Mejia v. Smith et al
Filing
67
ORDER granting the remaining Defendants' 42 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts VIII, IX, X, and XI, which are the only remaining claims in this case. -- The clerk shall enter judgment and close the case. So Ordered by Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. (New Hampshire) on 2/11/2014. (A copy of the attached Order was forwarded to Plaintiff via first-class mail on 2/12/2014.)(Duhamel, John)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
Edward Mejia, a/k/a Jose Maldonado
v.
Civil No. 12-cv-449-JD
Robert Charette, et al.
O R D E R
Edward Mejia, who is also known as Jose Luis Maldonado but
will be referred to as “Mejia”, brought a civil rights action,
arising from events that occurred during his trial on drug
charges.1
The remaining defendants, Supervisory Deputy United
States Marshal Robert J. Charette, Deputy United States Marshal
Justin Engen, Deputy United States Marshal Brian McDonald, and
Deputy United States Marshal Joseph Murphy, move to dismiss or in
the alternative for summary judgment on the claims against them,
asserting that Mejia did not allege a claim for excessive force
and alternatively that they are entitled to qualified immunity if
the claims were properly alleged.
Mejia objects, contending that
the defendants used excessive force in extracting him from a
transport van at the courthouse.
1
The criminal case is United States v. Maldonado, 09-cr-71-S
(D.R.I. 2009).
I.
Motion to Dismiss
The defendants move to dismiss the claims against them,
contending that Mejia did not allege sufficient facts to support
his claims.
Because the defendants filed their answer before
filing the motion to dismiss, it is construed as a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the
same standard as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
Shay v. Walters, 701 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir.
2012).
The court determined on preliminary review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A that Mejia stated excessive force claims
against the four deputy marshal defendants, who then had not been
identified.2
5.
See Order, March 22, 2013, (document no. 37) at 4-
In conducting preliminary review, the court used the same
standard that is applicable to a motion to dismiss or a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
See Hooker v. United States, 2014
WL 120659, at *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 13, 2014); Benbow v. Weeden, 2013
WL 4008698, at *2 (D.R.I. Aug. 5, 2013); Villar v. Buttermore,
2013 WL 3945914, at *5 (D.N.H. July 31, 2013).
The defendants
move to dismiss the claims on the grounds that Mejia fails to
state a claim of excessive force, without addressing the contrary
2
An excessive force claim against federal officers, such as
the deputy marshals named in this case, proceeds under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). See Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.3d 153, 155
(1st Cir. 2011).
2
determination on preliminary review.
See Mandeville v. Anderson,
2007 WL 4287724, at *4 (D.N.H. Dec. 4, 2007).
To the extent a motion to dismiss is cognizable in these
circumstances, which is unclear, the defendants’ motion fails for
the reasons stated in the order on preliminary review.
II.
Motion for Summary Judgment
The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that
they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Summary judgment is
appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“A genuine
issue is one that could be resolved in favor of either party, and
a material fact is one that has the potential of affecting the
outcome of the case.”
Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co.,
711 F.3d 217, 223 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“To be genuine, a factual dispute must be built on a
solid foundation--a foundation constructed from materials of
evidentiary quality.”
Nieves-Romero v. United States, 715 F.3d
375, 378 (1st Cir. 2013).
The two-part qualified immunity analysis asks “whether (1)
the facts alleged show the defendants’ conduct violated a
constitutional right, and (2) the contours of this right are
‘clearly established’ under then-existing law so that a
reasonable officer would have known that his conduct was
3
unlawful.”3
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 97 (1st
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In considering
qualified immunity, the court need not address each step but
instead may move ahead to determine whether a reasonable officer
would have known that his conduct was unlawful.
Asociacion De
Periodistas De P.R. v. Mueller, 680 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir. 2012).
“Excessive force claims, like most other Fourth Amendment
issues, are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the
information the officers had when the conduct occurred.”
Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001); accord Asociacion De
Periodistas, 680 F.3d at 81.
“[Q]ualfied immunity can protect
officers from litigation based on misjudgments about where lies
the ‘sometimes hazy border between excessive and acceptable
force.’”
Asociation De Periodistas, 680 F.3d at 81 (quoting
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206).
For that reason, an officer will be
protected by qualified immunity if he “‘reasonably, but
mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back
. . . [and] us[ed] more force than in fact was needed.’”
Id.
(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205).
In this case, the events in question occurred during Mejia’s
criminal trial.
The defendants have provided their declarations,
declarations of other officers involved, DVDs of footage taken by
cameras in the sallyport of the courthouse, Mejia’s medical
3
The same standard for qualified immunity applies in Bivens
suits as in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Hernandez-Cuevas, 723 F.3d at 97 n.6.
4
records, and other evidence in support of summary judgment.
In
opposition to summary judgment, Mejia submitted two identical
copies of his own declaration, copies of two reports from the
Wyatt Detention Facility, and part of the declaration of Cory
Cloud, an officer at the Wyatt Detention Facility.
Mejia was being held at the Wyatt Detention Facility pending
trial.
On the first day of trial, Mejia refused to leave his
cell to be transported to the courthouse.
He asserted that he
did not want to be represented by his appointed counsel and
wanted a different lawyer to represent him.4
notified by United States Marshals.
The judge was
At the judge’s request,
defense counsel went to Wyatt to talk to Mejia and to explain
that the trial would proceed whether he attended or not.
Defense
counsel and the marshal at Wyatt told the judge that Mejia was
extremely agitated and refused to speak with counsel.
The deputy chief of the Marshal Service arranged for a
telephone connection from Wyatt to the court so that Mejia could
participate in a hearing to address the issue of representation.
Mejia refused to cooperate but was brought to the conference room
against his will.
appointed counsel.
Mejia objected to being represented by his
The judge explained to Mejia that the trial
would begin and that if he refused to attend, one of his lawyers
would attend the trial and the other would stay with Mejia.
4
Mejia had changed counsel four times previously.
5
The marshals told the judge that in their opinion Mejia
would not be transported willingly to the court or participate by
remote access at Wyatt.
When the judge attempted to begin the
trial, Mejia refused to leave his cell, and the marshal reported
that Mejia was undressed and wrapped in a blanket.
The judge
informed the marshals that Mejia would be transported to the
court for trial the next morning, and the Chief Deputy Marshal
advised Supervisory Deputy Marshal Charette that extra security
would be required.
The next morning Mejia again refused to leave his cell when
ordered to do so.
face and body.”
54, ¶ 3.
Mejia “smeared urine and feces all over [his]
Mejia declarations, doc. no. 47, ¶ 3 & doc. no.
Mejia also threw urine and feces at the officers
attempting to remove him from his cell.
Mejia was subdued,
washed, dressed, and transported by van to the courthouse.
Deputy Marshals Murphy, McDonald, and Engen were briefed by
Charette about the events that had occurred in extracting Mejia
from his cell.
They were told that Mejia was being transported
to the courthouse and that they would receive Mejia when he
arrived and escort him into court.
The defendants went to the
sallyport in the courthouse to wait for Mejia’s arrival.
In the van, Mejia was shackled with leg irons and handcuffed
in front.
Although detainees are required to wear seatbelts
during transport and are belted into the seat when they enter the
van, they often remove the belt before arrival.
during the ride to the courthouse.
6
Mejia was quiet
When the van was inside the sallyport at the courthouse, the
deputy marshals approached the passenger side double doors.
Murphy asked about Mejia’s behavior during the trip and was told
that Mejia had been calm and quiet.
The defendants state,
supported by their declarations, that Murphy opened the doors to
the compartment where Mejia was seated and ordered Mejia to get
out of the van.
Mejia did not respond or move.
Murphy asked
Mejia again to get out and again there was no response.
According to the defendants, Murphy got into the van, facing
Mejia, and leaned toward Mejia, placing his left hand under
Mejia’s right shoulder to assist or carry Mejia out of the van.
In response, Mejia stiffened and kicked his legs out, kicking
Murphy in the groin and legs.
Mejia pulled on Murphy’s shirt and
appeared to be lunging at Murphy with his mouth open, attempting
to bite or hit Murphy with his head.
Murphy fell against the
side of the seating compartment.
When Murphy fell, McDonald saw Mejia rise from his seat over
Murphy in a threatening manner.
McDonald grabbed Mejia’s leg
shackles and yanked hard, knocking Mejia off of his feet and
pulling him away from Murphy and out of the van.
and thrashed violently.
Mejia kicked
Charette saw Mejia’s legs thrashing and
grabbed Mejia’s legs and pulled.
McDonald and Charette pulled
Mejia out of the van, and he landed face down on the floor.
The
extraction process took eight seconds.
In the struggle, Mejia hit and injured his face.
Engen
administered first aid to Mejia and stopped the bleeding.
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EMTs
were called, and Mejia was transported to the hospital by
ambulance.
Mejia offers two different versions of the extraction
process.
In his complaint, Mejia alleges that when the door to
the van was opened, the marshal “grabbed [Mejia] snatching [him]
from the van cuffed and shackled.”
Complaint, ¶ 40.
He further
states that when the marshal attempted to remove him he
“instinctively went rigid.”
Id.
After he “went rigid,” the
marshal “began to beat and brutalize” Mejia.
Mejia alleges that
he suffered injury to his nose, mouth, front teeth, and back.
In opposition to summary judgment, however, Mejia describes
the incident differently.
Mejia states in his declaration that
he had been sprayed with mace to subdue him during the cell
extraction process at Wyatt which irritated his eyes so that he
could not open his eyes while being transported to the
courthouse.
He states that the van door opened rapidly and that
he was “immediately attacked by a U.S. Marshal who began to punch
me in my side.”
Declaration, doc. no. 54, ¶ 9.
He further
states that he “was then pulled out of the van by my leg
shackles” and “was dragged out of the van on my stomach and
face.”
Id.
Mejia denies that anyone told him to get out of the
van.
Mejia does not mention his action of “going rigid” in his
declaration and instead states that he was punched before he made
any movement.
However, Mejia is bound by the factual allegations
in his complaint, which are judicial admissions, absent a
8
satisfactory explanation for new and different facts.
Schott
Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 976 F.2d
58, 61 (1st Cir. 1992); accord N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming
Found., Inc. v. Sprint Corp., 2006 WL 1207670, at *7 (D.R.I. May
2, 2006); see also Giddens v. Community Educ. Ctrs., Inc., --Fed. Appx. ---, 2013 WL 5405503, at *7 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2013)
(explaining doctrines of judicial estoppel and admissions which
bind the party to statements made in the complaint that
contradict later statements made to oppose summary judgment);
Official Comm. of the Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
that allegations in a complaint are binding judicial admissions).
Therefore, Mejia’s attempt to create a factual dispute to avoid
summary judgment by providing a different version of events in
his declaration is unavailing.
See Fin Brand Positioning, LLC v.
Take 2 Dough Productions, Inc., 2012 WL 27917, at *5 (D.N.H. Jan.
5, 2012) (“‘[T]he non-moving party cannot create a dispute
concerning material facts by simply submitting an affidavit that
contradicts his or her complaint, deposition testimony, or
answers to interrogatories without providing an adequate
explanation for that discrepancy.’”) (quoting Toney v. Perrine,
2007 WL 2688549, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 10, 2007)).
The events preceding Mejia’s arrival at the sallyport of the
courthouse provided ample grounds for the marshals to expect
trouble from Mejia.
When Mejia did not comply with two
instructions to get out of the van, Murphy reasonably concluded
9
that he had to climb into the van to get Mejia out.
Mejia then
kicked Murphy and appeared to threaten him further.
Even if the
defendants were mistaken about Mejia’s intent in “going rigid”
and leaning over Murphy, they reasonably interpreted those
actions as threatening.
In response, to protect Murphy and to
extract Mejia, McDonald and Charette pulled Mejia by his legs and
shackles out of the van, and Mejia sustained injuries in the
process.
Under the same circumstances, reasonable officers in the
defendants’ positions would have perceived a threat from Mejia
and would have responded, reasonably, with at least the amount of
force the defendants used.
Therefore, the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity and are not liable under Mejia’s
excessive force claims.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants motion for summary
judgment (document no. 42) is granted as to Counts VIII, IX, X,
and XI, which are the only remaining claims in this case.
The clerk of court shall enter judgment and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
(Sitting by designation.)
February 11, 2014
cc:
Leslie D. Parker, Esq.
T. David Plourde, Esq.
Jeffrey K. Techentin, Esq.
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