Seguin v. Bedrosian et al

Filing 107

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 97 Motion to Amend/Correctplaintiffs motion for reconsideration document no. 97 is granted in part as follows: to the extent that the December 12, 2012, order document no. 95 granted the defendants mot ion to dismiss document no. 62 , thatpart of the order is vacated. The motion for reconsideration document no. 97 is otherwise denied (this denial includes the plaintiffs challengesto the magistrate judge reference, the approval of the magistrate judges report and recommendation to deny the plaintiffs motionfor a preliminary injunction, her request for leave to fileanother amended complaint, and her request for a preliminaryinjunction). The plaintiff may file a response to the defendants moti onto dismiss document no. 62 the amended complaint 28 on or before January 25, 2013. No further extensions of time will be granted. No further filings are to be made by any party pending the filing of the plaintiffs response. The judgment entered on December 12, 2012, is vacated, pending the courts reconsideration of the defendants motion to dismiss document no. 62 after the plaintiff has filed her response to the motion.. So Ordered by Joseph DiClerico on 1/9/13. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

Mary Seguin
v.

Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD

Haiganush R. Bedrosian,
Chief Judge of the Family Court
of Rhode Island, et al.
O R D E R
Mary Seguin, proceeding pro se, brought suit against Rhode
Island Family Court judges and Rhode Island state officials,
alleging federal and state claims that arose from state custody
proceedings involving Seguin.

The court approved the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation to deny Seguin’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, denied Seguin’s motions to vacate the
reference to the magistrate judge, granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss, and terminated all other pending motions as moot.
Seguin now moves for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e), for leave to file an amended complaint, and for
a preliminary injunction.
The background information pertinent to this case is
included in the court’s prior order issued on December 12, 2012,
which is (document no. 95).

Discussion
Seguin moves for reconsideration of the dismissal of her
claims, arguing that the court misapprehended the facts, her
position in this case, and the controlling law.

She seeks leave

to file another amended complaint and moves again for a
preliminary injunction.

The defendants object.

Seguin filed a

reply.1

I.

Motion for Reconsideration2
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Seguin argues

that she was denied due process because the court did not allow
her to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss, that the
court should not have denied her motion for a preliminary
injunction because the motion was moot, that the court erred in
failing to find state court bias based on her charge that
decisions were made because “the grandmother does not speak
English,” that the court used the wrong standard for Younger

1

The reply is titled: “Plaintiff’s Second Supplemental
Memorandum in Suport [sic] of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
judgment, To File and Amended Complaint, and for a Preliminary
Injunction, and Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Objection
to Plaintiff’s Rule 59e [sic] Motion to Amend Judgment.”
2

Due to the plethora of filings that have been made, the
court has included docket document numbers to assist readers
through the labyrinthine traverse of this case.
2

abstention, that Younger is clearly an erroneous doctrine, and
that the court misapprehended her claims.

In her reply, Seguin

argues that her claims cannot be dismissed because she has a
right under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial.

She also

argues that the standard used to decide motions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is unconstitutional.

A.

Approval of Report and Recommendation and Denial of

Motion to Vacate Reference
Seguin’s motion for a preliminary injunction (document no.
5) was referred (document no. 17) to the magistrate judge on
September 20, 2012.

On October 24, 2012, the magistrate judge

issued a report and recommendation (document no. 27),
recommending that Seguin’s motion for a preliminary injunction
(document no. 5) be denied on grounds of Younger abstention.
Seguin then filed an amended complaint, “Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Jury
Demand,” (document no. 28) on October 26, 2012.

On November 5,

2012, Seguin filed an objection to the report and recommendation
(document no. 35).
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Seguin argues
in part that the court erred in approving the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation because her motion for a preliminary
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injunction (document no. 5) became moot when she filed an amended
complaint (document no. 28) on October 26.

Seguin did not object

to the report and recommendation on the ground that her motion
was moot or seek leave to withdraw her motion for a preliminary
injunction (document no. 5).

Therefore, the issue of mootness is

not an appropriate basis for reconsideration.

To the extent

Seguin challenges the legal basis for the court’s approval of the
report and recommendation and denial of her motion to vacate the
reference to the magistrate judge, her interpretation of the law
is incorrect.

B.

Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Seguin raises a valid concern about her opposition to the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Seguin filed her original

complaint (document no. 1), “Complaint,” on August 31, 2012.

As

is discussed above, Seguin filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction (document no. 5) on September 11, 2012, which was
referred to the magistrate judge who issued a report and
recommendation (document no. 27) on October 24.
The defendants moved to dismiss (document no. 24) Seguin’s
original complaint (document no. 1) on October 15, 2012.

On

October 26, Seguin filed an amended complaint, “Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and
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Jury Demand” (document no. 28).

Seguin filed an objection

(document no. 30) to the defendants’ motion to dismiss (document
no. 24) her original complaint (document no. 1) on November 1.
In response to Seguin’s amended complaint (document no. 28),
on November 2, 2012, the defendants moved to withdraw (document
no. 32) their first motion to dismiss (document no. 24) and moved
to strike (document no. 33) Seguin’s objection (document no. 30)
to their first motion to dismiss (document no. 24).

On November

6, Seguin filed a response (document no. 37) to the defendants’
motion to strike (document no. 33) her objection to the motion to
dismiss.
Also on November 6, Seguin filed a second amended complaint,
“Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction and Jury Demand” (document no. 39).

The

defendants moved to strike (document no. 40) the second amended
complaint (document no. 39) on November 8.

Seguin filed another

motion for a preliminary injunction (document no. 42) on November
9.

On November 14, Seguin filed a motion to amend (document no.

45) the amended complaint (document no. 28) and a third amended
complaint, “Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Preliminary
and Permanent Injunction and Jury Demand” (document no. 47).
Seguin moved for a temporary restraining order (document no. 52)
on November 19.
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On November 20, the defendants moved (document no. 58) to
strike the third amended complaint (document no. 47) and moved to
expedite consideration (document no. 59) of their motion to
strike.

Seguin moved, again, to vacate the reference of her

motion for a preliminary injunction to the magistrate judge
(document no. 60) and moved for sanctions against the defendants
(document no. 61).
On November 21, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss (document no. 62) the amended complaint (document no.
28).

On November 26, Seguin filed a fourth amended complaint,

“Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction and Jury Demand” (document no. 74).

On the

same day, Seguin filed a motion for an extension of time
(document no. 68) to respond to the motion to dismiss and a
motion to strike (document no. 69) the defendants’ motion to
strike her third amended complaint.

The defendants filed a

response (document no. 81) to Seguin’s request for an extension
of time in which they stated that they had no objection to a
reasonable extension of time.

The defendants also asked that

Seguin be precluded from making additional filings while the
motion to dismiss was pending.

On December 10, the defendants

moved to strike (document no. 90) the fourth amended complaint
(document no. 74).
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On December 12, 2012, the court determined that the
operative complaint was the amended complaint (document no. 28)
filed on October 26, 2012.

The court granted the defendants’

motion to dismiss (document no. 62) that complaint.

Seguin

points out, however, that she had asked for an extension of time
to respond to the defendants’ motion which was not resolved
before the order granting the motion to dismiss issued.

As a

result, Seguin did not file a response to the defendants’ motion
to dismiss (document no. 62) the amended complaint (document no.
28), which, as previously, stated the court determined was the
operative complaint.
Therefore, Seguin’s motion for reconsideration is granted to
the extent that she will be allowed to file a response to the
defendants’ motion to dismiss (document no. 62) the amended
complaint (document no. 28), filed on November 21, 2012, as is
provided below.

II.

Motion to Amend
As part of her motion for reconsideration, Seguin asks that

she be given leave to file another amended complaint.

Seguin

contends that the defendant state judges are no longer
participating in the proceedings involving her so that she is now
seeking only monetary damages against them rather than injunctive
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relief.

She also argues that she would bring claims for money

damages against the Rhode Island Attorney General, the Rhode
Island State Police, and the Providence Police on the grounds
that they did nothing to investigate, prosecute, or prevent the
conspiracy against her perpetrated by the judicial defendants.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the court
will grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.”

The court

may deny leave to amend, however, under appropriate
circumstances, including that the amendment would be futile.
Edlow v. RBW, LLC, 688 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 2012).

A proposed

amendment is futile if it fails to state a cognizable claim under
the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

Id.

Therefore, a motion to amend

the complaint will be denied if as proposed the amended complaint
fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”

Sanchez v. United States, 671 F.3d 86,

107 (1st Cir. 2012).
Seguin’s conclusory accusations that state judges engaged in
a conspiracy and a RICO enterprise against her do not state a
claim.

She lacks a factual basis for her accusations, making

them facially implausible.3

Therefore, her motion to amend is

denied.

3

Seguin’s arguments that the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is
unconstitutional are meritless.
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III.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Seguin’s renewed request for a preliminary injunction is

denied for the reasons provided in the report and recommendation
that was approved in the December 12, 2012, order.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration (document no. 97) is granted in part as follows:
to the extent that the December 12, 2012, order (document no. 95)
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss (document no. 62), that
part of the order is vacated.
The motion for reconsideration (document no. 97) is
otherwise denied (this denial includes the plaintiff’s challenges
to the magistrate judge reference, the approval of the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation to deny the plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction, her request for leave to file
another amended complaint, and her request for a preliminary
injunction).
The plaintiff may file a response to the defendants’ motion
to dismiss (document no. 62) the amended complaint (document no.
28) on or before January 25, 2013.
will be granted.

No further extensions of time

No further filings are to be made by any party

pending the filing of the plaintiff’s response.
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The judgment entered on December 12, 2012, is vacated,
pending the court’s reconsideration of the defendants’ motion to
dismiss (document no. 62) after the plaintiff has filed her
response to the motion.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
(Sitting by designation.)
January 9, 2013
cc:

Kevin F. McHugh, Esquire
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Esquire
Mary Seguin, pro se
Susan E. Urso, Esquire

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