Rhode Island Hospital v. United Nurses and Allied Professionals, Local 5098

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 19 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings- So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 1/21/10. (Barletta, Barbara)

UNITED S T A T E S D I S T R I C T C O U R T F O R T H E D I S T R I C T OF R H O D E I S L A N D

RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL, Plaintiff,

v.

C.A. No. 09-226-ML

UNITED N U R S E S A N D ALLIED PROFESSIONALS, L O C A L 5098, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This m a t t e r is before the C o u r t on Plaintiff, Rhode Island H o s p i t a l ' s ( " H o s p i t a l " ) m o t i o n to vacate an arbitration a w a r d a n d D e f e n d a n t ' s , U n i t e d N u r s e s and A l l i e d Professionals, Local 5098 ( " U n i o n " ) m o t i o n to c o n f i r m the arbitration award.' The H o s p i t a l filed its m o t i o n pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. l 2 ( c ) and the U n i o n has filed its m o t i o n p u r s u a n t to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The C o u r t has subject m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r this m a t t e r p u r s u a n t to 28 U . S . C . § 1331 as the case arises u n d e r S e c t i o n 301 o f the L a b o r M a n a g e m e n t Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10.

I. Standards o f R e v i e w
A m o t i o n for j u d g m e n t on the pleadings is treated m u c h like a R u l e 12(b)(6) m o t i o n to dismiss. P e r e z - A c e v e d o v. R i v e r o - C u b a n o , 520 F . 3 d 26 (1st Cir. 2008). In d e c i d i n g a m o t i o n for j u d g m e n t on the p l e a d i n g s the C o u r t m u s t " v i e w the facts c o n t a i n e d in the pleadings in the light m o s t favorable to the p a r t y o p p o s i n g the m o t i o n . . . and d r a w all r e a s o n a b l e inferences in

l T he

Union has filed a counterclaim, which in essence, is a motion to confirm the arbitration award.

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[that party's] favor." Curran v. Cousins, 509 F J d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2007). Judgment on the pleadings is proper "only i f the uncontested and properly considered facts conclusively establish the m o v a n t ' s entitlement to a favorable j u d g m e n t . " Aponte- Torress v. University o f Puerto Rico, 445 F.3d 50, 54 ( l s t Cir. 2006). Summary j u d g m e n t is appropriate " i f the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to j u d g m e n t as a matter o f l a w . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" i f the pertinent evidence is such that a rational factfinder could resolve the issue in favor o f either party, and a fact is "material" i f it "has the capacity to sway the outcome o f the litigation under the applicable law." N a t ' l Amusements, Inc. v. T o w n o f Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995). The moving party bears the burden o f showing the C o u r t that no genuine issue o f material fact exists. Id. Once the movant has made the requisite showing, the nonmoving party " m a y not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. C o n t ' ! Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 373 ( l s t Cir. 1991). Judicial review o f arbitral awards is "extremely narrow and exceedingly deferential." Bull HN Info. Sys .. Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 3 2 1 , 3 3 0 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A c o u r t ' s review o f an arbitration award is highly deferential because the parties "have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator" and thus, "it is the arbitrator's view o f the facts and o f the meaning o f the contract that they have agreed to accept." United

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Paperworkers I n t ' ! Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987). While the a r b i t r a t o r ' s award m u s t " d r a w its essence from the contract," to the extent t h a t the arbitrator is " e v e n arguably construing or applying the contract and acting w i t h i n the scope o f [her] authority, that a court is c o n v i n c e d [the arbitrator] committed serious error does not suffice to overturn [the] decision." Id. at 38. A successful challenge to an arbitration award generally requires a s h o w i n g that the award is "(1) unfounded in r e a s o n and fact; (2) based on reasoning so p a l p a b l y faulty that no j u d g e , or group o f j u d g e s , e v e r could conceivably have m a d e s u c h a ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial a s s u m p t i o n t h a t is concededly a non-fact." Advest. Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 , 8 - 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, an arbitral award is subject to b e i n g v a c a t e d w h e n an " a w a r d is contrary to the p l a i n language o f the collective bargaining a g r e e m e n t " or where "it is clear from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law - and then ignored it." Id. at 9; ~ also K a s h n e r Davidson Securities Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 6 8 , 7 4 · 7 5 (1st Cir. 2008). This C o u r t should uphold the a r b i t r a t o r ' s decision so long as " i t can find, within the four c o m e r s o f the agreement, any plausible basis for [the a r b i t r a t o r ' s ] interpretation." El Dorado T e c h n i c a l Services, Inc. v. Union Gen. De Trabajodores de Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d 3 1 7 , 3 1 9 (1st Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). II. Background The pertinent facts are straight forward and are not in dispute. The Hospital and Union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). The t e r m o f the C B A is July 1 , 2 0 0 7 , through June 30, 2011. In May 2008, the Hospital changed the e i g h t h o u r shift o f incumbent employees to eight and one h a l f hours w i t h a thirty minute unpaid meal period. The Union filed

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a grievance alleging that the Hospital violated the CBA by requiring the affected 8 hour shift employees to take a thirty minute unpaid meal period. The Hospital denied the grievance and the Union filed for arbitration. The parties requested that the arbitrator do two things: (1) she should decide whether the Hospital violated the CBA w h e n it changed the eight hour shifts o f incumbent employees to eight and a h a l f hour shifts with a thirty minute unpaid meal period; and (2), i f the arbitrator found that the Hospital violated the CBA, she should fashion an appropriate remedy. The arbitrator determined that the Hospital did violate the CBA. She ordered the Hospital to modify the schedules o f the aggrieved employees to comply with the CBA. III. Pertinent Provisions o f the CBA Article 2 o f the CBA generally describes management rights regarding the number o f shifts, hours o f work and selection o f employees. Article 2 provides, in part, that the Hospital retains the right to manage the operations o f the Hospital and direct the working force; hire employees o f its own selection . . . determine the number o f shifts, the number o f days in the workweek, the hours o f work and the number o f persons to be actively employed by the Hospital at any time . . . and, in general, to determine what work should be performed as well as when, where, how and by whom such work shall be performed. These enumerated rights o f management are not all inclusive. Except as expressly limited by specific provisions o f this Agreement, the Hospital retains all rights which pre-existed this Agreement. Complaint Exhibit B Article 2 § 1 (emphasis added). Article 14 o f the CBA more particularly governs hours o f work, schedules and breaks and provides that the basic work week for full-time employees consists o f thirty-five (35) to forty (40) hours o f w o r k per week. The workweek consists o f the seven consecutive days beginning with the day shift on Sunday. The basic schedule for full-time employees shall include two days o f f in each week. The basic day for full-time employees shall consist o f shifts o f eight. ten or twelve hours o f work per day. The basic workday is the twenty-four hour period beginning with the start o f the

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day shift. The H o s p i t a l may, in its discretion, create p o s i t i o n s a n d schedules t h a t include four-hour shifts, p r o v i d e d t h a t no employee shall i n v o l u n t a r i l y have her/his hours or shifts r e d u c e d or altered to include a four-hour shift. Id. at Article 14 § 1 ( e m p h a s i s added). The basic e i g h t - h o u r w o r k shifts are as follows: Day shifts shall b e g i n at or after 6:00 a.m. and e n d at or b e f o r e 6:00 p.m. E v e n i n g shifts shall b e g i n at or after 3:00 p.m. and end at or before 1:00 a.m. N i g h t shifts shall b e g i n at or after 11 :00 p.m. and end at or b e f o r e 8:00 a.m, Id. at § 2. Employees s c h e d u l e d to w o r k six to e i g h t hours shall receive one twenty-minute paid break. E m p l o y e e s s c h e d u l e d to w o r k m o r e t h a n e i g h t h o u r s but less t h a n ten hours will be p r o v i d e d an u n p a i d meal p e r i o d o f o n e - h a l f h o u r a n d a p a i d b r e a k o f fifteen minutes. . . . E m p l o y e e s are to be completely r e l i e v e d o f d u t y in order for the meal p e r i o d to be u n p a i d and employees may leave t h e i r w o r k areas. Id. at § 7 (emphasis added). During the life o f t h i s A g r e e m e n t it may be necessary for the e m p l o y e r to p e r m a n e n t l y c h a n g e the regular shifts, assignment to departments, units or shifts a n d / o r hours o f shifts as they existed at the t i m e this A g r e e m e n t was executed. No s u c h c h a n g e s will be m a d e w i t h o u t notice to and o p p o r t u n i t y for discussions w i t h the Union. Id. at § 9 (emphasis added). IV. Contentions o f the Parties The U n i o n argues t h a t the arbitrator honored the p l a i n language o f the CBA and concludes t h a t the a r b i t r a t o r ' s d e c i s i o n is based u p o n a plausible interpretation o f the CBA. The Hospital counters t h a t the a r b i t r a t o r ' s d e c i s i o n contravenes the p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f the CBA by ignoring u n a m b i g u o u s m a n a g e m e n t r i g h t s ' language in the C B A . T h e H o s p i t a l also argues t h a t the arbitrator e x c e e d e d her authority by substituting her j u d g m e n t in p l a c e o f the H o s p i t a l ' s j u d g m e n t regarding p a t i e n t c a r e and d i s p e n s e d her own b r a n d o f industrial justic e . The Hospital

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concludes that the a r b i t r a t o r ' s decision is palpably wrong and fails to d r a w its essence from the CBA. V. Analysis Article 2 o f the C B A grants to the Hospital the " r i g h t to m a n a g e the operations o f the Hospital" and to determine the " n u m b e r o f shifts," the " h o u r s o f w o r k , " the " m e t h o d s and schedules o f all services" and "to determine what w o r k should be p e r f o r m e d as well as when, where, how and by w h o m . . . . " C o m p l a i n t Exhibit B Article 2 § 1 (emphasis added). Article 2 however, also provides t h a t " [ e ] x c e p t as expressly limited by specific provisions o f this [CBA], the Hospital retains all rights w h i c h pre-existed this [ C B A ] . " Id. (emphasis added). Article 14 Section 9 o f the C B A states that during the term o f the C B A it " m a y be necessary for the [Hospital] to p e r m a n e n t l y change the regular shifts . . . units or shifts a n d / o r hours o f shifts as they existed at the t i m e " the C B A was executed. Id. Article 14 § 9 (emphasis added). While Article 2 and Article 14 § 9 grant the Hospital the authority to determine the hours o f work, n u m b e r o f shifts and hours o f shifts, the CBA also provides t h a t employees "scheduled to work six to eight hours shall receive [only] one twenty-minute p a i d b r e a k " while employees "scheduled to w o r k m o r e t h a n e i g h t hours but less t h a n ten h o u r s " are entitled to an " u n p a i d meal period o f o n e - h a l f h o u r and a p a i d b r e a k o f fifteen minutes." Id. at Article 14 § 7. The Hospital readily admits that the " o n l y possible interpretation o f Article 14, § 7 is that it outlines the breaks employees are entitled to receive based on the lengths o f the shifts they are scheduled to work . . . ." P l a i n t i f f s M e m o r a n d u m o f Law in Opposition to D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n for S u m m a r y Judgment at 3 (emphasis added). Consequently, the arbitrator was faced w i t h a C B A t h a t granted the Hospital the discretion to set the hours o f shifts while, at the same time, it granted employees

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specific delineated breaks b a s e d u p o n the length o f the shift to w h i c h the employee was assigned. The U n i o n contends that the arbitrator honored the plain language o f the CBA. The Hospital argues that Article 2 § 1 and Article 14 § 9 grant the Hospital the right to modify shifts and/or hours o f shifts and confers u p o n the Hospital the express right to determine an e m p l o y e e ' s hours o f work. The Hospital contends that the arbitrator ignored the " c l e a r and unambiguous" management rights language in the C B A in fashioning her decision. H o s p i t a l ' s Memorandum o f Law in Support o f M o t i o n for J u d g m e n t on the Pleadings at 1. This C o u r t finds that the arbitrator did not ignore the p l a i n language o f the CBA. The arbitrator specifically q u o t e d b o t h Article 2 and Article 14 § 9 in her decision. In fact, the arbitrator correctly o b s e r v e d t h a t Article 14 § 9 was a "general reservation o f m a n a g e m e n t ' s right to permanently change the regular shifts and assignment to shifts and hours o f shifts during the term o f the contract." C o m p l a i n t E x h i b i t A at 8 (emphasis added). W h a t the Hospital fails to acknowledge, however, is t h a t the arbitrator interpreted the plain language o f the CBA by identifying c o m p e t i n g provisions within the CBA and interpreting the C B A in light o f those competing provisions. The arbitrator found t h a t the language o f Article 14 § 7 ("employees scheduled to work six to eight hours shall receive one twenty-minute paid break") expressly limited the more general m a n a g e m e n t rights language (contained in Article 2 and Article 14 § 9) granting the Hospital the authority to set the hours o f shifts. " W h e n m o r e t h a n one contract provision is implicated, an arbitrator is at liberty to determine which o f the two c o m p e t i n g contract provisions governs o v e r the o t h e r . " Millcraft-SMS Services. LLC v. United Steel Workers o f America AFL-CIO-CLC, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1183 (N.D. Ala. 2004); see generally IMC-Agrico Co. v.

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International Chemical Workers Council o f t h e United Food and Commercial Workers Union. AFL-CIO, 171 F.3d 1322, 1328 ( l l t h Cir. 1999) (when "there are two plausible interpretations o f an agreement, then the arbitrator's choice o f one over the other will be honored"); National Gypsum Co. v Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, 147 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1998) (to the extent that there was a conflict between two sections o f a CBA, arbitrator is entitled to resolve it). The arbitrator's interpretation o f the CBA is certainly plausible given that the CBA provides that the Hospital's rights are "limited by specific provisions" o f the CBA. Complaint Exhibit B Article 2 § 1. The CBA reflects that the parties agreed on the length and type o f employee breaks based upon the length o f the shift o f the employee. Article 14 § 7 specifically provides only for a paid 20 minute break and no unpaid meal period for employees working between 6 to 8 hours. Id. Article 14 § 7. The parties did not agree on a half-hour unpaid meal period for those employees working 6 to 8 hours shifts but did agree on such a period for those employees working more than 8 hours on a shift. Id. "[W]hen parties list specific items in a document, any item not so listed is typically thought to be excluded." Lohnes v. Level 3 Communications. Inc., 272 F.3d 4 9 , 6 1 ( l s t Cir. 2001). In this CBA, the parties mutually agreed that 8-hour shift employees would receive j u s t the one twenty minute paid break. The arbitrator read the CBA as a whole and not as a conglomeration o f disconnected provisions. See generally Casey v. Lifespan Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d 471 (D.R.I. 1999) (court looks to explicit language o f the CBA and reads the pertinent provisions in the context o f the agreement as a whole). When the CBA is viewed in its entirety, the arbitrator's decision draws its essence from the CBA "since the specific governs over the general as a matter o f contract
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interpretation . . . . " Central States. Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Blue Ridge Trucking Company, No. 91 C 8 2 4 , 1 9 9 3 WL 303128 at

* 7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9 , 1 9 9 3 ) ; Lawson v.

F.D.I.C. 3 F.3d 11, 17 (1 st Circuit 1993) ("it is a familiar precept o f contract interpretation that the specific controls the general"); see generally Spenlinhauer v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 581 F. Supp. 2d 8 3 , 8 9 (D. Me. 2008) (where "general and specific clauses conflict, the specific clause governs the m e a n i n g o f the contract") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Hospital also argues that a prior arbitration award ( " D u n n decision"), which the Hospital contends illustrates that the Hospital had changed employee schedules without the U n i o n ' s agreement in the past, is authoritative in this dispute. The H o s p i t a l ' s position is unconvincing for two reasons. First, it is " b l a c k letter law that arbitration awards are not entitled to the precedential effect accorded to judicial decisions. Indeed, an arbitration award is not considered conclusive or binding in subsequent cases involving the same contract language but different incidents or grievances." El Dorada Technical Services. Inc. v. U n i o n General De Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d 317, 321 (1st Cir. 1992). Second, any reliance upon the Dunn decision is m i s p l a c e d as the D u n n decision is inapposite. The D u n n decision did not involve a contractual provision w h i c h supported the aggrieved e m p l o y e e s ' claim. Complaint Exhibit C at 6 (noting that the "controlling consideration is that no provision o f the labor agreement expressly gives to the . . . [employees] the contractual right in the holiday o f f weeks to work eight fewer hours t h a n their regular weekly schedule"). In this instance there is a contractual p r o v i s i o n in the C B A that supports the employees' claim. See Complaint Exhibit B Article 14 § 7; see generally C o m p l a i n t Exhibit A at 9. Since the a r b i t r a t o r ' s award rests upon a "plausible interpretation" o f the CBA, this Court

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"must uphold it." Salem Hospital v. Massachusetts Nurses Association, 449 F.3d 2 3 4 , 2 3 8 (1st C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) . Accordingly, the Hospital's motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED and the U n i o n ' s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 2

SO ORDERED

MaryM. i C h i e f United States District Judge January ~I , 2 0 1 0

~dh.dJ~

2T he Hospital also argues that the a r b i t r a t o r ' s creation o f an extra-contractual definition o f the phrase "hours o f work" in the CBA is unfounded in fact and is based upon palpably faulty reasoning. The Hospital concludes that the arbitrator's definition so polluted the arbitrator's decision that it must be overturned by the Court. The Court, however, need not specifically address the Hospital's argument as the arbitrator's decision is based upon a plausible interpretation o f the CBA without considering the arbitrator's definition o f the phrase "hours o f work."

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