Seguin v. Chafee et al

Filing 52

REVISED ORDER denying 45 MOTION for Recusal, denying 44 MOTION for Recusal, denying 46 MOTION to Amend/Correct. So Ordered by Judge Joseph DiClerico on 1/9/2013. (Smith, Rana)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

Mary Seguin
v.

Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD

Lincoln D. Chafee, et al.
O R D E R
Mary Seguin brought suit against Rhode Island Governor
Lincoln Chafee; Chief Judge of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
Paul Suttell; and two Rhode Island state officials, alleging
federal and state claims based on state court custody proceedings
that involved Seguin.

The court granted the defendants’ motion

to dismiss and terminated all other pending motions as moot.
Seguin moves for reconsideration and in the same motion seeks a
preliminary injunction and leave to file an amended complaint.
Seguin filed motions for my recusal.1

The defendants objected to

the motion for reconsideration but did not file a response to the
motion for recusal.

Seguin filed a reply to the defendants’

objection to her motion for reconsideration.2

1

Seguin filed a “Motion to Recuse” (document no. 44) and a
“Motion to Recuse Accompanying Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) Motion”
(document no. 45). The motions are substantially the same and
are addressed together.
2

The reply is titled “Plaintiff’s Second Supplemental
Memorandum in Suport [sic] of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

I.

Motions for Recusal
Seguin moves for my recusal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455,
for the appearance of condoning ex-parte petition
removal of fundamental parental rights that states “the
grandmother does not speak English,” which the Judge
states is meaningless and inconsequential to the
outcome of parental termination without notice, a
hearing or any transcribed recording (secret tribunal)
which resulted in the termination of all parental
rights for the past three years since January, 2010.

Doc. no. 45 at 1.

Seguin represents that “[t]he Judge stated

this in Seguin v. Bedrosian, 2012-614, and is extremely
prejudicial to the Plaintiff mother, whose parental rights were
terminated in the fashion described above.”

Doc. 45 at 1.

A federal judge is required to recuse himself from a case
“‘in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’”
United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 455(a)).

The court’s consideration of a recusal

issue includes a determination of whether the circumstances in
the particular case would support an objective appearance of
partiality as well as actual bias.

Id.

“[J]udges should not

recuse themselves lightly,” and in the absence of a reasonable
question of bias, judges have a duty to sit.

United States v.

Judgment, to File an Amended Complaint, and for a Preliminary
Injunction, and Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Objection
to Plaintiff’s Rule 59e [sic] Motion to Amend Judgment.”
2

Cruzado-Laureano, 527 F.3d 231, 239 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
The order issued in Seguin v. Bedrosian, 12-cv-614-JD
(D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2012), does not include the language or analysis
Seguin represents is there.

Instead, the court held that

Seguin’s charge of bias against the magistrate judge, because the
magistrate did not cite to Seguin’s allegation that the state
custody orders were based on the statement that “the grandmother
does not speak English,” was insufficient to support her motion
to vacate reference of her motion for a preliminary injunction to
the magistrate judge.

The court also held that Seguin’s charges

of bias against the state court judges, based on her perception
that certain custody orders were made because “the grandmother
does not speak English,” were insufficient to show an exception
to the Younger doctrine.

The order does not say that an “ex-

parte petition removal of fundamental parental rights that states
‘the grandmother does not speak English, . . . is meaningless and
inconsequential to the outcome of parental termination without
notice . . .”
Therefore, Seguin has not provided adequate grounds to
support her motions for recusal.3

3

Seguin’s arguments based on her assertions about the racial
components of the populations of New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and
3

II.

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
After the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,

judgment was entered against Seguin.

Seguin moves to alter or

amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
In support, Seguin argues that her due process rights were
violated because she was not allowed to file an additional
response to the motion to dismiss, that her complaint included
sufficient allegations of a conspiracy, that the court applied
the wrong Younger abstention standard, that the state courts do
not provide an adequate forum, and that Younger abstention does
not apply because the state court is corrupt.

In her reply,

Seguin argues that the standard under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and dismissal of her claims violate the
Seventh Amendment.
A motion under Rule 59(e) faces a high hurdle to succeed.
Latin Am. Music Co. v. ASCAP, 642 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2011).
The moving party must show “an intervening change in the
controlling law, a clear legal error, or newly-discovered
evidence.”

Soto-Padro v. Pub. Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 9 (1st

Cir. 2012).

New arguments and theories do not provide a basis

the United States are meritless. Further, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429 (1984), which Seguin cites, is inapposite to the issue
of recusal.
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for reconsideration.

Feliciano-Hernandez v. Pereira-Castillo,

663 F.3d 527, 537 (1st Cir. 2011).

Therefore, “a party cannot

use a Rule 59(e) motion to rehash arguments previously rejected
or to raise ones that could, and should, have been made before
judgment issued.”

Soto-Padro v. Pub. Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 9

(1st Cir. 2012).

A.

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

Seguin filed her original complaint on October 9, 2012, and
an amended complaint on October 31, 2012.

The defendants filed a

motion to dismiss the original complaint on November 7.

Seguin

then filed a second amended complaint on November 9, without
first seeking the defendants’ consent or leave of court.

The

defendants filed a motion to strike the second amended complaint
and a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on November 14.
On November 23, 2012, Seguin filed “Opposition to
Defendants’ First and Second Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike.”4

Three days later, Seguin moved for an

extension of time of forty-five days (document no. 29) to respond
to the defendants’ motion to dismiss (document no. 20) without

4

The opposition (document no. 28) is addressed to the
defendants’ motion to dismiss (document no. 15) Seguin’s original
complaint and the defendants’ motion to dismiss her amended
complaint (document no. 20).
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addressing the fact that Seguin had already filed her opposition
to that motion.

In support of her motion for reconsideration,

Seguin argues that her due process rights were violated because
she was not permitted to file an additional response to the
motion to dismiss as requested in motion for an extension of
time.
Seguin’s Opposition filed on November 23 objected to the
defendants’ second motion to dismiss (document no. 20) on the
grounds that it was “non-responsive” because she had filed a
second amended complaint and that “Younger Abstention is but a
continuous and repeated lie proffered by the counsel for the
defendants and the defendants, . . . .”

Document no. 28 at 3.

With reference to her amended complaint, Seguin argues that she
has alleged claims against the defendants “For an abhorrent
scheme of ex-parte terminating the Plaintiff’s parental rights
based on petitions that textually states ‘because the grandmother
does not speak English’ to set her up for extortion . . . .”
at 4.

Id.

Seguin asserts that she “not only pleaded with specificity

factual allegations of conspiracy, retaliation, discrimination
and extortion, the Plaintiff has submitted hundreds of pages of
documents showing F.B.I. investigation of criminal activities in
the R.I. state family court proceedings . . . .”

Id. at 7.

She

goes on to argue that Younger abstention does not apply to her
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claims for damages based on her assertions of conspiracies and
RICO activities.

She also relied on the allegations on her

improperly filed second amended complaint to support her
opposition.
Seguin filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.

She

cites no authority that would support a right to file two
oppositions to a motion to dismiss.

Because Seguin filed an

opposition, her claim of a due process violation lacks merit.

B.

Remaining Grounds for Reconsideration
Seguin argues that she alleged sufficient facts to support

her claims and that the court misapplied the Younger abstention
doctrine in this case.

She also argues that dismissal of her

claims violates the Seventh Amendment.

Seguin has not shown a

change in the law, a clear legal error, or newly discovered
evidence to support her motion for reconsideration.

Therefore,

her motion is denied.

III.

Motion to Amend
Seguin seeks leave to amend her complaint, stating that her

proposed amended complaint would avoid the application of the
Younger abstention doctrine by seeking only monetary relief.
Contrary to Seguin’s representations, however, the proposed
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amended complaint seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief
and a declaratory judgment that the defendants obtained “the
fraudulent [state court] order for the unlawful purpose of fraud,
. . . .”

As pleaded, the proposed amended complaint is futile.

More importantly, judgment has entered in this case.

“The

law in this circuit is clear that a district court may not accept
an amended complaint after judgment has entered unless and until
the judgment is set aside or vacated under Rules 59 or 60 . . .
.”

Feliciano-Hernandez v. Pereira-Castillo, 663 F.3d 527, 538

(1st Cir. 2011).

Seguin’s motion for reconsideration under Rule

59(e) is denied.

Therefore, her motion to amend also must be

denied.

IV.

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
Seguin seeks a preliminary injunction.

Because the case is

dismissed and her motion for reconsideration is denied, that part
of her motion is also denied.

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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for
recusal (documents no. 44 and 45) and her motion for
reconsideration, a preliminary injunction, and to amend her
complaint (document no. 46) are denied.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
(Sitting by designation.)
January 9, 2013
cc:

Mary Seguin, pro se
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Esquire
Susan E. Urso, Esquire

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