West v. Hoover et al
Filing
65
ORDER granting 52 Motion for Summary Judgment. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 1/11/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
THOMAS HOOVER, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
WARREN WEST,
C.A. No. 12-781 S
ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before
the
Court
is
Defendants’
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 52) (“Defendants’ Motion” or “Defs.’ MSJ”).
Plaintiff Warren West (“West”) filed an Opposition (ECF No.
55) (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 56)
(“Defs.’ Reply”).
After careful consideration, Defendants’
Motion is GRANTED for the reasons set forth below.
I.
Background 1
West is the former Finance Director for the Town of
Coventry (the “Town”).
1
(Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts
The Court gleans these facts from Defendants’ Statement
of Undisputed Facts (“Defs.’ SUF”) (ECF No. 53), West’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Pl.’s SUF”) (ECF No. 62), and
the evidence the parties attached to these documents and to
the parties’ respective briefs. In all instances, the Court
interprets facts properly supported by the record in the light
most favorable to West, the non-moving party.
(“Defs.’ SUF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 53.)
On July 7, 2010, the Town
suspended him with pay while it investigated an issue between
the
Town
and
the
Coventry
School
funding for the school department.
No. 52-4.)
Department
concerning
(Ex. 2, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF
The details of the funding issue are not material
to this dispute, but briefly, Rhode Island law at the time
required municipalities to provide at least the same amount
of local funds to their school systems from year to year.
(Ex. 5 pp. 7-8, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF No. 52-7; Ex. A, Pl.’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Pl.’s SUF”), ECF No. 62-1.)
The
required
effort.”
funding
(Id.)
level
In
was
mid-2010,
termed
the
“maintenance
Coventry
of
School
However, “[d]istrict courts are not required to ferret
through sloppy records in search of evidence supporting a
party’s case.” Mercado-Alicea v. P.R. Tourism Co., 396 F.3d
46, 51 (1st Cir. 2005).
It would be generous to describe
West’s citation to the record as “sloppy.” First, West did
not expressly controvert Defendants’ Statement of Facts, in
violation of LR Cv 56(a)(3). Further, West does not support
his purported facts in his Opposition and Statement of
Undisputed Facts with proper citations to the record. West
only sporadically cites to the record in his Opposition and
where he does, the exhibit numbers in his brief do not
correspond to the exhibits he filed with the Court. West’s
Statement of Facts does not conform to LR Cv 56(a)(2); West
cites to exhibits containing multiple documents or pages of
transcripts but does not direct the Court’s attention to a
page or line number to support his proposition. Thus, where
West has directed the Court to evidence supporting his
assertions of fact, the Court has interpreted the facts in
the light most favorable to him. But where West has either
failed to cite to the record or the Court could not identify
the evidence to which West cited, the Court gives West’s
contention no weight.
2
Superintendent
believed
that
the
Town
impermissibly
cut
school funding by $225,000 and requested that the Rhode Island
Department of Education (“RIDE”) investigate.
(See Ex. 4,
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 55-4; Ex. 5, Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 555.)
After RIDE commenced an investigation into the Town’s
maintenance of effort funding, the Town Council hired Ernest
Almonte (“Almonte”), a private auditor, to explore West’s
involvement in the issue.
(Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 53.)
On August 12, 2010, Almonte completed his investigation and
filed his report with the Town (the “Almonte Report” or
“Report”).
not
(Id. ¶ 5.)
provide
proper
The Report concluded that West “did
oversight
and
due
diligence
in
the
accounting treatment” of $225,000 in State housing aid that
was
initially
projects.
reserved
for
school
department
capital
(Ex. 5 p. 12, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF No. 52-7.)
It also
concluded that West “should have recognized the accounting
problem” and “revealed it . . . to the State, and worked with
the special legal counsel to clarify the situation . . . .”
(Id.)
On August 13, 2010, Thomas Hoover (“Hoover”), Coventry’s
Town Manager, forwarded West a copy of the Almonte Report.
(See
Ex.
6,
Defs.’
MSJ,
ECF
No.
52-8.)
In
a
letter
accompanying the Report, Hoover indicated that “[b]ased on
3
the [Report], [his] own observations, discussions with Town
employees, discussions with financial and legal advisors to
the Town . . . and [his] other investigations,” he did not
have confidence in West’s job performance and was considering
terminating West’s employment.
(Id.)
However, prior to
taking any employment action, Hoover offered West an informal
hearing to respond to Hoover’s letter, the charges set forth
therein, and the issues raised in the Almonte Report.
(Id.) 2
West availed himself of the informal hearing which took
place on August 20, 2010 at the law office of the Town’s
Solicitor, Patrick Rogers (“Rogers”).
No. 53.)
(Defs.’ SUF ¶ 7, ECF
West attended with his attorney; Hoover and Rogers
2
The parties dispute who actually wrote the letters from
Hoover. West contends that Coventry’s legal counsel, Patrick
Rogers (“Rogers”), actually wrote the letters. (Pl.’s SUF ¶
5, ECF No. 62.) The Town admits that Hoover consulted with
legal counsel when drafting the letters but disputes that
Rogers actually wrote them.
(Defs.’ Statement of Disputed
Facts (“Defs.’ SDF”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 64.) The evidence on which
West relies for his assertion clearly states Rogers assisted
in drafting at least one letter:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
And did you prepare this letter by yourself?
No.
Who assisted you in doing it?
Patrick Rogers.
(Ex. B p. 16:16-20, Pl.’s SUF, ECF No. 62-2.) The parties do
not point to any evidence stating that Rogers actually wrote
the letters. Nevertheless, the dispute seems to be one of
semantics. Both Hoover and Rogers had a role in drafting the
letters.
4
attended for the Town.
(Id.)
While West could not cross-
examine individuals about the Almonte Report, West did have
the opportunity to present his side of the story, suggest
areas that the Town may want to investigate, and point out
discrepancies in the allegations against him.
SUF, ECF No. 62-4.)
(Ex. D, Pl.’s
Indeed, West gave the Town a line-by-
line opposition to the Almonte Report at the hearing.
(Pl.’s
Opp’n 31, ECF No. 55; Ex. 52, Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 55-55.)
Hoover terminated West’s employment on August 20, 2010,
shortly after the hearing.
(See Ex. 8, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF No.
52-10; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 7, ECF No. 62.)
explained
that
“based
on
the
The “Termination Notice”
investigation
and
report
referenced in [the Town’s] letter to [West] dated August 13,
2010 and following the informal due process hearing of today
with [West’s] attorney,” West’s employment was terminated.
(Ex. 8, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF No. 52-10.)
The notice also advised
West that, pursuant to Section 51-20(D) of the Coventry Code
of Ordinances, he had two weeks to request a hearing before
the Town Personnel Board (the “Board”).
(Id.)
West exercised his right to a hearing, and the hearing
took place over five days between September 23, 2010 and March
24, 2011.
(Defs.’ SUF ¶ 13, ECF No. 53; Ex. 13, Defs.’ MSJ,
ECF No. 52-15.)
The Board, reconstituted on July 19, 2010,
was composed of three members, two of whom were affiliated
5
with the Republican Party, one of whom was not affiliated
with any political party.
62-10.) 3
(Ex. J p. 1, Pl.’s SUF, ECF No.
Patrick Rogers acted
as the impartial hearing
officer for the first two days of the hearing; Frederick G.
Tobin acted as the hearing officer for the remaining three
sessions.
(Ex. 13, Defs.’ SUF, ECF No. 52-15.)
Pursuant to
the Town’s Personnel Ordinance, the Board was tasked with
making
an
advisory
recommendation
to
the
appointing
authority, in this case, the Town Manager, as to whether West
proved by clear and convincing evidence that his termination
“was based on political, religious or racial prejudice or
that the appointing authority failed to notify the employee
3
West asserts that the Town improperly created the
Board. His most significant allegation is that Coventry Town
Council
Vice
President,
Laura
Flanagan
(“Flanagan”),
impermissibly sought to create a “politically oriented”
Board. (Pl.’s SUF ¶ 13, ECF No. 62.) In support of this
assertion, West cites to an email in which Flanagan outlines
the individuals she had “secured” for the board (Ex. J p. 2,
Pl.’s SUF, ECF No. 62-10), and other documents showing (1)
that the Town Council appointed the prospective members
Flanagan had “secured” (id. at p. 4), (2) that two of the new
members affiliated with the Republican Party, while one was
unaffiliated, (id. at pp. 2, 4), and (3) that each of the
prior Board members’ terms had expired by July 1, 2010, (id.
at p. 5). Nothing in this evidence suggests that Flanagan
sought to create a politically oriented personnel board. It
shows, at best, that the Board was composed of two members of
the Republican Party, a permissible composition under the
Town’s Charter. (See Defs.’ SDF ¶ 13, ECF No. 64.)
6
in accordance [with the required procedures].”
(Defs.’ SUF
¶¶ 10, 12, ECF No. 53; Ex. 13, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF No. 52-15.)
During the hearing, each side admitted numerous exhibits
and each called two witnesses.
52-15.)
(Ex. 13, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF No.
The Town called Hoover and Almonte.
(Id.)
the opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses.
West had
(See Defs.’
MSJ 14, ECF No. 52-1.)
West also called Kenneth Cloutier, a
former
councilman
Coventry
town
Coventry Town Clerk.
and
Cheryl
George,
the
(Ex. 13, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF No. 52-15.)
After the hearing, on July 28, 2011, the Board determined
that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the
Town had acted with religious, racial or political prejudice
in terminating West’s employment.
(Id.)
The Board also
determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that
the Town notified West of the reasons for his termination in
accordance with Town policy.
(Id.)
the Board dismissed West’s appeal.
Based on these findings,
(Id.)
West filed this lawsuit in Rhode Island Superior Court
on July 26, 2012, and the Town subsequently removed it to
this Court due to the presence of a federal question.
No. 1.)
Nos.
19,
(ECF
After failed motions to dismiss West’s claims (ECF
22,
23)
and
numerous
discovery
extensions,
Defendants sought leave to file the present motion (ECF No.
48), which the Court granted (Text Order from 11/3/14 granting
7
ECF No. 48).
Defendants then moved for summary judgment as
to all of West’s claims.
(ECF No. 52.)
For the reasons
explained below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.
II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Fed.
An issue of fact is only considered
“‘genuine’ if it ‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.’”
Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st
Cir. 1997) (quoting Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23
F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994)).
When deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the court must “examine[] the entire record
‘in the light most flattering to the nonmovant and indulg[e]
all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.’”
Id. at
959 (quoting Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581).
III. Discussion
Before considering the merits of the parties’ arguments,
the Court pauses to clarify the claims before it.
initially
filed
a
seven
count
complaint
West
against
ten
defendants.
At summary judgment, the Town moved to dismiss
each
provided
count,
reasons
why
each
count
should
be
dismissed, and argued that West improperly brought claims
against
a
number
of
the
defendants.
8
While
Defendants’
arguments on the specific claims and defendants may have
merit, the Court need not reach them.
West does not directly
address
does
Defendants’
arguments
nor
he
specifically
explain why his seven counts should survive summary judgment.
Instead, West seems to reduce his seven counts to one general
claim - that the Town violated West’s Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights when it terminated his employment. 4
West,
thus, has waived his other claims and the Court will not
consider them.
Merrimon v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 758
F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Even an issue raised in the
complaint but ignored at summary judgment may be deemed
waived.” (internal citation omitted)); Schneider v. Local 103
I.B.E.W. Health Plan, 442 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006) (“It is
well-established that issues adverted to in a perfunctory
manner,
unaccompanied
by
some
effort
at
developed
argumentation, are deemed waived.” (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted)). 5
4
West brings his due process claim against Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
5
As Magistrate Judge Almond noted in his Report and
Recommendation on Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss,
“Plaintiff’s Complaint is confusing and does not clearly
spell out which claims are being made against which Defendants
and does not clearly identify the legal bases of such claims.”
(Report and Recommendation 9, ECF No. 41.) Magistrate Judge
Almond did not dismiss West’s claims at that juncture because
Defendants did not comply with applicable procedural rules,
and failed to conduct a count-by-count analysis of the legal
9
West cites seven alleged “genuine issues and material
fact[s]” that he claims allow his case to survive summary
judgment.
(Pl.’s Opp’n 29-30, ECF No. 55.)
purported facts raise two issues:
At base, these
(1) whether the Town
afforded West adequate due process when it terminated his
employment; and (2) whether the Town violated West’s right to
due
process
because
the
predetermined and biased.
outcome
of
the
was
The Court considers each in turn.
A.
West Received Adequate Due Process
The
parties
do
not
dispute
West’s
entitlement to procedural due process.
to
hearing
argue
that
the
Town
did
not
constitutional
Instead, West seems
provide
him
with
pre-
termination process and that his post-termination process was
insufficient to vindicate his constitutional rights.
West’s
assertions are without merit.
The essential requirements of procedural due process
“are notice and an opportunity to respond.”
Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
For employees
like West, who can only be discharged for cause, this means
viability of Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.) Defendants learned
from their earlier mistakes; West, apparently, did not. As
noted above, West did not follow this Court’s procedures for
disputing Defendants’ Statement of Facts and does not provide
any analysis countering Defendants’ assertions that each of
his seven counts fails.
10
employers must offer some sort of hearing before terminating
the employee’s employment.
employer
offers
some
Id. at 542.
post-termination
However, when an
process,
termination hearing need not be elaborate.
Massachusetts,
functions
513
solely
F.3d
“as
an
309,
316
initial
(1st
check
the
pre-
Chmielinski v.
Cir.
2008).
against
It
mistaken
decisions — essentially, a determination of whether there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the
employee are true and support the proposed action.”
(internal
citation
and
quotation
marks
omitted).
Id.
Pre-
termination process meets this low bar when it includes “(1)
oral or written notice of the charges against [the employee],
(2) an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and (3) an
opportunity to present [the employee’s] side of the story.”
Id.
(internal
citation
and
quotation
marks
omitted).
Further, courts do not look at the pre- and post-termination
procedures in isolation.
Senra v. Town of Smithfield, 715
F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2013).
They look to the totality of
proceedings to determine if the procedural due process an
employee received was sufficient.
1.
Id.
West’s Pre-Termination Process
Here, West received sufficient pre-termination process.
The Town first notified West that it was looking into his job
performance as early as July 7, 2010, when it placed him on
11
paid administrative leave pending its investigation into his
involvement in the maintenance of effort issue.
The Town
then specifically notified West that it might terminate his
employment due to the maintenance of effort issue in its
August 13, 2010 letter. In the same letter, the Town provided
West
with
a
detailed
account
of
why
it
was
considering
terminating his employment and forwarded West a copy of the
Report
that
formed
the
primary
basis
for
its
decision.
Finally, the Town provided West with an opportunity to present
his side of the story on August 20, 2010, when the parties
met at the Town’s attorney’s office.
West attended the
meeting with counsel and, among other things, presented the
Town with a “line by line opposition to the Almonte report.”
(See Pl.’s Opp’n 31, ECF No. 55.)
The Town, thus, met each
requirement of its pre-termination due process obligation,
providing West with an adequate opportunity to respond to the
Town’s basis for his discharge.
2.
West’s
West’s Post-Termination Process
post-termination
process
reinforces
the
conclusion that the Town respected West’s due process rights.
During the five days of hearings, West, through his counsel,
extensively cross-examined both of the Town’s witnesses —
Almonte, the drafter of the report on which the Town based
its decision, and Hoover, the individual who decided to
12
terminate West’s employment.
(Exs. 16A, 16B, 16C, Defs.’
MSJ, ECF Nos. 52-18, 52-19, 52-20.)
Further, West called two
witnesses of his own, and submitted a number of exhibits to
the Board.
West
(Ex. 13, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF No. 52-15.)
argues
that
this
post-termination
process
was
constitutionally infirm because the Town refused to subpoena
additional witnesses on his behalf.
ECF No. 55.)
(See Pl.’s Opp’n 40-41,
But West cites to no authority suggesting that
the Town’s denial violated West’s due process rights and this
Court has found none.
Indeed, it is well settled that due
process does not afford employees the same level of process
as in courts of law; instead, it merely requires that the
Town give West “a meaningful opportunity to respond to the
Town’s explanation for his termination.”
Senra, 715 F.3d at
39; see Chmielinski, 513 F.3d at 316 (“The termination hearing
is not a court of law, and the same level of process is not
required.”).
This is precisely the opportunity the Town
afforded West.
He confronted each of the witnesses the Town
presented against him, called to his defense individuals who
would willingly testify for him, and presented documentary
evidence to the Board in support of his case.
when
considered
with
his
pre-termination
Particularly
process,
West
received all the post-termination process the Constitution
requires.
13
B.
Allegations that West’s Hearings Were Predetermined
and Biased
Even if he technically received adequate due process,
West asserts that Defendants’ motion should fail because his
hearings were a “charade” and, thus, did not actually offer
him a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Specifically, West
argues that the outcomes of both hearings were predetermined,
and that the decisionmakers were so biased that West had no
chance to challenge the Town’s decision.
Neither of these
arguments allow West’s claims to survive summary judgment.
1.
West
is
West Has Not Presented Evidence
Termination Was Predetermined
correct
that
hearings
with
that
His
predetermined
outcomes deprive employees of their due process rights.
See
O’Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2000); Duhani
v. Town of Grafton, 52 F. Supp. 3d 176, 183 (D. Mass. 2014)
(“[I]t is clear that when the evidence establishes that the
outcome of a municipal employee’s pre-termination hearing has
been predetermined regardless of the proof presented, the
concerns and goals of the pre-termination hearing as set forth
in Loudermill have not been met.” (internal citation and
quotation
marks
omitted)).
However,
in
predetermination
cases, the key inquiry is whether the decisionmakers retain
discretion to reconsider a termination decision pending the
hearing’s outcome.
See O’Neill, 210 F.3d at 49.
14
Indeed,
even drafting and sending a termination letter prior to a
hearing does not violate due process if the decisionmaker can
revise that decision after meeting with the employee.
Id.
Duhani v. Town of Grafton provides a useful contrast to
the facts of this case.
52 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D. Mass. 2014).
There, a town fired an employee for purported performance
reasons.
The town administrator conducted the employee’s
pre-termination hearing and made the initial decision to
terminate the employee.
The board of selectmen then affirmed
the termination during a post-deprivation appeal.
judgment,
however,
the
employee
presented
At summary
evidence
that,
prior to both hearings, members of the board of selectmen
indicated they wanted to get rid of the employee and create
a new position for a different person.
Id. at 181.
Though
a “close case,” the district court held that this evidence
created
a
question
predetermined
review.
the
of
fact
outcome
as
of
the
to
whether
employee’s
the
due
board
process
Id. at 183.
Here, by contrast, West has not presented any similar
evidence that the decisionmakers decided to replace West
prior to his hearings.
In support of his assertion, West
points to the invoices from the Town’s outside law firm.
These invoices show that the attorneys advised the Town
regarding the decision to terminate West.
15
And read in the
light most favorable to West, the billing records suggest
that the attorneys discussed among themselves the process and
strategy for terminating West well before the Town notified
West that it was considering terminating his employment.
(See, e.g., Ex. 55, Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 55-51.)
But, unlike
in Duhani, these invoices say nothing of the state of Hoover’s
decision regarding West at his pre-termination hearing nor do
they suggest that the Personnel Board had decided West’s fate
prior to West’s post-termination hearing.
In short, West
lacks any of the evidence that made Duhani a close call in
favor of the plaintiff.
2.
West has Not Presented
Termination Was Biased
Evidence
that
His
West also seems to argue that the Town denied him due
process because it was biased against him.
While bias in a
hearing can violate an employee’s due process rights, the
employee generally must show that the alleged bias “deprived
him
of
the
opportunity
to
put
his
facts
before
the
decisionmaker, or that there was an [ ] error of primary facts
in the grounds used for termination that could be explained
only by bias.”
Jackson v. Norman, 264 F. App’x 17, 19 (1st
Cir. 2008) (quoting Chmielinski, 513 F.3d at 318).
West first seems to argue that his process was biased
because attorney Patrick Rogers participated in both the
16
investigation into the maintenance of effort issue and West’s
termination hearings.
(See Pl.’s Opp’n 34-36, ECF No. 55.)
This argument suffers from at least two deficiencies.
First,
West has presented no evidence that Rogers was a decisionmaker
at either of his hearings.
Rogers certainly advised Hoover
leading up to the pre-termination hearing and participated in
both hearings.
But Hoover and the Personnel Board, not
Rogers, ultimately decided West’s fate. Thus, West has failed
to show how any bias on Roger’s part prohibited West from
getting a fair hearing before Hoover and the Personnel Board.
Further, even if Rogers was a decisionmaker, due process
does not prohibit an investigator from also presiding over
the due process hearing.
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58
(1975) (“[T]he combination of investigative and adjudicative
functions does not, without more, constitute a due process
violation . . . .”); see Chmielinski, 513 F.3d at 318 ([T]he
terminating
employer
may
preside
[at
an
employee’s
due
process hearing].”); Acosta-Sepulveda v. Hernandez-Purcell,
889 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Contrary to the district
court’s
premise,
it
is
not
required
that
conducted before an ‘impartial decisionmaker.’
hearing
may
be
presided
over
(internal citation omitted)).
by
the
a
hearing
be
In fact, the
employer
himself.”
Thus, that Rogers may have
been involved in both the investigation and hearings does
17
not, by itself, make Rogers so biased as to deprive West of
due process.
Instead, West would have to present “special
facts and circumstances” to suggest that Rogers’s risk of
bias or “unfairness [was] intolerably high.” Withrow, 421
U.S. at 58.
West
political
West has presented no such evidence.
also
argues
prejudice.
that
his
hearings
West
bases
this
were
biased
argument
on
by
his
assertion that members of the Republican Party took control
of the Town Council in November of 2008 and he was a holdover
employee from Democratic administrations.
ECF No. 55.)
(Pl.’s Opp’n 3-4,
West, however, presents no evidence to connect
the political makeup of the Council to his termination.
The
school funding issue that resulted in West’s discharge did
not arise until mid-2010, well over a year after the new
Council took power.
(See Ex. 4, Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 55-4;
Ex. 5, Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 55-5.)
Further, the Coventry
School Superintendent — someone West has not alleged to have
a politic bias — first raised the maintenance of effort issue;
he requested that RIDE look into the Town’s funding of the
school system. (Id.) The Town’s investigation into the issue
commenced after this request.
No. 52-7.)
(See Ex. 5, Defs.’ MSJ, ECF
And West has presented no evidence to suggest
that politics, as opposed to West’s position as the Town’s
Finance Director when the funding issue occurred, caused the
18
investigation to explore West’s conduct.
To be sure, West
believes that the Almonte Report got it wrong.
But even if
West is correct and the Town erred, the error does not alone
violate West’s due process rights.
See Chmielinski, 513 F.3d
at 318 (“[The employee] may disagree with the exercise of
judgment which led to the imposed penalty of termination of
his employment, but that does not state a due process concern
arising out of the hearing itself.”); Acosta-Sepulveda, 889
F.2d at 12 (In procedural due process claims, “[t]he alleged
procedural fault cannot be the examiner’s failure to reach
the right result.”).
West must present some evidence that
the errors could be explained only by bias.
F. App’x at 19.
See Jackson, 264
West’s evidence at summary judgment does not
approach this showing.
IV.
Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: January 11, 2016
19
Defendants’
Motion
for
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