McCormick et al v. Dresdale et al

Filing 33

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion to Dismiss; granting 25 Motion to Strike; defering ruling on 16 MOTION to Dismiss Action As Against Them Pursuant To F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). So Ordered by Judge William E. Smith on 4/28/10. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND ______________________________ WILLIAM R. MCCORMICK, III, CAROL A. MCCORMICK, and WILLIAM R. MCCORMICK, II, ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) MARCELLA E. DRESDALE, RICHARD ) C. DRESDALE, and BROWN ) UNIVERSITY et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ______________________________)

CA. No. 09-474 S

ORDER WILLIAM E. SMITH, United States District Judge. Plaintiff William McCormick (hereinafter "William") was a freshman student at Brown University ("Brown") in 2006. As an

athlete-scholar Brown offered him a full scholarship and the promise of an Ivy League education. ended abruptly and at his the end of that This relationship, however, first and year, resulting in

William

parents,

William

Carol

McCormick

(hereinafter "the parents") filing a lawsuit in Rhode Island Superior Court. The crux of Plaintiffs' claims are based upon

an incident whereby William alleges Defendant Marcella Dresdale, then a fellow Brown freshman, falsely accused him of rape; an accusation that quickly spiraled downwards into William's

withdrawal from Brown and the corresponding loss of his full scholarship. This case was filed under seal in the Rhode Island Superior Court at the request of Plaintiffs, based upon their concerns arising Dresdales from that a mutual contains release signed by and William and the

confidentiality

non-disparagement

provisions.

Defendants removed the case to federal court and

Plaintiffs moved to remand -- a motion that this Court denied. Plaintiffs then moved to lift the seal, which the Court granted over the pro-forma objection of the Dresdales. At some point prior to Plantiffs' motion to lift the seal, Plaintiffs became acutely aware of serious deficiencies in their sweeping Complaint. by filing Plaintiffs a First sought to correct those to

deficiencies

Amended

Complaint,

hoping

stave off any motions to dismiss and proceed directly into the discovery perceiving phase of litigation. with the Defendants, pleading, however, the still instant

deficiencies

filed

motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs objected to the motions and attached

In response, a proposed

Second Amended Complaint to that objection, along with numerous exhibits and documents outside the scope of the First Amended Complaint. Defendants promptly moved to strike the Second

Amended Complaint and the attached exhibits.

At oral argument

Plaintiffs basically conceded that the First Amended Complaint
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was

the

operative

document

at

issue.

The

Court

now

grants

Defendants' motion to strike insofar as Plaintiffs attempt to include exhibits not sufficiently incorporated into the First Amended Complaint. Now before the Court are the motions of Brown University ("Brown"), Ruth Simmons, David Kertzer, Russell Carey, Margaret Klawunn, Carla Hanson, Terry H. Addison, Robert Samuels, Jonah (Alan) Ward, Richard Bova, Rosario Navarro, Michelle Nuey, Col. Mark Shane Porter, Reil, Yolanda all named Castillo-Appollonio, individually and as Chung Nguyen, for and

agents

Brown

University ( "the individual Brown Defendants") and Marcella and Richard Dresdale ( "the Dresdales") to dismiss all claims in the First Amended Complaint.1 At the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel conceded that many of the claims brought in the First Amended Complaint (in

particular, those against the individual Brown Defendants) were premature. Only after discovery would the basis for the claims, Plaintiffs' counsel averred that

if any existed, be revealed.

he had sought to voluntarily dismiss some of the claims without

The Court notes that William's breach of contract claim against Brown is not at issue here. Furthermore, the parents have voluntarily dismissed their breach of contract claims against the individual Brown Defendants and Plaintiffs' counsel clarified at hearing that Count VII in the First Amended Complaint (entitled "Acts Tantamount to Criminality") is merely a request for punitive damages and is not a separate theory of liability.
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prejudice, under the auspices of Rule 41(a); however, opposing counsel did not consent, as is required by the rule. Plaintiffs' counsel has raised a concern that many fact witnesses from Brown soon will be graduating and presumably

leaving Rhode Island.

Given the existence of pressing time

concerns and the likely need for expedited discovery in this regard, the Court has concluded that it is in the interest of all parties that the Court (to the extent possible) should

convey its rulings in expedited fashion. explanatory detail may be necessary to

To the extent further explain the holdings

below the Court will address those issues at a future time. After careful consideration of the parties' briefs and

after oral arguments, it is ordered as follows: (1) Taking all the allegations set forth in the First

Amended Complaint as true, as is required by Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is satisfied that William has alleged a pattern of

wrongful conduct based on the collective actions of the agents of Brown University that, if proven, could be considered

outrageous, atrocious or utterly intolerable conduct on the part of Brown. See Hoffman v. Davenport-Metcalf, 851 A.2d 1083, 1089 Therefore, the Court DENIES Brown's motion to

(R.I. 2004).

dismiss William's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim;

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(2)

The

Court

agrees

that

"the

particular

fact

and

circumstances [here] including [1] the relationship between the parties, [2] the scope and burden of the obligation to be

imposed upon the defendant, [3] public policy considerations, and [4] the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff" weigh in favor of imposing a duty on Brown University to conduct a

reasonable investigation, and may include contacting the proper authorities, when confronted with alleged criminal activities by its students. 658 (R.I. Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., 969 A.2d 653, (internal quotation the marks, Court citations DENIES and

2009)

alterations

omitted).

Therefore,

Brown's

motion to dismiss William's negligence claim; (3) The Court GRANTS the individual Brown Defendants'

motion to dismiss William's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligence claims, but does so WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (4) The Court agrees that the face of the First Amended

Complaint reveals that the meeting with William and four agents on behalf of Brown, to address a credible allegation of "sexual misconduct" privileged. individual against William, the was Court motions legally GRANTS to justified Brown and the and the False

Therefore, Brown

Defendants'

dismiss

Imprisonment claim WITH PREJUDICE;

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(5)

The

Court motions

GRANTS to

Brown

and the

the Libel

individual claims

Brown WITHOUT

Defendants' PREJUDICE; (6)

dismiss

The Court finds that the parents were not third party to any contract between William, who turned

beneficiaries

eighteen on September 26, 2005, and Brown.

See e.g. Doe v. The

University of the South, No. 4:09-cv-62, 2009 WL 3297288 *12, 14 (E. D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2009) (no standing for parents of majority age student to bring claim against university) (citing Apffel v. Huddleston, 50 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1133 (D. Utah 1999)). Therefore,

the Court GRANTS Brown's motion to dismiss the parents' claims for Breach of Contract WITH PREJUDICE; (7) The Court motions Infliction GRANTS to of Brown and the the individual claims Brown for

Defendants' Intentional

dismiss

parents' and

Emotional

Distress

Negligence,

however, these claims are dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and (8) The Court defers on ruling on the Dresdales' motion to

dismiss based upon the Release at this time. IT IS SO ORDERED:

/s/ William E. Smith
William E. Smith United States District Judge Date: April 28, 2010

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