Martins v. Rhode Island Hospital et al
Filing
85
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 47 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting 76 Report and Recommendations and denying objections. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 8/13/14. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)
MICHAEL MARTINS,
C.A. No. 11-539 S
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
United States Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond has issued
a
Report
matter
and
(ECF
Recommendation
No.
76).
(“R&R”)
The
in
the
Plaintiff,
above-captioned
Michael
(“Martins”), has filed a series of objections.
Martins
For the reasons
that follow, the Court DENIES the objections and ACCEPTS the
R&R.
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Rhode
Island Hospital (the “Hospital”) (ECF No. 47) is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
I.
Background
The R&R thoroughly recounts the underlying facts and they
need not be reproduced in full here.
In brief, Martins was
terminated from his position as a Unit Assistant at the Hospital
for
theft
of
time.
Surveillance
cameras
and
the
Hospital’s
employee ID swipe system suggested that Martins left work for
approximately four hours on September 11, 2010 and, later, he
could not account for his whereabouts.
Martins was terminated
at a meeting with his supervisor, Cathy Fanning (“Fanning”), and
a
human
resources
representative,
Sandra
Badessa
(“Badessa”),
approximately two weeks later, despite the fact that Martins
informed Fanning and Badessa at this meeting that he suffers
from bipolar disorder. 1
Martins sued under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RI
CRA”),
the
FEPA”),
Rhode
the
Island
Rhode
Fair
Island
Employment
Civil
Practices
Rights
of
Act
(“RI
Peoples
with
Disabilities Act (“RI CRPWDA”), the Rhode Island Parental and
Family
Medical
Leave
Act
(“RI
PFMLA”),
the
National
Labor
Relations Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
The
R&R
Judgment
recommended
that
be
as
granted
to
the
Hospital’s
all
of
Motion
Martins’
for
claims
Summary
with
the
exception of Counts VI, VII and VIII, which assert claims based
on the Hospital’s alleged failure to reasonably accommodate a
disability.
Martins objects to the R&R insofar as it recommends
summary judgment on his remaining claims. 2
The Court considers
the objections in the order in which they are raised.
1
The record suggests that Martins’ union representative,
Linda Russolini (“Russolini”), was also present at this meeting.
2
The Hospital has not objected to the R&R.
2
II.
Martins’ Objections to the R&R 3
A.
Counts III, IV and V – Discriminatory Discharge
Martins objects first to the granting of summary judgment
on his claims for discriminatory discharge - Counts III, IV and
V, brought under RI CRA, RI FEPA and RI CRPWDA, respectively.
Martins
argues
that
Judge
Almond
erred
in
requiring
him
to
establish pretext in order for these claims to survive summary
judgment.
This argument misconstrues the R&R, which accurately sets
forth
the
relevant
law
requiring
a
plaintiff
to
establish
a
prima facie case of disability discrimination by showing, among
other things, that the employer discharged him in whole or in
part because of a disability.
Poulin v. Custom Craft, Inc., 996
A.2d 654, 658-59 (R.I. 2010).
The R&R then goes on to note that
only once the prima facie case has been established does the
burden
shift
to
the
employer
to
offer
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, which the aggrieved
employee can then refute with a showing of pretext.
v.
Dollar
(discussing
Tree
Stores,
McDonnell
Inc.,
Douglas
875
A.2d
Corp.
v.
13,
25
Green,
See DeCamp
(R.I.
411
2005)
U.S.
792
(1973)).
3
The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to
which Martins objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
3
The R&R concluded that Martins failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination because of a lack of evidence that
he
was
terminated
as
a
result
of
a
disability.
More
specifically, the R&R noted that Martins only informed Fanning
and Badessa of his bipolar disorder at the meeting immediately
prior
to
his
termination,
undermining
any
claim
that
discriminatory animus led to his firing.
What is more, the R&R
noted
and
Martins’
concession
that
Fanning
Badessa
did
not
believe his explanation that a disability played any role in his
disappearance from work.
Only after reaching this conclusion did Judge Almond note
that
even
were
Martins
to
establish
a
prima
facie
case
of
discrimination, under the burden-shifting framework, he had not
proffered
sufficient
evidence
to
demonstrate
pretext.
Judge
Almond principally relied on the undisputed fact that, prior to
the meeting at which Martins disclosed his bipolar disorder,
Fanning
and
Badessa
had
completed
an
concluded that Martins had stolen time.
investigation
which
Thus, his termination
for theft of time could not reasonably be construed as pretext
for unlawful discrimination.
In sum, Judge Almond did not improperly require a showing
of pretext, as Martins contends.
Instead, the R&R accurately
described the applicable law and correctly applied it to these
facts.
As such, this objection is DENIED.
4
B.
Counts IX and X – Interference with Leave Rights
Martins objects next to Judge Almond’s recommendation that
summary judgment be granted as to Counts IX and X, which assert
claims for interference with rights under the RI PFMLA and the
FMLA,
respectively,
for
failure
to
provide
required
notice.
Under the RI PFMLA, an “employee shall give at least [30] days
notice
of
the
intended
date
upon
which
.
.
.
leave
shall
commence and terminate, unless prevented by medical emergency
from giving the notice.”
added).
employer
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-2(a) (emphasis
Under the FMLA, “an employee must provide notice to the
as
soon
as
practicable
circumstances of the particular case.”
(emphasis added).
he
found
that
under
the
facts
and
29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a)
Martins contends that Judge Almond erred when
Martins
failed
to
give
the
Hospital
adequate
notice of his need for medical leave.
As
the
R&R
moving target.
was
notes,
Martins’
argument
is
something
of
a
Martins initially alleged that the fact that he
hospitalized
following
his
disappearance
from
work
in
September 2010 should have placed the Hospital on constructive
notice that he required medical leave. 4
114, ECF No. 23.)
(See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 105,
However, before Judge Almond, as now, Martins
abandons this line of argument and contends that he provided the
4
Martins later received a diagnosis of “bipolar disorder,
most recent episode manic.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 41.)
5
Hospital with actual notice of his need for medical leave when
he informed Fanning and Badessa of his bipolar disorder at the
meeting immediately preceding his termination.
Even setting aside the fact that this is arguably a newlyminted argument, the Court concurs with Judge Almond’s finding
that Martins’ actions at the meeting were insufficient to place
the Hospital on notice of his need for medical leave.
to
provide
adequate
notice,
“an
employee
must
In order
provide
his
employer with enough information to show that he may need FMLA
leave.”
Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th
Cir. 2005).
“Although the employee need not name [the FMLA], he
must provide information to suggest that his health condition
could be serious.”
Id. (citations omitted).
have
duty
an
affirmative
to
reason for the leave . . . .”
indicate
both
“Employees thus
the
need
and
the
Id. (citations omitted).
Martins’ own testimony reveals that his disclosures at the
meeting with Fanning and Badessa were deficient.
During this
meeting,
“around
Martins
initially
claimed
that
hospital” during the period in question.
Martins 97, ECF No. 48-1.)
Russolini,
Martins’
union
was
the
(See Dep. of Michael
Later, during the same meeting,
representative,
explanation did not “make any sense.”
148, ECF No. 63-23.)
he
told
him
that
his
(Dep. of Michael Martins
Only then did Martins state: “I’m sorry
. . . to tell you this, you know, I have bipolar disorder, and,
6
you know, it could explain the reason for, you know, my behavior
that day.”
the
R&R
(Dep. of Michael Martins 101, ECF No. 63-22.)
concludes,
Martins’
speculative
reference
to
As
bipolar
disorder as the cause of his disappearance is inadequate to have
placed
the
leave.
As such, this objection is DENIED.
C.
Hospital
on
notice
of
Martins’
need
for
medical
Count II – Collective Bargaining Agreement Violation
During his employment at the Hospital, Martins was subject
to
a
collective
bargaining
agreement
(the
“CBA”)
in
place
between the Hospital and his union, Teamsters Local 251 (the
“Union”).
violated
cause
In
the
and
Count
CBA
II,
by
that
Martins
terminating
the
Union
alleges
his
that
employment
violated
its
the
Hospital
without
duty
of
just
fair
representation by not pursuing a so-called Step III hearing to
contest his termination.
To prevail on such a “hybrid” claim,
Martins must prove both the violation by the Hospital of the CBA
and
the
violation
representation.
by
the
Union
of
the
duty
of
fair
See Almeida v. E. Utils. Corp., C.A. 99-269L,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21632, at *10 (D.R.I. Oct. 28, 1999).
With respect to the Union, Martins contends that it acted
in bad faith when it declined to pursue his grievance to a Step
III hearing.
He now objects to Judge Almond’s recommendation
that summary judgment be granted as to this count.
However,
Martins’
of
assertion
that
the
Union
7
violated
its
duty
fair
representation cannot withstand scrutiny.
As Judge Almond aptly
noted in the R&R, Martins’ claims regarding the Step III hearing
are contrary to his Complaint in which he alleged only that the
Union
failed
arbitration.
to
adequately
pursue
(Am. Compl. ¶ 68.)
his
grievance
through
Martins may not now bob and
weave his way to an entirely new cause of action.
See Rivera-
Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[A]
litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely
and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace.”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
What is more, the record suggests that the Union contacted
the Hospital’s Step III hearing designee with a request that the
Hospital reconsider Martins’ termination in light of evidence
presented
by
Martins’
treating
physician.
(See
Letter
from
Att’y Marc Gursky to Louis J. Sperling, ECF No. 63-15.)
The
Hospital declined to do so based on inconsistencies in Martins’
explanations for his absence from work.
(See Letter from Louis
J. Sperling to Att’y Marc Gursky, ECF No. 63-16.)
This suggests
that pursuit of a Step III hearing would have been futile and
that the Union did not violate its duty of fair representation.
Thus, this objection too is DENIED.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Martins’ objections are DENIED
and the R&R is ACCEPTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
8
The
Hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the
Hospital as to Counts II, III, IV, V, IX and X and DENIED as to
Counts VI, VII and VIII.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: August 13, 2014
9
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