iii) provide guidance on what is required o f him to obtain parole, and/or (iv) reclassify him into a work-release program.

DISCUSSION I. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) o f the Federal Rules provides for the dismissal o f an action which fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion , the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and construe these facts in the light most favorable to the pleader, although the Court need not credit bald assertions or unverifiable conclusions . Ashcroft v. Iqbal , -- U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 1949-1950 (2009). Further, the Court must review pleadings of a p r o se plaintiff liberally. See Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U .S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976). To state a claim for r e l i e f, a pleading must contain factual allegations that "raise [plaintiffs] right to relief above the speculative level" and ' " give the defendant fair notice o f what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. ' " Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 , 5 5 5 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U .S. 41 , 47, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957» ; see also Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1951 (discussing the plausibility requirement); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to maintain a §1983 action , the conduct complained o f must have been (i) committed by a "person" acting under color o f state law and (ii) deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right. Gomez v. Toledo , 446 U .S. 635 , 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920 (1980). As discussed below, I find that p l a i n t i f f s instant claims for r e l i e f under § 1983 fail because (1) plaintiff cannot use §1983 to seek release from incarceration and (2) defendants are not amenable to suit in this action .

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II.

P l a i n t i f f B a r r e d F r o m Seeking Release or Challenging D u r a t i o n of I n c a r c e r a t i o n
As noted in my previous Report and Recommendation in this action (D ocket # 13),

plaintiff cannot seek release or a speedier release from incarceration in a § 1983 action.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005). A state prisoner ' s sole remedy to

challenge the very fact or duration o f his physical imprisonment lies in a writ o f habeas corpus.
Prei ser v. Rodrigue z , 411 U.S . 475, 500 , 93 S.Ct . 1827 (1973). Accordingl y, to the extent

plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering the Parole Board to grant his parole application or order that he be released into a work-release program , p l a i n t i f f s claims are barred , and I recommend defendants ' motion to dismiss regarding such claims be GRANTED. Additionally, money damages are not available under § 1983 for a claim challenging the fact or duration o f a sentence unless the plaintiff shows that the sentence has been invalidated .
Heck v. Humphre y, 512 U.S . 477, 487 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994); White v. Gittens , 121 F.3d 803,

806 (1st Cir. 1997)(dismissing § 1983 damages claim for parole revocation) . Accordingly, as plaintiff has not shown that the denial o f his parole has been invalidated , to the extent that plaintiff seeks money damages for the denial o f his parole application, p l a i n t i f f s claims are barred. I recommend defendants ' motion to dismiss regarding such claims be GRANTED .

III.

S t a t e Defendants Not " P e r s o n s " u n d e r §1983 A. S t a t e of R h o d e I s l a n d and P a r o l e B o a r d Not " P e r s o n s " u n d e r §1983

It is well established that neither states nor state agencies are considered "persons"

against whom a § 1983 action may be maintained. Will v. Michigan Dep 't o f State Poli ce , 491 U.S. 58, 71, 1 0 9 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). Therefore , the State o f Rhode Island and the Parole Board , an agency o f the state, are not "persons" for purposes o f § 1983. I recommend that the motion to dismiss by the State o f Rhode Island and the Parole Board be GRANTED.

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B.

Parole Board Members in their Official Capacities Not Amenable to §1983 Suit for Damages

A suit for mone y damages under § 1983 against state officials in their official capacit y is equivalent to a suit against the state. Monell v. Ne w York City Dep 't o fS o c i a l Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n . 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). In such a suit , the real party in interest is the state for which the officials are agents , and the state treasury would be responsible for paying any damages awarded.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985).

Consequently, as a state is not a "p erson" amenable to suit for money damages , neither are state officials acting in their official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (1989). Therefore , to the extent the Parole Board Members are sued in their official capacities for money damages , I recommend that the motion to dismiss such claims be GRANTED.

IV.

Parole Board Members Protected by Quasi-Judicial Immunity A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity Shields Parole Board Members in their Individual Capacities from §1983 Action for Damages

To the extent plaintiff sues the Parole Board Members in their individual capacities for money damages , quasi-judicial immunity shields them from such claims . Judicial immunity protects judges from liability for their judicial acts to allow them to act freely upon their own convictions. Bradley v. Fisher , 80 U.S. 335, 347-351 (1872). Quasi-judicial immunity similarly protects persons performing tasks functionally equivalent to judges to allow them to perform their duties properly. See , e.g., B u t z v. Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 511-517 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978). The First Circuit determined that " parole board officials perform functionally comparable tasks to judges ," and ' ' ' render impartial decisions in cases and controversies that excite strong feelings because the litigant's liberty is at stake." Johnson v. R. 1. Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d. 5 , 6 (1st Cir. 1987)(citation omitted) . Thus , the First Circuit declared that " [p ]arole board members
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are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages in a § 1983 action for actions taken within the proper scope o f their official duties. " Id . at 8. Further , although judicial immunity does not apply i f the challenged act (i) is administrative or otherwise nonjudicial in nature , Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988) , or (ii) was taken in the "clear absence o f all jurisdiction," Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 , 98 S.Ct . 1099 (1978) , neither exception exists here . In this case

p l a i n t i f f s complaints regarding the Parole Board Members, including their alleged (i) failure to consider properly the parole factors enumerated in state law and Parole Board guidelines, (ii) improper consideration o f plaintiff as a habitual criminal , and (iii) their failure to state specific reasons for denying p l a i n t i f f s parole application, clearly involve actions in their adjudicatory capacity and were not taken in the clear absence o f all jurisdiction. As the Parole Board

Members were acting within the proper scope o f their official duties when they denied p l a i n t i f f s parole application, absolute immunity applies to bar damages claims against them under §1983. I recommend that the motion to dismiss such claims be GRANTED. B.

§1983 B a r s Actions for I n j u n c t i v e R e l i e f A g a i n s t P a r o l e B o a r d M e m b e r s as J u d i c i a l Officers

Although the law is not as clear with respect to §1983 actions for injunctive r e l i e f as it is with respect to § 1983 actions for damages , both the weight o f authorit y and analysis o f the law indicate that § 1983 includes language shielding the Parole Board Members from p l a i n t i f f s claims for injunctive r e l i e f here. The Federal Courts Improvement Act (the " F CIA" ), adopted in 1996, amended § 1983 to bar injunctive relief "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory r e l i e f was unavailable ." 42 U .S . c . §1983 ; see Section 309 o f the FCIA o f

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1996, Pub.L.No. 104-317, Title III, §309(c), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3847 , 3853. As previously discussed by this Court in Pelletier v. Rhode Island, No. 0 7 - 1 8 6 , 2 0 0 8 WL 5062162 (D .R.I. Nov . 26, 2008), this language in the FCIA prohibiting injunctive r e l i e f against "judicial officers" applies to quasi-judicial actors, such as parole board members, performing tasks functionally equivalent to judges. See also, e.g., Roth v. King , 449 F.3d 1272, 1286-87 (D .C.Cir. 2006);

Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2nd Cir. 1999); Von Staich v. Schwarzenegger, No. 042167, 2006 WL 2715276 (E.D.Cal. 2006); contra Simmons v. Fabian, 743 N.W.2d 281 (Minn .App. 2007). Pelletier has been cited with approval by several courts. See, e.g., Wise v.

United States , No . 6:09-01376 , 2009 WL 3052608, at *4 (D.S.C . Sept. 23, 2009)(clerk and
deputy clerks o f court, as quasi-judicial actors, immune from action for injunctive relief);

Gilmore v. Bostic, -- F.Supp.2d --, 2009 WL 890681, at *6 (S.D .W.Va . Mar 27, 2009)(parole
board members immune from action for injunctive relief) . As discussed above with respect to p l a i n t i f f s claims for damages against the Parole Board Members , p l a i n t i f f s allegations that the Parole Board Members violated his constitutional rights b y ignoring parole factors enumerated in state law , considering him to be an habitual criminal , and not adequately stating their reasons for denying his parole application impugn acts or omission made by the Parole Board Members in their adjudicatory capacity. Thus , as plaintiff did not claim that a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory r e l i e f was unavailable, p l a i n t i f f s claims against the Parole Board Members fit squarely within the FCIA prohibition on granting injunctive r e l i e f against judicial officers for actions in their judicial capacity. 42 U.S .C. § 1983. Accordingly , I recommend that the motion to dismiss p l a i n t i f f s claims against the

Parole Board Members for injunctive relief be GRANTED.

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CONCLUSION

As discussed above, I have found that (i) p l a i n t i f f s claims seeking a Court Order directing the Parole Board to grant his parole application or release him into a work-release program as well as his claims seeking money damages related to the denial of his parole are barred under § 1983; (ii) the State and the Parole Board are not "persons" amenable to suit under §1983; (iii) the Parole Board Members in their official capacities are not " persons" who can be sued under §1983 for damages; (iv) the Parole Board Members in their individual capacities have absolute immunity from suit for damages under § 1983 with respect to the actions about which plaintiff complains ; and (v) the FCIA bars p l a i n t i f f s claims against the Parole Board Members for injunctive relief. I thus recommend that defendants ' motion to dismiss p l a i n t i f f s §1983 claims for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) be GRANTED and the action be DISMISSED with prejudice in its entirety. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days o f its receipt. Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b); LR Cv 72(d). Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes a waiver o f both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court's decision. United States v. ValenciaCopete, 792 F.2d 4 (lSI Cir. 1986) (per curiam) ; Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. F o r d Motor Co., 616 F .2d 603 ( l sl Cir. 1980).

Jacob Hagopian Senior United States Magistrate Judge October 6, 2009

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