Seguin v. Chafee et al
Filing
42
ORDER: The Defendants' motion to dismiss 20 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and for Lack of Jurisdiction, is granted. All other pending motions are terminated as moot. The clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. Finding as moot 29 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply ; finding as moot 32 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 37 Motion for Disclosure; finding as moot 38 Motion for Sanctions; finding as moot 40 Moti on to Strike ; finding as moot 15 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 19 Motion to Strike ;finding as moot 21 Motion to Expedite; finding as moot 24 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; finding as moot 25 Motion for TRO; finding as moot 26 Motion to Disqualify Counsel ; finding as moot 27 Motion to Disqualify Counsel ; finding as moot 27 Motion to Expedite. So Ordered by Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. on 12/14/2012. (Smith, Rana)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
Mary Seguin
v.
Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD
Lincoln D. Chafee et al.
O R D E R
Mary Seguin brought suit against Rhode Island Governor
Lincoln Chafee, Judge Paul Suttell, Chief Judge of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, and two Rhode Island state officials,
alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal criminal
statutes, and state law, arising out of a series of orders issued
in cases relating to custody proceedings involving Seguin.
The
defendants moved to dismiss Seguin’s amended complaint and to
strike the subsequent amended complaints.
Seguin objected to the
defendants’ motions.
Background
This case arises out of child custody proceedings in the
Rhode Island Family Court (“Family Court”) involving Seguin and
her children, including proceedings instituted by Gero Meyersiek,
the father of one of Seguin’s daughters, naming Seguin as the
respondent.
See Meyersiek v. Seguin, No. K01-0521M (R.I. Fam.
Ct., Kent Cnty.).
Divorce and child custody proceedings between
Seguin and her ex-husband, Marc Seguin, are also pending in the
Family Court.
See Seguin v. Seguin, No. K01-10503 (R.I. Fam.
Ct., Kent Cnty.).
Both of these proceedings are at issue in this
case.
Judge Michael Forte of the Family Court granted Meyersiek
sole temporary custody of his daughter in an order granting a
motion for emergency relief dated January 11, 2010.
Thereafter,
the Family Court issued a series of orders, in both the Meyersiek
and Seguin proceedings, concerning custody, support, and
visitation issues.
Seguin asserts that the Family Court’s orders
were generally issued in her absence, without notice, without
findings, and without a stenographic record prepared, and were
intended to retaliate against Seguin for filing reports with
federal authorities regarding misconduct in her Family Court
proceedings.
Seguin has been, at times, represented by counsel
in the Family Court proceedings, and counsel has filed objections
to certain of the Family Court’s orders on Seguin’s behalf.
On June 22, 2010, in the child custody proceedings that
followed the Seguins’ divorce, Judge Stephen Capineri issued an
order, which limited Seguin’s visitation rights and rights to
communicate with her daughter, while granting Marc Seguin
temporary sole custody and physical possession of their daughter.
Seguin, through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Rhode Island Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”)
challenging the June 22, 2010, order.
In the certiorari
petition, Seguin asserted that the Family Court in the Meyersiek
proceedings issued a similar order on January 11, 2010, in
2
response to an emergency motion that Seguin’s counsel
characterized as an abuse of process.
The Supreme Court denied
Seguin’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
After reading news reports about unrelated litigation filed
in Rhode Island regarding truancy cases allegedly mishandled by
the Family Court, Seguin filed a report with the United States
Justice Department regarding those truancy cases in December
2010, and also provided federal authorities with information
regarding her child custody proceedings.
Then, on December 14,
2010, Judge Capineri recused himself from the child custody
proceedings involving Marc Seguin and from the Meyersiek
proceedings.
After Judge Capineri recused himself, Chief Family Court
Judge Haiganush Bedrosian presided over the Meyersiek
proceedings.
Judge Bedrosian issued a series of restraining
orders against Seguin, from January 7, 2011, through March 29,
2011, in a related Family Court proceeding in Providence County.
See Meyersiek v. Seguin, No. P11-0026A (R.I. Fam. Ct., Providence
Cnty.).
On March 29, 2011, all of the Meyersiek proceedings were
reassigned from Judge Bedrosian to Judge John McCann.
Seguin
alleges that Judge Bedrosian recused herself at that time because
of the pending Justice Department investigation and that Judge
Bedrosian instructed Judge McCann to continue to issue
retaliatory orders against Seguin.
3
The Meyersiek proceeding
remains pending in the Kent County Family Court before Judge
McCann.
Seguin filed a complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court
(“Superior Court”) against the judges involved in the custody
proceedings alleging, among other things, that the various orders
interfered with Seguin’s parental rights and right to travel,
that the judges who issued the orders were biased, that the
orders were retaliation for the misconduct reports she filed with
the United States Justice Department, that the Family Court
proceedings violated state laws requiring that all proceedings be
transcribed or recorded, and that she was deprived of due process
of law.
See Seguin v. Bedrosian, No. 2012-0124 (R.I. Super. Ct.,
Providence Cnty.).
In August 2012, following a hearing, the
Superior Court dismissed the complaint, finding that: 1) the
Superior Court lacked authority to review Family Court orders, 2)
Seguin’s claims asserting violations of federal criminal laws
were not based on viable private causes of action, and 3) the
Family Court judges were absolutely immune from suit.
(Aug. 4, 2012).
See id.
Judgment was entered on October 4, 2012, and
Seguin does not appear to have appealed the dismissal of her
Superior Court action to the Supreme Court.
Instead, shortly
after obtaining the adverse Superior Court decision, but before
judgment was entered, Seguin filed a complaint in federal court
in the District of Rhode Island.
4
Seguin’s complaint in the District of Rhode Island action
asserted essentially the same claims as were asserted in the
Superior Court action.
Her claims were based on alleged
constitutional violations, federal criminal statutes, and Rhode
Island state law.
Seguin sought injunctive and declaratory
relief as to the judicial defendants and other Rhode Island state
official defendants, and monetary damages from one defendant.
This court, which presided over that action, dismissed Seguin’s
complaint on December 12, 2012.
While that case was pending, Seguin filed the complaint in
this action.
The complaint here is similar to the other District
of Rhode Island complaint, except that it was brought against
different defendants.
Rather than the Family Court judges, this
action was brought against Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee;
Steven Constantino, the Secretary of the Rhode Island Executive
Office of Health and Human Services; Sharon Santilli, the
Director of the Rhode Island Child Support Office; and Judge Paul
Suttell, the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court.
In addition to the different defendants, Seguin’s complaint
in this action added allegations concerning a child support order
issued by Judge McCann on August 14, 2012,1 which imposed a child
support payment on Seguin and found her to have an earning
1
Seguin alleges that the order was issued on August 15,
2012. The defendants attached a copy of the order to their
motion to dismiss and it is dated August 14, 2012.
5
capacity of at least $150,000 a year.
Seguin alleges that this
order was fraudulent and was issued as the result of a conspiracy
between the defendants and various Family Court judges, including
Judge McCann, to retaliate against Seguin and to ensure continued
funding to the State of Rhode Island pursuant to Title 4 of the
Social Security Act.
Seguin’s requested relief in this action
focuses largely on prohibiting enforcement of the August 14,
2012, order, though, as discussed, she also seeks to enjoin the
Family Court proceedings generally and seeks monetary damages
against all of the defendants.
Discussion
Seguin filed a complaint (document no. 1) and then an
amended complaint (document no. 12) within twenty-one days after
serving the original complaint.
the amended complaint.2
The defendants moved to dismiss
Seguin objects to the motion to
dismiss.3
2
The defendants also moved to dismiss the original
complaint. Although they did not withdraw that motion to
dismiss, because the original complaint is no longer operative,
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the original complaint is moot.
In their motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the defendants
assert that Seguin “has not served any Defendant except for Chief
Judge Suttell with a copy of the Amended Complaint.”
Nevertheless, the defendants do not move to dismiss based on
insufficient service of process.
3
Seguin filed an opposition to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss her original complaint and, in the same filing, an
opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss her amended
complaint. Seguin subsequently requested an extension of time to
6
Seguin also filed two additional complaints: a second
amended complaint (“SAC”) (document no. 18) and a third amended
complaint (“TAC”) (document no. 39).
She did not seek or obtain
the court’s leave to file either of the additional complaints.
The defendants moved to strike the SAC but have not yet moved to
strike the TAC.
In their motions4 to strike the SAC, the
defendants argue that Seguin failed to obtain the defendants’
consent or leave of the court before filing the SAC as required
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
A.
Operative Complaint
“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is
one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after
service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a
motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
All other amendments require either
the opposing party’s written consent or leave of court.
See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
oppose the defendants’ motion to dismiss her amended complaint.
Because her opposition states that Seguin is opposing both
motions to dismiss, the court will consider the arguments in that
opposition applicable to the defendants’ motion to dismiss her
amended complaint.
4
Judge Suttell filed a separate motion to strike the SAC on
the same grounds as the other defendants’ motion.
7
“Leave to amend is ‘freely given when justice so requires,’
but courts have discretion to deny such motions under appropriate
circumstances, including undue delay and futility.”
Edlow v.
RBW, LLC, 688 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)).
“[D]enial of [a] plaintiff[‘s] motion [to amend] as
futile would be appropriate if the amended complaint still failed
to state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”
Platten v. HG Bermuda Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 132 (1st Cir.
2006).
The amended complaint filed on October 31, 2012 (document
no. 12), is allowed under Rule 15(a)(1).
Seguin did not obtain
the court’s leave to amend her amended complaint before filing
either the SAC or the TAC.
Therefore, the defendants’ motions to
strike the SAC are granted and the court sua sponte strikes the
TAC.
See Water Keeper Alliance v. United States Dep’t of
Defense, 199 F.R.D. 445, 445 (D.P.R. 2001) (“‘the district court
has the power, on motion or sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint
or to strike such parts as are redundant or immaterial’”)
(quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83-86-87 (2d Cir. 1995));
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Even if Seguin had moved for leave to file the SAC or the
TAC, the court would still deny the motion as futile.
The SAC
adds two additional defendants: Priscilla Glucksman, in-house
counsel of the Child Support Office of Rhode Island, and Peter
8
Kilmartin, Attorney General of Rhode Island.5
It also adds five
additional counts, all of which arise out of allegations related
to her child custody/divorce proceedings in the Family Court.
The TAC includes the same defendants and counts as the SAC, but
adds allegations of misconduct since the filing of the action and
elaborates on allegations in the SAC.
As discussed below,
neither the allegations nor the additional defendants in the SAC
or TAC changes the applicability of Younger abstention or
Seguin’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Therefore, even if the SAC or the TAC were the
operative complaint, either would be dismissed.
B.
Motion to Dismiss
Seguin’s amended complaint asserts the following claims: (1)
“Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution” (Count I); (2) “Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution”
(Count II); (3) “Immunities and Privileges Claim” (Count III);
(4) “Immunities and Privileges Clause of the U.S. Constitution
Article IV, Sec. 2, Clause 1” (Count IV); (5) “Fraud Upon the
Court” (Count V); (6) “42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983” (Count VI); (7) “42
U.S.C. Sec. 1981 and 1982” (Count VII); (8) “Attorney’s Fees,
Costs and Fees (Count VIII); (9) “42 U.S.C. Section 1985(2) and
5
Kilmartin was a defendant in the other District of Rhode
Island action which, as discussed above, this court dismissed on
December 12, 2012.
9
1985(3)” (Count IX); (10) “42 U.S.C. Section 1986" (Count X);
(11) “Equal Protection Clause” (Count XI); and (12) “Civil RICO,
claim for sec. 1962(c), sec. 1962(d) and 18 U.S.C. sec. 1513(e)
and sec. 1513(f)” (Count XII).
The defendants in the amended
complaint are Governor Lincoln Chafee, Steven Constantino, Sharon
Santilli, and Chief Judge Paul Suttell.
Seguin seeks various
forms of injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as monetary
damages.
The defendants argue that Seguin’s amended complaint should
be dismissed on various grounds, including Younger abstention.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
1.
Younger factors
The Younger abstention doctrine specifically requires
federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction when the
plaintiff in the federal case is seeking to enjoin ongoing state
proceedings.
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
As interpreted,
Younger abstention establishes “a court-made rule of abstention
built around the principle that, with limited exceptions, federal
courts should refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere
with ongoing state-court litigation.”
Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-
Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2004).
Younger abstention is
therefore “appropriate when the requested relief would interfere
(1) with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that
implicates an important state interest; and (3) that provides an
10
adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his
federal [claim].”
Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir.
2007); see also Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982).
With regard to the first factor, Seguin seeks to declare a
child support order issued in the Family Court proceedings void,
to enjoin the ongoing Family Court proceedings, to declare
illegal and/or unconstitutional the procedures employed in those
proceedings, and to enjoin the Family Court from enforcing its
orders generally.6
The relief Seguin seeks would interfere
extensively with the ongoing judicial Family Court proceedings.
See Montgomery v. Montgomery, 764 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (D.N.H.
2011) (“[a] federal-court proceeding ‘interferes’ with a statecourt proceeding for Younger purposes when it either ‘enjoins the
state proceeding or has the practical effect of doing so’”)
(quoting Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d
56, 70 (1st Cir. 2005)).
As for the second factor, the state has
6
In an apparent attempt to avoid the applicability of
Younger abstention, Seguin argues that she is not requesting an
injunction against the proceedings, but rather is “only seeking
enjoinment of enforcement of any and all fraudulently obtained
child support judgment [sic] obtained by the state defendants.”
Even if Seguin’s requested relief is so limited, such relief
would still interfere with the Family Court proceedings for
purposes of Younger abstention. See e.g., Peterson v. Fox, 488
F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.N.H. 2007) (“A ruling favorable to the
plaintiff in this case would be tantamount to reversing the
decision of the state court, and under Younger, such a ruling
should not be entered by this Court because it would improperly
interfere with state court proceedings.”).
11
a strong interest in the issues presented in the Family Court
cases, including child custody issues and the procedures employed
in Family Court.
See Colassi v. Looper, 2008 WL 2115160, at *2-
*3 (D.N.H. May 20, 2007) (state has strong interest in child
custody issues, including orders affecting custodial parent’s
ability to relocate out of state (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 422-23 (1979) and Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d
704, 708-09 (1st Cir. 1986))); see also Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d
100, 106 (6th Cir. 1994); Estes v. Gaston, 2012 WL 5839490, at *4
(D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2012) (“the State has a strong interest in
ensuring that . . . the parties under its jurisdiction obey the
orders of family courts as issued”).
As for the third factor, whether the state judicial
proceeding provides an adequate opportunity for Seguin to advance
her claims, Seguin has not “demonstrate[d] that ‘state procedural
law barred [the] presentation of’” those claims.
Murphy v. City
of Manchester, 70 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.N.H. 1999) (quoting
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987)).
Although
Seguin’s complaint implies that she does not have the opportunity
to present her claims because the Supreme Court denied her
petition for a writ of certiorari to review an order issued in
the divorce/child custody proceeding, that denial does not render
the appellate process “inadequate” for the purposes of excepting
this case from application of the Younger abstention doctrine.
See Parent v. New York, 2012 WL 2213658, at *2 (2d Cir. June 18,
12
2012) (“simply because the state courts have not issued decisions
in [the plaintiff’s] favor does not render them ‘inadequate’ for
purposes of Younger abstention”); see also Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610 (1975).
To the extent Seguin alleges
that the denial of her petition was because of the Supreme
Court’s bias against her, and thus she cannot bring her claims in
state court, the third Younger factor focuses only on whether any
procedural impediments exist.7
See Hansel v. Town Ct., 56 F.3d
391, 394 (2d Cir. 1995) (“So long as a plaintiff is not barred on
procedural or technical grounds from raising alleged
constitutional infirmities, it cannot be said that state court
review of constitutional claims is inadequate for Younger
purposes.”).
Seguin does not argue that Rhode Island law bars her from
raising her claims in the Family Court proceedings or in the
Supreme Court.8
“Absent some clear reason to think otherwise,
the court must and does assume that state procedures will afford
an adequate remedy.”
McKenna v. DeSisto, 2012 WL 4486268, at *4
7
Seguin’s allegations of bias in the Supreme Court are
discussed further in the following section concerning exceptions
to Younger abstention.
8
Although Seguin filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to review an order issued in the divorce/child custody
proceeding, Seguin chose not to appeal the Superior Court order
dismissing her case in which she brought constitutional claims
similar to this action, despite that avenue being available. See
R.I. Gen. Laws. §§ 8-1-2 & 14-1-52. Nor has Seguin appealed the
August 14, 2012, order.
13
(D.R.I. Sept. 27, 2012) (internal quotations marks and citation
omitted); see also Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15.
Therefore, the
third Younger factor pertains to this case.8
2.
Younger exceptions
When the three Younger criteria are satisfied, abstention is
required absent “exceptional circumstances,” which may include a
situation where “irreparable injury is both great and immediate .
. . or where there is a showing of bad faith [or] harassment.”
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Extraordinary circumstances are
also present in “cases in which extreme bias completely renders a
state adjudicator incompetent.”
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. López-
Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2008).
The “exceptions to
Younger’s policy of abstention have been very narrowly construed
by the Court.”
Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registration in Med. of
Commonwealth of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 779 (1st Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is the
plaintiff’s burden to “make sufficient specific factual
8
Seguin appears to suggest that Younger abstention does not
apply because “[t]he defendants are not parties or participants
to any on-going state proceedings.” She suggests, citing Dennis
v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), that suits brought against
individuals who corrupt a judicial process are not subject to
Younger. Seguin misreads Dennis, which held that private parties
conspiring with a judge are acting “under color of” law for
purposes of a § 1983 action. The case has nothing to do with
Younger abstention.
14
allegations which support an inference that the particular
exception applies and [she] cannot rely on general claims of
misconduct.”
Kennedy v. Town of Billerica, 594 F Supp. 2d 117,
124-25 (D. Mass. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Seguin’s complaint recounts various orders which were
decided in her adversaries’ favor and notes the recusal of
several Family Court judges in her proceedings.
To the extent
Seguin argues that these actions suggest bias on the part of the
judiciary (and, because of her allegations of a conspiracy, the
defendants generally), “[t]he presumption of judicial
impartiality cannot be trumped by free-floating invective,
unanchored to specific facts.”
Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80
F.3d 633, 640 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Judicial bias is a recognized
basis for derailing Younger abstention, but the claim requires
more than the frenzied brandishing of a cardboard sword.”); see
also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577-79 (1973).
Seguin’s
accusations and unfounded assumptions are not enough.
Therefore,
Seguin has not sufficiently alleged that the Family Court judges
are biased against her.
To the extent Seguin implies that the Supreme Court,
necessarily endorses the Family Court’s alleged bias and,
therefore, is unable to impartially review her claims against the
defendant judges, that argument is similarly unavailing.
“[A]n
entire group of adjudicators cannot be disqualified wholesale
15
solely on the basis of an alleged institutional bias in favor of
a rule or policy promulgated by that group.”
Brooks, 80 F.3d at
640 (citing Doolin Sec. Savs. Bank v. FDIC, 53 F.3d 1395, 1407
(4th Cir. 1995)).
Nor has Seguin adequately alleged that the Family Court
proceedings were brought in bad faith or that she would suffer
irreparable harm from abstention.
“‘[B]ad faith’ in [the
Younger] context generally means that a prosecution has been
brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid
conviction.”
Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975).
Here, the custody proceedings were instituted by Seguin’s exhusbands, not the Family Court or the defendant judges.
Regardless, Seguin’s allegations of bad faith are predicated
on conclusory allegations.
Seguin alleges that the various
orders issued against her in the Family Court proceedings,
including the August 14, 2012, order, were (i) motivated by bias
or retaliatory animus, (ii) were issued to cover up an elaborate
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO”)
enterprise, and (iii) were issued to perpetuate a scheme to
illegally receive federal funding pursuant to the Social Security
Act.
These conclusory allegations are insufficient to
demonstrate bad faith.
See Douglas v. N.H. Supreme Court Prof.
Conduct Comm., 187 F.3d 621, 1998 WL 1085773, at *1 (1st Cir.
1998) (“the element of illegal motive must be pleaded by alleging
specific non-conclusory facts from which such motive may
16
reasonably be inferred, not merely by generalized asseveration
alone”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Therefore, Seguin has not alleged that the bad faith exception
applies.
Nor has Seguin made “a showing of irreparable harm that is
both great and immediate.”
Esso, 522 F.3d at 143.
Seguin has
not shown that further review of her federal constitutional
claims in the Family Court proceedings or in a petition to the
Supreme Court, seeking to invoke that court’s appellate or
supervisory jurisdiction, would be insufficient to alleviate any
injury to her rights, without this court’s intervention.
Because Younger applies, abstention is required, and the
motion for preliminary injunctive relief is denied.
See Colonial
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2009)
(“If Younger requires abstention, ‘there is no discretion to
grant injunctive relief.’”) (citation omitted).
3.
Additional grounds for dismissal
Seguin argues that Younger abstention does not apply
because, although the suit seeks injunctive relief to prevent the
enforcement of the August 14, 2012, order (as well as others),
she also “demands damages from the state defendants for the harms
they caused en route to the judgment, $5 million from state
executive actors and $5 million from defendant Paul Suttell.”
Even assuming that Seguin seeks monetary damages and not
17
injunctive relief and that her claims were not subject to Younger
abstention, her claims would still be dismissed.
Seguin’s allegations against the defendants suggest a vast
conspiracy involving the Rhode Island Executive Office of Health
and Human Services, the Rhode Island Child Support Office, the
governor of Rhode Island, the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, and numerous Family Court judges, with a goal of
retaliating against Seguin for various reasons and fraudulently
inflating her child support obligations to illegally receive
federal funding pursuant to the Social Security Act.
Such
allegations to do not state “a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard “demands more than an unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations.
A pleading that
offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”).
The court may
grant a motion to dismiss “claims that are highly implausible or
pled only in conclusory terms.”9
Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal
Health, Inc., 607 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2010); DM Research,
Inc. v. College of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir.
9
Further demonstrating the implausibility of Seguin’s claims
is that the amended complaint does not mention any actions taken
by Constantino or Santilli, and the allegations against Governor
Chafee arise primarily out of allegations of conduct by his
“agent”, Glucksman.
18
1999) ([a] court need not accept unsupported allegations of a
“conspiracy” or an “agreement . . . as a sufficient basis for a
complaint”).
Accordingly, even if Seguin’s claims were not
subject to Younger abstention, they would still be dismissed
because the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss
(document no. 20) is granted.
terminated as moot.
All other pending motions are
The clerk of court shall enter judgment
accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
(Sitting by designation.)
December 14, 2012
cc:
Mary Seguin, pro se
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Esq.
Susan E. Urso, Esq.
19
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