Cook v. Wall et al
Filing
45
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 31 Motion to Dismiss; adopting in part 40 Report and Recommendations. So Ordered by Judge William E. Smith on 2/28/13. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
______________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
A. T. Wall, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________)
Jason Cook,
C.A. No. 09-169 S
ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, United States District Judge.
Before
the
Court
are
Plaintiff’s
and
Defendants’
Objections (ECF Nos. 43 and 42, respectively) to Magistrate
Judge
Lincoln
D.
Almond’s
(“MJ
Almond”)
Report
and
Recommendation (“R&R”), dated September 17, 2012. (ECF No.
40.)
MJ
Dismiss
Almond
recommended
Plaintiff’s
Amended
that
Defendants’
Complaint
granted in part and denied in part.
(ECF
Motion
No.
31)
to
be
The Court held a
hearing on both parties’ objections on January 28, 2013. 1
After careful review, MJ Almond’s R&R is adopted regarding
Counts I, III, IV, and VII but rejected regarding Counts
II, V, and VI.
1
The Court’s review of such an objection is de novo.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
For the following reasons, Cook’s Due Process claim is
entitled to proceed, but Cook’s Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress claim must be dismissed.
I.
Due Process
First,
the
recommendation
Court
to
does
grant
has
been
Defendants
terminated
allegation
alone;
presenting
evidence
as
witnesses
at
Cook
in
hearing
the
MJ
Motion
Almond’s
to
Dismiss
Cook asserts that his liberty
violated
the
adopt
Defendants’
Cook’s Due Process claim.
interest
not
a
variety
from
employment
Defendants
well
of
as
ways:
based
prohibited
calling
regarding
Cook
or
the
the
on
an
from
examining
employment
termination; the Defendants failed to timely notify Cook
that his appeal from the disciplinary board’s decision had
been
denied;
and
the
Defendants
placed
Cook
into
segregation without any evidence or hearings four times,
for more than fifty-two days total, including stints of
thirty days and eighteen days.
(See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-21,
28-31 (ECF No. 26).)
While some of these allegations alone
may
to
be
insufficient
violate
Cook’s
liberty
interest,
when taken in the aggregate, at the pleading stage, these
allegations
are
sufficient
to
make
violation of Cook’s liberty interest.
2
out
a
claim
of
a
“A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution
itself
.
.
.
or
it
may
arise
from
an
expectation
interest created by state laws or policies.”
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005).
or
Wilkinson v.
These state created
liberty interests
will
generally
be
limited
to
freedom
from
restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence
in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own
force,
nonetheless
imposes
atypical
and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidence of prison life. 2
Id.
(quoting
Sandin
v.
Conner,
515
U.S.
472,
483-84
(1995)).
The
Supreme
Court
has
also
held
that
placing
a
prisoner in segregated confinement for thirty days was not
considered
“atypical”
considered
a
under
or
violation
State
law
or
a
of
the
“significant
hardship”
a
liberty
protected
Due
Process
Clause
Constitution.
See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
reasoned
the
conditions
that
imposed
prisoner’s
upon
confinement
inmates
2
in
to
be
interest
of
the
The Court
“mirrored
[]
administrative
At oral arguments the Defendants referred to Almeida
v. Wall, C.A. No. 08-184S, 2008 WL 5377924 (D.R.I. Dec. 23,
2008), which found that a petitioner did not have a liberty
interest in his good time credit under R.I. Gen Laws § 4256-24 (1990 Reenactment).
After further review, the state
law, the liberty interest at issue, and the facts in
Almeida are distinguishable from this case and thus, it
does not prohibit Cook from bringing his Due Process claim.
See id. at *1-3.
3
segregation and protective custody” and that the prisoner’s
“confinement
did
not
exceed
similar,
but
totally
discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of
restriction.”
See id. at 486.
Nevertheless, here, at this stage of the case, Cook’s
Amended Complaint alleges multiple facts that could lead
the Court to find that Defendants have “impose[d] atypical
and significant hardship” on Cook which would thus violate
a state created and/or Due Process Clause liberty interest.
See
id.
at
Complaint
484.
appear
The
to
be
allegations
more
severe
in
Cook’s
than
the
Amended
facts
of
Sandin, as Cook states he was placed in segregation for
longer than thirty days without hearings or any evidence to
warrant the segregation, was terminated from his employment
without evidence, was prevented from producing any evidence
at
his
termination
hearing,
and
was
improperly
regarding the disciplinary board’s decision.
472; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18, 20-21, 28-31.
notified
See id. at
It is also worth
mentioning that the prisoner in Sandin was sentenced to
thirty years to life as a result of convictions for murder,
kidnapping, robbery, and burglary and had been often placed
in segregation prior to these incidents, unlike Cook, who
was
serving
entering.
a
seven
year
sentence
for
breaking
Compare Sandin, 515 U.S. at 474-75.
4
and
Therefore,
unlike
in
conditions
Sandin,
Cook’s
imposed
treatment
may
not
inmates
in
administrative
upon
“mirror[]
segregation and protective custody” and all of Defendants’
actions
could
rise
to
the
level
of
violating
Cook’s
protected liberty interest under state law — the Morris
Rules 3
—
and
Constitution. 4
II.
under
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
See id. at 486.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Second, Defendants correctly point out that MJ Almond
did
not
make
a
recommendation
regarding
the
Intentional
3
Contrary to Judge Almond’s R&R, even though the
Amended Complaint is not the most well pleaded complaint,
it appears Cook does plead a Due Process claim for which
relief can be granted as Cook asserts in his Amended
Complaint that his due process rights were violated by the
process and manner in which Defendants disciplined him, and
he specifically mentions the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Morris Rules under the Due Process Count of the Amended
Complaint. (See Am. Compl. pp. 17-20.)
4
In Rhode Island, the state laws that may create the
federal liberty interest here are the Morris Rules which
“spell
out
privileges
and
restrictions
for
each
classification,
establish
minimum
conditions
of
confinement, and enumerate those inmate actions that
constitute punishable conduct.” See Doctor v. Wall, 143 F.
Supp. 2d 203, 206 (D.R.I 2001).
Even though the Morris
Rules are state law, jurisdiction in federal court is
proper as Cook asserts that his due process rights were
violated when Defendants violated a liberty interest
created by the Constitution and the Morris Rules, not just
the Morris Rules alone.
See id.; Am. Compl. ¶ 55.
Thus,
because Cook is “mak[ing] an allegation of a federal
constitutional violation and bring[ing] an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983” the Court can hear this claim. See Doctor,
143 F. Supp. 2d at 205; Am. Compl. p. 17.
5
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim. Under Rhode Island
law, liability is only imposed after four factors have been
proven:
(1) the conduct must be intentional or in
reckless disregard of the probability of causing
emotional distress, (2) the conduct must be
extreme and outrageous, (3) there must be a
causal connection between the wrongful conduct
and the emotional distress, and (4) the emotional
distress in question must be severe.
Norton
v.
McOsker,
Furthermore,
Rhode
407
F.3d
Island
501,
510
“requires
(1st
that
Cir.
there
2005).
be
some
medical proof establishing physical symptoms of distress.”
Id.
Cook’s Amended Complaint, however, fails to allege
medical
proof
Accordingly,
of
Cook’s
physical
symptoms
Intentional
of
Infliction
of
distress.
Emotional
Distress claim must be dismissed.
III
Conclusion
Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Almond’s R&R is adopted
in part and rejected in part.
MJ
Almond’s
R&R
in
the
The Court accepts and adopts
following
respects:
first,
the
Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss regarding Counts
I and V (as they relate to Article 1, Section 21 of the
Rhode Island Constitution), the First Amendment retaliation
claim, for the reasons laid out by MJ Almond; second, as
neither party objected to MJ Almond’s R&R regarding Count
III, the Eighth Amendment Violation claim, Count IV, the
6
supervisory liability claim, and Count VII, captioned as a
Writ of Habeas Corpus claim, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss
DENIES
with
on
those
prejudice
counts;
Defendants’
finally,
Motion
the
for
Court
Summary
Judgment on Exhaustion Grounds, for the reasons laid out by
MJ Almond.
As discussed above, the Court does not adopt
the R&R for the following two claims:
claim
and
(2)
the
Intentional
(1) the Due Process
Infliction
of
Emotional
Distress claim. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss regarding Counts II and V (as they relate to
Article 1, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution), the
Due Process claim, and the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion
to
Dismiss
Count
VI,
the
Emotional Distress claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ William E. Smith
William E. Smith
United States District Judge
Date: February 28, 2013
7
Intentional
Infliction
of
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