Cobb v. United States of America et al

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER granting 15 Motion to Dismiss Counts II, II and IV- So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M Lisi on 6/2/10. (Barletta, Barbara)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

ARTHUR COBB, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CURTIS E . DOBERSTEIN, M . D . ; UNIVERSITY NEUROSURGERY, I N C . ; NEUROSURGERY FOUNDATION, I N C . ; JOHN a n d / o r JANE DOE, M . D . , A l i a s ; a n d JOHN DOE CORPORATION, A l i a s , Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER

C.A. No. 09-388ML

M a r y M. L i s i , C h i e f U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e . This case i s before the Court on motion by the United States to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of the p l a i n t i f f ' s 20-count

complaint against the United States and various other defendants i n what i s essentially a medical malpractice s u i t . 1 that follow, For the reasons

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s i s GRANTED a n d

C o u n t s I I , I I I , a n d IV o f t h e c o m p l a i n t a r e D I S M I S S E D .
I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff s a n d b l a s t e r who

Arthur sought

Cobb

("Cobb" )

is

a

55

year

old

former

treatment at Center

the Rhode

Island Veterans 2006, after

Administration Medical

("VAMC")

in January

O n l y C o u n t s I t h r o u g h IV a r e a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d States, which i s being sued on behalf of the United States Veterans Administration Medical Center.

suffering f r o m l e g w e a k n e s s f o r a y e a r a n d a h a l f .
2006,

On M a r c h 1 3 , Curtis Dr.

Cobb

consulted

a

private

physician,

defendant

D o b e r s t e i n / M.D. Doberstein stenosis

("Dr. Doberstein"), for back and leg pain. that Cobb was symptomatic of lumbar a n L3

stated

spinal
LS

and

intractable

back pain and performed

l a m i n e c t o m y a n d a n L3 - LS f u s i o n o n A p r i l 1 1 / 2 0 0 6 . C o b b ' s s y m p t o m s d i d n o t i m p r o v e a f t e r t h e s u r g e r y / a n d o n May
9 / 2 0 0 6 / C o b b u n d e r w e n t a n MRI o f t h e c e r v i c a l s p i n e a t t h e VAMC,

o n o r d e r b y D r . I s r a e l Y a a r ( " D r . Y a a r " ) 2 o f t h e VAMC. to Cobb/s administrative of Veterans claim Affairs filed with the "[t]he

According States

United

Department

("VA") /

differential

diagnosis at that time included neuromyelitis optical tumor/ or an ischemic process." A J u l y 1 2 / 2 0 0 6 a d d e n d u m i n t h e VAMC m e d i c a l

r e c o r d s i g n e d b y D r . Y a a r i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e MRI r e v e a l e d a l e s i o n on Cobb/ s c e r v i c a l spine. As C o b b ' s c o n d i t i o n c o n t i n u e d t o w o r s e n / Doberstein and Dr. Yaar. On

he continued to consult both Dr.

A u g u s t 2 8 / 2 0 0 6 / C o b b u n d e r w e n t a n o t h e r MRI o f t h e c e r v i c a l s p i n e on Dr. Yaar/s orders/ which revealed a solid lesion within the

cervical cord.

Dr. Yaar informed Cobb on t h a t date t h a t he had a On S e p t e m b e r 2 2 / 2 0 0 6 a n d a g a i n o n

cervical spinal cord tumor .

February 16/ 2007/ Cobb underwent two separate s u r g e r i e s by p r i v a t e physicians Dr. Doberstein and Dr. Adetokunbo Oyelese to address the

2

Dr. Yaar i s not a named defendant i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n .
2

tumor.

According

to

the

complaint,

Cobb

spent

months

in

rehabilitative treatment and is currently confined to a wheelchair. On A u g u s t 2 0 , t o t h e VA, 2008, Cobb's counsel sent a
~Notice

of Claim"

i n w h i c h h e a l l e g e d t h a t t h e VAMC w a s n e g l i g e n t i n [sic] and

t r e a t i n g Cobb because " i t f a i l e d t o timely diagnosis

treat a condition that resulted in severe and permanent injuries." Cobb's counsel sent an
~Amended

Notice

of

Claim"

(the

~Claim

N o t i c e " ) t o t h e VA o n A u g u s t 2 1 , 2 0 0 8 , i n w h i c h h e r a i s e d i d e n t i c a l claims. 3 Both communications included a demand t o compensate Cobb

"for the injuries, pain and suffering, and other damages sustained by Arthur Cobb i n the amount of $20 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . " Claim Notice, Page 3. After acknowledging receipt of Cobb's claim on October 26, 2 0 0 8 , t h e VA i s s u e d a d e n i a l o n M a r c h 3 1 , 2 0 0 9 , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a review of Cobb's claim "did not reveal the existence of any

n e g l i g e n t o r w r o n g f u l a c t o n t h e p a r t o f a n y e m p l o y e e " o f t h e VA. The denial l e t t e r also s t a t e d t h a t Cobb's claim was untimely as i t "was f i l e d more negligence." On A u g u s t 2 4 , 2 0 0 9 , C o b b f i l e d a 2 0 - c o u n t c o m p l a i n t i n t h i s Court, asserting against the United States under the Federal Tort than two years a f t e r the date of the alleged

3

The Amended Notice of Claim includes a d d i t i o n a l medical d e t a i l s regarding the surgeries Cobb underwent t o address the tumor.
3

Claims A c t

(~FTCA")

claims of (Count I) Negligence, (Count II) Lack (Count III) Corporate L i a b i l i t y , and (Count

of Informed Consent, IV)

Vicarious Liability.

The remaining 16 counts against non-

federal individual and corporate defendants are based on the same four legal theories. On M a r c h 2 6 , 2 0 1 0 , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s Count I I and Count I I I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground t h a t Cobb f a i l e d t o exhaust h i s administrative remedies and/or for failure to state a claim upon which r e l i e f can be

granted, pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b) (6). IV, the United States sought dismissal

With respect to Count because the claim is

d u p l i c a t i v e of Cobb's negligence claim a s s e r t e d i n Count I . Cobb filed a response in opposition to the motion on April 12, 2010, to which the United States filed a reply on April 22, 2010. II. Standard of Review

(A) R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) In order to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b) (6),
~the

complaint must 'contain sufficient factual matter,
~state

accepted as true, to

a claim to r e l i e f that i s plausible on

i t s f a c e . " ' " C u n n i n g h a m v . N a t i o n a l C i t y B a n k , 5 8 8 F . 3 d 4 9 , 52 ( 1 s t Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. - , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 U.S. 868 544, (2009) (quoting 570, 127 are S.Ct. Bell Atlantic 167 true, Corp. v. 929

Twombly, (2007)).

1955,

L.Ed.2d and

Well-pleaded facts

accepted as

factual

4

allegations plaintiff.

are

viewed

in

the

light

most Inc.,

favorable

to

the 34-35

Rederford v.

u.s.

Airways,

589 F.3d 30,

(1st Cir. 2009). Rule 12 (b) (6)

A dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal so viewed,

is appropriate only i f the complaint,

fails to allege a

" ' p l a u s i b l e e n t i t l e m e n t t o r e l i e f . ' " ACA F i n .

Guar. Corp. v. Advest, I n c . , 512 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly has " r e c e n t l y a l t e r e d the Rule

12(b) (6) standard i n a manner which gives i t more h e f t " ) . Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary, complaint must contain "more than an unadorned, unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." a

the-defendant-

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. - - -, "Threadbare recitals of the by mere conclusory "whether a . be a

129 S.Ct. a t 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868. elements of a do cause not of action, Id.

supported

statements,

suffice."

A determination

complaint states a plausible claim for relief will

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on i t s j u d i c i a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d common s e n s e . " Id.

(B) E x h a u s t i o n o f A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e m e d i e s T h e FTCA c o n s t i t u t e s a l i m i t e d w a i v e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' sovereign immunity with respect to private t o r t claims. v. united States, 566 F.3d 248, 252 Fothergill

(1st Cir. 2009); Barrett ex

r e I . Estate of B a r r e t t v. United States, 462 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2006) (United States cannot be sued "absent an express waiver of i t s immunity"). U n d e r t h e FTCA, a n i n d i v i d u a l m a y s u e t h e g o v e r n m e n t

5

"for i n j u r y o r l o s s o f p r o p e r t y , o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y o r death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of h i s o f f i c e or emploYment under circumstances where the United States, i f a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the a c t o r omission occurred." 28 U .S .C. § 1346(b) (1). As a w a i v e r o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y , t h e FTCA i s

s t r i c t l y construed and a l l ambiguities are resolved in favor of the United States. 2005) . A t o r t c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p u r s u a n t t o t h e FTCA i s "'forever barred' federal unless agency it is presented two in writing after the to the In r e Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, 23-24 (1st Cir .

appropriate accrues."

within

years

claim

Gonzalez v. United S t a t e s , 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir.

2 0 0 2 ) ; 28 U . S . C . claim was based, United States

s

2401(b).

Although the VA's denial of Cobb's on the timeliness of his claim, that argument in its the

in part, not

does

advance

motion.

Moreover, a review of the facts alleged by the p l a i n t i f f reveals t h a t Dr. Yaar informed Cobb of h i s s p i n a l tumor on August 28, 2006 a n d t h a t C o b b ' s i n i t i a l c l a i m t o t h e VA w a s f i l e d o n A u g u s t 2 0 , 2008, within the requisite 2 year period. However/ a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c l a i m may T h e FTCA i n c l u d e s a n

have been timely does not end the analysis.

administrative exhaustion requirement "to ensure that 'meritorious claims can be s e t t l e d more quickly without the need for f i l i n g s u i t and possible expensive and time-consuming litigation. '"
6

Barrett ex

reI. E s t a t e o f B a r r e t t v . U n i t e d S t a t e s l 4 6 2 F . 3 d a t 3 6 ( c i t a t i o n omitted). The "'exhaustion of p l a i n t i f f s l administrative remedies

i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f t h e i r FTCA claims.
I"

Redondo-Borges v. United States Dept.
I

of Housing and

Urban Dev.

421 F.3d I I 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Cotto v. United

S t a t e s l 9 9 3 F . 2 d 2 7 4 1 2 8 0 ( 1 s t C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) ) . P u r s u a n t t o 28 U . S . C .
§

2675

1

a

claimant

must

"first

present[]

the

claim

to

the

appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing" against the United States. before instituting an action
§

28 U . S . C .

2675(a). Therefore

I

this

Court must next determine whether Cobb exhausted h i s administrative r e m e d i e s u n d e r t h e FTCA. Barrett ex reI. Estate of Barrett v.

U n i t e d S t a t e s l 4 6 2 F . 3 d 2 8 1 37 requirement is "'a

(1st Cir. 2006) (FTCAls exhaustion jurisdictional requirement I

non-waivable

l i m i t i n g the s u i t t o claims f a i r l y made t o the agency") ( c i t a t i o n omitted) . The F i r s t C i r c u i t has held t h a t the FTCAls n o t i c e requirement i s s a t i s f i e d when the claimant provides "a claim form or ' o t h e r w r i t t e n n o t i f i c a t i o n l which includes (1) s u f f i c i e n t information for the agency to i n v e s t i g a t e the claims l and (2) the amount of damages sought." Santiago-Ramirez v. Seely of Dept. of Defense l 984 F.2d

16 1 19 (1st Cir. 1993) ( c i t i n g Lopez v. United S t a t e s l 758 F.2d 806 1

809-10

(1st Cir.

1985)).

In Santiago-Ramirez

I

the First Circuit

deemed a claimantls l e t t e r to the administrative agency s u f f i c i e n t

7

because " i t s t a t e s t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e a p p e l l a n t , t h e d a t e o f t h e incident, involved, the location of the incident, the government agents It also states the Santiago-

and the type of injury alleged.

amount of the damages the appellant i s requesting." R a m i r e z , 9 8 4 F . 2 d a t 20

(determining that "such language put the

agency on notice that i t should investigate the possibility of potential tortious behavior on the part of i t s agents"). The Court

of Appeals also noted that i t "approache[d] the notice requirement leniently , 'recognizing that individuals wishing of the to sue the

government must

comply with the details

law,

but also

keeping i n mind t h a t the law was not intended to put up a b a r r i e r of technicalities to defeat their claims.'" F.2d a t 19 provided by (quoting Lopez , the claimant S a n t i a g o - R a m i r e z , 984 The information so that the

758 F.2d a t 809)). has to be

sufficient

government "may reasonably begin an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the claim." Santiago-Ramirez, 984 F.2d a t 19.

III.

Discussion

(A) C o u n t I I - L a c k o f C o n s e n t In Count I I of h i s complaint, Cobb a l l e g e s t h a t the United S t a t e s " f a i l e d t o inform [him] of the r i s k s of harm attendant to the treatment and care in question and proceeded to perform said treatment and care without having obtained his informed consent." Complaint 6. for lack of The Claim Notice, however, does not specify a claim consent, nor does a careful review of t hat

8

communication r e v e a l a n y a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t w o u l d i m p l y s u c h a c l a i m . Instead, Cobb recounts, i n some d e t a i l , the d i a g n o s t i c procedures h e u n d e r w e n t a t t h e VAMC a n d t h e s u r g e r i e s p r o v i d e d b y n o n - V A physicians. employees, The agents, Claim Notice concludes that "the VAMC, its

and assigns are responsible for the injuries M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e VAMC w a s n e g l i g e n t i n [sic]

suffered by Mr. Cobb.

i t s treatment of Mr. Cobb as i t f a i l e d t o timely diagnosis and treat a condition that resulted in severe

and permanent

i n j u r i e s t o Mr. Cobb, including unnecessary pain and s u f f e r i n g , f o r w h i c h t h e VAMC i s l i a b l e . " Claim Notice, Page 3. Notwithstanding

Cobb's assertion that a claim for lack of consent i s "inherent" in the claim of delayed diagnosis, the Claim Notice makes no reference to insufficiently provided information that would allow such an inference. As p o i n t e d o u t b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t i n i t s m e m o r a n d u m , t h e F i r s t C i r c u i t h a s n o t y e t a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r a FTCA a l l e g i n g negligent diagnosis and/or treatment by hospital personnel The Ninth

automatically implies a claim for informed consent. Circuit which, like the First Circuit,

has established liberal

notice requirements, agreed with "[t]he majority of circuits4 that

4

Only the Fifth Circuit held has that "[b]y i t s very nature, the informed consent claim is included in the [plaintiffs'] allegation of [medical malpractice] in their administrative claim." F r a n t z v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 29 F . 3 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 4 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 9 4 ) . Although the Fourth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's rule, in Drew ex r e I . Drew v. United S t a t e s , 231 F.3d 927 (4th Cir. 2000),
9

have a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e

[which]

have held that

to adequately

exhaust administrative remedies with respect to an informed consent claim, a medical malpractice claim is not necessarily sufficient." Goodman v. United States, 298 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir.

2002) ( l i s t i n g cases).

The Seventh Circuit,

in accord with the

Eleventh Circuit, determined t h a t Uthe administrative claim must narrate facts from which a legally trained reader would infer M u r r e y v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 73

failure to obtain informed consent."

F.3 1448, 1453 (7th C i r . 1996) ( c i t i n g Bush v. United S t a t e s , 703 F .2d 491, 495 (11th Cir. 1983)). Although the Appellate Courts in Goodman and in Murrey

ultimately decided that the respective administrative claims were sufficient for an inference of a claim for lack of consent, the

c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n b o t h c a s e s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e c a s e now before this Court. In Goodman, the plaintiff filed his

administrative claim without legal assistance; the terms used in the claim ucould imply that the claimant's wife agreed to a

procedure received;"

involving a and the

greater standard of administrative agency,

care in

than what its

she

response,

s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e o f i n f o r m e d c o n s e n t . Goodman v . United States, 298 F.3d a t 1056-57 . In Murrey, the administrative and his

c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d t h a t UV.A. p h y s i c i a n s a s s u r e d [ M u r r e y ]

family t h a t surgery was the only available therapy and t h a t i t

t h e En B a n c C o u r t w a s d i v i d e d a n d d i d n o t i s s u e a w r i t t e n o p i n i o n .
10

would e x t e n d h i s l i f e b y 1 5 y e a r s , "

M u r r e y v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 73

F .3d at 1452, which allowed an inference that information provided to the p a t i e n t was c r i t i c a l i n his decision making process. None of these circumstances are p r e s e n t i n the i n s t a n t case. Cobb was represented by counsel who filed two detailed Claim

N o t i c e s w i t h t h e VA; n o t h i n g i n t h e C l a i m N o t i c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t a lack of consent played a role in Cobb's diagnosis and/or treatment b y VA p h y s i c i a n s ; a n d t h e V A ' s d e n i a l l e t t e r m a k e s n o r e f e r e n c e t o the issue of informed consent. Based on the foregoing, and in the

consideration of the circumstances of this particular case,

Court finds t h a t Cobb f a i l e d to exhaust h i s administrative remedies with respect t o the claim made i n Count I I of h i s complaint. (B) C o u n t I I I - C o r p o r a t e L i a b i l i t y In Count I I I of h i s complaint, Cobb a l l e g e s t h a t the United States "failed to promulgate and enforce policies and procedures to insure the delivery of ordinary medical care, and/or otherwise

failed to discharge i t s responsibilities as a medical provider." Complaint 7. Cobb f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t the United S t a t e s had a duty

"to provide quality medical care to the Plaintiff, to protect his safety, to protect him from incompetent and/or negligent treatment, to ensure that those providing care and treatment within i t s walls were properly credentialed, and to otherwise exercise reasonable care for his protection and wellbeing." Id. Although i t i s not entirely clear from the complaint, Cobb's

11

objection t o t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s a p p e a r s t o i n d i c a t e t h a t h i s c o r p o r a t e l i a b i l i t y c l a i m i s b a s e d o n U s e l e c t i n g a p e r s o n who t h e employer knew o r should have known was u n f i t o r incompetent f o r the emploYment, thereby exposing t h i r d p a r t i e s to an unreasonable r i s k o f h a r m . " P l a i n t i f f ' s Mem. 7 , q u o t i n g R o d r i g u e s v . M i r i a m H o s p . , 623 A.2d 456, 462-463 (R.I. 1993). of Rhode In Rodrigues, the Supreme Court

Island adopted the theory of corporate negligence as

applied to hospitals as an extension of negligent-hiring theory. Rodrigues v. Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d a t 463; see Gianguitti v.

Atwood Med. A s s . , L t d . , 973 A . 2 d 5 8 0 , 590 n . 1 0 ( R . I . 2 0 0 9 ) ( l i s t i n g cases addressing theories of corporate negligence, and noting that the Court had not yet considered whether a physicians' practice group, uunder a theory of direct negligence, also known as

corporate negligence,"

had a

duty to adopt policies

to ensure

adequate care for i t s physicians' patients). C o b b ' s C l a i m N o t i c e m a k e s n o m e n t i o n o f t h e VAMC's a l l e g e d failure to "promulgate and enforce policies and procedures" to

ensure adequate medical care, nor does i t include allegations that a n y o f t h e VAMC'S a t t e n d i n g p h y s i c i a n s l a c k e d p r o p e r c r e d e n t i a l s . I n s t e a d , t h e C l a i m N o t i c e a d v i s e s t h e VA t h a t t h e t h r u s t o f C o b b ' s c o m p l a i n t i s t h a t t h e VAMC u f a i l e d t o t i m e l y d i a g n o s i s [sic] and

treat a condition that resulted in severe and permanent injuries to Mr. Cobb." Amended Claim Notice, Page 3. As s u c h , t h e f a c t s a n d

allegations contained in the Claim Notice are sufficient to state

12

a

c l a i m o f n e g l i g e n c e u n d e r t h e FTCA,

but they do not provide

notice t o the United S t a t e s t h a t Cobb i s advancing a theory of corporate liability as well. Without providing the VA with

sufficient information to afford i t an opportunity to investigate his claim, Cobb's administrative remedies remain unexhausted. In sum, because the Claim Notices were i n s u f f i c i e n t t o a l e r t t h e VA t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c l a i m s C o b b a s s e r t e d i n C o u n t s I I a n d I I I in his complaint, those claims are barred due to Cobb's failure t o e x h a u s t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s p u r s u a n t t o t h e FTCA. on that States' determination, the Court need not address the Based United

alternative argument,

that Counts I I and I I I of Cobb's

complaint f a i l t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f may be granted. (C) V i c a r i o u s L i a b i l i t y U n d e r t h e FTCA, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , b y w a i v i n g i t s s o v e r e i g n immunity, assumes l i a b i l i t y for the wrongful act of an while
~employee"

" w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h i s o f f i c e o r emp L o y m e r r t . . "

i . e.

as

respondeat superior.

K n o w l e s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 91 F . 3 d 1 1 4 7 , 1 1 5 2 FTCA a l l o w s the United States to assume

(8th Cir.

1996)

(~The

l i a b i l i t y for the negligence of i t s employees under a theory of
respondeat superior").

Liability of the United States under the

FTCA i s l i m i t e d t o v i c a r i o u s l i a b i l i t y . K n o w l e s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 91 F . 3 d a t 1 1 5 3 vicarious,
(~liability

under respondeat superior theory is See Sterling v. United

and not direct liability").

S t a t e s , 85 F . 3 d 1 2 2 5 , 1 2 2 9 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 9 6 ) (FTCA c r e a t e s v i c a r i o u s

13

liability) . In Count IV of h i s complaint, Cobb a l l e g e s t h a t "Defendant was at all relevant times vicariously responsible for the acts of its agents and servants, including, but not limited to, the acts of Dr. Yaar," and that "[a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, [Cobb] s u f f e r e d s e v e r e a n d p e r m a n e n t i n j u r i e s . . . " As the claims set in Cobb's Count I

the United S t a t e s points out i n i t s memorandum, forth in Count IV are duplicative of those

raised

negligence claim directed against the United States.

alleges t h a t the United States was negligent "by and through i t s agents, actors and employees," Complaint 5. This assertion,

however, i s j u s t another way of describing v i c a r i o u s l i a b i l i t y , and the only theory under which l i a b i l i t y of the United States under t h e FTCA m a y b e e s t a b l i s h e d , i f s o p r o v e n . B e c a u s e C o b b ' s v i c a r i o u s l i a b i l i t y claim i s already inherent in his negligence claim, Count IV i s d u p l i c a t i v e and may be dismissed.
Conclusion

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

United

States'

motion

to

d i s m i s s C o u n t s I I , I I I , a n d I V i s GRANTED a n d C o u n t s I I , I I I , a n d IV a r e h e r e w i t h DISMISSED. SO ORDERED:

Chief United States District Judge D a t e : ~ J-, 2 0 1 0
14

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