Seguin v. Bedrosian et al

Filing 111

ORDER granting 62 Motion to Dismiss; denying 109 Motion to Amend/Correct: defendants motion to dismiss (document #62) is granted. The claims against Hugh T. Clements are also dismissed. All claims are dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiffs motion to amend (document no. 109) is denied. The clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.So Ordered by Joseph DiClerico on 1/30/13. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

Mary Seguin
v.

Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD

Haiganush R. Bedrosian, et al.
O R D E R
Mary Seguin, proceeding pro se, brought suit against Rhode
Island Family Court judges and Rhode Island officials, alleging
federal and state claims that arose from state custody
proceedings involving Seguin.

The court approved the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation to deny Seguin’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, denied Seguin’s motions to vacate the
reference to the magistrate judge, granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss, and terminated all other pending motions as moot.

In

response to her motion for reconsideration, that part of the
order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss was vacated, and
Seguin was granted an opportunity to file a response to the
motion to dismiss.

1

Seguin has now filed her response.1

Seguin also filed a motion to amend her complaint, in
violation of the order issued on January 9, 2013.

Standard of Review
The analysis of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) proceeds through three steps.

Schatz v.

Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.
2012) (citing Ocasio-Hernandez v. Foruno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2011)).

First, the court must ignore any allegations

in the complaint “that simply offer legal labels and conclusions
or merely rehash cause-of-action elements.”
55.

Schatz, 669 F.3d at

Second, the properly pleaded facts must be taken as true,

with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff.
Id.

Third, the court considers the appropriate allegations and

inferences and determines whether “they plausibly narrate a claim
for relief.”

Id.

Seguin’s challenge that the standard of review under Rule
12(b)(6) is unconstitutional lacks merit.
determined the applicable standard.

The Supreme Court has

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555
(2007).

Seguin’s arguments are inapposite and unpersuasive.

Discussion
Seguin alleged that Rhode Island state court judges violated
her constitutional rights, engaged in a RICO conspiracy, and
violated the Rhode Island constitution and state law in making
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certain rulings in Seguin’s child custody proceedings.

She

sought an injunction against the Providence Chief of Police, Hugh
T. Clements, Jr., and the Superintendent of the Rhode Island
State Police, Steven G. O’Donnell, to preclude enforcement of
domestic violence orders.2

Seguin also alleged a claim for

damages against the Rhode Island Attorney General, Peter F.
Kilmartin.

The defendants moved to dismiss Seguin’s claims on

the ground, inter alia, that the action must be dismissed based
on the Younger abstention doctrine.3

See Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971).
In the December 12, 2012, order, the court analyzed the
application of the Younger abstention doctrine in this case both
in approving and adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation to deny Seguin’s motion for a preliminary
injunction and for purposes of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Seguin does not dispute the application of Younger abstention in

2

The background information pertinent to this case is
included in the court’s prior order issued on December 12, 2012,
which is document no. 95.
3

As is noted in the December 12, 2012, order at footnote 11,
although Clements did not join in the motion to dismiss because
he had not then been served, application of the Younger doctrine
supports sua sponte dismissal of the claims against Clements.
See Agustin v. County of Alameda, 234 Fed. Appx. 521, 522 (9th
Cir. 2007); Lewis v. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 2009 WL 950451,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2009).
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her response to the motion to dismiss.

Instead, Seguin restates

her arguments to support her motion for recusal, which was
previously denied; argues that the Rule 12(b)(6) standard imposed
by Iqbal, and related cases, is unconstitutional; and seeks to
amend her complaint to state claims to avoid the application of
Younger abstention.

A.

Recusal
For the reasons stated in the order issued on January 9,

2013, denying Seguin’s motion for recusal, Seguin has not raised
any cognizable basis for my recusal.

B.

Motion to Dismiss
Seguin does not dispute the application of the Younger

abstention doctrine to her claims, brought in the operative
complaint.

Document 28, filed Oct. 26, 2012.

Therefore, the

analysis and application of Younger abstention for purposes of
the motion to dismiss that is provided in the December 12, 2012,
order is unaffected by Seguin’s response and is ratified and
confirmed after reviewing the response.
The defendants argue that Seguin’s complaint requires
Younger abstention.

As discussed above, Younger abstention is

“appropriate when the requested relief would interfere (1) with
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an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an
important state interest; and (3) that provides an adequate
opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal
[claim].”

Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir.

2007).
As with Seguin’s motion for a preliminary injunction, which
was the subject of the magistrate’s report and recommendation,
Seguin’s amended complaint seeks to enjoin ongoing Family Court
proceedings about the custody of her children, to declare orders
issued in those proceedings void, to declare illegal and/or
unconstitutional the procedures employed in those proceedings,
and to enjoin the Family Court from enforcing its orders.

The

relief Seguin seeks would interfere extensively with the ongoing
judicial Family Court proceedings.

See Montgomery v. Montgomery,

764 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (D.N.H. 2011).
Considering the second factor, the state has a strong
interest in the issues presented in the Family Court cases,
including child custody issues and the procedures employed in
Family Court.
1994).

See Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 106 (6th Cir.

Further, for the same reasons as discussed in

consideration of Seguin’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
Seguin has not “demonstrate[d] that ‘state procedural law barred
[the] presentation of’” those claims.
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Murphy v. City of

Manchester, 70 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.N.H. 1999) (quoting Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987)).

Nor has Seguin

adequately alleged that any exceptions to Younger abstention
apply.
Accordingly, Younger abstention applies and, therefore,
requires the dismissal of Seguin’s claims as to the judicial
defendants.

See Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registration in Med. of

Commonwealth of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 785 (1st Cir. 1990).
Seguin’s claims against Clements and O’Donnell apparently stem
from their failure to prevent or intercede with the judicial
defendants’ allegedly unlawful behavior in the Family Court
proceedings and Seguin seeks a prospective injunction to halt any
future enforcement of orders entered in the Family Court
proceedings.

Therefore, Seguin’s claims against Clements and

O’Donnell are similarly subject to Younger abstention.
Seguin appears to allege that Kilmartin violated various
laws by seeking to dismiss her civil rights claim brought in
state court and that Kilmartin conspired with judges in the state
court proceedings to deprive her of her rights.

To the extent

Seguin seeks declaratory or injunctive relief against Kilmartin
to prevent him from participating in, or to direct his conduct
in, state court proceedings that involve her, those claims are
subject to Younger abstention.

In addition, Seguin sought
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damages from Kilmartin, the only defendant sued in his individual
capacity.

Even if the claims against Kilmartin were not subject

to Younger abstention, they would still be dismissed because
Seguin does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In sum, Seguin’s claims are dismissed under Younger
abstention and because she has not stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted.

C.

Motion to Amend
Seguin has filed yet another motion to amend her complaint.

In the order issued on January 9, 2013, Seguin was granted an
opportunity to respond to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, but
the parties were all ordered not to make any further filings.
Seguin disregarded that order.
Even if the motion to amend were properly filed, it would
not succeed.

As was the case with her last attempt to amend her

complaint, Seguin falsely represents that she now seeks only
money damages and that the complaint no longer implicates Younger
abstention because of that change.

The proposed amended

complaint appears to be very similar or identical to Seguin’s

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previous attempt to amend, which was denied.4
97, filed on Dec. 17, 2012.

See document no.

Contrary to her representation,

Seguin continues to seek declaratory and injunctive relief that
would interfere with state court proceedings and the effects of
state court orders.

The proposed amended complaint is futile,

and the motion to amend is denied.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss
(document no. 62) is granted.

The claims against Hugh T.

Clements are also dismissed.

All claims are dismissed with

prejudice.
The plaintiff’s motion to amend (document no. 109) is
denied.
The clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly and
close the case.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
(Sitting by designation.)
January 30, 2013
cc:

Kevin F. McHugh, Esquire
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Esquire
Susan E. Urso, Esquire
Mary Seguin, pro se

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Seguin’s repetitious and duplicative filings do not advance
her cause.
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