Mendonca v. City of Providence et al
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 34 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 35 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 3/15/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
LUIS MENDONCA,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) C.A. No. 12-850-S
)
CITY OF PROVIDENCE, through its
)
Finance Director, MICHAEL PEARIS; )
PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT;
)
CHIEF DEAN ESSERMAN;
)
ROBERT DECARLO; FRANK NEWTON;
)
EVERETT CARVALHO;
)
MARGARET SCHLAGETER;
)
MATTHEW MULLIGAN;
)
ROBERT MALAVAGNO;
)
PAUL A. RENZI; CLIFFORD JONES;
)
JAMES GRENNAN; JANE DOE OFFICER;
)
JOHN DOE OFFICER;
)
RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN,
)
through its President, John Maeda; )
JUSTIN WALL; WILLIAM LAPIERRE;
)
JANE DOE OFFICER,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
This case arises out of the 2009 arrest of Plaintiff Luis
Mendonca,
during
which
he
was
officer, leaving him in a coma.
motions
for
summary
judgment:
struck
by
a
Providence
Police
Now before the Court are two
the
Rhode
Island
School
of
Design’s (“RISD”) Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims
asserted against it and its public safety officers Justin Wall
and William LaPierre (ECF No. 35), and the City of Providence’s
(the “City”) and Providence Police Officers’ (“PPD Defendants”)
Motion
for
Partial
Summary
Judgment
(ECF
No.
34).
For
the
reasons set forth below, both motions are GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
I.
Background
The
series
of
events
that
led
to
Mendonca’s
arrest,
assault, and hospitalization began on September 22, 2009.
that
date,
RISD
public
safety
officials,
including
On
LaPierre,
began investigating a theft of a student’s phone from the RISD
library.
ECF
No.
(RISD’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 4-5,
36.)
Mendonca
was
identified
by
the
victim
as
a
participant in the theft and seen in library video footage on
the night of the theft.
(Id. ¶¶ 4-7.)
On October 20, 2009, Mendonca again tried to enter the RISD
library.
attempts
(Id. ¶ 16.)
to
gain
An employee recognized him from prior
unauthorized
notified RISD public safety.
access
to
RISD
buildings
(Id. ¶¶ 10-14; 16-18.)
and
Wall, on
patrol that evening, received the dispatch relating to Mendonca.
(Id. ¶ 21.)
The dispatch stated that a larceny suspect was in
the area and provided a description of the suspect.
22.)
Shortly
thereafter,
Wall
passed
Mendonca,
believed fit the description in the dispatch.
The
parties
happened next.
provide
vastly
(Id. ¶¶ 21-
different
who
Wall
(Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)
accounts
of
what
Since this order considers RISD and the City’s
2
motions, the Court must resolve these disputed facts in favor of
Mendonca, the non-moving party.
upon
identifying
him,
nearly hitting him.
drove
Mendonca asserts that Wall,
his
car
full
speed
at
(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 6, ECF No. 40.)
Mendonca,
When Wall
exited his vehicle, Wall grabbed Mendonca by the shirt, slammed
him against Wall’s vehicle, told him to shut up, asked him for
an ID, and inquired if he had any weapons.
(Id. ¶ 6.)
Wall
then handcuffed Mendonca and ordered him to sit on the curb.
(Id.
¶
10;
RISD’s
SUF
¶
27,
ECF
No.
36.)
During
this
interaction, Mendonca claims he complied with Wall’s requests
and that Wall initiated any contact that occurred between the
two men.
(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 11, ECF No. 40.)
LaPierre arrived at the scene after Wall placed Mendonca in
handcuffs.
(RISD’s SUF ¶¶ 28-30, ECF No. 36.)
He instructed
Wall to remove the handcuffs and told Mendonca he was free to
leave.
36.)
(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 17, ECF No. 40; RISD’s SUF ¶ 38, ECF No.
During this interaction, LaPierre also recognized Mendonca
as a suspect in the September 2009 phone larceny and asked for
the Providence Police (“PPD”) to respond to the scene.
(RISD’s
SUF ¶¶ 35-36, ECF No. 36.)
Mendonca did not linger with the RISD officers.
He began
to walk away, but turned to see one officer lunging at him.
(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 19, ECF No. 40; RISD’s SUF ¶¶ 39-40, ECF No. 36.)
No physical contact resulted.
(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 19, ECF No. 40.)
3
Mendonca then began to run from Wall and LaPierre and the two
RISD officers pursued him.
(Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 19-20, 22, ECF No. 40;
RISD’s SUF ¶¶ 39, 41, 44, ECF No. 36.)
At
some
point,
various
members
of
the
PPD
joined
the
pursuit, though the parties never specify which of the twelve
officers named in the Complaint participated.
ECF No. 34-1.)
(City’s SUF ¶ 3,
The search party eventually located Mendonca
under a vehicle behind a property on Benefit Street.
(Pl.’s SUF
¶ 25, ECF No. 40; City’s SUF ¶ 3, ECF No. 34-1; RISD’s SUF ¶ 52,
ECF
No.
36.)
PPD
Officer
Frank
Newton
and
Wall
extracted
Mendonca from under the car, at which point Mendonca asserts
Newton assaulted him.
(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 25, ECF No. 40; RISD’s SUF
¶¶ 53, 55, ECF No. 36.) 1
Then, an undisclosed member of the PPD
handcuffed Mendonca, and Newton, with Wall’s assistance, began
to escort Mendonca to a PPD cruiser.
(RISD’s SUF ¶¶ 56-57, ECF
No. 36.)
Mendonca,
however,
never
made
it
to
the
cruiser.
PPD
Officer Robert DeCarlo intercepted the three men and proceeded
to
strike
flashlight.
Mendonca
several
times
in
the
head
with
his
(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 26, ECF No. 40; RISD’s SUF ¶ 57-58,
1
The parties disagree over how Mendonca was “extracted”
from under the vehicle.
RISD asserts that Wall and Newton had
to physically remove Mendonca.
(RISD’s SUF ¶ 55, ECF No. 36.)
Mendonca, however, testified that he voluntarily gave himself up
to police when the PPD discovered him.
(Pl.’s Dep. 155:22157:4, Ex. A to RISD’s SUF, ECF No. 35-2.)
4
ECF No. 36.)
blows.
Mendonca sustained severe injuries from DeCarlo’s
(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 30, ECF No. 40.)
Shortly
charged
after
Mendonca
the
with
October
two
20,
counts
of
2009
incident,
assault
the
relating
City
to
his
interaction with the RISD public safety officers and with one
count of resisting arrest.
(City’s SUF ¶ 4, ECF No. 34-1.)
The
City dismissed the resisting arrest charge prior to trial. 2
The
City,
however,
successfully
tried
and
convicted
Mendonca
in
Rhode Island District Court for assaulting Wall and LaPierre.
(Id.)
Mendonca appealed both convictions to the Superior Court.
The parties resolved the appeal in January 2015, when Mendonca
pled nolo contendere to an amended charge of disorderly conduct.
(Id.)
The assault charges were dismissed pursuant to R.I. R.
Crim. P. 48(a).
Mendonca
commenced
this
civil
action
in
Rhode
Island
Superior Court on October 12, 2012 and Defendants removed the
case to this Court.
(ECF No. 1.)
On March 3, 2013, this Court
dismissed all claims against the PPD (ECF No. 15), and on May
28, 2013, the Court dismissed Counts V and VI against former
Police Chief Dean Esserman (ECF No. 21).
The City and RISD
filed the present motions on August 14, 2015 and August 21,
2
In is his brief, Mendonca asserted that he was not charged
with resisting arrest until 60 days after his arrest.
(Pl.’s
Opp’n to the City’s Mot. 4, ECF No. 38.) At oral argument, the
parties agreed that this was incorrect.
The PPD charged him
with resisting arrest the day after his arrest.
5
2015, respectively.
(ECF Nos. 34 and 35.)
Oral arguments were
held on November 20, 2015.
II.
Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
Fed. R.
An issue of fact is only considered “‘genuine’
if it ‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’”
Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting
Maldonado-Denis
Cir. 1994)).
court
must
v.
Castillo-Rodriguez,
23
F.3d
576,
581
(1st
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
“examine[]
flattering
to
the
inferences
in
that
the
entire
nonmovant
party’s
record
the
indulg[e]
and
‘in
all
favor.’”
Id.
at
light
most
reasonable
959
(quoting
Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581).
III. RISD’s Motion
Mendonca
public
safety
brings
five
officers:
claims
Count
II
against
RISD
asserts
an
and
the
excessive
RISD
force
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wall and LaPierre; Count IV
asserts
a
common
law
failure
to
train
and
supervise
claim
against RISD; Count V alleges that Wall and LaPierre were part
of a civil conspiracy violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count XI
alleges a common law false imprisonment claim against Wall and
LaPierre;
Count
XII
alleges
common
6
law
assault
and
battery
claims against Wall; and Count XIII alleges common law assault
and battery claims against LaPierre.
RISD, Wall, and LaPierre
have
all
moved
for
summary
judgment
on
claims.
The
Court
considers each claim in turn.
A.
Count II and Count V: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against
Wall and LaPierre
RISD principally argues that Counts II and V fail because
RISD’s public safety officers did not operate under the color of
state law, and, thus, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to Wall’s
and LaPierre’s conduct.
RISD is correct.
To make out a viable
§ 1983 claim against a private entity, a plaintiff must show (1)
that the conduct complained of transpired under color of state
law, and (2)
ensued.
that
a
deprivation
of
federally
secured
rights
Klunder v. Brown Univ., 778 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2015)
(“Klunder
II”).
Defendants
fail
Mendonca’s
on
the
§
first
1983
claims
element,
against
negating
the
the
RISD
need
to
consider the second.
Courts
recognize
three
tests
for
determining
conduct transpired under the color of state law.
parties
agree
that
the
so
function test applies here. 3
called
“public”
or
if
private
Id.
The
“exclusive”
Under this test, a private entity
3
The other two tests are the “state compulsion test” and
“nexus/joint action test.” Klunder v. Brown Univ., 778 F.3d 24,
30-31 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Klunder II”).
Conduct implicates the
state compulsion test when the state “has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
7
operates under the color of state law when it performs a “public
function that has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state.”
Id. at 31 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Both the Supreme Court and First Circuit have
explicitly
open
left
whether,
and
in
security forces constitute state actors.
what
context,
private
Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 n.14 (1978); Klunder II, 778 F.3d at
30 n.5.
Other courts, however, have considered the subject and
have held that private security officers act under the color of
state law where they are “endowed by law with plenary police
powers such that they are de facto police officers.”
Romanski
v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005).
Generally,
this
requires
two
things:
(1)
that
a
government
entity grant authority to a private security force; and (2) that
the authority include at least one power exclusively reserved
for the state.
Romanski
requirements.
See id.
provides
a
good
illustration
of
these
There, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a
private casino security guard acted under the color of state law
overt or covert, that the [challenged conduct] must in law be
deemed to be that of the State.”
Id. at 30.
The nexus/joint
action test “deems a private party a state actor where an
examination of the totality of the circumstances reveals that
the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint
participant [in the challenged activity].” Id. at 30-31.
The
parties do not argue that either of these tests is applicable
here.
8
when she detained a patron for violating a casino policy.
Id.
The court noted that security guards typically have many powers
commonly associated with police, such as the power to detain
trespassers and shoplifters, the ability to carry a firearm, and
the ability to use the firearm in self-defense.
Id. at 637-38.
These, however, are not powers exclusively held by the state;
they are powers that the common law and federal constitution
also
grant
to
private
entities
through
doctrines
like
the
shopkeepers’ privilege, and the rights to effectuate citizens’
arrests, to self-defense and to bear arms.
Id.
Accordingly,
they are not powers that, alone, make a private security guard a
state actor.
Id.
The court, however, went on to note that the
security guard was also licensed under a Michigan statute that
granted her “the authority to arrest a person without a warrant
as set forth for public peace officers.”
Id. at 638.
The court
held that this “plenary arrest power” exceeded the authority the
common law bestows on private entities and individuals; it was
power traditionally held exclusively by the police.
Thus, the
guard acted under the color of state law and the patron who was
detained could sustain a § 1983 claim.
Detroit
Entm’t,
LLC,
484
F.3d
824,
Id.; cf. Lindsey v.
829-30
(6th
Cir.
2007)
(casino security guard did not act under color of state law
where the guard was not licensed under Michigan law and, thus,
did not have plenary arrest authority).
9
Numerous other cases
have
reached
the
same
conclusion
as
Romanski,
holding
that
private security guards become state actors, for the purpose of
§ 1983’s exclusive function test, only with some sort of state
or municipal authorization of plenary police powers. 4
Both RISD and Mendonca rely heavily on Klunder v. Trs. &
Fellows of the Coll. or Univ. in the English Colony of Rhode
Island & Providence Plantations, in New England, in Am., C.A.
No. 10-410 ML, 2011 WL 2790178 (D.R.I. July 13, 2011) (“Klunder
I”).
There, the plaintiff argued that Brown University’s police
force constituted a state actor under § 1983 as a matter of law.
Id. at *1, *4.
First, he noted that Brown’s police force was
See Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184
F.3d 623, 628-30 (7th Cir. 1999) (private hospital security
guard acted under the color of law where city ordinance conveyed
“all of the powers of the regular police patrol” to the guards);
Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983, 994-95 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(University of Chicago police acted under the color of state law
where a state statute granted them “the powers of municipal
peace officers and county sheriffs” and the officers exercised
these powers); Scott v. Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 98 C 6614,
1999 WL 134059, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1999) (“By virtue of
the [state] statute,” which “delegated [campus police] the same
powers
as
municipal
officers
but
with
a
more-limited
jurisdiction, . . . the [campus] police force was transformed
from mere private security guards” into state actors.); cf. Wade
v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (private security guard at
a public housing complex did not act under the color of state
law where the geographic scope of his authority was limited to
the lobby of the complex and his powers — the right to
effectuate a citizens’ arrest, carry a handgun, and use deadly
force in self-defense — were not exclusively reserved for
police); Faiaz v. Colgate Univ., 64 F. Supp. 3d 336, 350-51
(N.D.N.Y. 2014) (unlike other private university security
officers in New York, Colgate’s security officers were not
deputized under state law and thus did not act under the color
of state law).
4
10
the only non-governmental entity whose agents were defined as
“peace officers” by state statute (R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-21).
Id. at *5.
Then the plaintiff cited Brown’s website, on which
the university publicized its police force as licensed Rhode
Island special state police officers who were required to attend
a
state
certified
police
academy,
carry
authorized to enforce state statutes.
Id.
firearms,
and
were
The court, however,
denied Plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of whether the
security officers acted under the color of state law.
While
Brown was bestowed with state authority, the court held that
questions of fact existed as to whether Brown actually exercised
plenary police powers (that would fall under § 1983) or just
police-like powers (that would not).
Id. at *7. 5
Mendonca argues that, under Klunder I, his § 1983 claims
should survive because questions of fact exist as to whether
Wall
and
LaPierre
detained Mendonca.
exercised
plenary
police
powers
when
they
(Pl.’s Opp’n to RISD’s Mot. 4, ECF No. 39.)
Mendonca’s argument, however, puts the proverbial cart before
the
horse.
As
even
the
cases
on
which
Mendonca
relies
demonstrate, the Court need not reach the questions of whether
an entity exercised plenary police powers unless the private
security forces have received the powers from some sort of state
5
The First Circuit affirmed the decision and declined to
determine if Brown’s security force was a state actor under §
1983. Klunder II, 778 F.3d at 30 n.5.
11
or
municipal
(university
grant.
officers
Klunder
deputized
I,
2011
municipal
WL
2790178
officers
under
at
*5
Rhode
Island law); Romanski, 428 F.3d at 637-38 (casino security guard
licensed under a Michigan statute); Payton v. Rush-PresbyterianSt.
Luke’s
Ctr.,
184
police
(hospital
Med.
F.3d
force
deputized
623,
628-30
as
(7th
municipal
Cir.
1999)
officers
under
city ordinance); Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983, 994-95
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (university police force granted plenary police
power under state statute); Scott v. Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, No.
98
C
6614,
(same).
1999
WL
134059,
at
*5
(N.D.
Ill.
Mar.
8,
1999)
Here, there is no dispute that Wall and LaPierre were
not authorized peace officers under Rhode Island law in 2009.6
And Mendonca has presented no other evidence that RISD officers
operated under another state or municipal grant of authority.
Unlike
element
in
Klunder,
for
his
Mendonca
§
1983
has
claims
not
established
against
Wall
a
threshold
and
LaPierre,
entitling RISD to summary judgment on Counts II and V.
B.
Count IV:
Failure to Train Against RISD
The Court need not linger on Mendonca’s failure to train
claim.
For
any
claim
at
summary
judgment,
the
burden
of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
initially rests with the moving party.
6
Nat’l Amusements, Inc.
In 2013 RISD public safety officers became authorized
peace officers like Brown’s officers. See R.I. Gen. Laws 12-721(22).
12
v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995).
the
moving
contradict
party
has
the
met
showing
this
by
burden,
“the
pointing
to
But once
nonmovant
specific
must
facts
demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue.” Id.
(citing
Celotex
Corp.
v.
Catrett,
477
U.S.
317,
324
(1986)
(emphasis added)).
Here, RISD points to record evidence that Wall and LaPierre
received training.
(Ex. B to RISD’s SUF 6-2 – 6-5, ECF No. 35-
3; LaPierre Dep. 124:18-125:25, Ex. C to RISD’s SUF, ECF No. 354.)
Mendonca
does
not
dispute
this
evidence,
nor
does
he
present evidence that would suggest this training was deficient.
Indeed, Mendonca’s statement of undisputed facts is completely
silent on the training RISD provided – or failed to provide –
its officers.
(See Pl.’s SUF, ECF No. 40.)
not
any
point
to
evidence
call
into
or
raise
question
any
the
And Mendonca does
arguments
adequacy
of
in
his
Opposition
that
RISD’s
training.
Thus, Mendonca has not established that sufficient
evidence exists for a jury to find in his favor on Count IV,
entitling RISD to summary judgment.
See DeNovellis v. Shalala,
124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322–325).
13
C.
Count XI:
LaPierre
False Imprisonment Claim Against Wall and
To prevail on his false imprisonment claim, Mendonca must
show that (1) Wall and LaPierre intended to confine him; (2)
Mendonca was conscious of the confinement; (3) Mendonca did not
consent
to
otherwise
the
confinement;
privileged;
legal justification.
and
(4)
(5)
the
Mendonca
confinement
was
was
detained
not
without
Illas v. Przybyla, 850 A.2d 937, 942 n.4
(R.I. 2004); Dyson v. City of Pawtucket, 670 A.2d 233, 238-39
(R.I. 1996).
The Court finds that questions of fact exist as to
whether Wall falsely imprisoned Mendonca, but none exist as to
LaPierre.
RISD
argues
that
Mendonca’s
claim
fails
against
because Wall was justified in detaining Mendonca.
Supp. Mot. 16-17, ECF No. 35-1.)
Wall
(RISD Mem.
Though case law in Rhode
Island is sparse, generally, a private person is justified in
arresting another for a criminal offense “if an act or omission
constituting
a
felony
has
been
committed
and
the
actor
reasonably suspects that the other has committed such act or
omission.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 119 (1965); see In
re Paul F., 543 A.2d 255, 257 (R.I. 1988) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 119 at 194 (1965) with approval).
Further,
at least one Rhode Island court has held a citizen’s arrest
lawful
where
a
reliable
source
14
informed
the
citizen
that
an
individual would commit a felony.
F.
Supp.
411,
jurisdiction
415
(D.R.I.
effectuated
See Monteiro v. Howard, 334
1971)
a
(police
lawful
officer
citizen’s
outside
arrest
when
his
he
detained an individual based on information he received from a
reliable informant that the individual would be committing a
felony).
the
But regardless of the justification for the arrest,
method
for
circumstances.
effectuating
it
must
be
reasonable
under
the
See In re Paul F., 543 A.2d at 257.
Here, questions of fact exist as to the reasonableness of
Wall’s
detention
Mendonca
of
testified
Mendonca.
—
that
If
Wall
the
events
charged
unfolded
Mendonca
with
as
his
vehicle, threw him against the hood, told Mendonca to shut up,
and then placed him in handcuffs — jurors could disagree as to
the reasonableness of Wall’s means of detention.
Accordingly,
Wall is not entitled to summary judgment on Count XI.
On
the
LaPierre’s
concedes
other
hand,
involvement
that
when
no
in
LaPierre
questions
Mendonca’s
arrived
of
fact
detention.
on
the
scene,
ordered Wall to take the handcuffs off Mendonca.
16-18, ECF No. 40.)
told
Mendonca
he
remain
as
to
Mendonca
LaPierre
(Pl.’s SUF ¶¶
Then, after ordering his release, LaPierre
was
free
to
go.
(Id.)
Based
on
these
undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could find that LaPierre
15
intended
to
confine
Mendonca,
and
LaPierre
is
entitled
to
summary judgment on Count XI. 7
D.
Count XII and XIII:
Assault
Against Wall and LaPierre
and
Battery
Claims
For Mendonca’s assault claims to survive summary judgment,
he must present evidence that Wall and/or LaPierre (1) intended
to
cause
a
harmful
or
offensive
contact
with
Mendonca
or
intended to cause an imminent apprehension of such a contact;
and (2) that Mendonca suffered such an imminent apprehension.
See
Restatement
(Second)
of
Torts
§
21
(1965);
Broadley
v.
State, 939 A.2d 1016, 1021 (R.I. 2008); Webbier v. Thoroughbred
Racing Protective Bureau, Inc., 254 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I. 1969).
Mendonca’s
battery
claims
require
“the
consummation
of
the
assault,” meaning that the RISD defendants caused an offensive
or unconsented touching of Mendonca’s body.
Picard v. Barry
Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 654 A.2d 690, 694 (R.I. 1995).
RISD concedes that Wall’s conduct meets the elements of an
assault and battery.
claims
should
be
Nevertheless, it argues that Mendonca’s
dismissed
because
response to Mendonca’s conduct.
Wall
acted
reasonably
in
As detailed above, there are
questions of fact as to the reasonableness of Wall’s actions.
7
Mendonca seems to concede this point in his Opposition in
that LaPierre’s name is conspicuously absent from Mendonca’s
false
imprisonment
argument,
focusing
entirely
on
Wall’s
conduct. (Pl.’s Opp’n 6-7, ECF No. 39.)
16
Thus, RISD’s motion as to Count XII – the Assault and Battery
claim against Wall – is denied.
Mendonca’s claim against LaPierre is a closer call.
For
the assault claim, Mendonca asserts LaPierre lunged at him and
chased him despite telling Mendonca he was free to go.
(Pl.’s
SUF ¶ 19, ECF No. 40; RISD SUF ¶¶ 39, 44, 50-52, ECF No. 36.)
Based
on
this
evidence,
Mendonca’s
LaPierre should go to the jury.
assault
claim
against
On the other hand, for his
battery claim, Mendonca presents no evidence that LaPierre ever
made contact with him.
Since this is an essential element of
battery, Mendonca’s battery claim against LaPierre fails as a
matter of law.
RISD’s motion as to Count XIII, therefore, is
granted as to the battery claim but denied as to the assault
claim.
IV.
Providence’s Motion
The City and PPD Defendants move for summary judgment on
four of the seven claims Mendonca asserts against them: Count
III, Mendonca’s failure to train claim against the City; Count
V, Mendonca’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Conspiracy claim against
the PPD Defendants; Count VIII, Mendonca’s malicious prosecution
claim against the City and the PPD Defendants; and Count X,
Mendonca’s false imprisonment claim against the City and the PPD
Defendants.
The Court considers each claim below.
17
A.
Count III:
City
Failure to Train and Supervise Against the
It is unclear whether Mendonca brings a negligent training
claim or a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The
Court, however, need not resolve this issue because the City is
entitled to summary judgment regardless.
waiver hangs heavy over this claim.
First, the specter of
Mendonca did not oppose the
City’s Motion in his brief, and did little to articulate his
opposition at oral argument.
This alone provides a basis for
granting the City summary judgment.
See Schneider v. Local 103
I.B.E.W. Health Plan, 442 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006) (“It is
well-established
that
issues
adverted
to
in
a
perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,
are
deemed
waived.”
(internal
citation
and
quotation
marks
omitted)).
Yet more damning is Mendonca’s lack of evidence.
He has
pointed to nothing in the record that even references the PPD’s
training
policies,
procedures,
or
protocols.
Nor
has
he
presented evidence as to the specific training the individual
PPD Defendants may or may not have participated in.
Thus, there
is no evidence in the record to support a failure to train claim
under either § 1983 or the common law, entitling the City to
summary judgment on Count III.
18
B.
Count V:
Civil Conspiracy Under § 1983 Against all
the PPD Defendants
Mendonca’s civil conspiracy claim suffers the same fate as
his
failure
to
train
claim.
His
Opposition
does
not
even
mention the claim, much less develop an argument as to why it
should go to the jury.
And Mendonca has presented no evidence
to suggest that a conspiracy existed between the PPD Defendants
to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
On either basis,
the City is entitled to summary judgment.
C.
Counts VIII and X:
Malicious Prosecution and False
Imprisonment Against the City and PPD Defendants
The
fate
of
Mendonca’s
false
imprisonment
and
malicious
prosecution claims depends on whether the PPD Defendants had
probable cause to arrest and charge Mendonca in conjunction with
the events of October 20, 2009.
See Beaudoin v. Levesque, 697
A.2d 1065, 1067 (R.I. 1997) (“Probable cause in our law is a
necessary
element
in
false
arrest,
false
imprisonment,
and
malicious prosecution claims.”); Vigeant v. United States, 462
F. Supp. 2d 221, 227 (D.R.I. 2006) aff’d, 245 F. App’x 23 (1st
Cir. 2007)(same (collecting cases)).
The PPD Defendants argue
that no questions of fact exist on this point: (1) they had
probable
arrest,
cause
and
conviction
to
arrest
regardless,
for
and
(2)
assaulting
charge
they
Wall
19
Mendonca
claim
and
with
Mendonca’s
LaPierre
resisting
subsequent
demonstrates
the
existence of probable cause as a matter of law.
The Court is
not persuaded by either of the City’s arguments.
Probable cause is “a common sense, nontechnical conception
that
deals
with
the
factual
and
practical
considerations
of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.”
United States v. Vongkaysone, 434 F.3d 68,
73-74 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d
190, 198 n.11 (1st Cir. 1997)).
It “depends upon the reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting
officer at the time of the arrest.”
U.S. 146, 152 (2004).
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
Accordingly, a probable cause inquiry
starts with what the relevant actors knew at the time of arrest
or charge, see Fernandez-Salicrup v. Figueroa-Sancha, 790 F.3d
312, 324 (1st Cir. 2015), and turns on whether the information
amounted to “information upon which a reasonably prudent person
would
believe
crime.”
the
suspect
had
committed
or
was
committing
a
United States v. Vongkaysone, 434 F.3d at 73 (quoting
United States v. Young, 105 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997)).
1.
The
City
Mendonca’s Malicious Prosecution Claim
argues
that
it
had
probable
cause
to
charge
Mendonca with resisting arrest – and, thus, probable cause to
defeat Mendonca’s malicious prosecution claim - because:
[T]he plaintiff does not dispute that he ran from a
Providence police officer (Defendant Newton), failed
to stop as demanded, hid under an automobile, failed
20
to remove himself from that hidden position despite
being ordered to do so by Newton, to the point where
he had to be physically removed, by Newton and others,
from that hiding place. One would be hard-pressed to
suggest that that does not amount to probable cause to
charge resisting arrest.
(City’s Reply 2, ECF No. 42.)
flaws.
First,
even
if
the
This assertion suffers from two
facts
recounted
above
establish
probable cause (as they probably do), the City does not cite any
evidence to support its assertions.
Neither in its brief nor
Statement of Undisputed Facts does the City reference deposition
testimony, affidavits, or other documents that might support its
version of Mendonca’s arrest.
Instead, the City’s only evidence
is admissions in Mendonca’s Complaint that Mendonca “was pursued
by . . . various members of the Providence Police Department,”
“was found hiding beneath or partially beneath a motor vehicle,”
and “was arrested.”
(The City’s SUF ¶ 3, ECF No. 34-1.)
These
assertions do not suggest, as the City argues, that Mendonca
knew he was being pursued by the PPD, ignored the PPD’s demands
to stop running, or failed to remove himself from his hiding
place despite being ordered to do so.
Second,
Mendonca
the
resisted
City’s
arrest
claim
is
that
it
incorrect.
is
At
undisputed
his
that
deposition,
Mendonca testified that when he became aware of the PPD, he
complied with their requests.
(See Pl.’s Dep. 155:22-157:4, Ex.
A to RISD’s SUF, ECF No. 35-2.)
21
A trier of fact could, of
course, discredit Mendonca’s testimony and credit any testimony
the
City
presents
from
its
officers.
At
summary
judgment,
however, the Court must resolve disputed facts in Mendonca’s
favor.
Consequently,
and
particularly
based
on
the
record
before the Court, questions of fact exist as to whether the PPD
had probable cause to charge Mendonca with resisting arrest.
The
City
also
argues
that
it
is
entitled
to
summary
judgment on Mendonca’s malicious prosecution claim as a matter
of law because Mendonca was convicted on another charge relating
to the events of October 20, 2009.
In support of this argument,
the
under
City
correctly
states
that,
Rhode
Island
law,
a
conviction, even if reversed on appeal, is conclusive evidence
of probable cause for that particular charge.
Gawel,
37
F.3d
1484
(1st
Cir.
1994)
See Yates v.
(unpublished)
(probable
cause defeated malicious prosecution claim because plaintiff had
“previously been found guilty of the criminal charge in question
after trial in the Rhode Island District Court . . . [e]ven
though this verdict was reversed after a jury trial in the Rhode
Island Superior Court” (emphasis added)); Nagy v. McBurney, 392
A.2d 365, 368 (R.I. 1978) (same).
Under this rule, the City
would be entitled to summary judgment had Mendonca brought a
malicious
prosecution
claim
for
the
charges
on
which
he
was
convicted – assault against Wall and LaPierre – even if that
charge was overturned on appeal.
22
Mendonca, however, bases his
malicious
prosecution
claim
on
the
City’s
resisting
charge, a charge the City dismissed before trial.
arrest
None of the
cases the City cites consider this precise issue and the Court
has found no Rhode Island authority on point.
Perhaps
recognizing
this
dearth
of
authority,
the
City
directs the Court to the “related crimes doctrine” for support.
The doctrine, under both Rhode Island and federal law, relates
to arrests.
It posits that there is probable cause for an
arrest if it exists for some crime, even if it was not the crime
initially charged.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-5 (“If a lawful cause
of arrest exists, the arrest shall be lawful even though the
officer
made
the
arrest
on
an
improper
ground.”);
see
also
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. at 152–54; United States v. Jones,
432 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) (it is irrelevant what crime is
cited during the arrest because “[i]f, on the facts known to the
arresting officers, there was probable cause to believe [the
defendant]
valid”).
was
committing
another
crime,
the
arrest
[is]
The City asserts that the Court should extend the
doctrine to prosecutors who bring more than one charge against a
defendant in the same criminal proceeding.
According to the
City, if a prosecutor has probable cause to charge an individual
with one crime, he or she has probable cause for all other
charges.
23
A number of courts have rejected the City’s argument and
this
Court
does
the
same.
“[I]n
contrast
to
false-arrest
claims, probable cause as to one charge will not bar a malicious
prosecution claim based on a second, distinct charge as to which
probable cause was lacking.”
Elmore v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
605 F. App’x 906, 915 (11th Cir. 2015); Holmes v. Vill. of
Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007); Johnson v.
Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 2007); Posr v. Doherty, 944
F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991).
As the Seventh Circuit explained,
when an individual is arrested, the seizure is the same whether
the arrest was based on one or multiple grounds; but once an
individual
is
prosecuted,
additional
costs
and
each
burdens.
additional
Holmes,
charge
511
F.3d
imposes
at
682.
Moreover, while the First Circuit has not definitively ruled on
the subject, it has acknowledged this trend in other circuits.
See Rivera-Marcano v. Normeat Royal Dane Quality A/S, 998 F.2d
34, 38 (1st Cir. 1993).
Based on this case law – particularly without any contrary
authority
from
conviction
for
the
Rhode
assault
Island
does
not
Supreme
entitle
Court
the
–
City
Mendonca’s
to
judgment on Mendonca’s malicious prosecution claim. 8
8
summary
And, as
Of course, this is not to say that dismissal of a criminal
charge prior to trial is evidence of a malicious prosecution.
It is not. Plaintiffs must still establish that law enforcement
lacked probable cause to charge an individual with the crime
24
noted above, the City has not presented sufficient evidence to
show no questions of fact exist as to the existence of probable
cause for the resisting arrest charge.
Thus, the City’s motion
is denied as to Count VIII.
2.
Mendonca’s False Imprisonment/False Arrest Claim
Regarding probable cause for Mendonca’s false imprisonment
claim, as noted above, both Rhode Island and federal law treat
arrests and charges differently.
While neither has extended the
“related crimes doctrine” to charges, they both have done so for
arrests.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-5; Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at
152–54.
Accordingly,
Providence
Police
“it
is
Department
irrelevant”
cited
during
what
the
crime
arrest
the
because
“[i]f, on the facts known to the arresting officers, there was
probable
cause
to
believe
[Mendonca]
crime, the arrest [is] valid.”
was
committing
another
Jones, 432 F.3d at 41 (emphasis
added).
Here,
conviction
the
City
establishes
again
argues
probable
(City’s Reply 3, ECF No. 42.)
that
cause
for
Mendonca’s
assault
Mendonca’s
arrest.
It argues that the conviction
should establish probable cause for any arrest - regardless of
the actual crime cited during the arrest - as a matter of law
that was ultimately dismissed.
The Court merely declines to
hold that, as a matter of law, a conviction on one charge
imputes probable cause to other charges dismissed prior to
trial.
25
under the related crimes doctrine.
The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, however, has rejected this argument on multiple occasions
when
determining
imprisonment
whether
claims.
distinguishing
probable
Dyson,
between
670
cause
for
false
at
239
(expressly
imprisonment
false
A.2d
exists
and
malicious
prosecution claims and holding that the “[g]uilt or innocence of
the underlying charge . . . is not relevant to the determination
of
whether
the
arresting
officer
committed
a
false
imprisonment.” (quoting Moody v. McElroy, 513 A.2d 5, 10 (R.I.
1986))).
In
light
of
this,
the
City
must
point
to
evidence
sufficient to show it had probable cause to arrest Mendonca –
something the City has failed to do for both resisting arrest
and
assault.
The
Court
detailed
the
City’s
relating to the resisting arrest charge above.
deficiencies
For the assault
charge, the record is completely silent on whether, at the time
of the arrest, the PPD knew of the alleged assault on the RISD
officers.
the
PPD
The only evidence before the Court is that RISD told
of
Mendonca’s
suspected
larceny
and
flight.
(See
LaPierre Dep. 50:13-20, Ex. C to RISD’s SUF, ECF No. 35-4.)
The
evidence says nothing of an assault on the RISD officers.
The
First Circuit has recently emphasized the impropriety of summary
judgment in circumstance like this where “the record is silent
as to whether or not [the arresting officers] knew [the facts
26
giving rise to probable cause] at the time she arrested [the
defendant].”
Fernandez-Salicrup, 790 F.3d at 324 (emphasis in
original).
The
City’s
Motion
as
to
Mendonca’s
false
imprisonment claim is, therefore, denied.
V.
Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
RISD’s
Motion
for
Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Summary
The Court
GRANTS RISD’s Motion as to Count II (excessive force under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Wall and LaPierre), Count IV (failure to
train
against
RISD),
and
Count
V
(civil
U.S.C. § 1983 against Wall and LaPierre).
conspiracy
under
42
The Court also GRANTS
IN PART RISD’s Motion as to Counts XI (False Imprisonment) and
XIII
(assault
and
battery
against
LaPierre).
Count
XI
is
granted as to LaPierre, but denied as to Wall; Count XIII is
granted as to the Battery claim, but denied as to the assault
claim.
The Court DENIES RISD’s Motion as to Count XI (False
Imprisonment against Wall) and Count XII (Assault and Battery
against Wall).
The City and PPD Defendants’ Motion is also GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
The Court GRANTS the Motion as to Count III
(failure to train against the City of Providence), and Count V
(civil
conspiracy
Defendants).
The
under
42
U.S.C.
Court
DENIES
27
the
§
1983
Motion
against
as
to
the
Count
PPD
VIII
(malicious prosecution against the City and PPD Defendants) and
Count X (false imprisonment against the PPD Defendants).
Accordingly,
the
following
counts
will
proceed
to
trial
against the following Defendants:
•
Count
I,
Civil
Rights
Violation
under
42
U.S.C.
§
1983
against PPD Officer Robert DeCarlo;
•
Count VII, Assault and Battery against PPD Officer Robert
DeCarlo;
•
Count
VIII,
Malicious
Prosecution
against
the
City
of
Providence and PPD Defendants;
•
Count
IX,
Intentional
Infliction
of
Emotional
Distress
against PPD Officer Robert DeCarlo;
•
Count X, False Imprisonment Against the PPD Defendants;
•
Count XI, False Imprisonment against Wall;
•
Count XII, Assault and Battery against Wall;
•
Count XIII, Assault against LaPierre.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: March 15, 2016
28
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?