Ward v. Lotuff et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 4 Motion to Dismiss- So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 11/2/09. (Barletta, Barbara)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT C O U R T FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND JAMES WARD, Plaintiff, v. C.A. No. 09-357-ML MARY LOTUFF and 1. RICHARD RATCLIFFE , Defendants. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ratcliffe's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief can be Granted. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Ratcliffe's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. I. Facts and Procedural History On August 5, 2008, James Ward (" P l a i n t i f f ' ) filed a mult i-count complaint in the Providence County Superior Court against Mary and Richard Lotuff. The complaint alleged, among other things, several landlord-tenant claims, fraud, misrepresentation, abuse o f process and intentional infliction o f emotional distress . The Lotuffs engaged Attorney 1. Richard Ratcliffe ("Defendant") to represent them in the Superior Court action. After Defendant entered his appearance on b e h a l f o f the Lotuffs, Pl aintiff mailed to Defendant a copy o f a motion to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff requested Defendant's assent to the proposed amendment. On October 15, 2008, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter (the "Letter "), stating that the Lotuffs "declined to agree to [ P l a i n t i f f s ] proposed amendment." Def. Exhibit A. In the Letter, Defendant told Plaintiff to consider retracting certain allegations or he " m ay expect further action from us on b e h a l f o f Ms . Lotuff, which action may include a motion for Rule 11 1 sanctions." Compl ., ~ 109. Undeterred , Plaintiff filed his motion to amend with the proposed amended complaint. The motion to amend was granted by the Rhode Island Superior Court. The Lotuffs then filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The motion to dismiss was granted under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as to six counts o f the amended complaint. I Plaintiff has now filed this Complaint in this Court alleging, among other things , several land-lord tenant claims against Mary L o t u f f" Plaintiff has also named Defendant Radcliffe as a defendant in Count VIII (Abuse o f Process), Count IX (Intentional Infliction o f Emotional Distress) , Count X (Negligent Infliction o f Emotional Distress) and Count XI (Punitive Damages). II. Standard o f Review Defendant Radcliffe has moved to dismiss all counts against him pursuant to Fed . R. Civ. P . 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss , a " comp laint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true , to ' state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. '" Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Ati. Com. v . Twombly, 550 U.S. 5 4 4 , 5 7 0 (2007)). The Court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw [s] all reasonable inferences in favor o f the plaintiff[]. " Gargano v. Liberty Int ' l Underwriters, 572 F.3d 45 , 4 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Fitzgerald v. Harris , 549 F.3d 46 , 5 2 (1st Cir. 2008)). I The court ackn ow led g e s that there were at least thr ee remaining claims in st ate court prior to P l a i n t i f f filing this Complaint. The parties have not informed the Court o f the status o f the remain ing stat e cla ims . Regardless , De fendant was not a party in the state court action . Th erefore, the status o f thos e remaining state claims is not rele vant to the mot ion presen tly before the Court . 2 Wh ile Richard L o t u f f a p p e a r e d to be a named defendant in the state c o u r t a ct io n, he is not a named Defendant in the federa l Complaint. 2 The plaintiff must allege facts supporting "each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory. " Campagna v. Mass. D e p ' t o f Envtl. Prot., 334 F.3d 150, 1 5 5 ( I s t Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). While well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, "un supp orted conclusions or interpretations o f law" are rejected. Dixon v. Shamrock Fin . Corp., 522 F.3d 76, 79 ( l s t Cir. 2008) (citing W a s h . Legal Found. v . Mass . Bar Found., 993 F.2d 9 6 2 , 9 7 1 ( l st Cir. 1993)).3 This Court is mindful that P l a i n t i f f is proceeding p r o se; therefore, his pleadings are accorded a more generous reading . III. Analysis Count VIII: Abuse o f Process Under Rhode Island law, abuse o f process "arises when a legal proceeding , although set in motion in proper form, becomes perverted to accomplish an ulterior or wrongful purpose for which it was not designed. " Hillside Assocs. v. Stravato, 642 A . 2 d 6 6 4 , 6 6 7 (R.!. 1994) (citing Brough v. Foley , 572 A.2d 63 , 6 7 (R.!. 1990). An abuse o f process claim m u s t demonstrate two elements - " ( I ) that the defendant instituted proceedings or process against the plaintiff and (2) the defendant used these proceedings for an ulterior or wrongful purpose that the proceedings were not designed to accomplish." Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 154 (R.!. 2008) (quoting 3 While P l a i n t i f f refers to the O c t o b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 letter (the " L ett e r) from Defendant Ratcliffe throughout the Complaint, the Letter was not attached to the Complaint, nor was it incorporated by reference. The Court need not rely on the Letter in its consideration o f Defendant Ratcliffe's motion because key portions o f the Letter are referenced within P l a i n t i f f s Complaint. Even if this Court did so rely , Defendant Ratcliffe 's motion would not automatically be transformed into a motion for summary j u d g m e n t under Rule 56(c). This C o u r t may properly consider " the relevant entirety o f a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint, even though not attached to the co mp la int, without converting the motion into one for summary j u d g m e n t . " Cloro x Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commer Co., 228 F.3d 2 4 , 3 2 ( l s t Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The October 15, 2008 Letter is the primary basis o f Count VIII, Count IX, Count X and Count XI, and would therefore qualify as 'integra!' to the Complaint. 3 Butera v. Boucher, 798 A . 2 d 340, 353 (R.!. 2 0 0 2 » . The Rhode Island S u p r e m e C o u r t has defined ' j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g ' w i t h i n its " or d in ary and customary m e a n i n g " to include " a n y proceeding w h e r e i n j u d i c i a l a c t i o n is i n v o k e d and taken." Hillside Assocs., 642 A . 2 d at 668 (citing Roberts v. City o f C r a n s t o n Z o n i n g B o a r d o f Review, 448 A .2d 779 , 781 (R .!. 1982» . While a formal hearing b e f o r e an administrative body may constitute a legal proceeding, Id. at 669, the mere sending o f a letter c a n n o t be construed to satisfy the ' j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g ' requirement. In C o u n t VIII, P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s that " D e f e n d a n t Ratcliffe, on b e h a l f o f Defendant Lotuff, mailed a threatening letter to P l a i n t i f f w i t h the ulterior and wrongful p u r p o s e o f using the threat to intimidate P l a i n t i f f into withdrawing certain allegations w h i c h substantiate the basis for [the] punitive damages c l a i m [ ] . " Cornpl.i f 107. P l a i n t i f f further alleges t h a t D e f e n d a n t " recklessly and maliciously m a d e the threats against P l a i n t i f f w i t h o u t h a v i n g fully investigated the allegations o f P l a i n t i f f ' and specifically threatened t h a t i f P l a i n t i f f did n o t " r e t r a c t certain allegations within 21 days, " P l a i n t i f f " m ay e x p e c t further a c t i o n ... includ[ing] a m o t i o n for Rule 11 sanctions." Id . at 1 1 1 0 8 , 109 . E v e n accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in the Complaint, t h e C o m p l a i n t is devoid o f any reference to a legal p r o c e e d i n g or process instituted by Defendant. W h i l e the C o m p l a i n t references the alleged t h r e a t e n i n g letter, the sending o f the Letter is clearly not tantamount to instituting a legal proceeding. B e c a u s e the C o m p l a i n t fails to allege plausible facts supporting the material elements o f A b u s e o f Process , D e f e n d a n t R a t c l i f f e ' s M o t i o n to D i s m i s s C o u n t VIII is granted. 4 Count I X : Intentional Infliction o f Emotional Distress Under Rhode Island law , to recover for Intentional Infliction o f Emotion Distress, a plaintiff must prove , among other things , that " ( 1) the defendant acted with intent to cause emotional distress or with reckless disregard as to whether emotional distress would result and (2) the defendant 's conduct was ' s o outrageous in character , and so extreme in degree , as to go beyond all possible bounds o f decency, and to be regarded as atrocious , and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Gail v . New Eng. Gas Co., 460 F. Supp.2d 3 1 4 , 3 2 6 (D.R .!. 2006) (quoting Swerdlick v. Koch , 721 A.2d 849 , 863 (R.!. 1998) (quoting Restatement (Second) o f Torts § 46 cmt. d, at 73) ). Additionally, a plaintiff must establish both a " causal connection " between the defendant ' s conduct and the resulting emotional distress , and physical symptoms " manifestin g the distress. " Id. at 326 (citing Marchetti v. Parsons , 638 A.2d 1047 , 1052 (R.!. 1994)). This Court need not address the Complaint's unsupported conclusory assertions o f emotional and physical ailments, because the Complaint does not satisfy the second element o f the Intentional Infliction o f Emotional Distress claim. Count IX can be dismissed based on the "" finding that the Letter , as a matter o f l a w , does not constitute 'outrageous' conduct. See Gail, 460 F. Supp.2d at 326 . Defendant merel y sent a letter warning the Plaintiff to conduct a more thorough investigation into the allegations made against the Lotuffs , or he could expect further action to be taken by the Lotuffs , including a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Compl. ,~~ 108, 109. The Letter is far from the outrageous conduct required for a plausible Intentional Infliction o f Emotional Distress claim . Defendant Ratcliffe 's Motion to Dismiss Count IX for Intentional Infliction o f Emotional Distress is, therefore , granted . 5 Count X: Negligent Infliction o f Emotional Distress To reco ver under a theory o f Negligent Infliction o f Emotional Distress under Rhode Island law, plaintiffs m u s t either (1) be within the zone o f danger o f those who are " p hy sically endangered by the acts o f a negligent defendant" or (2) be bystanders who are " re lated to a victim whom the y witn ess being injur ed. " Perrotti v . Gonicberg , 877 A . 2 d 631 , 636 (R.!. 2005) (citing Jalowy v . Friendl v Home, Inc ., 818 A.2d 698 , 710 (R.!. 2003) (internal citations omitted)). Additionally, plaintiffs must, as a result o f the defendant's negligent act , suffer from "serious emotional injury that is accompanied by physical symptomatology ." Perotti, 877 A.2d at 637 (citing Marchetti , 638 A . 2 d at 1052). Negligent Infliction o f Emotional Distress is a limited cause o f action that is not designed to reach situations where an attorney merely sends a letter on b e h a l f o f his client. To satisfy the ' physical endangerment' element o f a Negligent Infliction o f Emotional Distress claim , Plaintiff must fit into one o f the "t wo groups o f plaintiffs [who] are able [] to seek recovery under a theory o f negligent infliction o f emotional distress" - those within the zone o f danger who are physically endangered , and those who, as bystanders, witness a relative be injured. Id . at 636 . Plaintiff clearly does not qualify as either limited category o f plaintiffs. Therefore, D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion to Dismiss C o u n t X for Negligent Infliction o f Emotional Distress is granted. Count XI: Punitive D a m a g e s P l a i n t i f f s claim to punitive damages against Defendant Ratcliffe is premised upon Count VIII, Count IX , and Count X. In light o f the fact that all three underlying counts against Defendant are dismissed , Count XI for Puniti ve Damages must also be dismissed. 6 IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above , Defendant Ratcli ffe ' s M o t i o n to Dismiss Count VIII, Count IX, Count X, and C o u n t XI is GRANTED. SO ORDERED . MaryM. i Chief United States District Judge No vember ~ 2 009 OJ~dh .g~ 7

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