McCormick et al v. Dresdale et al

Filing 117

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 112 MOTION for Reconsideration re: 110 Order on Motion to Compel Brown University filed by Carol A. McCormick, William R. McCormick, II, William R. McCormick, III. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Landya B. McCafferty, District of NH on 7/25/11. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

William R. McCormick, III;
Carol A. McCormick; and
William R. McCormick, II
v.

C.A. 09-474-PJB-LM

Marcella E. Dresdale; Richard
C. Dresdale; and Brown University
in Providence in the State of
Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations

O R D E R
William R. McCormick, III moves the court to reconsider a
portion of its order on his motion to compel Brown University
(“Brown” or “the University”) to produce certain documents.
Brown objects.

For the reasons that follow, McCormick’s motion

for reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part.
McCormick asked Brown to “[i]dentify and produce all
documents that evidence donations of any kind made by Richard
Dresdale or any individual, group or entity on his behalf, or at
his request, to Brown or any individual or entity related to
Brown, from January 1, 2000 to the present.”

The court denied

McCormick’s motion to compel on two grounds: (1) Brown has
already produced documents concerning Dresdale’s donations to

the University, rendering McCormick’s request partially moot;
and (2) as between Brown and Dresdale, Dresdale is a more
convenient source of the requested information, and the burden
on Dresdale to produce that information would be substantially
less than the burden on Brown.
Regarding the first basis for the court’s decision, the
court acknowledges that it erred by saying that Brown had
produced information about Dresdale’s donations.

To the

contrary, it is Dresdale who has produced information about his
donations to Brown.

Nonetheless, production of that same

information by the University would be cumulative or
duplicative.

Moreover, the court remains convinced that given

the wording of McCormick’s request, Dresdale is both a more
convenient and less burdensome source of the information
McCormick seeks on this topic.

To be sure, there are any number

of ways in which McCormick could have phrased enforceable
requests for documents from Brown related to Dresdale’s alleged
fundraising activities on behalf of the University.

But, of

course, the court can consider only the discovery requests
McCormick actually made, not those he could have made.

The

request McCormick actually made is for information that can be
obtained much more conveniently from Dresdale than from Brown.

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For the reasons given, McCormick’s motion to reconsider,
document no. 112, is granted in part and denied in part.

To the

extent that McCormick points out the court’s erroneous statement
that Brown produced information on Dresdale’s donations, the
motion is granted.

But, to the extent that McCormick asks the

court to compel Brown to produce documents related to donations
to the University made by Dresdale, on his behalf, or at his
request, the motion is denied.
SO ORDERED.

__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States Magistrate Judge
July 25, 2011
cc:

Joseph V. Cavanagh, Jr., Esq.
J. Scott Kilpatrick, Esq.
Stephen J. Reid, Jr., Esq.
Steven M. Richard, Esq.
Michael Burch, Esq.

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