Petaway v. Duarte et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting Defendants' 6 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying 15 Motion to Amend Complaint. So Ordered by Chief Judge Mary M. Lisi on 5/22/2012. (Duhamel, John)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
WILLIAM PETAWAY
Plaintiff

vs.

C.A. No. 11-497-ML

C/0 DUARTE, C/0 ADDISON,
C/0 ALLARD, C/0 MANNING,
C/0 LEDUC, C/0 KLAUS,
CAPTAIN HEADEN,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff William Petaway, an inmate at the Adult Correctional Institutions (the "ACI") in
Cranston, Rhode Island, has filed a pro se complaint (Doc. #1) seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and related statutes! Before this
Court are: (1) a motion to dismiss the complaint, filed by all Defendants (Doc. #6); and (2)
Plaintiffs motion to amend or correct his complaint (Doc. #15) in the above-captioned action.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted, and the motion to amend is
denied.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint Plaintiff alleges three separate instances of deprivations of his civil
rights: (1) that a false booking was lodged against Plaintiff arising from his involvement in an
altercation between a correctional officer and another inmate, and after inadequate notice and
hearing, he was placed in 30 days of punitive segregation; (2) that another correctional officer,
out of loyalty to the officer involved in the altercation, either lost or stole Plaintiffs head phones
and beard trimmer; and (3) that still another correctional officer purposely told other inmates
1

Plaintiff has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP application"). fu view of this
Court's findings regarding the complaint, the IFP application can be denied as moot. See infra at 12.

1

that Plaintiff was a "snitch," thereby placing him in danger of serious physical injury. The
complaint names six ACI Correctional Officers (C/0) as defendants:

Correctional Officer

Duarte, Correctional Officer Addison, Correctional Officer Allard, Correctional Officer
Manning, Correctional Officer Leduc, Correctional Officer Klaus and Captain Heading. 2 All
defendants are employees of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he is a Connecticut inmate who was transferred
involuntarily to the ACI facility on October 1, 2008. Cmpt.

~1.

Plaintiff asserts that on

November 21, 2008, C/0 Addison picked a fight with inmate Rose, allegedly because Rose had
previously complained about Addison to Captain Heading. Id.

~~

3-18.

When Plaintiff

intervened in the altercation, another C/0, Leduc, pulled him away and, according to Plaintiff,
thereafter filed false disciplinary charges against Plaintiff on the grounds that Plaintiff had
attempted to assist Rose, when all Plaintiff did was to try to "break it up." Id. ~~ 20, 35:36.
Plaintiff further alleges that the 'booking" was not read to him until 48 hours after the illcident
and that he did not receive a hearing until December 9, 2008, in· violation of RIDOC's
disciplinary policy. Id.

~~

36-38.

Plaintiff states that he was transferred to the Maximum

Security segregation unit on November 22, 2008. Id. ~ 30. 3
Plaintiff further alleges that C/0 Manning, in a show of unity with DOC
lost Plaintiffs headphones and beard trimmer. Id.

~~

~taff,

stole or ·

31-32. He states that he filed a grievance

relative to his missing trimmer and headphones, and that in response he was compensated by the
Department for "most of the money for property." Id.

~~

33-35. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that

2

The spellings of Defendants' names are taken from their Motion to Dismiss rather than the complaint,
as the Defendants are presumed to use correct spellings.

3

Plaintiff further alleges that later on the day of the altercation the lights were turned out in his unit and
that C/0 Allard, C/0 Klaus and several other corrections officers approached him wearing black gloves to
beat him, but he stops short of expressly alleging that he was beaten by those officers. (Cmpt. ,, 27-30.)

2

··

from July 2010 through February 2011, C/0 Duarte told other inmates that Plaintiff was not
prosecuted for his involvement in the November 2008 altercation because he is a "snitch" and
that this disclosure "has put [his] safety at risk." ld.

~~

43-44. Plaintiff further complains that

video surveillance cameras4 are not installed in the Maximum Security section of the ACI
[presumably to record incidents such as the one described herein]; and that hand-held video
cameras were not used to record the incidents of which he complains. ld. ~~ 24-25.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that all defendants be
terminated from their employment at the ACI for their actions; that this Court order that
surveillance cameras be installed in the maximum-security area; and that corrections officers be
required to use handheld video cameras when responding to incidents. Id. at 2, Sec. V. Plaintiff
also seeks $5,000 in compensatory and $10,000 in punitive damages from each Defendant. ld.
The Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint (Doc. #6). Plaintiff has
filed a memorandum in support of his objection to the motion (Doc. #9) ("Obj. to Motion').
DISCUSSION
A.

Law Governing Motion to Dismiss
In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The Court must accept a plaintiffs allegations as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).
Further, the Court is required to review pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally. See Estelle v.
4

The complaint refers to the cameras as "mod cameras" which the Court takes to mean, in context,
fixed surveillance cameras permanently installed in 'B' module (a High Security area) of the prison.
(Cmpt. ~ 24.)

3

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

However, the Court need not credit bald assertions or

unverifiable conclusions. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (a plaintiff must plead "factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.")
To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the deprivation of
a federal right, (2) a causal connection between the actor and the deprivation, and (3) state
action. Sanchez, 590 F.3d at 41.
With these principles in mind, this Court considers the motion to dismiss as to each of
Plaintiffs claims. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the Defendants acted under color of
state law.

The question is whether the facts alleged rise to a violation of the plaintiffs

constitutional rights and if so, whether the violation was caused by Defendants' actions.
B.

Improper Disciplinary Action
Plaintiff first alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights ·as a

result of (a) a false booking charging him with assaulting a corrections officer, and (b) the
belated notice and hearing on those charges, which resulted in Plaintiff's being placed in punitive
segregation. Cmpt. ~~ 3-20, 36-39.
The Due Process Clause standing alone confers no liberty interest in freedom from state
action taken within the sentence imposed. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995). In order
to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause, a Plaintiff must allege some sort of
interference with a protected liberty interest, such as one created by state regulation. ld. at 48384.
Plaintiff claims that he had a state-created liberty interest in avoiding false disciplinary
actions and in receiving adequate notice and a disciplinary hearing pursuant to established prison

4

policy, and the so-called "Morris Rules." (Obj. to Motion at 4, 7.) While this proposition is
debatable, 5 the fact remains that under Sandin any state-created interests are "generally limited to
freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. In Sandin the Supreme
Court held that Sandin's punitive segregation for a term of 30 days "did not present the type of
atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id.
at 486. See also Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1160 (1st Cir. 1996) (following "the new
threshold test articulated in Sandin").
Here, Plaintiff was given 30 days of punitive segregation. Pursuant to Sandin, such a
punishment fails to come within the reach of the "atypical and significant" benchmark which
would implicate a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sandin, 515 U.S. at
484. 6

5

This Court need not decide whether the policy regulations of RIDOC and/or the Morris rules -- which
are state regulations, see Doctor v. Wall, 143 F.Supp.203, 204 (D.R.I. 2001) --establish a liberty interest
on behalf of inmates. But see DiCiantis v. Wall, 795 A.2d 1121, 1126 (R.I. 2002) (fmding that there is no
constitutional liberty interest in prison disciplinary proceedings under Sandin). Even assuming in
Plaintiff's favor that these regulations were not followed, he has not alleged any due process violation
under Sandin so as to proceed on this claim in this Court, as discussed herein.
6

Plaintiff's reliance on Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005), is misplaced. In Surprenant,
the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, was falsely accused of assaulting a corrections officer but maintained that
he was in a separate room lifting weights at the time of the incident. Id. at 10. Surprenant received no
prehearing notice of his charges and was put in segregation under onerous conditions pending a hearing
and then, after a summary hearing, was given 30 days punitive segregation without credit for time spent
in prehearing segregation. Id. at 10-11. In upholding a verdict finding that the defendant corrections
officers violated Surprenant's due process rights, the Court of Appeals expressly noted that in view of
plaintiff's status as a pretrial detainee rather than a convicted inmate, the standard under Sandin v.
Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), did not apply. Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 17 (" ... Sandin's rationale applies
only to those convicted of crimes -- not to pretrial detainees").
Here, the Sandin standard does apply to Plaintiff, a convicted inmate. As noted infra, although
Plaintiff similarly alleges that Defendant Leduc filed "a fabricated disciplinary report" falsely accusing
him of assaulting a corrections officer, Plaintiff, unlike Surprenant, does not deny any involvement in the
altercation between Rose and Addison but rather describes his involvement as an attempt to "break it up." ·· ·
(Cmpt. ~~ 20-21.) The fact that Leduc's characterization of the incident differed from Plaintiff's --when
considered together with the punishment imposed (30 days segregation)-- simply does not render Leduc's
conduct a violation of Plaintiff's liberty interest cognizable under Sandin.
5

Moreover, even assuming that the delayed notice and hearing Plaintiff received incident
to the disciplinary action were not constitutionally sufficient, because Plaintiffs short-term
punishment did not implicate a protected liberty interest, full procedural safeguards were not
constitutionally required. See Moore v. Begones, No. 09-543-S, 2010 WL 27482 at *5 (Jan. 4,
2010) (Report and Recommendation of Hagopian, J., as adopted by Smith, J.) (claim of false
disciplinary charges found not to implicate any liberty interest, citing Sandin 515 U.S. at 48.7)".
This Court has reviewed Plaintiffs allegation that Defendant Leduc filed "a fabricated
.
.

disciplinary report" that he assaulted a corrections officer. However, Plaintiff does not allege
that he never became involved in the altercation between Rose and Addison but rather describes
his involvement as an attempt to "break it up." (Cmpt. ~~ 20-21.) The differing characterizations
of Plaintiffs conduct do not require a finding that Leduc's report was fabricated.
Accordingly, since Plaintiff has failed to allege an interference with a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause, his claim of improper disciplinary action must be
dismissed.
B.

Lost or Confiscated Property
The complaint further alleges that Defendant Manning, "as a show of unity [with] his

fellow C/Os, stole or lost" Plaintiffs headphones and beard trimmer." (Cmpt ~~ 31-32) Plaintiff
states that he filed a grievance with the prison relative to this loss, that his claim was "upheld"
and that he "was paid most of the money for property." (Id. ~ 35.) Plaintiff does not give a dollar
value for either item. He claims that in view of Manning's motivation for stealing or losing the
items, he is entitled to "full" compensation instead of"most." (Obj. to Motion at 9.)
This claim requires little discussion, as this claim is both undeveloped and de minimus.
Plaintiff does not provide the date when the property was taken or any dollar value for either

6

item, and he leaves it to this Court to speculate as to whether the property was lost or stolen. In
any event, the postdeprivation remedy provided to Plaintiff, pursuant to which he received most
of the value of the property, was fully adequate under existing case law. See Lowe v. Scott, 959
F.2d 323, 340 (1st Cir. 1992) (" ... if a state provides adequate postdeprivation remedies-- either
by statute or through the common-law tort remedies available in its courts -- no claim of a
violation of procedural due process can be brought under §1983 against the state officials whose
random and unauthorized conduct occasioned the deprivation.") (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 533 & n.14, and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537, 543-44 (1981)).
Here, it is clear that a suitable postdeprivation remedy existed. As Plaintiff
acknowledges, his grievance was sustained, and he was substantially made whole. He fails to
indicate any amount of damages or loss that remains after the settlement. In short, there was no
improper deprivation here, and certainly not one that rises to a constitutional dimension. Thus,
this claim fails.
C.

Failure to Protect Claim
Plaintiff further alleges that during a seven-month period ending in February 2011,

Defendant Duarte informed other inmates that the reason Plaintiff was not criminally charged for
his conduct in the Rose-Addison altercation was because Plaintiff was a "snitch," and that this
action by Duarte exposed him to risk from other inmates, in violation of his rights under the
Eighth Amendment. Cmpt. ~~ 43-44.
"[P]rison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). However, "[n]ot every injury suffered
by a prisoner at the hands of another results in constitutional liability on the part of prison
officials." Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.

7

at 834). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that the

deprivation alleged was "objectively, sufficiently serious" and (2) that prison officials possessed
a sufficiently culpable state of mind, namely one of 'deliberate indifference' to an inmate's health
or safety." Id. at 8 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).
"Deliberate indifference" in turn requires a showing that prison officials subjectively
were "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists," and [they] must also draw the inference." Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Even if they are aware of the risk, prison officials "cannot be deliberately indifferent if they
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not avoided." Id. (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). In the context of a failure to protect claim, "a prison official has
sufficient culpable intent if he has knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious
harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the harm."
Fournier v. Northern NH Correctional Facility, No. 07-264, 2008 WL 2741117, at *3 (D.N.H.
July 10, 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
In this case, although Plaintiff alleges that Duarte's actions in labeling him a snitch place
him at risk, the complaint does not allege that he was ever actually assaulted or harmed by
anyone, nor does it aver any other facts tending to show a substantial risk of serious harm. Thus,
on the face of the complaint, Plaintiff does not state a claim on which relief may be granted.
In his response to the State's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that "he was subject to
threats by several known and unknown inmates at H.S.C. [the High-Security Complex]" and that
the "danger [to an inmate of being labeled a snitch] is known by RIDOC .... " (Obj. to Mot. at
3.) However, Plaintiff does not describe the number or nature of these a:lleged threats or what
harm he suffered as a result. He also states that he was placed "on 'single rec[reational] status'

8

for his safety." (ld.) The latter allegation does not suggest ''deliberate indifference" but rather the
opposite-- that at least some measures were taken for Plaintiffs safety. See Giroux v. Somerset
County, 178 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Even if prison officials know of a substantial risk to
inmate health or safety, ... they 'may be found free from liability if they respond reasonably to
the risk."') (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). Thus, this Court fmds that the allegations as to
this claim fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff further contends in his response that no allegation of harm is necessary in order
to recover, invoking a decision by the Fourth Circuit, Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267
(4th Cir. 2001). (Obj. to Motion at 2-3.) In Benefield, the court noted that "labeling an inmate a
snitch has the potential for great harm and may violate constitutional guarantees" and that an
inmate "does not need to wait until he is actually assaulted before obtaining relief." Id. at 1272.
See also Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir.l984) (same).
While it is true, as Plaintiff urges, that an inmate does not have to wait until he suffers an
attack to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation, he does have to show that serious injury ·
is "sure or very likely" and "sufficiently imminent." Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49-50 (2008)
(quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993)). Accord Kelley v. Wall, No. CA 10233-ML, 2010 WL 5176172 at *3 (D.R.I. Nov. 30, 2010) (Report and Recommendation by
Hagopian, MJ, as adopted by Lisi, J.) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 49-50).
Here, Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated that the alleged labeling of him as a
snitch has subjected him to a substantial risk of harm in this case. This Court concludes that the
facts pled by Plaintiff on this claim -- even supplemented by the assertions in Plaintiffs
objection to the motion to dismiss -- fail to show a substantial risk of serious harm so as to state
an Eighth Amendment claim. See Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822, 825 (1st Cir.l991) ("'[t]o

9

establish fear of constitutional dimensions, an inmate must show more than simple anxiety"')
(quoting Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975,979 (4th Cir.1985). 7
Further, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants acted with 'deliberate indifference' to
his safety. As noted supra, Plaintiffs own filings suggest that Defendants took action in response
to Plaintiffs allegations by placing him in single recreational status. See Giroux, 178 F.3d at 32.
See also Kelley, 2010 WL 5176172 at *3 (recommending denial of claim for injunctive relief
based on failure to protect from potentially dangerous cellmates, where Plaintiff inter alia
declined protective segregation).
For all of these reasons, this Court concludes that the complaint, even as supplemented,
fails to state a claim for failure to protect as a result of being labeled a snitch.
D.

Motion to Amend Complaint
After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his

complaint, asserting that this Court should not dismiss the suit but should grant him permission
to modify his complaint "to state a claim." (See Motion/Request of the Plaintiff to Amend
Complaint to State a Claim [Doc. #15] at 1l The Government has objected to the motion.

7

In Purvis, which predated Benefield, the First Circuit acknowledged that "a prisoner need not wait to
be assaulted to obtain relief' from violence at the hands of other prisoners and that prison officials have a
duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "to exercise reasonable care to provide reasonable protection from an
unreasonable risk of harm." 929 F.2d at 825. The court further noted that "[a]n unreasonable risk of harm
is established where a plaintiff shows that there was a strong likelihood that violence would occur." Id.
(citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court of appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a claim, where Purvis's allegations (that as a gay person, he was threatened
by cellmates who were hostile to gay prisoners) did not indicate that he was ever subjected to a serious
risk of harm from such cellmates. Id. at 825-26.
8

In support of his motion to amend, Plaintiff's inexplicably relies on Laurence v. Wall, 551 F.3d 92 (1st
Cir. 2008). That decision concerned a prose plaintiff's access to the assistance of the United States
Marshal's Office in serving the summons and complaint upon defendants. Id. at 53-54. Although the
Court of Appeals incidentally noted that the plaintiff had moved to file, and did file, an amended
complaint, id. at 93, the court did not address either the basis for the amended complaint or the grounds
on which it was permitted to be filed. Thus, Laurence is of no help to Plaintiff.
10

The motion to amend cannot succeed for two reasons. First, as the Government points
out, it does not comply with the requirements of this Court's Local Rules, as Plaintiff has not
filed any proposed amended complaint or supporting memorandum, and thus his motion
provides no inkling as to the basis or contents of the proposed amended pleading. See D.R.I. LR
Cv 15 (requiring that a motion to amend a pleading "be accompanied by (a) the proposed
amended pleading; and (b) a supporting memorandum that explains how the amended pleading
differs from the original and why the amendment is necessary."); Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d
24, 28 n. 2 (1st Cir. 2000) ("We have consistently held that a litigant's prose status [does not]
absolve him from compliance with [either] the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [or] a district
court's procedural rules.").
To the extent that Plaintiff elsewhere describes his contemplated amendments, they are
futile.

In his objection to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff proposes to amend his

complaint by adding the following points or allegations: (1) that "he was subject to threats by
several known and unknown inmates at H.S.C. because of [Defendant] Duarte's LIE [labeling
him a snitch];" (2) that the danger of being labeled a snitch is known to ACI officials and this
Court; and (3) reiterating that no harm need be suffered by Plaintiff for such an allegation to be
made. (Obj. to Motion at 3.) However, all of these grounds have been discussed supra by this
Court and found to be insufficient, and thus, any proposed amended complaint based on such
grounds would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (listing futility of·
amendment as reason to denial of motion to amend); Feliciano-Hemandez v. Pereira-Castillo,
663 F.3d 527 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding district court's disallowance of filing amended .
complaint on grounds of delay and futility). Thus, the motion to amend must be denied. 9
9

To the extent that Fed. R. Civ. P. IS(a)(l)(B) permitted Plaintiff to amend his pleading "once as a
matter of course within ... 21 days after service of a motion under rule 12(b)," Plaintiffs motion to amend
11

This Court has considered all of Plaintiffs other arguments in support of the claims made
in his complaint and finds them to be without merit. 10 None of the allegations in Plaintiffs
complaint state a claim of constitutional dimension or a claim on which relief may otherwise be
granted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing considerations, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the complaint
is hereby GRANTED. In addition, for the reasons expressed herein, Plaintiffs motion to amend
his Complaint is hereby DENIED.

Plaintiffs IFP application is hereby DENIED as moot.

SO ORDERED:

Is/ MaryM. Lisi
Mary M. Lisi
·chief United States District Judge
May 22,2012

-- mailed on February 3, 2011, some 40 days after service of the instant motion to dismiss -- was
untimely. Even if the statements concerning an amended complaint contained in Plaintiffs objection to
the motion to dismiss (which objection was filed 21 days after that motion) were somehow construed to
constitute a motion to amend, they fail for the reasons noted above.
10

Plaintiffs claims concerning corrections officials' non-use of either fixed or hand-held video
surveillance cameras to record prison disturbances or incidents (Cmpt. at 3, Sect. V and~~ 24-25) are
likewise dismissed. There is no constitutional requirement that such cameras be used, and the use or nonuse of such equipment is within the discretion of correction officials. See Sandin, 515 U.S. 482-83 (noting
view that "federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to
manage a volatile environment") (citing Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-563 (1974)) (further
citations omitted).
12