Seguin v. Bedrosian et al
Filing
95
ORDER: Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction 5 and motions to vacate the referral order document nos. 35 , 36 , and 60 are denied. The defendants motion to dismiss document no. 62 is granted. All other pending motions are term inated as moot. The clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. Finding as moot 23 Motion ; finding as moot 27 Report and Recommendations.; finding as moot 33 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 34 Motion for Extens ion of Time to Answer ; finding as moot 40 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 42 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; finding as moot 44 Motion to Expedite; finding as moot 45 Motion to Amend/Correct; finding as moot 52 Motion for TRO; finding as moot 58 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 59 Motion to Expedite; finding as moot 61 Motion for Sanctions; finding as moot 66 Motion for Entry of Default; finding as moot 68 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Repl y ; finding as moot 69 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 73 Motion for Extension of Time ; finding as moot 5 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; finding as moot 85 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 87 Motion for Sanctions; finding as moot 88 Motion to Disqualify Counsel. ; finding as moot 88 Motion to Expedite; finding as moot 90 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 92 Motion for Disclosure; finding as moot 93 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 22 Motion to Expedite. So Ordered by Joseph DiClerico on 12/12/12. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
Mary Seguin
v.
Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD
Haiganush R. Bedrosian, Chief
Judge of the Family Court of
Rhode Island, et al.
O R D E R
Mary Seguin brought suit against Rhode Island Family Court
judges and Rhode Island state officials, alleging claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, federal criminal statutes, and state law, arising
out of a series of orders issued in cases relating to custody
proceedings involving Seguin.
Seguin filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction, which was referred to Magistrate Judge
Landya B. McCafferty.
The magistrate issued a Report and
Recommendation concluding that the motion should be denied.
Seguin objected to the magistrate’s recommendation and moved to
vacate reference of the motion to the magistrate.
The defendants
objected to the motion to vacate reference to the magistrate, and
also moved to dismiss Seguin’s amended complaint and to strike
the subsequent amended complaints.
defendants’ motions.
Seguin objected to the
Background
This case arises out of child custody proceedings in the
Rhode Island Family Court (“Family Court”) involving Seguin and
her children, including proceedings instituted by Gero Meyersiek,
the father of one of Seguin’s daughters, naming Seguin as the
respondent.
See Meyersiek v. Seguin, No. K01-0521M (R.I. Fam.
Ct., Kent Cnty.).
Divorce and child custody proceedings between
Seguin and her ex-husband, Marc Seguin, are also pending in the
Family Court.
See Seguin v. Seguin, No. K01-10503 (R.I. Fam.
Ct., Kent Cnty.).
Both of these proceedings are at issue in this
case.
Judge Michael Forte of the Family Court granted Meyersiek
sole temporary custody of his daughter in an order granting a
motion for emergency relief dated January 11, 2010.
Thereafter,
the Family Court issued a series of orders, in both the Meyersiek
and Seguin proceedings, concerning custody, support, and
visitation issues.
Seguin asserts that the Family Court’s orders
were generally issued in her absence, without notice, without
findings, and without a stenographic record prepared, and were
intended to retaliate against Seguin for filing reports with
federal authorities regarding misconduct in her Family Court
proceedings.
Seguin has been, at times, represented by counsel
2
in the Family Court proceedings, and counsel has filed objections
to certain of the Family Court’s orders on Seguin’s behalf.
On June 22, 2010, in the child custody proceedings that
followed the Seguins’ divorce, Judge Stephen Capineri issued an
order, which limited Seguin’s visitation rights and rights to
communicate with her daughter, while granting Marc Seguin
temporary sole custody and physical possession of their daughter.
Seguin, through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Rhode Island Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”)
challenging the June 22, 2010, order.
In the certiorari
petition, Seguin asserted that the Family Court in the Meyersiek
proceedings issued a similar order on January 11, 2010, in
response to an emergency motion that Seguin’s counsel
characterized as an abuse of process.
The Supreme Court denied
Seguin’s petition for a writ of certiorari on September 9, 2010.
See Seguin v. Seguin, No. SU-2010-22-M.P. (R.I. Sept. 9, 2010)
(Ex. G to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Comp. (document no. 62-20)).
After reading news reports about unrelated litigation filed
in Rhode Island regarding truancy cases allegedly mishandled by
the Family Court, Seguin filed a report with the United States
Justice Department regarding those truancy cases in December
2010, and also provided federal authorities with information
regarding her child custody proceedings.
3
Then, on December 14,
2010, Judge Capineri recused himself from the child custody
proceedings involving Marc Seguin and from the Meyersiek
proceedings.
After Judge Capineri recused himself, Chief Family Court
Judge Haiganush Bedrosian presided over the Meyersiek
proceedings.
Judge Bedrosian issued a series of restraining
orders against Seguin, from January 7, 2011, through March 29,
2011, in a related Family Court proceeding in Providence County.
See Meyersiek v. Seguin, No. P11-0026A (R.I. Fam. Ct., Providence
Cnty.).
On March 29, 2011, all of the Meyersiek proceedings were
reassigned from Judge Bedrosian to Judge John McCann.
Seguin
alleges that Judge Bedrosian recused herself at that time because
of the pending Justice Department investigation and that Judge
Bedrosian instructed Judge McCann to continue to issue
retaliatory orders against Seguin.
The Meyersiek proceeding
remains pending in the Kent County Family Court before Judge
McCann.
Seguin filed a complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court
(“Superior Court”) against the judges involved in the custody
proceedings alleging, among other things, that the various orders
interfered with Seguin’s parental rights and right to travel,
that the judges who issued the orders were biased, that the
orders were retaliation for the misconduct reports she filed with
4
the United States Justice Department, that the Family Court
proceedings violated state laws requiring that all proceedings be
transcribed or recorded, and that she was deprived of due process
of law.
See Seguin v. Bedrosian, No. 2012-0124 (R.I. Super. Ct.,
Providence Cnty.).
In August 2012, following a hearing, the
Superior Court dismissed the complaint, finding that: (1) the
Superior Court lacked authority to review Family Court orders;
(2) Seguin’s claims asserting violations of federal criminal laws
were not based on viable private causes of action; and (3) the
Family Court judges were absolutely immune from suit.
(Aug. 4, 2012).
See id.
Judgment was entered on October 4, 2012, and
Seguin does not appear to have appealed the dismissal of her
Superior Court action to the Supreme Court.
Instead, shortly
after obtaining the adverse Superior Court decision, but before
judgment was entered, Seguin filed the complaint in this action.
Seguin’s complaint in this action asserts essentially the
same claims as were asserted in the Superior Court action.
Her
claims are based on alleged constitutional violations, federal
criminal statutes, and Rhode Island state law.
Seguin seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief as to the judicial defendants
and other Rhode Island state official defendants, including Peter
Kilmartin, the Attorney General of Rhode Island, whom Seguin
5
suggests were complicit in the judicial defendants’ illegal
activity.
Seguin also seeks monetary damages from Kilmartin.
Discussion
Seguin filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking
to enjoin the defendants from presiding over her child custody
proceedings, to prohibit the defendants from enforcing or issuing
orders, and to declare void prior Family Court orders issued in
the child support proceedings.
The court referred the motion to
the magistrate, who issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”)
concluding that Seguin’s motion should be denied.
Seguin
objected to the R&R and also moved to vacate the order referring
the motion to the magistrate.
After the magistrate issued the R&R, Seguin filed an amended
complaint and, subsequently, three additional amended complaints.
The defendants have moved to dismiss Seguin’s first amended
complaint and to strike the subsequent amended complaints.
I.
Motion to Vacate Referral Order and Objection to R&R
On October 24, 2012, the magistrate issued an R&R concluding
that Seguin’s motion for a preliminary injunction should be
denied based on Younger abstention.
U.S. 37 (1971).
See Younger v. Harris, 401
Seguin filed a timely objection to the R&R and,
6
in the same filing, moved to vacate the reference of the motion
to the magistrate.1
The defendants argue that reference of the
motion to the magistrate was proper and that the magistrate
correctly found that Younger abstention applies.
A.
Motion to Vacate Reference
In support of her motion to vacate reference of the motion
for a preliminary injunction to the magistrate, Seguin argues
that the magistrate is biased because the R&R did not address
Seguin’s allegations of racial and gender discrimination in the
underlying state proceedings.
Seguin contends that there is no
plausible explanation for the magistrate’s failure to discuss
those allegations other than that the magistrate is biased, and
that her bias deprived Seguin of due process.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) provides: “[t]he court may . . . under
extraordinary circumstances shown by any party, vacate a
reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge under this
subsection.”
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(3).
1
“The
Seguin submitted her filing containing both the objection
to the R&R and the motion to vacate reference to the magistrate
twice (document nos. 35 and 36). Although the two documents
appear to be identical, the first is docketed as Seguin’s
objection, and the second is docketed as Seguin’s motion to
vacate. Seguin subsequently filed a second motion to vacate the
reference to the magistrate (document no. 60), which repeats a
portion of her earlier filings.
7
‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard is difficult to satisfy.”
Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 2011
WL 70593, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011).
“Although
‘extraordinary circumstances’ remain somewhat undefined, courts
are clear that unfounded accusations of bias and empty charges of
impartiality cannot fall within the definition.”
McGrath v.
Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 4842837, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 10,
2009) (citing Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 171,
173 (D.D.C. 2003)); see also Gleis v. Buehler, 2012 WL 1379323,
at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2012) (“judges do not vacate referrals
whenever bias is alleged but instead require the movant to point
to facts satisfying the statute’s standard of extraordinary
circumstances”).
Further, “[b]ecause issues regarding a judge’s
impartiality must generally arise from ‘extrajudicial’ factors,
‘judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for
a bias or partiality motion.’”
M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v.
McGill, 2011 WL 2464184, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2011) (quoting
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994)).
Seguin argues that extraordinary circumstances exist because
the magistrate is biased, as evidenced by the R&R’s failure to
cite to the phrase “because the grandmother does not speak
English,” which Seguin alleges was the basis for the Family
8
Court’s orders depriving her of her custodial rights.2
Seguin
also alleges bias based on the magistrate’s failure to cite
Seguin’s allegations of gender discrimination, which appear to be
predicated on the existence of custody orders issued against her
while she was, as she describes herself, “a pregnant Texas woman
on the verge of giving birth.”
Seguin’s charges of bias do not meet the definition of
extraordinary circumstances.3
See, e.g., Moses v. Sterling
Commerce (Am.), Inc., 122 Fed. Appx. 177, 182 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“These conclusory allegations [of prejudice and bias]
demonstrate a distaste for how this case was being resolved by
the magistrate judge.
A motion to vacate the reference cannot
stand on these grounds.”).
Case law is clear that “[a]
magistrate judge’s purported ‘bias,’ as allegedly manifested
through his or her rulings, does not meet the ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ standard.”
Zerega Ave., 2011 WL 70593, at *3; see
2
The actual quote, which is included in the “emergency
motion for ex parte relief” filed by Meyersiek, appears to be
that Seguin left her children “with the maternal grandmother who
does not speak English.” Seguin infers that because this
allegation was included in the motions for custodial relief, the
Family Court granted the motions “because the grandmother does
not speak English.”
3
The magistrate discussed Seguin’s allegations of “biased
judges and invalid procedures,” but did not mention the specific
allegations about which Seguin complains.
9
also Manion, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 174-75; Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 2001 WL 1003206, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2001); Frank
v. County of Hudson, 962 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.N.J. 1997); Clay v.
Brown, Hopkins & Stambaugh, 892 F. Supp. 11, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1995).
Accordingly, Seguin’s motions to vacate the reference to the
magistrate do not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and are
therefore denied.
B.
The Magistrate’s R&R
The magistrate recommended denial of Seguin’s motion for a
preliminary injunction based on the application of the Younger
abstention doctrine.
In her objection to the R&R, Seguin argues
that Younger abstention does not apply because her case presents
extraordinary circumstances, including extreme bias and immediate
irreparable harm, and further suggests that bias in the Supreme
Court prevents her from pursuing her claims in state court.4
4
A district court is not bound to accept the magistrate
judge’s recommendations on the disposition of any pretrial
matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Thus, a district court “may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, . . . the
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id.; see also
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980) (district
court has broad discretion to review recommendations of
magistrate judge).
10
1.
Younger factors
The Younger abstention doctrine specifically requires
federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction when the
plaintiff in the federal case is seeking to enjoin ongoing state
proceedings.
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
As interpreted,
Younger abstention establishes “a court-made rule of abstention
built around the principle that, with limited exceptions, federal
courts should refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere
with ongoing state-court litigation.”
Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-
Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2004).
Younger abstention is
therefore “appropriate when the requested relief would interfere
(1) with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that
implicates an important state interest; and (3) that provides an
adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his
federal [claim].”
Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir.
2007); see also Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982).
With regard to the first factor, Seguin seeks to enjoin
ongoing Family Court proceedings concerning the custody of her
children, to declare orders issued in those proceedings void, to
declare illegal and/or unconstitutional the procedures employed
in those proceedings, and to enjoin the Family Court from
enforcing its orders.
The relief Seguin seeks would interfere
11
extensively with the ongoing judicial Family Court proceedings.
See Montgomery v. Montgomery, 764 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (D.N.H.
2011) (“[a] federal-court proceeding ‘interferes’ with a statecourt proceeding for Younger purposes when it either ‘enjoins the
state proceeding or has the practical effect of doing so’”)
(quoting Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d
56, 70 (1st Cir. 2005)).
As for the second factor, the state has
a strong interest in the issues presented in the Family Court
cases, including child custody issues and the procedures employed
in Family Court.
See Colassi v. Looper, 2008 WL 2115160, at *2-
*3 (D.N.H. May 20, 2007) (state has strong interest in child
custody issues, including orders affecting custodial parent’s
ability to relocate out of state (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 422-23 (1979) and Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d
704, 708-09 (1st Cir. 1986))); see also Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d
100, 106 (6th Cir. 1994).
As for the third factor, whether the state judicial
proceeding provides an adequate opportunity for Seguin to advance
her claims, Seguin has not “demonstrate[d] that ‘state procedural
law barred [the] presentation of’” those claims.
Murphy v. City
of Manchester, 70 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.N.H. 1999) (quoting
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987)).
Although
Seguin implies that she does not have the opportunity to present
12
her claims because the Supreme Court denied her petition for a
writ of certiorari to review an order issued in the divorce/child
custody proceeding, that denial does not render the appellate
process “inadequate” for the purposes of excepting this case from
application of the Younger abstention doctrine.
See Parent v.
New York, 2012 WL 2213658, at *2 (2d Cir. June 18, 2012) (“simply
because the state courts have not issued decisions in [the
plaintiff’s] favor does not render them ‘inadequate’ for purposes
of Younger abstention”); see also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 610 (1975).
To the extent Seguin suggests that the
denial of her petition was because of the Supreme Court’s bias
against her, and thus she cannot bring her claims in state court,
the third Younger factor focuses only on whether any procedural
impediments exist.5
See Hansel v. Town Ct., 56 F.3d 391, 394 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“So long as a plaintiff is not barred on procedural
or technical grounds from raising alleged constitutional
infirmities, it cannot be said that state court review of
constitutional claims is inadequate for Younger purposes.”).
Seguin does not argue that Rhode Island law bars her from
raising her claims in the Family Court proceedings or in the
5
Seguin’s allegations of bias in the Supreme Court are
discussed further in the following section concerning exceptions
to Younger abstention.
13
Supreme Court.6
“Absent some clear reason to think otherwise,
the court must and does assume that state procedures will afford
an adequate remedy.”
McKenna v. DeSisto, 2012 WL 4486268, at *4
(D.R.I. Sept. 27, 2012) (internal quotations marks and citation
omitted); see also Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15.
Therefore, the
third Younger factor pertains to this case.
2.
Younger exceptions
Seguin argues that even if the three Younger factors are
met, her case presents extraordinary circumstances requiring the
court to intervene in the state proceedings.
Specifically,
Seguin argues that the Family Court proceedings have been brought
in bad faith and are motivated by, among other things, ethnic and
racial bias, and retaliatory animus because she reported issues
concerning the truancy cases and the Family Court proceedings to
federal authorities.
When the three Younger criteria are satisfied, abstention is
required absent “exceptional circumstances,” which may include a
situation where “irreparable injury is both great and immediate .
6
Although Seguin filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to review an order issued in the divorce/child custody
proceeding, Seguin chose not to appeal the Superior Court order
dismissing her case in which she brought constitutional claims
similar to this action, despite that avenue being available. See
R.I. Gen. Laws. §§ 8-1-2 & 14-1-52.
14
. . or where there is a showing of bad faith [or] harassment.”
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Extraordinary circumstances are
also present in “cases in which extreme bias completely renders a
state adjudicator incompetent.”
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. López-
Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2008).
The “exceptions to
Younger’s policy of abstention have been very narrowly construed
by the Court.”
Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registration in Med. of
Commonwealth of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 779 (1st Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is the
plaintiff’s burden to “make sufficient specific factual
allegations which support an inference that the particular
exception applies and [she] cannot rely on general claims of
misconduct.”
Kennedy v. Town of Billerica, 594 F Supp. 2d 117,
124-25 (D. Mass. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Seguin argues that each of the judges of the Family Court is
biased against her because they issued various orders against her
in the custody proceedings.
Specifically, as discussed above,
she alleges that ex-parte custody orders were issued because of
allegations that her mother does not speak English, which
suggests racial and ethnic bias, and that the Family Court did
not terminate a domestic violence proceeding against her while
15
she was “a pregnant Texas woman on the verge of giving birth,”
which suggests gender bias and discrimination.
Although Seguin cites various orders which were decided in
her adversaries’ favor and the recusal of several Family Court
judges in her proceedings, “[t]he presumption of judicial
impartiality cannot be trumped by free-floating invective,
unanchored to specific facts.”
Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80
F.3d 633, 640 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Judicial bias is a recognized
basis for derailing Younger abstention, but the claim requires
more than the frenzied brandishing of a cardboard sword.”); see
also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577-79 (1973).
Seguin’s
accusations and unfounded assumptions are not enough.
Therefore,
Seguin has not sufficiently alleged that the Family Court judges
are biased against her.
To the extent Seguin implies that the Supreme Court
necessarily endorses the Family Court’s alleged bias and,
therefore, is unable to impartially review her claims against the
defendant judges, that argument is similarly unavailing.
“[A]n
entire group of adjudicators cannot be disqualified wholesale
solely on the basis of an alleged institutional bias in favor of
a rule or policy promulgated by that group.”
Brooks, 80 F.3d at
640 (citing Doolin Sec. Savs. Bank v. FDIC, 53 F.3d 1395, 1407
(4th Cir. 1995)).
16
Nor has Seguin adequately alleged that the Family Court
proceedings were brought in bad faith or that she would suffer
irreparable harm from abstention.
“‘[B]ad faith’ in [the
Younger] context generally means that a prosecution has been
brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid
conviction.”
Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975).
Here, the custody proceedings were instituted by Seguin’s exhusbands, not the Family Court or the defendant judges.7
Regardless, Seguin’s allegations of bad faith, which are
predicated on conclusory assertions that the various orders
issued against her in the Family Court proceedings were motivated
by either racial, ethnic, or gender bias, retaliatory animus, or
were issued to cover up an elaborate Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) enterprise are insufficient to
demonstrate bad faith.7
See Douglas v. N.H. Supreme Court Prof.
7
Seguin’s suggestion that the court must engage in the
analyses contained in Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943 (5th Cir.
1981) and Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979) is
misplaced for the same reasons. Those cases involve criminal
prosecutions brought by states against individuals who were able
to show that the actions were instituted as retaliation because
the plaintiffs were exercising their constitutional rights.
7
As discussed below, Seguin’s amended complaint, which was
filed after the magistrate issued the R&R, alleges the existence
of a RICO enterprise within the Rhode Island state court system.
Seguin’s objection to the R&R is based, in part, on the
allegations in her amended complaint, and therefore references
17
Conduct Comm., 187 F.3d 621, 1998 WL 1085773, at *1 (1st Cir.
1998) (“the element of illegal motive must be pleaded by alleging
specific non-conclusory facts from which such motive may
reasonably be inferred, not merely by generalized asseveration
alone”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Therefore, Seguin has not alleged that the bad faith exception
applies.
Nor has Seguin made “a showing of irreparable harm that is
both great and immediate.”
Esso, 522 F.3d at 143.
Seguin has
not shown that further review of her federal constitutional
claims in the Family Court proceedings or in a petition to the
Supreme Court, seeking to invoke that court’s appellate or
supervisory jurisdiction, would be insufficient to alleviate any
injury to her rights, without this court’s intervention.
Accordingly, after due consideration of the objection filed,
the court approves the R&R of Magistrate Judge McCafferty dated
October 24, 2012.8
Because Younger applies, abstention is
required, and the motion for preliminary injunctive relief is
the allegations of a RICO enterprise.
8
“‘[O]nly those issues fairly raised by the objections to
the magistrate’s report are subject to review in the district
court and those not preserved by such objection are precluded on
appeal.’” School Union No. 37 v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d
554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Keating v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 1998)).
18
denied.9
See Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d
22, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (“If Younger requires abstention, ‘there
is no discretion to grant injunctive relief.’”) (citation
omitted).
II.
Motion to Dismiss
The magistrate’s R&R addressed Seguin’s first motion for a
preliminary injunction which was based on allegations contained
in Seguin’s original complaint.
Shortly after the magistrate
issued the R&R, Seguin filed an amended complaint (document no.
28).
The amended complaint added three new defendants:
Peter
Kilmartin, the Attorney General of Rhode Island; Hugh Clements,
the Chief of the Providence Police Department; and Steven
O’Donnell, the Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police.
The amended complaint also added additional constitutional
claims, allegations of a RICO conspiracy, and details concerning
9
Seguin also asserts that Younger abstention does not apply
because Ex Parte Young applies instead. “The Ex Parte Young
exception simply stated is that the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar a suit for prospective injunctive relief against a named
state official for ongoing federal law violations.” Office of
Child Advocate v. Lindgren, 296 F. Supp. 2d 178, 188 (D.R.I.
2004). The applicability of Ex Parte Young has no bearing on
whether Younger abstention is required. See Younger, 401 U.S. at
45.
19
Seguin’s claims.
The defendants move to dismiss the amended
complaint.
Seguin also filed three additional complaints:
a second
amended complaint (“SAC”) (document no. 39), a revised second
amended complaint (“RSAC”) (document no. 47), and another “second
amended complaint” (“third complaint”) (document no. 74).
Seguin
filed a “motion to amend/correct” the amended complaint on the
same day she filed the RSAC, but has otherwise not sought the
court’s leave to file any of the additional complaints.
The
defendants move to strike each of the additional complaints,
arguing that Seguin failed to obtain the defendants’ consent or
leave of the court before filing the SAC, the RSAC, or the third
complaint, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
A.
Operative Complaint
“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is
one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after
service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a
motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
All other amendments require either
the opposing party’s written consent or leave of court.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
20
See Fed.
“Leave to amend is ‘freely given when justice so requires,’
but courts have discretion to deny such motions under appropriate
circumstances, including undue delay and futility.”
Edlow v.
RBW, LLC, 688 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)).
“[D]enial of [a] plaintiff[‘s] motion [to amend] as
futile would be appropriate if the amended complaint still failed
to state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”
Platten v. HG Bermuda Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 132 (1st Cir.
2006).
The amended complaint filed on October 26, 2012, is allowed
under Rule 15(a)(1).
Seguin did not obtain the court’s leave to
amend her amended complaint before filing either the SAC, the
RSAC, or the third complaint.
Therefore, the defendants’ motions
to strike those complaints are granted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2).
Even if the court were to consider the RSAC as merely a
proposed complaint and attached to Seguin’s “motion to
amend/correct” the amended complaint, as would have been
appropriate under the Rhode Island Local Rules, see LR cv 15, the
court would still deny the motion as futile.
The RSAC adds two
additional defendants, Chief Judge Paul Suttell of the Supreme
Court, and the Family Court itself.
The RSAC adds allegations
(I) against Judge Suttell which concern Seguin’s attempts to
21
report the alleged illegal activity in the Family Court and Judge
Suttell’s alleged contribution to that illegal activity in
response to Seguin’s complaints, (ii) additional details
concerning private agreements between state officials and
Meyersiek, and (iii) additional details concerning the existence
of a RICO enterprise within the Rhode Island state court system.
As discussed below, these additional allegations do not change
the applicability of Younger abstention, and, therefore, even if
the RSAC were the operative complaint, it would still require
dismissal.
B.
Motion to Dismiss
Seguin’s amended complaint asserts the following claims:
(1) “Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1 Section 2 of the Rhode
Island Constitution (Procedural Due Process Claim)” (Count I);
(2) “Substantive Due Process Claim” (Count II); (3) “Immunities
and Privileges Claim” (Count III); (4) “Immunities or Privileges
Claim of Fourteenth Amendment” (Count IV); (5) “Parental Rights
Stemming from the Due Process Right of the Fourteenth Amendment”
(Count V); (6) “Fifth Amendment” (Count VI); (7) “Fraud Upon the
Court” (Count VII); (8) “Rhode Island General Laws” (Count VIII);
(9) “Equal Protection Clause” (Count IX); (10) “42 U.S.C. Section
1982, 1983, 1985(2) and 1985(3)” (Count X); (11) “42 U.S.C.
22
Section 1986" (Count XI); (12) “First Amendment (Parental Rights
Claim)” (Count XII); (13) “Fourth Amendment (Unreasonable Search
and Seizure)” (also listed as Count XII); (14) “Ninth Amendment:
Interference and Retaliation Against Plaintiff’s Exercise of her
Right to Report Federal Law Violations by the Defendants” (Count
XIII); (15) “First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments; Familial
Integrity Violation” (Count XIV); (16) “The Supremacy Clause”
(Count XV); (17) “Violence Against Women Act” (Count XVI); (18)
“Due Process Right to a Fair Tribunal” (Count XVII); (19) “42
U.S.C. Sec. 2000d et seq.” (Count XVIII); (20) “Rule Eleven
Sanction” (Count XIX); (21) “The Commerce Clause (Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3) and the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article
I, Section 8, Clause 18)” (Count XX); and (22) “18 U.S.C. Sec.
1964(c) Civil RICO” (Count XXI).
The defendants in the amended
complaint are Judge Bedrosian, Judge McCann, Judge Capineri,
Judge Forte, Kilmartin, Clements, and O’Donnell.
Seguin seeks
various forms of injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as
monetary damages against the non-judicial defendants to the
extent they are sued in their individual capacity.
1.
Younger
The defendants argue that Seguin’s complaint requires
Younger abstention.
As discussed above, Younger abstention is
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“appropriate when the requested relief would interfere (1) with
an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an
important state interest; and (3) that provides an adequate
opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal
[claim].”
Rossi, 489 F.3d at 34-35.
As with Seguin’s motion for a preliminary injunction which
was the subject of the magistrate’s R&R, Seguin’s amended
complaint seeks to enjoin ongoing Family Court proceedings about
the custody of her children, to declare orders issued in those
proceedings void, to declare illegal and/or unconstitutional the
procedures employed in those proceedings, and to enjoin the
Family Court from enforcing its orders.
The relief Seguin seeks
would interfere extensively with the ongoing judicial Family
Court proceedings.
See Montgomery, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
As for the second factor, as explained above, the state has
a strong interest in the issues presented in the Family Court
cases, including child custody issues and the procedures employed
in Family Court.
See Mann, 22 F.3d at 106.
Further, for the
same reasons as discussed in consideration of Seguin’s motion for
a preliminary injunction, Seguin has not “demonstrate[d] that
‘state procedural law barred [the] presentation of’” those
claims.
Murphy, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (quoting Pennzoil Co., 481
24
U.S. at 14).
Nor has Seguin adequately alleged that any
exceptions to Younger abstention apply.
Accordingly, Younger abstention applies and, therefore,
requires the dismissal of Seguin’s claims as to the judicial
defendants.10
See Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 785.
Seguin’s claims
against Clements and O’Donnell apparently stem from their failure
to prevent or intercede with the judicial defendants’ allegedly
unlawful behavior in the Family Court proceedings and Seguin
seeks a prospective injunction to halt any future enforcement of
orders entered in the Family Court proceedings.
Therefore,
Seguin’s claims against Clements and O’Donnell are similarly
subject to Younger abstention.11
10
The allegations in the RSAC against Judge Suttell and
those concerning the alleged RICO conspiracy and secret
agreements with Meyersiek would not change the applicability of
Younger abstention. Seguin’s requested relief would enjoin the
ongoing Family Court proceedings and Seguin is not barred from
presenting those claims to the Supreme Court. Any suggestion
that Judge Suttell’s alleged bias would create an exception to
Younger is unavailing for the reasons discussed in the analysis
concerning the magistrate’s R&R.
11
Although Clements did not join in the motion to dismiss
because of service of process issues, “[t]he fact that the
Younger doctrine precludes the exercise of jurisdiction in this
action also means that the court should sua sponte dismiss the
action” as to Clements. Lewis v. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 2009
WL 950451, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2009) (citing Am. Family
Prepaid Legal Corp. v. Columbus Bar Assoc., 498 F.3d 328 (6th
Cir. 2007)); see also Reinhardt v. Mass. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
715 F. Supp. 1253, 1259 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Our decision to
25
2.
Remaining claim
Seguin seeks the “[a]ward of actual, compensatory, exemplary
and incidental damages against the non-judicial defendants
brought to this court in their individual capacity.”
As
discussed above, the non-judicial defendants are Clements,
O’Donnell, and Kilmartin.
Kilmartin is the only non-judicial
defendant sued in his individual capacity.
Seguin appears to allege that Kilmartin violated various
laws by seeking to dismiss her § 1983 claim brought in the
Superior Court and, in that action, making various legal
arguments that were without merit yet were accepted by the
Superior Court when it dismissed the action.
Even if this claim
were not subject to Younger abstention, it would still be
dismissed because it does not state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Seguin’s motion for a preliminary
injunction (document no. 5) and motions to vacate the referral
order (document nos. 35, 36, and 60) are denied.
The defendants’
abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this matter applies
equally to all the defendants. Consequently, we exercise our
power to dismiss the complaint as against Joudrey sua sponte.”).
26
motion to dismiss (document no. 62) is granted.
pending motions are terminated as moot.
All other
The clerk of court shall
enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
(Sitting by designation.)
December 12, 2012
cc:
Kevin F. McHugh, Esquire
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Esquire
Susan E. Urso, Esquire
Mary Seguin, pro se
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